Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is available only when there is a justiciable controversy.

Cole v. Clarke · filed 1999-08-1725-21,149 et seq.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,149 et seq. (Reissue 1995), is available only when there is a justiciable controversy.

Section 25-21,239 makes a truck owner jointly and severally liable for injury or property damage resulting from operation of a qualifying truck in Nebraska, but it does not apply when the injury results from operation outside Nebraska.

Erickson v. U-Haul Intern. · filed 2009-07-0225-21,239

Under § 25-21,239, U-Haul International is not liable, because § 25-21,239 only creates liability for injuries or damage "resulting from the operation thereof in this state." It is undisputed that Shari's injury occurred while Dale operated the truck in Iowa. Shari's injury did not result from the operation of the truck within Nebraska, and therefore, § 25-21,239 does not apply.

Section 25-21,239 imposes joint and several liability on owners of leased trucks, truck-tractors, or trailers, but a minivan designed primarily to carry passengers is not a covered truck.

Philpot v. Aguglia · filed 2000-05-26

Section 25-21,239, by its terms, applies only to leased trucks, truck-tractors, and trailers. It does not apply to any other type of motor vehicle. ... From this evidence, it is clear that the minivan was designed, used, and maintained primarily for the transportation of persons, and not for the transportation of property.

Section 25-21,239 makes owners of leased trucks, truck-tractors, and trailers liable to persons injured because of the operation of the leased item.

Erickson v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. · filed 2007-09-0725-21,239

That statute makes owners of leased trucks, truck-tractors, and trailers liable to persons injured because of the operation of the leased item.

Contributory negligence proportionately reduces a claimant's damages, but bars recovery when it equals or exceeds the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought.

Carroll v. Chase County · filed 2000-06-23

Any contributory negligence chargeable to a claimant shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as damages for an injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory negligence but shall not bar recovery, except that if the contributory negligence of the claimant is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought, the claimant shall be totally barred from recovery. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.09 (Reissue 1995).

The term "person" in § 25-21,186 includes organizations as well as individuals when they render emergency care.

Opinion No. (1988) · filed 1988-03-03

You have asked whether a "person" who renders care pursuant to Section 25-21,186 encompasses both individuals and organizations. Our reading of the pertinent statutes indicates that the term "person" in this statute does indeed include individuals as well as organizations. ... After reviewing Section 25-21,186, we do not find that the context of the statute requires a different interpretation of the term "person" than the general definition provided in Section 49-801.

Section 25-21,186 does not immunize a person whose emergency-care conduct is not gratuitous.

Drake v. Drake · filed 2000-10-20

Section 25-21,186 describes care that is rendered “gratuitously.” We conclude that § 25-21,186 does not apply to Jenson because his conduct was not gratuitous.

Section 25-21,261(1) provides civil-penalty immunity for a timely disclosed violation that is appropriately corrected, but it does not restrict otherwise authorized injunctive relief.

Opinion No. (2001) · filed 2001-03-01(1)

In our view, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,261 (1) and 25-21,259 do not address the availability of injunctive relief during the interim between the discovery of the violation and the obtaining of a permit.

Section 25-21,185.10 permits allocation of noneconomic damages only in direct proportion to a defendant’s negligence and does not authorize allocating damages to intentional tort-feasors.

Brandon v. County of Richardson · filed 2001-04-20

Section 25-21,185.10 does not provide for allocation of damages to a defendant for his or her intentional torts. The plain language of Nebraska’s comparative negligence law does not allow for allocation of damages to intentional tort-feasors.

Sections 25-21,254 et seq. protect only voluntary environmental audits and do not protect reports or records that environmental laws require regulated entities to create, keep, or furnish.

