Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365

Section 42-365 permits alimony based on the parties’ relative incomes and contributions to the marriage even when the supported spouse has been gainfully employed.

Schmidt v. Parkert · filed 2017-05-23

The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when the relative economic circumstances and the other criteria enumerated in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) make it appropriate. ... Given the parties’ current incomes and given Lana’s significant contributions to the marriage outside of her employment, we cannot say that the district court’s award of alimony is untenable or unreasonable.

Section 42-365 calls for courts deciding alimony to consider each party’s income and earning capacity and the general equities alongside the statutory criteria.

Becher v. Becher · filed 2017-06-06

In addition to the specific criteria listed in § 42-365, a court should consider the income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities before deciding whether to award alimony.

Section 42-365 calls for courts deciding alimony to consider the parties’ income and earning capacity and the general equities alongside its listed factors.

Holen v. Holen · filed 2017-12-12

In addition to the specific criteria listed in § 42-365, a court should consider the income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities. ... After a de novo review of the record and considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude the court’s award of nominal alimony was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 42-365 directs courts considering alimony to weigh the parties’ circumstances, the length of the marriage, their contributions, and the supported party’s ability to work while caring for minor children.

Wiedel v. Wiedel · filed 2018-05-18

In dividing property and considering alimony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of each party.

Section 42-365 requires courts considering alimony to weigh the parties’ circumstances, the length of the marriage, their contributions to it, and the supported party’s ability to work while caring for minor children.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2018-06-05

In considering alimony, a court should weigh four factors listed in § 42-365: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4) the ability of the party seeking support to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of each party. ... Based upon our de novo review of the factors set forth in § 42-365, the alimony award was not untenable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Myrna $1,500 in alimony for 96 months.

Section 42-365 permits an alimony award’s duration to be reduced to credit payments made under a prior decree that was later vacated.

Passauer v. Kelley · filed 2015-12-29

It was an abuse of discretion by the district court to not credit Samuel for alimony previously paid. Accordingly, we modify the alimony award’s duration from 60 months to 48 months.

Section 42-365 directs courts deciding alimony to consider the parties’ circumstances, the length of the marriage, their contributions, the recipient’s ability to work, and the parties’ income, earning capacity, and general equities.

Mitchell v. Mitchell · filed 2018-03-20

In addition to the specific criteria listed in § 42-365, a court should consider the income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities before deciding whether to award alimony. ... We find no plain error in the district court’s determination of alimony.

Section 42-365 permits reasonable alimony based on the parties’ circumstances, including the length of the marriage and their earning capacities.

Donahoe v. Donahoe · filed 2020-01-14

Here, the parties were married for 25 years and the evidence indicates a significant disparity in the circumstances of the parties. Lisa works as a school counselor and in 2016 earned a gross monthly income of approximately $5,600 and has a pension and healthcare provided for her through her employment. By comparison, Edward is self-employed and earned over $160,000 in 2016 as we articulated in a previous section of this opinion. The district court awarded Lisa alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for 60 months. After reviewing the record, we find the district court’s award of alimony was not untenable such as to deprive Edward of a substantial right or just result, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to Lisa.

Section 42-365 directs courts considering alimony to weigh the parties’ circumstances, the marriage’s duration, their contributions, and the supported party’s ability to work without interfering with the interests of minor children in either party’s custody.

Harms v. Harms · filed 2019-08-27

In considering alimony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of each party. § 42-365. ... Considering those same circumstances, and our standard of review, we determine that the award of alimony by the district court was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 42-365 requires courts considering alimony to weigh the listed criteria along with each party’s income and earning capacity and the general equities of the situation.

Nelson v. Richardson-Nelson · filed 2021-06-29

In addition to the specific criteria listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), a court should consider the income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities of the situation.

Section 42-365 permits alimony for continued support when the parties’ economic circumstances and the statutory factors make it appropriate.

Simons v. Simons · filed 2022-08-05

Under § 42-365, “The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when the relative economic circumstances and the other crite- ria enumerated in this section make it appropriate.” ... Under the evi- dence presented and arguments made, we cannot conclude that the court’s award of alimony was patently unfair.

Section 42-365 permits alimony that maintains a spouse’s marital standard of living while the spouse prepares to return to work, when the award is reasonable under the parties’ circumstances.

Brisso v. Brisso · filed 2022-04-12

Although the monthly alimony award provides significant time for Tracy to pursue her nursing license or other occupation and eventual employment while sustaining the standard of living Tracy and Mark established, it also provides some balance during the transitional years to allow Tracy to obtain the employment that she will need to sustain herself once the alimony award ends after six years. When considering these matters, and the factors related to an alimony award, we conclude that the district court’s alimony award was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 42-365 permits an alimony award that accounts for the recipient’s resources and ability to support herself.

Vargasfontanez v. Vargas · filed 2024-05-14

Although the length of marriage and disparity of incomes favors an award, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Samantha alimony of $1 per month. All of a party’s resources are relevant to their need for ali- mony.

Section 42-365 permits reasonable alimony based on the parties’ circumstances, contributions to the marriage, and ability to support themselves.

Stevison v. Stevison · filed 2023-01-31

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), “[t]he purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when the relative economic circumstances and the other criteria enumerated in this section make it appropriate.” ... Having considered the alimony factors and the limited evidence related to those factors, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award Nathan alimony.

Section 42-365 requires courts to consider the parties’ overall circumstances when deciding whether alimony is reasonable.

Deges v. Deges · filed 2023-06-13

Section 42-365 requires a court to consider the overall circumstances of the parties in making an alimony determination.

In considering alimony under § 42-365, courts should weigh each party’s income and earning capacity and the general equities alongside the statute’s listed factors.

Hollertz v. Robinson · filed 2025-04-01

In addition to the specific criteria listed in § 42-365, in dividing property and considering alimony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider the income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities of the situation.

Contributions to the marriage are one of several factors courts consider when awarding alimony under § 42-365.

