FMSHRC ALJ decision Docket WEST 86-191 Decided November 2, 1987 Mixed result Judge John J. Morris

Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company

Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company (FMSHRC WEST 86-191): One citation vacated and two affirmed

Apply this to your situation

This order from 1987 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1987
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Final ALJ decision, not Commission precedent
This decision became final under the 40-day rule in 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1) because no later Commission review appears in the official index. It binds the parties but is not binding on the Commission in other cases. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company faced three electrical safety citations at the Kemmerer Mine. The judge vacated the citation for a missing straining clamp because wooden blocks inside the junction box adequately protected the cable. He affirmed citations for an ungrounded space heater and an improperly maintained telephone system, finding that those conditions could cause electrical injury or an explosion. The company was ordered to pay $150 for each affirmed citation, for a total of $300.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standards: 30 C.F.R. §§ 77.603, 77.701, and 77.502
  • Outcome: Citation No. 2831954 was vacated, citations Nos. 2831955 and 2831956 were affirmed, and $300 in penalties was assessed.
  • Key point: Electrical equipment must be grounded and maintained to prevent shock, fire, or explosion hazards, while the evidence must still show that the cited condition violated the specific standard.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
SOL (MSHA) PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL
DDATE:
19871102
TTEXT:


Page 2

~1908

             Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
                    Office of Administrative Law Judges

SECRETARY OF LABOR, CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), Docket No. WEST 86-191
PETITIONER A.C. No. 48-00086-03508
v.
Kemmerer Mine
PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL
MINING COMPANY,
RESPONDENT

                                 DECISION

Appearances: James H. Barkley, Esq., Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Denver, Colorado,
for Petitioner;
John A. Bachmann, Esq., The Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Company, Denver, Colorado,
for Respondent.

Before: Judge Morris

 The Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Mine Safety and

Health Administration, charges Pittsburg and Midway Coal Company,
(P & M), with violating three safety regulations promulgated
under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 et
seq., (the Act).

 A hearing on the merits took place on January 6, 1987 in

Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties filed post-trial briefs.

                                  Issues

 The issues presented are whether the violations occurred; if

so, what penalties are appropriate.

                           Citation No. 2831954

 This citation alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R.      77.603

which provides:

           77.603 Clamping of trailing cables to equipment.

      Trailing cables shall be clamped to machines in a
      manner to protect the cables from damage and to prevent
      strain on the electrical connections.

 The violative condition is described in the subject citation

as follows:


Page 3

~1909
The junction box located in pit #1ÄVD supplying power
to the #809 overburden shovel does not have a straining
clamp on the 7200 Volt A.C. trailing cable. The cable
is very tight and not preventing a strain on the electrical
connections.

                        Summary of the Evidence

 Melvin Potter, a person experienced in mining, has been an

MSHA electrical inspector for eight years. On May 6, 1986, he
inspected the Kemmerer Mine operated by P & M (Tr. 5Ä7).

 During the course of his inspection, as he went by a

junction box in the 1ÄVD pit, he could not see a straining clamp
(FOOTNOTE 1) on it (Tr. 7). The restrained cable was the trailing cable
for the shovel. The voltage in the cable was 7200 AC (Tr. 7, 8).

 A company electrician opened the junction box. Inside the

box he observed a wooden clamp, but it was not fastened and it
was loose from the cable (Tr. 8, 9). If it had been fastened it
would have served as a straining clamp for the 1000 or more foot
cable. When the inspector observed the trailing cable it was taut
and there was strain on it (Tr. 10).

 Failing to secure the trailing cable could cause a phase to

ground fault or a phase to phase fault. A phase to phase would
energize the junction box and the rest of the system with 7200
volts (Tr. 13Ä15). If a miner touched the box he would be
electrocuted (Tr. 14).

 In the inspector's opinion, it was reasonably likely that an

injury could occur if the condition was not remedied.

 In cross examination the inspector agreed that the citation,

as written, states there was no straining clamp on the cable (Tr.
40).

 However, there was a wooden block clamp in the box. But the

clamps were laying down in the box and not around the cable (Tr.
42).