Opinion No. (2001) · filed 2001-05-01

It is our view that the environmental audit statutes would not restrict the ability of the Department to require reports or records to be made or kept by public water supply systems. As previously stated, an environmental audit which is afforded protection under the environmental audit statutes is one prepared as a self-initiated assessment or review not otherwise expressly required by environmental requirements. Furthermore, § 25-21,258 provides that the protections created for environmental audit documents do not apply to documents or information required to be developed, maintained, or reported pursuant to any environmental requirements or to documents or other information required to be available or furnished to regulatory agencies pursuant to any environmental requirements or any other law. Therefore, the reports or records required to be made or kept by the state Safe Drinking Water Act or implementing regulations would be afforded no protection under the environmental audit statutes.

Section 25-21,219 limits forcible entry and detainer proceedings to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents, so they do not adjudicate title.

Cummins Management, L.P. v. Gilroy · filed 2003-08-15

Because of its summary nature, the Legislature has narrowed the issues that can be tried in a forcible entry and detainer action to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents thereto. See § 25-21,219. The action does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession.

Section 25-21,219 limits forcible entry and detainer proceedings to the right of possession and statutorily designated related matters, so a title dispute cannot be tried there.

Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo · filed 2014-10-17

Because of its summary nature, the Legislature, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,219 (Reissue 2008), has narrowed the issues that can be tried in a forcible entry and detainer action to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents thereto.

Section 25-21,219 limits forcible entry and detainer proceedings to the immediate right of possession and designated incidents, while § 25-21,112 permits quiet-title relief only against a person claiming or apparently having an adverse estate or interest in the real estate.

Homebuyers Inc. v. Watkins · filed 2019-06-0425-21,219 and 25-21,112

Because of its summary nature, the Legislature, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,219 (Reissue 2016), has narrowed the issues that can be tried in a forcible entry and detainer action to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents thereto.

The forcible entry and detainer statutes limit the action to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents; a court lacks jurisdiction when resolving the action would require deciding a title dispute.

KJH Enterprises v. Schroeder · filed 2023-04-18

Nebraska law has long held that a court cannot determine a question of title in a forcible entry and detainer action. If the resolution of the case would require the court to determine a title dispute, it must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003). Because of its summary nature, the Legislature has narrowed the issues that can be tried in a forcible entry and detainer action to the right of possession and statutorily designated incidents thereto. Id. The action does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession. Id. Thus, when a party attempts to interject a title dispute into a forcible entry and detainer action, thereby transforming the proceedings into an equitable action to determine title, the court is divested of jurisdiction. Id.

A forcible entry and detainer action cannot proceed when resolving it would require the court to decide a title dispute; the court must dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

Hill v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage · filed 2024-11-07

In Nebraska, such a claim is a forcible entry and detainer action, which does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession. Homebuyers Inc. v. Watkins, No. A-18-258, 2019 WL 2361760, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. June 4, 2019). However, “[i]f the resolution of a forcible entry and detainer action requires a court to determine a title dispute, the court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 854 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 2014); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,219 (Reissue 2016)). Here, as Hill’s forcible detainer action is reliant upon the resolution of the currently disputed title to the Property, and as she herself alleges that issue has not been resolved, her Count VIII claim cannot proceed until resolution of the Property’s title is concluded. Therefore, as amendment of this claim would be futile prior to title resolution, Count VIII must be dismissed without prejudice.

Nebraska's forcible-entry-and-detainer statutes limit the proceeding to specified possession disputes, and require dismissal when deciding possession would require resolving a title dispute or a landlord-tenant contract dispute.

Woodsonia Hwy. 291 v. American Multi-Cinema · filed 2025-03-14

In Nebraska, the Legislature has limited the scope of forcible entry and detainer actions to two circumstances: (1) “complaints of unlawful and forcible entry into lands and tenements and the detention of the same” and (2) “complaints against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands or tenements, unlawfully and by force hold the same.” ... In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the contest is limited to the naked right of possession of the premises. Because the action is merely possessory, the question of title to real estate cannot be either tried or determined in the case. ... But if the claimant’s right of possession depends on resolving “some right of [the] defendant, whether legal or equitable, in the property itself,” the court must dismiss the forcible entry and detainer action for want of jurisdiction. ... A forcible entry and detainer action is not the proper action to resolve a contract dispute between a landlord and tenant—even one that is “simple.”