Bennett v. Bennett · filed 2026-06-02

While the district court’s reasoning may not be untenable, contributions to the ... marriage is only one of the factors in § 42-365 that the district court regards.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause shown, which requires evidence of changed circumstances.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 1980-07-08

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1978) provides that “orders for alimony may be modified or revoked for good cause shown.” In order to warrant the modification of a decree of dissolution providing for the payment of alimony, there must be evidence of changed circumstances supporting such action. ... Considering the entire record, we agree with the trial court that there was no change in circumstances shown to support a conclusion that there was "good cause” to terminate, the payment of alimony.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause when circumstances have changed materially and substantially.

Chamberlin v. Chamberlin · filed 1980-07-29

There would seem to be little doubt that, under the above definition, a material change in circumstances since the entry of a divorce decree containing provisions for alimony, would constitute “good cause” for a modification of such original provisions. We emphasize, however, that it is not merely a change in circumstances that warrants such a modification, but only a change of circumstances of a material and substantial nature.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of unaccrued alimony for good cause, which may include a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Sloss v. Sloss · filed 1982-10-01

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1978) provides that except for amounts which have accrued prior to a petition to modify, orders for alimony may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... A material change in circumstances might constitute good cause for altering alimony provisions in a divorce decree. Not every change in circumstances warrants such modification, but only changes of circumstances which are material and substantial.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances; cohabitation without evidence of improved financial condition does not establish good cause.

Roth v. Roth · filed 1984-10-05

Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances, and depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. ... There is no evidence that the cohabitation of the respondent and Peter Ely “materially and substantially” improved her financial condition. ... The evidence fails to show a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, including a material change from business ownership to salaried employment.

Sholl v. Sholl · filed 1984-01-27

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1978) provides that, except for amounts which have accrued prior to the service of summons on the petition to modify, orders for alimony may be modified or revoked for "good cause shown." ... We determine that, under the facts of this case, the change in the husband's status from an owner-operator of a business he was purchasing to that of a salaried employee is such a material change in circumstances as to constitute good cause to modify the husband's alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause shown by a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Cooper v. Cooper · filed 1985-01-11

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1984) provides that “orders for alimony may be modified or revoked for good cause shown ...” Generally, this court has held that good cause for altering alimony provisions in a divorce decree is demonstrated by a material and substantial change of circumstances. ... This court finds that the combined effects of appellant’s lower income from his change in employment and appellee’s newfound capacity to work are a material and substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification in the decree so as to afford appellant temporary relief.

Section 42-365 bars adding alimony to a decree that omitted it only when the court has no other authority to modify or vacate the decree.

Howard v. Howard · filed 1980-12-12

We further hold that §42-365 is limited in its application to those situations in which, except for this statute, the court could not otherwise modify or vacate the decree.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, despite a decree purporting to prohibit later modification.

Murrell v. Murrell · filed 1989-05-19

Thus, the language of the district court purporting to render the alimony award in the instant case not subject to later modification is null, void, and of no effect.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause shown by a material change in circumstances; a substantial increase in the paying spouse’s income may establish that change.

Northwall v. Northwall · filed 1991-05-10

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1988) provides that an order for alimony may be revoked or modified “for good cause shown.” Good cause is demonstrated by a material change in circumstances. ... This increase in income demonstrated that there had been a material and substantial change in circumstances and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s application to modify.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony in a consent decree for good cause shown, which requires a material change in circumstances not contemplated when the decree was entered.

Desjardins v. Desjardins · filed 1992-01-31

Alimony awards entered pursuant to a consent decree may be modified pursuant to § 42-365, which provides that such orders may be revoked or modified “for good cause shown.” ... Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence showed a material and substantial change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties at the time of the decree.

Section 42-365 ties an alimony modification to service of process: alimony obligations that accrued before service cannot be modified, even if the petition was filed earlier.

Hamilton v. Hamilton · filed 1993-03-05

There is nothing in § 42-365 which is repugnant to § 25-217, for § 42-365 deals not with when an action is commenced, but with what an order of modification may affect.

Section 42-365 allows future alimony payments to be modified for good cause.

Novak v. Novak · filed 1993-09-14

With respect to Gerald’s request to modify alimony, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1988) states: “Unless amounts have accrued prior to the date of service of process on a petition to modify, orders for alimony may be modified or revoked for good cause shown ...” Consequently, since future alimony payments had not yet accrued, those remaining payments were subject to modification upon good cause shown.

Section 42-365 generally bars retroactive cancellation or reduction of alimony installments that accrued before service of a petition to modify.

Mathis v. Mathis · filed 1996-01-30

Installments of alimony become vested as they accrue, and courts are generally without authority to retroactively cancel or reduce accrued amounts.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Portland v. Portland · filed 1997-01-28

We do not dispute Bryan’s contention that he made the move to NC in good faith, but, rather, we point out that an award of alimony may be modified or revoked only for good cause shown. Good cause means a material and substantial change of circumstances and depends upon the facts of each case.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, shown by a material change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the decree was entered or caused merely by the passage of time.

Wood v. McGRATH, NORTH MULLIN & KRATZ · filed 1998-06-30

Generally, an order for alimony may be revoked or modified for good cause shown, unless amounts have accrued prior to the date of service of process on a petition to modify. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1993). Good cause is demonstrated by a material change in circumstances which was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the decree or did not result from the mere passage of time.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for an unforeseen, material decrease in earning capacity without proof that the recipient cannot work in any occupation.

Bowers v. Scherbring · filed 2000-06-02

Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1998), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. In order for Bowers to show good cause, she must show a material and substantial change in circumstances which was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the decree. ... We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring Bowers to present evidence to show that she was unemployable in any occupation. In summary, Bowers has shown a material and substantial change in circumstances that supports a modification of alimony.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony only for good cause, which requires a material and substantial change in circumstances. A loss of income caused by the payor’s fault does not qualify.

