FMSHRC ALJ decision Docket WEVA 2016-0134-D Decided February 5, 2016 Procedural Judge Janet G. Harner

Secretary of Labor obo Jesse R. Stolzenfels v. Marion County Coal Company, and its successors

Secretary of Labor obo Jesse R. Stolzenfels v. Marion County Coal Company (FMSHRC WEVA 2016-0134-D): Economic reinstatement settlement remained binding

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This order from 2016 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ezel answers your situation under the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 2016
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Interlocutory temporary-reinstatement order, not Commission precedent
This order preserved economic reinstatement while MSHA continued investigating the underlying discrimination complaint. It did not dispose of the case or become a final decision under the 40-day rule in 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1). No later Commission review appears in the official index. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Marion County Coal did not request a hearing on Jesse Stolzenfels's temporary-reinstatement application and instead joined a settlement providing economic reinstatement. The agreement stated that payments would continue until MSHA declined the discrimination complaint or the matter reached a final unappealed decision. The operator later sought dissolution, citing a mine idling and an alleged media comment by Stolzenfels's counsel about why economic reinstatement had been chosen. Judge Janet G. Harner found no evidence supporting dissolution or tolling and concluded that the operator had simply changed its mind because of the alleged comment. Because the settlement showed no fraud or mutual mistake, the motion was denied.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited authority: 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45
  • Outcome: The motion to dissolve temporary economic reinstatement was denied, leaving the settlement in effect.
  • Key point: A party that waived a hearing and negotiated economic reinstatement remains bound until the agreement ends by its own terms, absent fraud or mutual mistake.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

7 PARKWAY CENTER,
SUITE 290

875 GREENTREE ROAD

PITTSBURGH, PA 15220

TELEPHONE:
412-920-7240 / FAX: 412-928-8689

SECRETARY
OF LABOR

MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH   

ADMINISTRATION
(MSHA),

On
behalf of JESSE R. STOLZENFELS

Complainant

v.

MARION
COUNTY COAL COMPANY,

and
its successors,

Respondent

TEMPORARY
REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDING

Docket
No. WEVA 2016-134-D

MORG-CD-2016-3

Mine
I.D.: 46-01433

Mine:
Loveridge No. 22

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO
DISSOLVE ORDER APPROVIING JOINT SETTLEMENT MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ECONOMIC
REINSTATEMENT

On
December 10, 2015, pursuant to Section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 (“Act”), 30 U.S.C. §801, et. seq., and 29 C.F.R.
§2700.45, the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) filed an Application for
Temporary Reinstatement of miner Jesse R. Stolzenfels (“Stolzenfels” or
“Complainant”) to his former position with Consolidation Coal Co., now known as
Marion County Coal Company (herein “Respondent”) at its Loveridge #22 Mine[1] pending
final hearing and disposition of the case.

Respondent
did not timely request a hearing on the Secretary’s Application . Rather, on December
22, 2015, I received a Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Regarding Temporary
Reinstatement from Respondent, the Secretary and the attorneys for Stolzenfels.
This Motion provided for temporary economic reinstatement in lieu of physical
reinstatement. This Motion provided:

5.
 Mr. Stolzenfels’s period of economic temporary reinstatement will terminate
upon a                             finding by MSHA that section 105(c)(1) has
not been violated. Alternatively, if                             MSHA finds
that the discrimination complaint has merit and causes a Complaint of                                   Discrimination
to be filed with the Review Commission, Mr. Stolzenfels’s temporary                                     reinstatement
shall expire only after any decision or other similar order from the                                  Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission becomes a final order that is not                        appealed
by the Secretary, Mr. Stolzenfels or Respondent.

On
December 23, 2015, I issued a Decision and Order Approving Joint Settlement Motion
for Temporary Economic Reinstatement. This Order specifically included the
paragraph noted above describing how temporary economic reinstatement would
terminate.