Section 25-21,154 gives courts discretion, rather than imposes a duty, to refuse declaratory relief that would not end the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2004-07-23

Section 25-21,154 provides as follows: “The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” We have long stated that this provision indicates discretionary rather than mandatory power.

Section 25-21,154 allows a court to refuse declaratory relief when the judgment would not terminate the underlying uncertainty or controversy, and whether to entertain the action is within the trial court's discretion.

Polk County Recreational Ass'n v. Susquehanna Patriot Commercial Leasing Co. · filed 2007-07-20

We have noted that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,154 (Reissue 1995) provides that a court “‘may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding,’ ” and we have stated that the decision “whether to entertain an action for declaratory judgment is within the discretion of the trial court.”

Section 25-21,154 gives courts discretion, rather than imposes a duty, to refuse declaratory relief that would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

Mansuetta v. Mansuetta · filed 2017-01-2725-21,154

Section 25-21,154, in particular, provides as follows: “The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” We have long noted that this provision indicates discretionary rather than mandatory power.

The comparative-negligence provisions do not allow a plaintiff’s contributory negligence to be applied in a strict-liability cause of action.

Shipler v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2006-03-10

The language of § 25-21,185.09 allows a jury to compare a plaintiff’s contributory negligence to the negligence of a defendant or defendants. It does not provide that the plaintiff’s negligence may be applied in the plaintiff’s cause of action based upon strict liability in tort. Section 25-21,185.10 allows the jury to compare the negligent conduct of codefendants, mandating that “[e]ach defendant shall be liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of negligence . . . .” Section 25-21,185.10 does not provide that one defendant’s negligence may be compared to another in a cause of action for strict liability in tort.

Section 25-21,185 addresses contributory negligence in strict-liability tort actions and, as construed here, does not make it a defense to such a claim.

Meisner v. Patton Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1990-05-25

Since the passage of that statute the Nebraska Supreme Court, in Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 451-52, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987) has, at least in dicta, restated the traditional rule, citing Hawkins, supra, even in the face of the language of the statute which was quoted by the court in its opinion. In addition, the legislative history of the statute indicates that it was intended to state the law in Nebraska as it existed prior to passage. I conclude that the Nebraska Supreme Court if faced with this exact issue, would hold, as it indicated in Rahmig, that contributory negligence is no defense.

Section 25-21,185.11(1) reduces a claimant’s claim against nonsettling joint tort-feasors by the settling tort-feasor’s proportionate share of liability determined by the trier of fact, rather than by the settlement amount.

Tadros v. City of Omaha · filed 2007-07-13(1)

Because § 25-21,185.11 mandates reduction by the settling tort-feasor’s proportionate share of liability as determined by the trier of fact, the trial court erred in failing to deduct that share of responsibility attributable to Bowley from Tadros’ judgment for economic damages against the City.

Section 25-21,185.09 requires a defendant seeking judgment under Nebraska's comparative-negligence scheme to prove that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought.

Fickle v. State · filed 2007-07-20185.09

To entitle a defendant to judgment under the comparative negligence statutory scheme, the defendant must prove that any contributory negligence chargeable to the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought. ... See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.09 (Reissue 1995).

Nebraska’s declaratory-judgment statute allows trustees and persons interested in administering a trust to seek a declaration on any question arising in the trust’s administration.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Estate of Mansfield · filed 2007-08-31

Further, Nebraska’s declaratory judgment statutes allow trustees and persons interested in the administration of a trust to seek a declaration regarding any question arising in the administration of a trust.