Lambert v. Lambert · filed 2000-10-03

An award of alimony may be modified or revoked only for good cause shown. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1998). Good cause means a material and substantial change of circumstances and depends upon the facts of each case.

Section 42-365 permits a court to reduce alimony for good cause when an inheritance materially improves the recipient's financial circumstances.

Krause v. Krause · filed 2000-12-05

Generally, an order for alimony may be revoked or modified for good cause shown, unless amounts have accrued prior to the date of service of process on a petition to modify. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1998). ... We do not find this modification to be untenable in light of this record, and we, accordingly, affirm.

Section 42-365 permits modification or termination of alimony for good cause, but a loss of income caused by the payor's fault does not qualify.

Pope v. Pope · filed 1997-02-14

We therefore extend the rule of Ohler to cases involving the modification or termination of alimony and find that a petition for the modification or termination of alimony will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one's talents and assets. In the absence of evidence that Patrick fell asleep because of some justifiable reason, we hold that Patrick's bad act resulting in the loss of his employment does not constitute good cause justifying the termination of his alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 permits a court to consider military disability benefits and the corresponding waiver of retirement benefits when deciding whether changed circumstances justify modifying alimony.

Kramer v. Kramer · filed 1997-05-23

We hold that while a Nebraska court may not include service-connected disability benefits awarded to a military retiree as a part of a marital estate under Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989), it may consider such benefits and the corresponding waiver of retirement pension benefits required by federal law in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits.

Section 42-365 permits modification of an existing alimony award for good cause, meaning a material and substantive change in circumstances, even when the original award was nominal.

Collett v. Collett · filed 2005-12-09

Because alimony, albeit nominal, was allowed in the original decree, the award is subject to modification for “good cause shown” pursuant to § 42-365. In this context, “good cause” means a material and substantive change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Section 42-365 permits alimony modification for good cause, but an appellate change to the property award does not itself constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Finney v. Finney · filed 2007-04-20

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... It is the decree that was affirmed as modified, from the time it was originally entered, that provides the appropriate frame of reference for a subsequent application to modify.

Section 42-365 permits alimony modification for good cause, requiring a material and substantial change in circumstances; the paying spouse's increased income alone did not suffice without a proven increase in the recipient's living expenses.

Simpson v. Simpson · filed 2008-02-22

Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown.[7] ... Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the evidence of Robert's increased income does not constitute, in and of itself, a material and substantial change in circumstances, without a proven increase in Lana's living expenses.

Section 42-365 requires a party seeking to modify or revoke alimony for good cause to file a complaint to modify.

Marcovitz v. Rogers · filed 2008-07-25

If one party wants to modify an alimony award, a proceeding to modify or revoke an order for alimony for good cause shall be commenced by filing a complaint to modify. ... In this case, while the form of the transaction was a promissory note, the substance of it was an impermissible attempt to modify a decree of dissolution without the approval of the court, and without satisfying the statutory requirements for such a modification.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for a material and substantial change in circumstances; after an earlier modification request is denied, the court measures any new change from that proceeding.

Metcalf v. Metcalf · filed 2008-10-21

Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends on the circumstances of each case. ... We conclude that the district court did not err in limiting its review to whether a material change in circumstances had occurred since the last modification proceeding which culminated in the January 26, 2006, order.

Section 42-365 allows alimony modification for good cause; after an earlier modification request, the court first determines whether circumstances changed since that request, then assesses whether the change is material against the original or last modified award.

Metcalf v. Metcalf · filed 2009-08-07

We conclude that when there has been one or more previous modification proceedings, the court should first determine whether there has been any change in circumstances arising after the most recent modification proceeding. If circumstances have changed since the time of the most recent request for modification, then the court should consider the change in circumstances since the original decree or order affecting alimony to determine whether there has been a material and substantial change. If there has been no change between the most recent modification request and the current request, the current modification is barred by res judicata.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances; increased income alone does not justify an increase without evidence of increased expenses.

Pales v. Pales · filed 2015-06-23

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), alimony orders may be modified for good cause shown. Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case. ... Without a corresponding demonstration that her expenses had increased since the prior modification proceeding, an increase in Warren’s income alone does not justify increasing the alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 permits a court to modify or revoke alimony that has not accrued before service of a modification petition, for good cause shown.

James-Estenson v. Estenson · filed 2017-11-21

The timing of the service of process affects the modification of alimony payments. The amended complaint was served on Nathan on November 20, 2012. Consequently, the district court had the authority to revoke un-accrued alimony payments from the date of service of process, November 20, 2012, going forward for good cause shown.

Section 42-365 permits alimony modification for a material and substantial change in circumstances; paying off a mortgage did not qualify when other expenses offset the savings.

Gagne v. Gagne · filed 2017-12-26

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case. ... Upon our de novo review of the record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Robert failed to prove good cause existed to warrant modifying the alimony award.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances. Cohabitation may justify modification if it improves the recipient’s overall financial condition.

Skalsky v. Skalsky · filed 2018-07-17

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... We agree with the court’s conclusion that John did not establish a material change in circumstances since the divorce decree that would justify reducing or terminating the award of alimony to Melissa.

Section 42-365 allows alimony modification for good cause, which requires a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Troester v. Troester · filed 2019-04-23

Accordingly, we find that Timothy has failed to prove that there was good cause justifying modification of alimony for the same reasons we set out above concerning child support.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Oswald v. Oswald · filed 2019-05-28

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... Our analysis in that regard applies with equal force in determining whether John’s alimony obligation should be reduced or eliminated. When we impute an annual income of $107,000 to John, it is clear that he has sufficient income to meet his living expenses and to pay the alimony obligation that he agreed to in the decree of dissolution. We affirm the district court’s decision to deny John’s request to modify or eliminate his alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 allows alimony to be modified for good cause, but a decrease in income caused by the paying party’s own fault or voluntary wastage does not establish good cause.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2019-06-04

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... We previously concluded that while Richard’s financial position has changed, it was due to his own fault by his voluntary wastage and dissipation of his talents and assets. Thus, any decrease in his income cannot be attributed to good cause.

