Peters & Garman Construction

Plain-English summary

Peters & Garman Construction failed to answer the Secretary of Labor's civil penalty petition and an order to show cause, so the chief administrative law judge entered a default order and assessed the proposed $227 penalty. The parties later asked to rescind the default order and approve their settlement, but the Commission could not evaluate the explanation for the delay on the existing record. The Commission vacated the default order and remanded the case so the operator could present its position and the judge could address relief from default and the settlement.

Decision snapshot

• Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. §§ 820(k), 823(d)(1), and 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.65(c) and 2700.70(a)
• Outcome: The default order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
• Key point: Relief from a final default judgment requires a supported showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
MSHA V. PETERS & GARMAN
DDATE:
19920211
TTEXT:
February 11, 1992
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v. Docket No. WEST 91-87-M

PETERS & GARMAN CONSTRUCTION

BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Backley, Doyle, Holen, and Nelson, Commissioners
ORDER
BY THE COMMISSION:
In this proceeding arising under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988)(the "Mine Act"), Commission Chief
Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order of Default on June 17,
1991, finding respondent Peters & Garman Construction ("P&G") in default for
failure to answer the civil penalty petition filed by the Secretary of Labor
and the judge's order to show cause. The judge assessed the civil penalty of
$227 proposed by the Secretary. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
default order and remand this case for further proceedings.
On January 28, 1992, the Commission received a letter dated January 22,
1992, in which counsel for the Secretary requests, on behalf of both parties,
that Judge Merlin rescind the previously issued default order and enter an
order confirming the settlement agreement negotiated between the parties.
Counsel for the Secretary explains that he was delayed in submitting the
settlement agreement because respondent's counsel was temporarily out-ofstate.
The judge's jurisdiction over this case terminated on June 17, 1991,
when his decision was issued. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.65(c). Under the Mine Act and
the Commission's procedural rules, relief from a judge's decision may be
sought by filing a petition for discretionary review with the Commission
within 30 days of its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. §
2700.70(a). P&G did not file a timely petition for discretionary review
within the 30-day period, nor did the Commission direct review on its own
motion. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B). Thus, the judge's decision became a final
decision of the Commission 40 days after its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1).
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Under these circumstances, we deem the January 22 letter to be a request
for relief from a final Commission decision and to incorporate a late-filed
petition for discretionary review. See J.R. Thompson, Inc., 12 FMSHRC 1194,
1195-96 (June 1990). Relief from a final judgment is available to a movant

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under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise
~248
or excusable neglect. See, e.g., Lloyd Logging, Inc., 13 FMSHRC 781, 782 (May
1991). It appears that an explanation for P&G's failure to respond to the
judge's order to show cause may have been raised and that the parties have
been engaged in settlement negotiations. We are unable to evaluate the merits
of the explanation on the basis of the present record. We will afford P&G the
opportunity to present its position to the judge. See, e.g., Blue Circle
Atlantic, Inc., 11 FMSHRC 2144, 2145 (November 1989). If the judge determines
that final relief from default is appropriate, he shall also take appropriate
action with respect to the parties' settlement agreement. 30 U.S.C. § 820(k).
Accordingly, we vacate the judge's default order and remand this matter
for proceedings consistent with this order.