Sections 25-21,185.07 through 25-21,185.12 apply when contributory negligence could legally be a defense, and § 25-21,185.11(1) reduces the claimant’s recovery against nonsettling tort-feasors by the settling tort-feasor’s proportionate share of liability determined by the fact finder.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. S. Pride Trucking, Inc. · filed 2018-06-2825-21,185.07 and 25-21,185.11(1)

In sum, federal law doesn't preclude applying Nebraska's comparative negligence statutes-specifically, § 25-21,185.11-where their application does not affect the shipper's right to recover from a carrier under the Carmack Amendment or increase the carrier's potential liability beyond that permitted under the Carmack Amendment.

Sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12 apply only in civil actions where contributory negligence may be a defense, so § 25-21,185.09's allocation-instruction requirement does not apply when contributory negligence is not at issue.

Sherman v. Winco Fireworks · filed 2008-07-03185.07, 185.09, 185.11(2)

The Shermans' legal position is inconsistent with our reading of Nebraska law. Crucially, the Shermans ignore Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.07, which restricts the applicability of the two Nebraska statutes on which they depend: "Sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12 shall apply to all civil actions to which contributory negligence may be, pursuant to law, a defense . . . ." (Emphasis added.) By expressly narrowing the application of these statutes to cases in which contributory negligence is at issue, § 25-21,185.07 impliedly excludes the statutes' application outside of that context.

Section 25-21,185.07 applies the contributory-negligence provisions to civil actions in which contributory negligence may be a defense and involving injury, death, or property harm, but it does not make contributory negligence a defense where negligence is not the governing standard.

Graske v. Auto-Owners Insurance · filed 2009-08-13

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185.07 states the civil actions to which contributory negligence is a defense. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently analyzed § 25-21,185.07 and related statutes to determine whether contributory negligence could be asserted in a strict liability action. See Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006). In finding that it could not, the court found that the contributory negligence statutes were intended to permit the contributory negligence of a plaintiff to be compared to the negligence of other persons against whom recovery is sought. See id. at 218-19, 710 N.W.2d at 830-31. Because negligence is not the standard applicable to the claims asserted in this case, it follows that defendant should not be able to assert plaintiffs’ negligence as an affirmative defense.

Section 25-21,108 requires the court in a partition action to determine reasonable attorney fees after partition or confirmation of sale, tax them as costs, and allocate them according to the parties’ pleadings concerning shares and encumbrances.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 2009-04-17

Section 25-21,108 provides for attorney fees in partition actions as follows: [T]he court shall, after partition or after the confirmation of the sale and the conveyance by the referee, determine a reasonable amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, which amount shall be taxed as costs in the proceedings. If the shares confirmed by such judgment and the existence of all encumbrances of which the plaintiff had actual or constructive notice were accurately pleaded in the original complaint of the plaintiff, such attorney's fees shall be awarded entirely to the attorney for the plaintiff; otherwise, the court shall order such fees for the attorneys to be divided among such of the attorneys of record in the proceedings as have filed pleadings upon which any of the findings in the judgment of partition are based. ... We agree. ... For steering the partition action to a confirmed sale, the district court awarded Robert the entire amount of his attorney fees, $1,636.19. We do not find this to be an abuse of discretion.

Section 25-21,150 authorizes a person with rights under a contract to obtain a judicial determination of the contract’s construction or validity and a declaration of related rights or legal relations.

Young v. Govier & Milone · filed 2013-07-12

Section 25-21,150 provides: Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. ... As a court of record, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the claim for declaratory relief.

Section 25-21,221 requires a separate three-day notice to leave or quit before a forcible entry and detainer action, and a lease-termination notice does not substitute for it.

I.P. Homeowners, Inc. v. Morrow · filed 2003-09-0225-21,221

The above authority establishes that by statute as well as long practice, a notice to leave or quit is necessary in a forcible entry and detainer action.

Subsection (3) requires a name change when proper and reasonable cause and notice are established, and a petitioner’s inmate status alone is not a substantial reason to deny the change.

In Re Change of Name of Picollo · filed 2003-09-16(3)

In light of the language of § 25-21,271 and the above-cited cases, we find that the mere fact that a petitioner is an inmate is not a substantial reason for denying a petition for name change.

Section 25-21,150 gives the district court subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory-judgment issues, while § 25-21,154 permits but does not require the court to refuse a declaratory judgment that would not terminate the controversy.

Anderson v. Wells Fargo Financial Acceptance Pennsylvania, Inc. · filed 2005-04-0125-21,150 and 25-21,154

Section 25-21,150 gave the district court subject matter jurisdiction over the general class of issues raised in Anderson’s complaint, and the district court was possessed of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 25-21,149 authorizes courts of record within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine declaratory-judgment actions.

Brown v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2010-05-0525-21,149

Nebraska district court has the power to hear and determine actions for declaratory judgment.

Section 25-21,108 authorizes reasonable attorney-fee awards in partition proceedings after a judgment directs partition and the statutory partition process is completed.

Labenz v. Labenz · filed 2015-07-24

In particular, the recovery of such fees is permitted by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,108 (Reissue 2008), which provides: If, in the proceedings in partition, judgment shall be entered directing partition, as provided in section 25-2179, the court shall, after partition or after the confirmation of the sale and the conveyance by the referee, determine a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, which amount shall be taxed as costs in the proceedings. ... The Labenzes argue that their counsel is entitled to an award of attorney fees under our case law and under § 25-21,108. We disagree. While this case began as a partition action, that action effectively ended when the parties decided to sell the land at public auction. In this case, no referee was ever appointed. No referee’s report was ever issued. The court did not monitor the sale of the property. In certain partition actions, the award of attorney fees is permitted. But this was not a completed action for partition. We decline to expand the allowance of attorney fees to the scenario presented by these facts.

Sections 25-21,185.07 to 25-21,185.12 apply only in civil actions where contributory negligence may be a defense, so their jury-allocation instruction requirements do not apply outside that context.

Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc. · filed 2008-07-0325-21,185.07

§ 25-21,185.07 impliedly excludes the statutes’ application outside of that context.

Section 25-21,150 allows a person whose legal relations are affected by a statute to seek a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under that statute.

Jacob v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs. · filed 2013-07-23

Section 25-21,150 sets forth who may request a declaratory judgment under the act. ... Insomuch as the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act allows such a remedy, his petition is not frivolous.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act permits a person whose rights or legal relations are affected by a statute or ordinance to seek a declaration concerning its construction or validity.

Latenser v. Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 2017-05-30

Under Nebraska’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 (Reissue 2016), any person whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. See § 25-21,150. Here, Latenser is seeking to have the Intercessors’ status under § 55-884(k)(1) determined by the Zoning Board. In other words, he is seeking a declaratory judgment from the Zoning Board.

The name-change statutes do not authorize a district court to decide whether a minor child's birth date should be changed.

In re Change of Name of Druckenmiller · filed 2024-06-07

We hold that under the plain language of §§ 25-21,270 to 25-21,273, a district court, exercising jurisdiction in a name change case, has no power to decide whether a minor child’s birth date should be changed.

Nebraska's declaratory judgment statutes allow trustees and interested persons to seek declarations about questions arising in trust administration, including instructions on a trustee's duties and powers.

In re Margaret L. Matthews Revocable Trust · filed 2022-09-09

We have said that Nebraska’s declaratory judgment statutes allow trustees and persons interested in the administration of a trust to seek a declaration regarding any question arising in the administration of a trust. A trustee or beneficiary may apply to an appropriate court for instructions regarding the administration or distribution of the trust if there is reasonable doubt about the powers or duties of the trusteeship or about the proper interpretation of the trust provisions.

Section 25-21,185.10 does not apply when only one defendant remains when the case is submitted to the jury, while § 25-21,185.11 requires apportionment of a settling tort-feasor’s share and reduction of the claim against the remaining defendants by that share.

Ammon v. Nagengast · filed 2017-04-18(185.10), (185.11), and (185.11)(1)

Because Murry was no longer a defendant in Ammon’s action at the time the case was submitted to the jury, we agree that § 25-21,185.10 is inapplicable to the question of apportionment of liability between appellees and Murry. However, unlike in Maxwell v. Montey, supra, Murry was not merely dismissed as a party—she was dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement. ... In this case, appellees asserted the negligence of a settling third-party tort-feasor as a defense; thus, this is a “civil action to which contributory negligence was asserted as a defense,” and the provisions of the comparative fault statutes, including § 25-21,185.11, are applicable. As reflected above, § 25-21,185.11(1) plainly states that after the claimant settles with a joint tort-feasor, the claims against other persons “shall be reduced by the amount of the released person’s share of the obligation as determined by the trier of fact.”

Section 25-21,185.11(1) requires a claimant’s recovery against a non-settling defendant to be reduced by the settling party’s share as determined by the trier of fact; because that fact finding must be requested, a defendant can waive the resulting allocation.

S.S. v. Bellevue Medical Center · filed 2017-06-22(1)

First, it is not clear that the allocation statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 185.11, applies in cases such as this one where the plaintiff was not negligent. Compare Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 721 (8th Cir. 2008) (seeming to suggest that the statute applies only when the plaintiff was negligent), with Ammon v. Nagengast, No. A-15-1184, 2017 WL 1540753, at *5, (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2017) (noting that the statute applies even when the plaintiff was not negligent). But even if the statute applies, it does not unconditionally mandate allocation. Rather, it mandates that a plaintiff’s claim against a non-settling defendant “be reduced by the amount of the [settling party]’s share of the obligation as determined by the trier of fact.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 185.11(1) (emphasis added). The reduction requires a fact finding. Yet, as the district court noted, Bellevue failed to submit the tortfeasors’ relative obligations to the trier of fact. It therefore waived this determination, and, with it, an allocation.

Section 25-21,185.11 requires a plaintiff’s claim against a nonsettling defendant to be reduced by the settling party’s share of the obligation as determined by the trier of fact, rather than mandating allocation unconditionally.

Schmidt v. Heather Ramsey, APRN-CNM · filed 2017-06-2225-21,185.11

But even if the statute applies, it does not unconditionally mandate allocation.

For a name-change petition involving a petitioner under nineteen, certified-mail notice is required only for a legal parent who lacks custody; a person with no legal rights to custody, visitation, or otherwise is not a “noncustodial parent” entitled to that notice.

In re Change of Name of Whilde · filed 2017-12-22(2)

Section 25-21,271(2) requires that, in addition to the general notice that must be given by publication, “[i]n an action involving a petitioner under nineteen years of age who has a noncustodial parent, notice of the filing of the petition shall be sent by certified mail within five days after publication to the noncustodial parent . . . .” Whether Margaret was entitled to notice by certified mail, and therefore whether notice was given as required by the statute in this case, depends on whether she was a “noncustodial parent” within the meaning of the statute at the time notice was required to be given. ... We give the word “parent,” under the language of § 25-21,271(2), its plain and ordinary meaning, and Margaret was not a “parent” for purposes of the name-changing provision in § 25-21,271(2). Because Margaret had no legal rights to custody or visitation or otherwise with regard to the child at all relevant times during the pendency of this action to change the child’s name, it is clear that she was not a “noncustodial parent” under § 25-21,271(2) and that she was not entitled to notice by certified mail as afforded to a noncustodial parent under the statute.

Section 25-21,149 permits an insurer to seek declaratory relief on whether an insured’s conduct or a specific event is excluded from coverage and allows a declaration that the insurer owes no coverage when the conduct or event falls outside the policy.

Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Fisher · filed 2018-03-1325-21,149

We agree with GMR that a declaratory judgment can be entered when it is clear from the language of the policy that the insured’s actions are not covered by the policy. An insurer may petition a court to declare, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 2016) of Nebraska’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, whether an insured’s conduct or a specific event is excluded from coverage under a policy of insurance. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hadley, 264 Neb. 435, 648 N.W.2d 769 (2002). Where it is proved that a specific event or type of conduct is beyond the terms of an insurance policy, a court may enter a declaratory judgment that the insurer is not obligated to provide coverage to the insured for the event or conduct. Id.

Section 25-21,206 waives the State’s sovereign immunity for qualifying contract- or law-based claims only when the statute’s pleading requirements are satisfied.

Burke v. Bd. of Trs. of the Neb. State Colls. · filed 2019-03-15

Finally, both parties discuss Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,206 (Reissue 2016), which provides that the State may be sued in “any matter founded upon or growing out of a contract, express or implied, originally authorized or subsequently ratified by the Legislature, or founded upon any law of the state.” ... Section 25-21,206 contains specific requirements, one of which is that the complaint must comply with the pleading requirements in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,202 (Reissue 2016). ... Even liberally construed, Burke’s complaint does not address the requirements of subsections (4) or (5) in § 25-21,202. ... Here, § 25-21,206 expressly waives the State’s sovereign immunity, but only if the requirements of the statute are met. Burke’s complaint does not contain the necessary factual allegations to satisfy § 25-21,202, and therefore she cannot rely on § 25-21,206 to waive the State’s sovereign immunity here.

Section 25-21,206 waives sovereign immunity for suits founded on a contract or state law, but the waiver is strictly construed and a statutory fee-collection duty is not thereby contractual.

SID No. 1 v. Adamy · filed 2015-01-1625-21,206

We conclude there has been no waiver of the counties’ sovereign immunity in these cases.

Section 25-21,182 makes conformity with the state of the art at the time the product was first sold to a non-seller a defense in product-liability actions based on negligent or defective design, testing, or labeling.

Susman v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company · filed 2020-03-0525-21,182

Under Nebraska law: ... technology reasonably available at the time. ... The timeframe relevant to this defense is not when the tire was manufactured, but when it was “first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling” tires.

Section 25-21(1) voids construction-contract provisions requiring one party to indemnify another for the latter’s own negligence, but it does not apply where the agreement contains no such indemnity provision or, under this court’s analysis, to a goods transaction governed by the UCC.

SMA, LLC v. Chief Industries, Inc. · filed 2020-03-30(1)

There are several reasons why the anti-indemnification statutes do not apply here. First, the statutes are concerned with indemnification provisions where a second party is committing to indemnify a first party against damages caused by the sole negligence of the first party. Effectively such provisions make the second party the insurer of all the first party’s negligent acts or omissions. There is no such provision in the Agreement to Purchase between Chief Industries and SMA. ... This Court could find no authority that anti-indemnification provisions such as these apply to transactions for goods under the UCC. ... This Court concludes that the anti-indemnification provisions do not apply under the facts of this case and instead the UCC and the economic loss doctrine apply.

Section 25-21,150 authorizes declaratory judgments, but declaratory relief is unavailable when another equally serviceable remedy exists.

Cain v. Lymber · filed 2020-08-14

Although declaratory judgment actions are permitted by statute, our cases have held that there are some circumstances in which a declaratory judgment is not available. ... Thus, we have noted that an action for declaratory judgment will not lie where another equally serv­iceable remedy is available.

Section 25-21,180 defines a products-liability action broadly as an action for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by a product's manufacture or design, without limiting coverage to users or consumers.

Dubas v. Clark Equipment Company · filed 2021-03-31

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,180 also defines a products-liability action without limiting it to users or consumers as “any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, design . . . of any product.”

Section 25-21,185.11(2) permits a released tortfeasor to be dismissed or excluded as a party while the tortfeasor's negligence is still considered in determining liability.

Dubas v. Clark Equipment Company · filed 2021-09-09(2)

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.11, Kennedy Construction need not be a party to the Dubases’ claim against Clark Equipment in order for Clark Equipment to demonstrate any potential fault of Kennedy Construction in the accident.