Section 42-365 permits an alimony order to be modified or revoked for good cause, which requires a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Ellis v. Ellis · filed 2020-04-07

Alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. Metcalf v. Metcalf, 278 Neb. 258, 769 N.W.2d 386 (2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016). Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Section 42-365 allows modification of alimony agreed to in a property settlement for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances, unless modification was expressly precluded or limited.

Grothen v. Grothen · filed 2020-12-31

We conclude that our statutory and case law sup- ports the conclusion that where the parties have not expressly precluded or limited modification of alimony pursuant to § 42-366(7), an alimony provision that was agreed to by the parties as part of a property settlement agreement may later be modified in accord­ance with § 42-365.

Section 42-365 permits an alimony order to be modified or revoked for good cause, including a material and substantial change in the parties’ circumstances.

Harper v. Harper · filed 2021-04-20

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... There has been a material change in circumstances since the decree was entered and good cause existed to terminate Christopher’s alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Nielsen v. Nielsen · filed 2021-06-29

Alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. Metcalf v. Metcalf, 278 Neb. 258, 769 N.W.2d 386 (2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016). Good cause means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Section 42-365 allows an alimony award to be modified or revoked for good cause, including a reduction in income caused by a job loss that was not willful.

Hodgen v. Hodgen · filed 2022-01-11

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), an award of alimony may be modified or revoked if the moving party can show good cause. ... Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mark’s lost employment and reduced income demonstrated a material change in circumstances and good cause justifying the modification of his child support and alimony.

Section 42-365 permits modification or revocation of alimony for good cause, which requires a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Swahn v. Swahn · filed 2022-03-01

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... Based on the facts of this case, we do not find that Curtis’ sustained increase in income considered in conjunction with Gwynne’s financial circumstances at the time of trial constitutes a material change in circumstances justifying a modification in alimony.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause shown by a material and substantial change in economic circumstances.

Newquist v. Newquist · filed 2022-11-01

To modify an alimony order, the plaintiff must show good cause. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016). Good cause is a showing of a material and substantial change in economic circumstances and is analyzed on a case-by-case basis.

Section 42-365 permits modification of an existing alimony award for good cause, including a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Mackiewicz v. Mackiewicz · filed 2023-01-20

A district court entering a decree dissolving a marriage has the power to award alimony and, where it is awarded, the power to modify or revoke it. ... We conclude that the alimony award is modifiable.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, but a decrease in income caused by voluntary underemployment does not establish good cause.

Gregg v. Gregg · filed 2022-10-11

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. ... Based on the facts of this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Richard’s decreased income at the time of trial did not constitute a material change in circumstances or good cause justifying a modification of alimony.

Section 42-365 permits modification of alimony for good cause, meaning a material and substantial change in circumstances; tax liens that attach after the decree can support modification.

Storm v. Cornutt · filed 2026-06-09

Under § 42-365, alimony may be modified for good cause shown, and “good cause” means a material and substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances of each case. ... We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the tax liens filed in March 2021 were a material change that occurred after the decree to support a modification of spousal support.

Section 42-365 does not permit modification of alimony-in-gross judgments entered before July 6, 1972, even if the divorce decree had not yet become final.

Sheldon A. Bernstein and Lorrie H. Bernstein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · filed 1980-06-30

There is no escape from the conclusion that the Nebraska court would find the statute inapplicable to the Bernsteins’ divorce decree. It follows, therefore, that Nebraska law as it stands does not make the installment payments contingent.

Section 42-365 terminates alimony upon the recipient’s remarriage when the parties’ written agreement and the decree do not provide otherwise.

Euler v. Euler · filed 1980-08-08

Section 42-365 clearly states that alimony payments will terminate by operation of law when a decree is silent on the effect of death or remarriage. We, therefore, hold that the trial court was correct in finding that the alimony award in question should be terminated. However, we are of the opinion that the order should have terminated the alimony award as of the date of Virginia’s remarriage on December 26,1978, and we, therefore, modify the order of the District Court to that extent.

Section 42-365 applies to alimony in gross and terminates it upon the recipient’s remarriage unless a written agreement or court order provides otherwise.

Kingery v. Kingery · filed 1982-06-04

We must reject the contention that the awards of alimony in gross are excluded from the termination provisions of § 42-365, because to hold otherwise would be simply to rewrite the statute. ... The alimony terminates by operation of law when the condition occurs.

Section 42-365 makes alimony depend on economic circumstances, so cohabitation alone cannot terminate it.

Else v. Else · filed 1985-05-10

When enacting § 42-365 in 1972, the Legislature had ample opportunity to retain misconduct of a spouse or former spouse as a factor to be considered in determining whether to allow or continue alimony. However, misconduct as a bar to alimony, before or after divorce, was not retained by the Legislature. Rather, receipt of alimony depends on “economic circumstances” described in the statute adopted in 1972.

Section 42-365 generally ends alimony when either party dies or the recipient remarries; a court may order otherwise when the circumstances justify it.

Bauerle v. Bauerle · filed 2002-05-17

However, there were no children as a result of this marriage, nor is there any evidence in the record that Jeanine or Dirk have health problems or economic circumstances which would justify departing from the default termination provisions of § 42-365. For these reasons, we determine the district court abused its discretion.

Section 42-365 terminates an alimony obligation upon either party’s death or the recipient’s remarriage.

Marcovitz v. Rogers · filed 2004-02-27

Pursuant to § 42-365, Rogers’ obligation shall terminate upon the death of either Rogers or Marcovitz or upon Marcovitz’ remarriage.

For alimony awards in dissolution decrees entered on or after July 1,2004, § 42-365 terminates alimony upon either party’s death or the recipient’s remarriage unless the decree or a written agreement explicitly says otherwise.

