Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912

A motion for new trial does not toll the 30-day deadline to appeal a criminal judgment under § 25-1912.

State v. Veatch · filed 2007-10-23(1)

A motion for new trial does not toll the running of the 30-day jurisdictional requirement of § 25-1912.

A notice of appeal filed before the court announces a ruling on a pending motion to alter or amend the judgment has no effect.

Beckman v. McAndrew · filed 2007-12-04(3)

We conclude that Beckman's motion to dismiss in this case should be treated as a motion to alter or amend because it asks for vacation of the July 18, 2006, order and dismissal of the action. At the time Beckman's notice of appeal was filed on August 15, there had been no announcement by the court or order entered with regard to the motion to dismiss. Therefore, under § 25-1912(3), the notice of appeal filed on August 15 was of no effect.

A timely motion for new trial after a hearing that constitutes a trial terminates the time for filing a notice of appeal.

Meister v. Meister · filed 2007-12-21(3)

Because there was a trial, Schlender ... properly moved for new trial within 10 days, terminating the time for filing a notice of appeal.

Section 25-1912(3) tolls the 30-day appeal period only for a timely motion for new trial, to alter or amend a judgment, or to set aside a verdict.

Peavy v. Hansen · filed 2013-12-24(3)

The 30-day appeal period is tolled only by a timely motion for new trial, a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment, or a timely motion to set aside the verdict. See § 25-1912(3).

A timely motion for new trial stops the time to appeal, and the 30-day period begins when the court rules on the motion.

Despain v. Despain · filed 2015-02-06(3)

Time to appeal from the decree was terminated until the district court ruled on the motion for new trial. The notice of appeal filed within 30 days after the ruling on the motion for new trial was timely.

A timely motion for new trial stops the time for filing a notice of appeal and gives the party 30 days after the order denying the motion to appeal.

Lindsay Internat. Sales & Serv. v. Wegener · filed 2017-09-15(3)(a)

But under § 25-1912(3)(a), a timely motion for new trial under § 25-1144.01 will terminate the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal, giving the party 30 days from the entry of the order denying the motion to file a notice of appeal.

A timely motion to alter or amend terminates the 30-day appeal period, which begins anew when the court rules on the motion.

Lombardo v. Sedlacek · filed 2018-03-23(3)

Thus, under § 25-1912(3), the time to appeal to this court begins anew after the motion to alter or amend is disposed of.

Section 25-1912(3) saves a notice of appeal filed after the court officially announces its decision on a timely postjudgment motion but before it enters the ruling.

Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha · filed 2017-05-12(3)

Therefore, we cannot determine that an announcement was made which was sufficient to invoke the savings clause of § 25-1912(3) (Reissue 2016).

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal under § 25-1912.

Jordan v. LSF8 Master Participation Trust · filed 2018-07-13(3)(b)

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016), however, also terminates the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal under § 25-1912.

Section 25-1912(3) restarts the 30-day appeal period when a timely postjudgment motion is decided; an untimely motion does not toll the period.

Skalsky v. Skalsky · filed 2018-07-17(3)

Under § 25-1912(3), filing a timely postjudgment motion terminates the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed; instead, the 30-day period to appeal starts anew upon the entry of the order ruling upon the postjudgment motion. ... Because her motion was filed more than 10 days after entry of the court’s order, it was not effective as either a motion for new trial or a motion to alter or amend. Thus, her motion did not operate as a tolling motion. Melissa’s notice of appeal, also filed on June 30, was timely and effective to divest the district court of jurisdiction.

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the appeal period, and a new 30-day period begins when the court rules on the motion.

Bryson L. v. Izabella L. · filed 2019-01-25(3)

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the time to file an appeal, and the full 30-day period to appeal begins to run from the entry of the order ruling upon the motion to alter or amend a judgment.

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment stops the appeal clock, makes an earlier notice of appeal ineffective, and requires a new notice after the motion is decided.

Welch v. Peery · filed 2019-03-05(3)

Section 25-1912(3) provides that the running for the time for appeal shall be terminated by the filing of a timely motion to alter or amend judgment. ... Thus, with regard to the district court’s decision to deny his motion for contempt, Preston’s notice of appeal is of no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of an order ruling on his motion to reconsider.

Section 25-1912(3) terminates the running of the appeal period when a timely motion seeks to alter or amend a district court judgment disposing of a petition in error.

McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys. · filed 2019-07-12(3)

It naturally follows that a motion to alter or amend a judgment, which motion seeks a substantive alteration of a judgment entered by a district court disposing of a petition in error and which motion is filed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment, will terminate the time for running of appeal pursuant to § 25-1912(3).

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment ends the running of the 30-day appeal period, which begins again when the court rules on the motion.

Grayek v. Anguiano · filed 2019-12-17(3)

Accordingly, we treat Grayek’s motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because Grayek filed his motion 10 days after the district court entered its order granting summary judgment, the motion was timely filed and terminated the 30-day period to appeal.

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment makes a notice of appeal filed before the motion is decided ineffective.

State ex rel. BH Media Group v. Frakes · filed 2020-05-15(3)

As a result, under § 25-912(3), the motions to alter or amend caused Frakes’ notice of appeal to have no effect.

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the time to appeal, and a notice of appeal filed before the court rules on that motion is ineffective.

Kingston v. Kingston · filed 2022-07-26(3)

Thus, Trevor’s motion constitutes the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend that was filed within 10 days of a judgment and thus terminated the time to file an appeal. Accordingly, Laura’s July 13 notice of appeal, filed before the court resolved Trevor’s motion, was ineffective.

A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the time to appeal, and the 30-day period begins anew when the court rules on the motion.

Arnold v. Walz · filed 2020-06-19(3)

However, filing a timely motion for a new trial or a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment terminates the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed.

A notice of appeal filed while a terminating motion is pending has no effect, and the motion remains effective until it is dismissed.

State v. Harris · filed 2020-09-25(3)

Under § 25-1912(3), a notice of appeal filed before a pending terminating motion has been dismissed shall have no effect. But the terminating motion continues to operate until it is dismissed, even if the proponent attempts to appeal in the meantime.

A timely motion under § 25-1329 terminates the time to appeal under § 25-1912(3), but a motion under § 25-2001 does not.

Patterson v. Patterson · filed 2021-11-30(3)

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020) provides that the appeal time shall be terminated “by a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016). ... However, Frank’s motion to “amend or alter judgment” was not filed pursuant to § 25-1329; rather, it was filed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016), which provides for the district court’s power to vacate or modify its judgments or orders during its term or upon a motion filed within 6 months after entry of a judgment. Accordingly, there is no pending motion terminating the appeal time for the December 22 decree and the absence of a district court order disposing of Frank’s post-decree motion does not impact this court’s jurisdiction over the present appeal.

A timely motion to alter or amend stops the appeal clock until a court order disposes of the motion; a notice of appeal filed before then has no effect.

Dunham v. Dunham · filed 2026-04-21(3)

However, until a timely filed tolling motion is disposed of by the entry of a court order, the appeal clock is not triggered. See § 25-1912(3). Therefore, the appeal filed in case No. A-25-177 is of “no effect,” id., and is dismissed, while the appeal filed in case No. A-25-338 properly triggers the jurisdiction of this court.

The 30-day period to appeal a final order begins when the order is entered on the trial court’s journal.

In Re Interest of JA · filed 1994-01-14(1)

When an appeal is taken from a final order, the time for appeal begins to run when the order is entered on the journal of the court.

The 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal begins when the judgment is rendered in open court with a trial docket notation or when it is entered on the court’s journal.

Tri-County Landfill, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1995-02-03(1)

Thus, there are two occurrences which may begin the 30-day period in which a notice of appeal must be filed: (1) the rendition of the judgment, which occurs when an oral pronouncement of the judgment is made in open court and a notation of the judgment is made on the trial docket, or (2) the entry of a judgment, which is the act of the clerk of the court in spreading on the court’s journal both the proceedings had and the relief granted or denied.

Section 25-1912(2) treats a notice of appeal or poverty affidavit filed after announcement of a final order but before its entry as filed on the date of entry.

State v. Billups · filed 2001-08-07(2)

Since a poverty affidavit which is substituted for the docket fee must be filed within the time and in the manner required for filing the docket fee and § 25-1912(2), a poverty affidavit filed or deposited after the announcement of a decision or final order but before entry of the judgment, decree, or final order shall be treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order and on the date of entry of the judgment, decree, or final order. Consequently, Billups’ notice of appeal and poverty affidavit which were filed prior to the entry of the district court’s final order are treated as if they were filed after the entry of the final order and are sufficient to perfect an appeal therefrom.

Section 25-1912(2) does not let a notice of appeal relate forward when it was filed before the announcement of a final judgment.

J & H Swine, Inc. v. Hartington Concrete, Inc. · filed 2004-09-28(2)

Section 25-1912(2) was not intended to validate anticipatory notices of appeal filed prior to the announcement of a final judgment.

Section 25-1912(2) saves a premature notice of appeal only when the announced decision would be final and appealable once entered.

State v. Lotter · filed 2018-09-28(2)

Because the court did not reach the merits of claim 3, its February 22, 2017, order did not announce a “deci- sion or final order” within the meaning of § 25-1912(2).

Section 25-1912(2) allows a notice of appeal filed after an oral announcement to take effect upon entry of the order; the oral announcement alone is not appealable.

In re Interest of John J. · filed 2019-06-25(2)

This implies that even where there has been an oral pronouncement of the decision, an order must still be entered before there can be appellate review. In the present case, there was never a written order signed by the judge stating that Byron’s visitation was suspended following the court’s oral pronouncement in court. Because there was never a written order, the clerk of the court never entered a judgment. Therefore, there was no appealable order entered from the court’s oral pronouncement suspending Byron’s visitation.

Section 25-1912(2) allows a notice of appeal to relate forward only if it is filed after announcement of a decision or final order but before entry of judgment.

Schnackel v. Schnackel · filed 2019-11-26(2)

Section 25-1912(2) provides for rela- tion forward of a notice of appeal or docket fee only when it is filed or deposited after the announcement of a decision or final order, but before entry of the judgment. Here, there was no announcement of a decision or final order on the postdecree motion prior to the filing of the notice of appeal; therefore, the original notice of appeal does not encompass the postdecree order.

Section 25-1912 requires a timely notice of appeal and a docket fee deposited with the trial court clerk to obtain Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.

In Re Interest of KDB · filed 1989-09-15

Except as hereinafter noted, for the Supreme Court to obtain appellate jurisdiction, it is mandatory that a party timely file a notice of appeal and deposit a docket fee in the office of the clerk of the trial court.

Section 25-1912 requires a notice of appeal and docket fee within 30 days; an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis may file a poverty affidavit in place of the fee.

In Re Interest of NLB · filed 1990-01-26

Section 25-1912 requires that the notice of appeal must be filed and the docket fee paid within 30 days of the rendition of the judgment or decree or the making of the final order from which an appeal is taken. The appeal is deemed perfected upon compliance with those requirements. ... In this case, appellant has filed both the notice of appeal and the poverty affidavit within the time prescribed by statute. ... In any event, we hold that all that is necessary for one proceeding in forma pauperis to confer jurisdiction on this court on appeal is to file the notice of appeal and the affidavit of poverty required by § 25-2301.

Section 25-1912 requires an appellant to deposit the docket fee with the district court clerk within 30 days of the order being appealed.

Fine v. Fine · filed 1995-10-03

Under § 25-1912 and Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 33-103 and 33-106.04 (Reissue 1993), an appellant must deposit $53 with the clerk of the district court within 30 days of the order being appealed.

Section 25-1912 controls the deadline for paying the docket fee to perfect an appeal; denial of a request to proceed in forma pauperis does not extend that deadline.

In Re Interest of Noelle F. · filed 1996-03-15(1)

We first address whether § 25-2308 extends the time to pay docket fees when the trial court has denied a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. From our review of § 25-1912 and §§ 25-2301 to 25-2310, we conclude that it does not. The time for perfecting an appeal is controlled by § 25-1912, and the time for filing the docket fee is not extended by § 25-2308.

Section 25-1912(3) requires a notice of appeal and a docket fee to vest appellate jurisdiction; a poverty affidavit substitutes for the fee only if it states that the appellant cannot pay the costs of the appeal.

State v. Schmailzl · filed 1995-06-30(3)

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 1994) provides that an appellate court obtains jurisdiction over an appeal when the notice of appeal and the docket fee have been deposited in the office of the clerk of the district court. ... We hold that a poverty affidavit must assert that the defendant is unable by reason of poverty to pay the costs of the appeal in order to vest jurisdiction with an appellate court. An inadequate affidavit does not waive the mandatory docket, fee or vest jurisdiction, and this case must be dismissed because the appeal was not properly perfected.

An appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal and paying the docket fee or filing a valid poverty affidavit in its place; an appeal is dismissed when leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied and the fee remains unpaid.

In Re Interest of Noelle F. · filed 1995-07-25(1), (3)

The cases hold, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum. Supp. 1994), that an appeal is perfected upon filing a notice of appeal and paying a docket fee or upon filing a valid poverty affidavit in lieu of such docket fee. ... Given the trial court’s proper finding that appellant’s requests to proceed in forma pauperis were not well taken and the fact that appellant has failed to pay docket fees in connection with these appeals, we dismiss the appeals. See § 25-1912(1) and (3).

Section 25-1912(3) provides for perfecting an appeal by timely filing a notice of appeal and paying the associated costs; once perfected, the appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over the case.

Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Bellevue Bridge Commission · filed 1998-10-13(3)

The commission’s appeal was properly perfected, in that the commission timely filed its notice of intention to appeal and paid the costs associated with such notice. § 25-1912(3). Therefore, the district court order nunc pro tunc is not considered by us, nor is it effective for any purpose, as the district court clearly lacked jurisdiction to enter the order.

An appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is filed and the docket fee deposited, at which point the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case.

Micro/Mini Systems, Inc. v. Boyle · filed 1996-07-09(3)

Section 25-1912(3) provides in significant part: “[A]n appeal shall be deemed perfected and the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of the cause when such notice of appeal has been filed and such docket fee deposited . . . .” ... We conclude that the trial court lost its jurisdiction upon Micro’s appeal on January 13, 1995, and after that date it was without jurisdiction to enter the order dismissing Micro’s action against Boyle P.C.

A poverty affidavit used to perfect an appeal must be filed during the 30 days after the judgment or final order.

State v. Parmar · filed 1998-09-25

Therefore, a poverty affidavit is insufficient to perfect an appeal unless it is filed during the 30-day period following the rendition of judgment.

Section 25-1912 makes the notice of appeal and docket fee mandatory and jurisdictional; an appeal is not perfected without the required fee.

Martin v. McGinn · filed 2004-04-29(4)

When the district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal on June 3, 2003, Martin had 30 days in which to file a docket fee with the clerk of the district court. See §§ 25-1912 and 25-2301.02(1). Since the record indicates that Martin did not file a docket fee, he did not perfect his appeal and we lack jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, the notice of appeal and docket fee were mandatory and jurisdictional.

Section 25-1912 requires a notice of appeal and a docket fee; a proper in forma pauperis application and poverty affidavit can substitute for payment of the fee.

Glass v. Kenney · filed 2004-10-15

We have stated that “[a] poverty affidavit serves as a substitute for the docket fee otherwise required upon appeal by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 33-103 . . . and § 25-1912.” ... In case No. S-03-128, Glass filed a timely notice of appeal, a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis, and a poverty affidavit, and thus, contrary to the State’s contention, case No. S-03-128 was properly docketed in this court, and we obtained jurisdiction.

Section 25-1912(4) makes a juvenile appeal jurisdictionally effective when the appellant files a notice of appeal and pays the docket fee within 30 days; an appeal bond is not jurisdictional.

State v. Richard F. · filed 2005-06-28(4)

Our statutory law states, and our case law holds, that to perfect an appeal from a juvenile court to an appellate court, the appealing party must, within 30 days after the rendition of such judgment, (1) file a notice of appeal with the juvenile court and (2) deposit with the clerk of the juvenile court the docket fee required by law.

Section 25-1912(4) requires payment of the docket fee within 30 days to perfect an appeal; a good faith attempt to pay does not satisfy that requirement.

In Re Interest of Jesse D. · filed 2007-05-08(4)

The simple fact is that although OJS attempted to tender payment of the docket fee during the 30 days after the entry of the county court’s order, the docket fee was not actually paid until August 24, 2006, which was more than 30 days after entry of the county court’s order. Since OJS did not pay the required docket fee within 30 days after the county court’s order and said payment is a jurisdictional requirement, this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

Only filing a notice of appeal and depositing the docket fee are jurisdictional requirements; late payment for a bill of exceptions does not require dismissal.

In re Guardianship of Celeste T. · filed 2015-12-01(4)

The fee requirement, albeit important to the operation of our judicial system, is not jurisdictional, and we decline to consider it further. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(4) (Reissue 2008)(no step other than filing of notice of appeal and depositing of docket fee shall be deemed jurisdictional).

Section 25-1912 requires a party to file a notice of appeal and pay the docket fee within 30 days after entry of the order, unless in forma pauperis status is granted.

In re Interest of D.I. · filed 2018-12-31

To perfect an appeal under § 25-1912, a party must, within 30 days after entry of the order from which the appeal is being taken, file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court and deposit the required docket fee unless in forma pauperis status is granted.

An appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal and depositing the required docket fee with the district court clerk.

Seldin v. Estate of Silverman · filed 2020-03-06

An appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal and depositing the required docket fee with the clerk of the district court.

Section 25-1912(4) does not make the age of a timely filed poverty affidavit a jurisdictional bar when the district court grants an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

State v. Blake · filed 2022-01-28(4)

The relative stale- ness of the execution of a poverty affidavit does not change the mandate of § 29-2306 that “[i]f an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed and granted, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall acquire jurisdiction of the case when the notice of appeal is filed with the clerk of the district court” nor the mandate of § 25-1912(4) that “no step other than the filing of such notice of appeal and the depositing of such docket fee shall be deemed jurisdictional.”

An appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal and depositing the docket fee; requesting a bill of exceptions is not required for perfection.

Willbrand on behalf of Willbrand-Santos v. Sotolongo · filed 2024-06-11(4)

We note that according to § 25-1912, the request for a bill of exceptions or lack thereof does not affect the perfection of an appeal.

Section 25-1912 requires the district court clerk to forward notices of appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Ellis v. Francis Kneifl, Individually and as Judge for the State District Court of Nebraska, Cedar County · filed 1987-11-25

Section 25-2214 certainly does not make the clerk the court’s agent for the purpose of violating the mandate of § 25-1912 to forward notices of appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Section 25-1912(5) permits a district court clerk to certify for appellate review only a true copy of the proceedings before the trial court.

State v. Caton · filed 1994-06-21(5)

A clerk of a district court can only certify for review that which is a “true copy of the proceedings” before the trial court. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(5) (Cum. Supp. 1992).

Section 25-1912(5) permits the district court clerk to certify only proceedings contained in the district court’s records.

State v. Hanus · filed 1995-07-03(5)

Of course, the district court clerk can certify only those proceedings “contained” in that court. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(5) (Cum. Supp. 1994). It is obvious that no official county court transcript was ever transmitted to the clerk of the district court. Therefore, none was “contained” in the district court’s records.

Section 25-1912 prevents a district court from entering a further judgment in the appealed matter after a notice of appeal is filed.

Beavers v. Graham · filed 1981-07-31

The judgment on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment entered February 8, 1980, was in error and should not have been entered.

Section 25-1912(3)’s phrase “of the cause” does not create a jurisdictional distinction from the phrase “of the matter appealed” in § 25-2729(2).

Salkin v. Jacobsen · filed 2002-03-29(3)

Jacobsen argues that there is a principled difference between the phrase “of the matter appealed” in § 25-2729(2) and the phrase “of the cause” in § 25-1912(3). He contends that because district courts, pursuant to § 25-2729(2), only obtain jurisdiction “of the matter appealed,” the county court is free to consider those matters not directly on appeal, including attorney fees. By contrast, Jacobsen suggests that the phrase “of the cause,” as used in appeals from a district court under § 25-1912(3), completely strips the district court of all jurisdiction. Jacobsen cites no authority in support of this argument, and we find it to be premised upon a semantic distinction without a difference.

Section 25-1912(4) leaves the district court with jurisdiction to correct a void sentence before the defendant files a notice of appeal and poverty affidavit.

State v. Alston · filed 2020-06-30(4)

See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018); State v. Schmailzl, 248 Neb. 314, 534 N.W.2d 743 (1995) (appellate court obtains jurisdiction over appeal when notice of appeal and docket fee have been deposited in office of clerk of district court). ... After acknowledging its error, the district court proceeded to resentence Alston prior to Alston filing a notice of appeal and poverty affidavit. Here, the district court’s original sentences were invalid and void, and pursuant to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Lotter, supra, the district court retained jurisdiction over Alston at the time of the resentencing.

Section 25-1912 supplies the appeal procedure for final district court orders under the Sex Offender Commitment Act, regardless of which party appeals.

In re Interest of L.T. · filed 2016-10-28

We therefore hold the proper procedure to be followed when taking an appeal from a final order of the district court under § 71-1214 is the general appeal procedure set forth in § 25-1912. That appeal procedure applies regardless of the party taking the appeal, applies in both criminal and civil cases, and provides a procedure “to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification of . . . final orders made by the district court.”

Section 25-1912’s ordinary appeal procedure does not let the State challenge an order granting absolute discharge in a criminal case without following § 29-2315.01’s exception proceeding requirements.

State v. Jones · filed 2026-01-30

In this case, we address a somewhat arcane question of appellate procedure: Could the State of Nebraska obtain appellate review of a district court order granting a criminal defendant’s motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds by filing an ordinary appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2024)? Or was it instead required to pursue an exception proceeding under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Cum. Supp. 2024)? We conclude that under the circumstances, the State was obligated to pursue an excep- tion proceeding under § 29-2315.01.

Section 25-1912 permits an appeal from a district court’s final order in a criminal case even when the case is remanded for further proceedings below.

State v. Beyer · filed 2000-11-09

Sections 25-1911 and 25-1912 provide for an appeal from a final order of a district court in both civil and criminal cases. Thus, in the present case, once the district court rendered a judgment affirming Beyer’s conviction, the district court’s judgment was final for purposes of filing an appeal from that order, even though the case was remanded for further proceedings on the restitution issue.