Magma Copper Company, Pinto Valley Division

Plain-English summary

Magma Copper failed to file its answer with the Commission in a civil penalty case, and the Chief Administrative Law Judge entered a default order assessing the Secretary’s proposed $20 penalty. Magma said it was representing itself and had sent its answer and response to the Department of Labor’s regional office instead of the Commission. The Commission vacated the default order and remanded the case so the judge could determine whether final relief from the default was warranted. The Commission did not decide whether Magma owed the penalty.

Decision snapshot

• Cited provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.5(b), 2700.28, 2700.65(c), and 2700.70(a)
• Outcome: The default order and $20 penalty assessment were vacated, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
• Key point: An operator’s mistaken delivery of pleadings to the Department of Labor instead of the Commission may warrant relief from a default order.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

August 18, 1992

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v. Docket No. WEST 92-98-M

MAGMA COPPER COMPANY,
PINTO VALLEY DIVISION,

BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Backley, Doyle, Holen and Nelson, Commissioners

ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988) ("Mine Act"). On July 15,
1992, Commission Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order
of Default, finding respondent Magma Copper Company ("Magma") in default for
failure to answer either the civil penalty proposal of the Secretary of Labor
or the judge's Order to Show Cause. The judge assessed the civil penalty of
$20 proposed by the Secretary. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
default order and remand this case for further proceedings.

The judge's jurisdiction over this case terminated when his decision was
issued on July 15, 1992. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.65(c). Under the Mine Act and the
Commission's procedural rules, relief from a judge's decision may be sought by
filing a petition for discretionary review with the Commission within 30 days
of its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a). Magma filed
a timely petition with the Commission on July 30, 1992, seeking relief from
the judge's default order.

Magma petitions for review on the grounds that it was proceeding pro se
and that it had answered the petition for civil assessment and the judge's
show cause order. Magma erroneously sent its pleadings to the Solicitor of
Labor's Regional Office in San Francisco rather than the Commission's office
in Washington, D.C.

Under the Commission's rules of procedure, the party against whom a
penalty is sought must file an answer with the Commission within 30 days after
service of the penalty proposal. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.5(b) & .28. When no answer
to the penalty proposal was filed with the Commission, the judge, on April 9,
1992, issued an order directing Magma to file an answer within 30 days or show
good cause for its failure to do so. When Magma failed to respond to the show
cause order, the judge issued an order of default on July 15, 1992.

It appears that Magma may have confused the roles of the Commission and
the Department of Labor in this adjudicatory proceeding. On the basis of the
present record, we are unable to evaluate the merits of Magma's position. In
the interest of justice, we will permit Magma to present its position to the
judge, who shall determine whether final relief from the default order is
warranted. See, e.g., Kelley Trucking Co., 8 FMSHRC 1867 (December 1986).

Accordingly, we vacate the judge's default order and remand this matter
for further proceedings.

Ford B. Ford, Chairman
Richard V. Backley, Commissioner
Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner
Arlene Holen, Commissioner
L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner