Ravalli County

Plain-English summary

Ravalli County failed to answer the Secretary’s penalty petition and a show-cause order, so an ALJ entered a default order assessing a $954 civil penalty. Ravalli later sent its contest letter to MSHA’s district office instead of the Commission and asked to reopen the case, explaining that it believed the district office would forward the letter. The Commission treated the letter as a late petition for discretionary review, excused the late filing, and reopened the proceeding. It remanded the case to the ALJ to decide whether relief from default was warranted under Rule 60(b). Two Commissioners would have granted the motion outright because the Secretary did not oppose reopening.

Decision snapshot

• Cited authority: 30 U.S.C. §§ 823(d)(1) and (d)(2), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.1(b), 2700.69(b), and 2700.70(a)
• Outcome: The Commission reopened the proceeding, excused the late review filing, and remanded for the ALJ to decide whether Rule 60(b) relief from default was warranted.
• Key point: A misdirected letter may be treated as a late petition for review when justice requires, but the ALJ must still decide whether the record supports relief from default.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1730 K STREET N.W., 6TH FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

                                     October 27, 1999

SECRETARY OF LABOR, :
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH :
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA) :
:
v. : Docket No. WEST 99-164-M
: A.C. No. 24-01302-05508
RAVALLI COUNTY :

BEFORE: Jordan, Chairman; Marks, Riley, Verheggen, and Beatty, Commissioners

                                         ORDER

BY: Jordan, Chairman; Riley and Beatty, Commissioners

    This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of

1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1994) (“Mine Act”). On June 25, 1999, Chief Administrative
Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order of Default to Ravalli County (“Ravalli”) for failing to
answer the Petition for Assessment of Penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor on April 1, 1999, or
the judge’s Order to Respondent to Show Cause issued on May 14, 1999. The judge assessed the
civil penalty of $954 proposed by the Secretary.

    On September 9, 1999, Judge Merlin received a facsimile from Ravalli, which included a

copy of a letter dated June 30, 1999 from Ravalli’s attorney to the Department of Labor’s Mine
Safety and Health Administration’s (“MSHA”) District’s Office in Denver, Colorado, requesting
that the default order be set aside and a proceeding on the merits allowed. Mot. at 1. With this
request, Ravalli also attached a copy of a letter dated April 28, 1999 sent to MSHA’s District
Office, contesting the citations and a letter dated June 29, 1999 from Ravalli to its attorneys
regarding its actions in handling this matter and the default order entered by Judge Merlin in this
proceeding. Id. at 3-5. In its June 30 letter to MSHA, Ravalli asserts that it believed that its
April 28 letter to MSHA satisfied its filing requirements in response to the Secretary’s petition
for assessment of penalties and the judge’s show cause order. Id. at 1. It also alleges that it
believed MSHA’s District’s Office would forward its letter to the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (“the Commission”) and would have sent the letter to the
Commission itself if it had known MSHA would not forward its letter. Id.

   The judge’s jurisdiction in this matter terminated when his decision was issued on

June 25, 1999. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.69(b). Under the Mine Act and the Commission’s procedural

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rules, relief from a judge’s decision may be sought by filing a petition for discretionary review
within 30 days of its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a). If the
Commission does not direct review within 40 days of a decision’s issuance, it becomes a final
decision of the Commission. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1). The Commission received Ravalli’s letter
on September 9, 1999, more than 30 days after the judge’s default order had become a final
decision of the Commission.

    Relief from a final Commission judgment or order is available to a party under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(1) in circumstances involving mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. F. W.
Contractors, Inc., 17 FMSHRC 247, 248 (Mar. 1995); see 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1(b) (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure apply “so far as practicable” in the absence of applicable Commission rules).
On the basis of the present record, we are unable to evaluate the merits of Ravalli’s position. In
the interest of justice, we reopen the proceeding, treat Ravalli’s letter as a late-filed petition for
discretionary review requesting relief from a final Commission decision, and excuse its late
filing. See Cecil Kilmer Flagstone, 21 FMSHRC 480, 481 (May 1999) (treating letter
misdirected to Regional Solicitor’s Office as a late-filed petition requesting relief from a final
order and remanding to judge); F. W. Contractors, 17 FMSHRC at 248 (treating letter asserting
that answer had been misdirected to Regional Solicitor’s Office as late-filed petition and
remanding to judge).

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    We remand this matter to the judge, who shall determine whether final relief from default

is warranted under Rule 60(b).1 If the judge determines that such relief is appropriate, this case
shall proceed pursuant to the Mine Act and the Commission’s Procedural Rules, 29 C.F.R. Part
2700.

                                         Mary Lu Jordan, Chairman




                                         James C. Riley, Commissioner




                                         Robert H. Beatty, Jr., Commissioner




   1
      In view of the fact that the Secretary does not oppose Ravalli’s motion to reopen this

matter for a hearing on the merits, Commissioners Marks and Verheggen conclude that the
motion should be granted.

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