Holm v. Holm · filed 2004-04-23

Accordingly, we overrule Watters prospectively and hold that with respect to any alimony award included in a decree of dissolution entered on or after July 1,2004, the statutory grounds for termination set forth in § 42-365 will apply unless the decree, or a written agreement of the parties, includes explicit language stating that the death of either party and/or the remarriage of the alimony recipient shall not terminate the alimony order.

Section 42-365 permits a court to order alimony to continue after the paying spouse’s death when the recipient’s circumstances justify departing from the usual termination rule.

Riegel v. Lemond · filed 2019-07-09

Given the evidence of Jackie’s persistent physical limitations and her inability to obtain gainful employment, in addition to the limited amount of alimony awarded to Jackie, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in departing from the default termination provisions of § 42-365. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision that Stephen’s alimony obligation will terminate upon Jackie’s death or remarriage or upon further order of the court, but will not terminate upon his death.

Section 42-365 permits a court to require reasonable security for payment, and life insurance coverage exceeding the required payments is not necessarily unreasonable.

Trimble v. Trimble · filed 1984-07-27

Section 42-365 provides in part that “[reasonable security for payment may be required by the court.” We are unable to say that the amount of security in this case is unreasonable, although we acknowledge that the combined face value of the life insurance policies is more than sufficient to discharge the required payments at least twice over.

Section 42-365 permits courts to require reasonable security for alimony payments, but security in the original decree generally requires compelling circumstances.

Vanderveer v. Vanderveer · filed 2021-09-24

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) addresses alimony and provides that “[r]easonable security for payment may be required by the court.” ... We have also said that “reasonable security for payment of alimony . . . should be invoked in the original decree only when compelling circumstances require it.” ... On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in not requiring Steve to maintain life insurance as security for his alimony obligation.

Section 42-365 bars a later alimony award when the original dissolution decree awarded none, but a prior legal separation does not trigger that bar.

Pendleton v. Pendleton · filed 1993-03-05

As previously stated, the court is not statutorily precluded from awarding alimony in a dissolution proceeding simply because no alimony was awarded by a prior separation decree.

Section 42-365 governs alimony in a dissolution decree; an initial award after legal separation does not require a showing of good cause to modify the separation decree.

Connolly v. Connolly · filed 2018-02-23

Furthermore, we note that by its terms, § 42-365 is applicable only to an alimony award in a decree of dissolution and makes no mention of a decree of legal separation.

Section 42-365 requires a court to determine alimony independently when a dissolution follows legal separation, without requiring a change in circumstances.

State v. Fischetto · filed 2019-09-24

Stated differently, the trial court must independently analyze the factors set forth in § 42-365 in determining the appropriateness of an alimony award in an original dissolution decree.

Section 42-365 requires courts to consider alimony and property division separately because property division distributes marital assets equitably.

Kramer v. Kramer · filed 1993-04-06

Furthermore, § 42-365 tells us that when a court is dividing marital assets, property division and alimony “serve different purposes and are to be considered separately. The purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties.” ... For these reasons, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Kathleen $750 per month in Pyke alimony in lieu of an outright interest in Kenneth’s military pension, as Kathleen was deprived of a fair and equitable result with respect to the division of the military pension.

Section 42-365 directs courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ circumstances, the duration of the marriage, their contributions and career interruptions, and the supported party’s ability to work while caring for minor children.

Reichert v. Reichert · filed 1994-05-27

In dividing property upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties; (2) the duration of the marriage; (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, including contributions to the care and education of the children, and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities; and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of such party. § 42-365. ... Considering the factors outlined above, the division of the marital estate was reasonable.

Section 42-365 permits a court to consider a spouse’s nonmarital trust assets when determining alimony, even though those assets are not subject to property division.

Ainslie v. Ainslie · filed 1996-03-22

Accordingly, the wife’s two trust funds, while not subject to division in a property settlement, may properly be taken into account when determining alimony.

Section 42-365 calls for a reasonable property division based on the facts of each case and permits a court to include accounts receivable in the marital estate.

Venter v. Venter · filed 1996-03-29

The ultimate test for determining the appropriateness of the division of property, as well as alimony, is reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case. ... Under the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by including the accounts receivable in the marital estate.

Section 42-365’s gainful-employment consideration applies to alimony, not property division.

Ward v. Ward · filed 1998-10-27

The statute also provides the court may consider “the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of such party”; however, this phrase obviously applies only to alimony, which is not an issue in this case.

Property division under § 42-365 depends on the statutory factors and the circumstances of each case, with reasonableness as the ultimate test.

Laubscher v. Laubscher · filed 1999-08-31

However, property division is not subject to a rigid mathematical formula, but, rather, turns upon the facts and circumstances of each case in light of the statutory factors found in § 42-365, and the ultimate test is always one of reasonableness.

Section 42-365 directs courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ circumstances, the length of the marriage, their contributions, and the supported party’s ability to work, with fairness and reasonableness guiding the division.

Hajenga v. Hajenga · filed 1999-10-15

In dividing property upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties; (2) the duration of the marriage; (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities; and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of each party, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Heald v. Heald · filed 2000-06-02

Equitable property division under § 42-365 is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordanee with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 treats alimony as spousal support and property division as the equitable distribution of marital assets.

Kelley v. Jeter (In Re Jeter) · filed 2001-02-01

This statutory provision indicates that alimony and division of property are wholly different: property division is the equitable distribution of marital assets, while alimony represents spousal support and maintenance.

Section 42-365 distinguishes alimony, which provides spousal support and maintenance, from property division, which distributes marital assets equitably.

Kelly v. Jeter · filed 2001-02-01

This statutory provision indicates that alimony and division of property are wholly different: property division is the equitable distribution of marital assets, while alimony represents spousal support and maintenance.

Section 42-365 calls for classifying property, valuing marital assets and liabilities, and equitably dividing the net marital estate.