On
January 19, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dissolve Order Approving Joint
Motion for Temporary Economic Reinstatement (“Motion to Dissolve”). On January
28, 2016, the Secretary and the Complainant filed oppositions to the Motion to
Dissolve. In support of its Motion, Respondent asserts that the mine was idled
until January 18, 2016,[2]
and Stolzenfels has been placed in a better position than he would have been
had he been reinstated. Further, Respondent asserts that it was informed that
counsel for Stolzenfels issued a comment to the media that Respondent placed Stolzenfels
on temporary economic reinstatement because it wanted to avoid “demonstrat[ing]
[that] workers have rights they can use to speak out on the job”;[3] and that
Respondent wishes to avoid any appearance such is the case.

The
Secretary and the Complainant oppose the Motion to Dissolve on the basis that
Respondent has presented no evidence to support either dissolution or tolling. The
Secretary’s Opposition recites many reasons why dissolution is not appropriate,
all of which I find to have merit. In sum, I conclude that Respondent is not
entitled to dissolution of my Decision and Order Approving Joint Settlement
Motion for Temporary Economic Reinstatement.

Initially
I note that Respondent did not request a hearing on the Secretary’s
Application, thereby forgoing a contest of the Secretary’s Application. Rather
it chose to join in a motion by the parties on temporary economic
reinstatement. In the Joint Motion , Respondent agreed that economic
reinstatement would continue until either the Secretary declined to issue a
Complaint of Discrimination[4]
or until there was a final decision by the Review Commission or an appropriate
Court of Appeals if the Respondent appealed an unfavorable decision by the
Commission. The only justification for Respondent to now seek dissolution is
that it has had a change of heart, as noted by the Secretary in his Opposition
to the Motion to Dissolve, that was occasioned by the Complainant’s counsel’s alleged
remarks to the media. It would thus appear that the Motion to Dissolve was in
retaliation for such perceived remarks, whether true or not. Clearly, this is a
totally insufficient basis for dissolution.

It
is well settled Commission law that a valid settlement agreement cannot be
reopened or altered unless there are grounds of fraud or mutual mistake. United
Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1769, District 22 v. Utah Power and Light
Company, 12 FMSHRC 1548, 1555 (Aug. 1990). Moreover, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 60(b), do not provide a basis for
Respondent’s requested relief as there has been no mistake, inadvertence,
fraud, misconduct or other applicable reason for relief. See also Secretary
of Labor (MSHA) o/b/o Juan G. Pena v. Eisenman Chemical Company, 11 FMSHRC
2166, 1267-68 (Nov. 1989). In the instant case Respondent agreed to temporary
economic reinstatement and cannot now claim that it was mistaken so as to
entitle it to dissolution of the settlement. Respondent, like all parties to a
settlement, should be bound by all the terms it negotiated until the agreement
is terminated by its terms.

Respondent’s
Motion to Dissolve is without merit and IT IS HEREBY DENIED.

/s/ Janet G. Harner

Janet
G. Harner

Administrative
Law Judge

Distribution
(Via E-mail and First Class Mail):

Jordana
L. Greenwald, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U. S. Department of Labor, The
Curtis Center, Suite 630 East, 170 South Independence Mall West, Philadelphia,
PA 19106-3306

greenwald,[email protected]

Thomas
A. Smock, Esq., Philip K. Kontul, Esq., & Michael D. Glass, Esq., Ogletree,
Deakins, Smoak, Nash & Stewart, P.C. One PPG Place, Suite 100, Pittsburgh,
PA 15222

[email protected] [email protected] & [email protected]

Tony
Oppegard, Esq., P.O. Box 22446, Lexington, KY 40522 [email protected]

Rachel
Hanna, Esq., Law Office of Rachel Hanna, P.O. Box 871, 117 E. Washington St.,
Lewisburg, WV 24901 [email protected]

Jesse
R. Stolzenfels 1209 Wilson Ridge Road, Thornton, WV 26440

[1] This mine,
located in Marion County, West Virginia, was purchased by Murray Energy Company.
from CONSOL Energy, Inc. in December 2013 and its name has been subsequently
changed to Marion County Coal Company.

[2] No further
details of this alleged mine idling were included in the Motion.

[3] Respondent did
not identify the source of the alleged comment by the Complainant’s counsel.

[4] This event has
not occurred as MSHA has not yet concluded his investigation of Stolzenfels’s
discrimination complaint.

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