Section 25-21,112 permits a person claiming title to or an estate in real estate to bring an action to determine interests, cancel unenforceable liens or claims, and quiet title; the court treated such a quiet-title action as in rem.

Max Christian Kant and Ann Marie Kant · filed 2022-11-28

An action to quiet title is in rem and is not affected by the discharge injunction. Under Nebraska statute: ... quieting the title to real estate. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,112 (emphasis added).

Section 25-21,112 permits a person claiming title or an estate in real estate to bring a quiet-title action against persons claiming, or apparently having, an adverse estate or interest in the property.

Page v. Siedband · filed 2023-11-14

An action may be brought and prosecuted to final decree, judgment or order, by any person or persons, whether in actual possession or not, claiming title to, or an estate in real estate against any person or persons who claim, or apparently have an adverse estate or interest therein, for the purpose of determining such estate, or interest, canceling unenforceable liens, or claims against, or which appear to be against said real estate, and quieting the title to real estate. ... She does not allege that appellees are claiming any “adverse estate or interest” in the property. ... Because Siedband does not allege appellees had an interest in the property adverse to her interest in the property, the district court properly dismissed the quiet title action against appellees with prejudice.

Section 25-21,149 authorizes declaratory judgments but does not remove the trial court’s discretion under the pleading rules to allow or deny an amendment adding a declaratory-judgment claim.

Jacob v. Nebraska Bd. of Parole · filed 2022-12-23

First, we find no merit to Jacob’s argument that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 2016), by stating that “[n]o action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for,” deprives the trial court of the discretion conferred by § 6-1115(a) of the rules of pleading to determine whether leave to amend should be given. ... This language does not address leave to amend.

Section 25-21,159 requires all persons with an interest that could be affected by declaratory relief to be joined as parties; a person is indispensable when the court cannot decide the controversy without affecting that interest.

In re Eileen Ryan Revocable Trust · filed 2024-05-0325-21,159

When declaratory relief is sought, it is a statutory requirement that “all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration.”

Section 25-21,221 requires a party bringing a forcible-entry-and-detainer action to give the adverse party at least three days’ notice to leave the premises, with service by delivery to the party or, if unavailable, at the usual place of abode.

Kramer Ranch Co. v. Kramer · filed 2025-07-0825-21,221

The 3-day notice or “notice to quit” is necessary to obtaining an order of restitution in a forcible entry and detainer action. See I.P. Homeowners v. Morrow, 12 Neb. App. 119, 668 N.W.2d 515 (2003). ... Here, there was evidence that the notice to leave premises was served on May 3, 2024, at Bruce’s home address. Therefore, there was no plain error regarding the notice and the district court did not err in failing to dismiss Kramer Ranch’s complaint for forcible entry and detainer.

Section 25-21,185.09 requires an instruction on the effects of allocating negligence when the claimant's contributory negligence is at issue, but it does not apply when no contributory negligence is alleged against the claimant.

Lear v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital Sys. · filed 2025-07-22185.09

Here, however, based on the facts of this case, no allocation of negligence instruction was required. ... Here, there was no allegation that there was any contributory negligence on Joshua’s part, so § 25-21,185.09 is inapplicable in this case.

Under § 25-21,243(1), the trial court must decide as a matter of law whether the action lacked a substantial basis in fact and law or a substantial argument for changing existing law; only if it did may the jury decide the required malicious purpose and damages.

SAND LIVESTOCK SYSTEMS, INC. v. Svoboda · filed 2008-09-16(1)

We hold that under § 25-21,243(1), a trial court must first determine as a matter of law whether the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Section 25-21,185.10 requires several, proportional liability for noneconomic damages when defendants did not act as part of a common enterprise or plan, with a separate judgment against each defendant.

Sinsel v. Olsen · filed 2009-12-24185.10

Where, as here, there was no claim that multiple defendants acted as a part of a common enterprise or plan, the liability of each defendant for noneconomic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of negligence, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.