Tyma v. Tyma · filed 2002-05-17

Equitable property division under § 42-365 is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 permits a reasonable division of marital property based on the parties’ circumstances, the duration of the marriage, and each party’s contributions.

McGuire v. McGuire · filed 2002-10-01

After reviewing the record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in making an equal division of the marital estate.

Section 42-365 calls for an equitable division of marital assets based on the circumstances of the parties.

Claborn v. Claborn · filed 2004-01-09

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1998), the purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. ... Here, the award of $66,819 of assets to Cynthia and $19,466 to Billy is unreasonable and unfair. Cynthia was awarded over two-thirds of the marital estate, when the record does not support such an unequal distribution of property.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Gangwish v. Gangwish · filed 2004-04-29

Under § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 permits a court to consider the parties’ earnings when dividing marital property; doing so does not turn the division into an alimony award.

Shearer v. Shearer · filed 2005-07-22

Section 42-365 provides that a court may order division of property as is reasonable, considering factors such as the parties’ circumstances, the duration of their marriage, and the contributions of each party to the marriage. ... A trial court may consider the earnings of the parties in determining a fair and equitable division of property. Such consideration, as permitted by law, does not render the resulting property division a back-door alimony award.

Section 42-365 requires courts dividing property equitably to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value the marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate.

Gress v. Gress · filed 2006-03-03

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), the equitable division of property is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and equitably divide the net marital estate.

Millatmal v. Millatmal · filed 2006-10-27

Under § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Sitz v. Sitz · filed 2008-05-30

Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2004), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 permits a court to exclude a disability pension from the marital estate when the recipient cannot work, relies on disability payments for income, and has separate retirement benefits.

Bandy v. Bandy · filed 2008-10-14

A trial court's determination that a former spouse's disability pension should not be included in the marital estate is not an abuse of discretion where the former spouse was unable to work as a result of injuries, his or her only income was from disability payments, and his or her disability pension was distinct from retirement benefits.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Sutton v. Sutton · filed 2013-04-02

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 requires equitable division of property through classification, valuation, and division of the net marital estate.

Bussell v. Bussell · filed 2013-09-17

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 calls for classifying the parties’ property, valuing marital assets and liabilities, and dividing the net marital estate equitably.

McIver v. McIver · filed 2013-10-01

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate fairly and reasonably.

Logan v. Logan · filed 2015-01-20

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 requires courts to consider the parties’ contributions when equitably dividing marital property and debt.

Catlett v. Catlett · filed 2015-08-18

Applying the factors set forth in § 42-365, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s division of property and allocation of debt.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Wiech v. Wiech · filed 2015-11-03

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the marriage. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 permits a court deciding alimony to consider all property the parties own when the decree is entered, including inherited property.

Brozek v. Brozek · filed 2016-02-05

Shelley notes that the division of the marital estate and the award of alimony are separate inquiries under § 42-365. But that does not mean that a party’s resources are irrelevant to her need for alimony. In weighing a request for alimony, the court may take into account all of the property owned by the parties when entering the decree, whether accumulated by their joint efforts or acquired by inheritance.

Section 42-365 treats property division and alimony as separate inquiries, but a party’s resources remain relevant to the need for alimony.

Spady v. Spady · filed 2016-06-07

However, although the division of the marital estate and the award of alimony are separate inquiries under § 42-365, it does not mean that a party’s resources are irrelevant to her need for alimony.

Section 42-365 requires courts dividing marital property to classify the property, value the marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Stanosheck v. Jeanette · filed 2016-07-15

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008) is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 uses a three-step process for equitable property division: classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate.

Lorenzen v. Lorenzen · filed 2016-07-22

We have stated that under § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the mar- riage. The second step is to value the marital assets and mari- tal liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value the marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Burcham v. Burcham · filed 2016-09-27

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 makes classifying property as marital or nonmarital the first step in equitable division.

Lisec v. Lisec · filed 2017-03-07

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital.

Section 42-365 does not require specific findings when a court divides marital property.

Becher v. Becher · filed 2018-03-09

Our divorce statutes do not require specific findings in the division of property,20 except a finding whether a property settlement agreement is or is not unconscionable.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value marital assets and liabilities, and equitably divide the net marital estate.

Westwood v. Darnell · filed 2018-04-13

Under § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or non- marital. The second step is to value the marital assets and mari- tal liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 calls for equitable division of marital assets after the parties’ property and debts are classified and valued.

Cook v. Cook · filed 2018-07-31

Under Nebraska’s divorce statutes, “The purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equita- bly between the parties.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016).

Section 42-365 calls for an equitable division of marital property after the court classifies and values the marital estate.

Tierney v. Tierney · filed 2019-06-18

The purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016). Equitable division of property is a three-step process: (1) classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the marriage; (2) value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties; and (3) calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 calls for an equitable division of marital assets between spouses.

Wolverton v. Wolverton · filed 2019-06-25

The purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016).

Section 42-365 calls for classifying property as marital or nonmarital, valuing marital assets and liabilities, and equitably dividing the net marital estate.

Schnackel v. Schnackel · filed 2019-11-26

Equitable prop- erty division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets and determine the marital liabilities of the parties. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 provides a three-step process for equitable property division: classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, then divide the net marital estate.

Reinmuth v. Reinmuth · filed 2019-12-10

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. Dooling v. Dooling, 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019). The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the marriage. Id. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. Id. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in § 42-365.

Section 42-365 uses a three-step process for equitable property division: classify the property, value the marital estate, and divide it fairly.

Nelms v. Nelms · filed 2019-12-10

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Schieffer v. Schieffer · filed 2020-06-02

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. ... The premarital amount was clearly traceable, and thus Ryan should have received an offset for his premarital $33,137.94 credit balance. We modify the decree accordingly.

Section 42-365 calls for equitable property division by classifying property, valuing marital assets and liabilities, and dividing the net marital estate.

Harper v. Harper · filed 2020-09-22

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. Stanosheck v. Jeanette, supra. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. Id. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. Id. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties.

Section 42-365 requires courts to set aside proven nonmarital property before valuing and dividing the net marital estate.

Ramsey v. Ramsey · filed 2021-03-30

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the marriage. ... That amount was traceable and verified by undisputed evidence, and it should have been set aside as Kyle’s premarital interest in the home.

Section 42-365 treats property division and alimony as separate forms of relief; a property award does not by itself preclude alimony.

Bell v. Malcom-Bell · filed 2021-06-29

Per Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), division of marital property and alimony serve different purposes and are to be considered separately. ... We find nothing within the property division ordered by the court which would detract from an award of alimony.

Section 42-365 uses a three-step process for equitable property division: classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, then divide the net marital estate.

Toro v. Toro · filed 2021-09-21

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 calls for an equitable division of marital assets, generally awarding each spouse one-third to one-half of the estate according to fairness and reasonableness.

Hamann v. Hamann · filed 2022-06-28

“The purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties.” § 42-365. There is no mathematical formula by which property awards can be precisely determined, but as a general rule, a spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case.

Section 42-365 divides property equitably by classifying property as marital or nonmarital, valuing marital assets and liabilities, and dividing the net marital estate.

Beecham v. Beecham · filed 2022-11-29

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. ... The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. ... The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. ... The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties.

Section 42-365 treats alimony and property division as separate inquiries, so income from inherited property excluded from division may be considered when determining alimony.

Radmanesh v. Radmanesh · filed 2023-10-27

As stated previously, the division of marital property and the award of alimony are separate inquiries under § 42-365. The fact that property is inherited and therefore excluded from division in a dissolution proceeding does not prevent the ... income it generates from being considered when determining alimony.

Section 42-365 requires gifted real estate and its passive appreciation to be set aside as nonmarital property when dividing the marital estate.

Snow v. Snow · filed 2023-12-26

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. ... The real estate consisting of the two parcels Ronald was gifted by his parents and its passive appreciation should have been set off to Ronald as nonmarital property and not included in the marital estate.

Section 42-365 permits a court to divide marital property as is reasonable under the parties’ circumstances, even if one spouse receives less than one-third of the estate.

McCarty v. McCarty · filed 2024-02-13

Section 42-365 allows a court to order a division of property as may be reasonable.

Section 42-365 uses a three-step process to classify property, value the marital estate, and divide it equitably.

Weston v. Weston · filed 2024-04-23

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process.

Section 42-365 authorizes courts to divide the marital estate equitably according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Petersen v. Petersen · filed 2024-11-19

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. ... We disagree with the first portion of the court’s conclusion regarding the traceability of nonmarital assets, at least insofar as it relates to the real estate at issue.

Section 42-365 authorizes courts to divide the marital estate equitably according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Backhaus v. Backhaus · filed 2025-05-09

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a trial court to equitably distribute the mari- tal estate according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 42-365 treats property division and alimony as serving different purposes, so an award of marital property does not by itself make alimony unreasonable.

Coppersmith v. Coppersmith · filed 2025-07-15

Regarding Larry’s claims that an award of alimony was not appropriate because Kristine was awarded the equalization payment, her home and vehicle, the parties’ retirement accounts, the Pit Stop proceeds, and that Kristine was awarded her interest in Law Farms without any consideration for active appreciation, these assets were awarded as part of the division of the parties’ marital property which purpose is different than the purpose of an alimony award.

Section 42-365 authorizes courts to divide the marital estate equitably according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Espejo v. Espejo · filed 2025-10-28

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 42-365 permits an equitable division of property based on the parties’ circumstances and the duration of the marriage, guided by fairness and reasonableness.

Ketcham v. Ketcham · filed 2025-11-18

Pursuant to § 42-365, the court may order a division of property based on the circumstances of the parties and duration of the marriage. ... We are not inclined to disturb the district court’s order of division, considering the circumstance of the parties and relative short duration of their marriage.

Section 42-365 calls for equitable property division, beginning with classification of property as marital or nonmarital; traceable appreciation of premarital property remains nonmarital when neither spouse’s efforts or marital funds produced it.

Coufal v. Coufal · filed 2015-07-17

Equitable property division under § 42-365 is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. ... The district court abused its discretion by including as a marital asset the increase in value of the nonmarital portion of the retirement account.

Section 42-365 generally excludes property acquired before marriage from the marital estate unless contributions during the marriage are proved sufficient to convert it to marital property.

Gurzick v. Gurzick · filed 2016-12-13

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a three-step process: The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or non-marital, the second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties, and the third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties in accordance with statutory principles. ... Further, Raschel did not provide adequate proof that her contributions to the Kawasaki motorcycle were sufficient to convert it to a marital asset. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Kawasaki motorcycle was Aaron’s premarital asset and excluding it from the marital estate.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property, value marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate; a pension distributed as a share of monthly benefits need not have a total value on the equalization worksheet.

Panowicz v. Panowicz · filed 2017-08-29

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... Because there was no total value of the pension, the court did not err in failing to include the distribution of the pension on its equalization worksheet.

Section 42-365 makes classification of property as marital or nonmarital the first step in equitable property division.

Schmeidler v. Schmeidler · filed 2018-04-17

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital.

Section 42-365 excludes from the marital estate an ownership interest one spouse gives to the other as separate property.

Sellers v. Sellers · filed 2016-07-29

Having found the first interpretation, i.e., that Ryan gifted the 50-percent interests to Krista as her separate property and retained the 50-percent interests as his separate property, it would have been proper to treat each party’s 50-percent interests as his or her separate, nonmarital property.

Appreciation or income from a nonmarital asset is marital property to the extent it was caused by either spouse’s efforts during the marriage.

Stephens v. Stephens · filed 2017-07-14

We hold that the appre- ciation or income of a nonmarital asset during the marriage is marital insofar as it was caused by the efforts of either spouse or both spouses.

Section 42-365 permits a personal injury settlement to be divided between marital and nonmarital interests when the proceeds are insufficient to compensate both the injured spouse and the marital estate.

Marshall v. Marshall · filed 2017-10-13

Indeed, where, as here, the evidence shows the settlement proceeds were inadequate to compensate the purely personal losses proved by the injured spouse, and also were inadequate to compensate loses to the marital estate, inequity would generally result from classifying all of the settlement proceeds as either marital or nonmarital.

Section 42-365 calls for courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value the marital estate, and divide it equitably.

Alberts v. Alberts · filed 2019-02-19

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... We find no abuse of discretion in either the court’s use of Gustafson’s appraisal figures or in the court’s decision to consider only $246,404 of the premarital quarter section’s value a marital asset.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value the marital estate, and divide it equitably.

Arbie v. Arbie · filed 2020-08-18

It is well settled that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... In our review, we can find no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that Phillip did not meet his burden of proving that the Arizona property should be considered nonmarital.

Section 42-365 treats funds retained from an asset used to secure a marital debt as marital property to the extent those funds derive from that debt.

Hart v. Hart · filed 2021-01-19

The $39,000 proceeds from the CD should be considered marital property to the extent that it is derived from a marital debt.

Under § 42-365, a spouse claiming property is nonmarital must prove it remains separate or traceable; untraceable proceeds commingled with marital property belong in the marital estate.

Van Ranken v. Van Ranken · filed 2021-03-09

It appears the district court found Daniel’s testimony more credible and as such, found the cattle proceeds could not be traced, became commingled with the parties’ marital property, and should therefore be included in the marital estate. We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Nellie failed to satisfy her burden of proof that the proceeds from the sale of cattle remained nonmarital property.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital, value the marital assets and liabilities, and divide the net marital estate equitably.

Wright v. Wright · filed 2021-04-27

Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. ... While we note the record before us could have supported the court’s award to Lucas of the items listed in exhibit 101, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding that Lucas had not carried his burden to prove this property to be nonmarital.

Section 42-365 requires courts to value marital assets and liabilities before calculating and dividing the net marital estate.

Sjulin v. Sjulin · filed 2021-12-21

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. ... The issue before us concerns the second step of the process, the proper valuation of the marital home and its mortgage. ... As such, we reject Ryan’s argument that the district court’s valuations failed to properly account for the roof repair and the mortgage refinance.

Section 42-365 requires courts to classify property as marital or nonmarital before equitably dividing the marital estate; premarital title alone did not establish that the house was nonmarital.

McNulty v. NcNulty · filed 2022-03-08

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. Dooling v. Dooling, supra. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought that property to the marriage. ... However, Sean failed to meet his burden of proof because the evidence was controverted as to whether a mortgage existed that was paid postmarriage and there was no evidence that all the other costs of ownership were paid by either Sean’s parents or with premarital funds.

Under § 42-365, appreciation of premarital property remains nonmarital when a spouse’s work merely maintains the property and the increase in value comes from market forces.

McGinnis v. McGinnis · filed 2019-07-02

As each witness testified that Timothy’s work on the property was maintenance to ensure the ability to farm the land and keep it productive, we find that the evidence demonstrates that the land did not appreciate as a result of marital efforts, but rather through market forces.

Under § 42-365, appreciation of inherited investments is presumed marital unless the owning spouse proves the growth is traceable to nonmarital property and was not caused by either spouse’s active efforts.

White v. White · filed 2020-01-31

We did not limit our holding solely to retirement accounts and business interests, and we decline to do so now. Therefore, the burden was on Tim to rebut the presumption that the appreciation in the 6300 account was marital.

Section 42-365 permits property traceable to a spouse’s premarital property to be set aside to that spouse when dividing the marital estate.

Higgins v. Currier · filed 2020-02-11

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process. ... In our de novo review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in setting aside the Omaha property, purchased with proceeds from Higgins’ premarital Iowa property, to Higgins as nonmarital property.

Section 42-365 excludes a premarital retirement account and its passive growth from the marital estate when the growth is not due to either spouse’s efforts.

Freyer-Reining v. Reining · filed 2020-02-11

Here, Pamela met her burden of proving her iHeart Media 401K was a nonmarital asset.

Under § 42-365, adding a spouse to the title of premarital property is evidence that the property became marital, but does not create a presumption that it was a gift.

Bowen v. Bowen · filed 2021-04-06

Although Melvin’s act of adding Karen’s name to the title did not create a presumption that he gifted the property to her, it was evidence to be considered with all other evidence here in determining whether the Rahn Boulevard property retained its character as a nonmarital asset following the parties’ marriage.

Section 42-365 allows a spouse to retain premarital equity that the spouse proves can be traced into marital property.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2021-11-30

As a result, we find that Amber met her burden of proving that she had nonmarital assets of $5,300 that can be traced from the purchase of the LaVista home to the marital home.

Section 42-365 treats appreciation caused by marital contributions as marital property; a spouse claiming premarital equity must prove its amount.

Montegut v. Mosby-Montegut · filed 2022-06-21

With regard to the growth in equity during the marriage, we conclude such constituted active appreciation through mari- tal contributions. In light of Tamara’s failure to establish the alleged portion of nonmarital equity, the entirety of the equity at the time of dissolution should have been included in the marital estate.

Dogs that originated as one spouse’s premarital property may become marital property through both spouses’ contributions to their care during the marriage.

Liu v. Welch · filed 2024-05-21

Assuming without deciding that Kiwi and Bagel originated as Liu’s premarital property, we find that, during the parties’ marriage, Kiwi and Bagel became marital property due to the marital contributions of both Liu and Welch in providing for Kiwi and Bagel during the marriage. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the classification of Kiwi and Bagel as marital assets in the division of the parties’ marital property.