 When the inspector pointed out the failure to have a

restraining clamp in the box the electrician immediately put on a
wooden clamp (Tr. 56Ä58). The electrician said they had worked on
the box before the inspection and had apparently left the clamp
off.

 Photographs, Exhibits R1 and R2, were not taken at the time

of the inspection (Tr. 56).


Page 4

~1910
Called as a rebuttal witness, Inspector Potter identified his
notes made at the inspection. They indicated there was no clamp
on the cable (Tr. 242).

 Richard Dovey, testifying for respondent, serves as P & M's

manager of safety and training (Tr. 60, 61).

 The witness accompanied the inspection team. They initially

discussed the necessity of P & M placing firefighting equipment
on a utility's substation.

 On two occasions the morning of the inspection the inspector

had driven by the 1ÄVD area. There was no external clamp on the
box. They called the electricians to shut down the shovel. A
photograph was taken on a identical junction box (Tr. 65, 55; Ex.
R3). The witness, Dave Ravnikar, Rex Playstead and Inspector
Potter were present at the time of the inspection.

 When we approached the box Mr. Potter directed the

inspection party to stop because he could not see a strain clamp.
However, when the box was opened he observed the wooden blocks
were located in their proper place. That is, two wooden blocks
with a hole cut in them held the cable (Tr. 68). The blocks
measure 8 inches by 8 inches with a hole approximately two and
one eighth inch (Tr. 69). The blocks cannot come out when the lid
is closed.

 Company policy requires the shock blocks and straining

clamps on the trailing cables. This protects strain from the
inner mechanism of the box and it protects the cable against
scuffing on the metal edges of the boxes (Tr. 71).

 In the opinion of the witness the clamp qualifies as a

trailing clamp under 77.603. The connectors inside the box were
protected from strain as a result of the clamp (Tr. 71, 72).
After the inspection an external Clellen grip was installed. The
company representatives didn't tell the inspector they already
had a clamp in place because they hadn't decided if the inside
clamp in place was a legitimate cable strain (Tr. 73).

 Witness Dovey's basic statements to MSHA's supervisory mine

inspector in Sheridan, Wyoming was the same as his testimony (Tr.
182Ä185). However, the supervisor indicated that all of the
citations would stand as written (Tr. 185, Ex. R7).

 Dovey didn't disagree that the screws in the restraining

clamps were missing (Tr. 186).

                              Discussion

 The evidence is conflicting as to whether a violation of the

regulation occurred.


Page 5

~1911
Inspector Potter testified the junction box did not have an
external straining clamp. He agrees the citation was written in
this fashion. But when the junction box was opened it was found
the box contained wooden blocks around the cable. These blocks
suffice as a straining clamp. Since the wooden blocks serve as a
restraining clamp it follows that P & M did not violate the
regulation.

 I credit respondent's evidence that the cable was resting on

the two wooden blocks. I disregard the inspector's evidence that
blocks were unfastened and loose from the cable. Blocks measuring
8" x 8" in a junction box are not likely to become loose in
a box of this type. In addition, it was not shown how any screws,
even if missing, would affect the ability of the blocks to serve
as a straining clamp when the junction box was closed.

    Citation No. 2831954 should be vacated.

                            Citation No. 2831955

 This citation alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R.      77.701

which provides:

       77.701 Grounding metallic frames, casings, and other
              enclosures of electric equipment.

         Metallic frames, casings, and other enclosures of
         electric equipment that can become "alive" through
         failure of insulation or by contact with energized
         parts shall be grounded by methods approved by an
         authorized representative of the Secretary.

 The violative condition is described in the citation as

follows:

         A 110 volt AC space heater located in the electrical
         supervisor's office is not equipped with a proper
         ground. The heater was energized and in use.

                           Summary of the Evidence

 On the same inspection Mr. Potter found an ungrounded 110

volt AC metal-cased heater in the electrical supervisor's office.
It had two phase wires plugged into a 110 volt outlet. It lacked
a third wire for grounding (Tr. 16). In addition, there was no
solid connection to any metal water lines having a low resistance
to earth. Further, there was no grounding of any other type (Tr.
17). Failure to ground this type of heater could cause shock,
serious burns or a fatality. If this condition continued and a
fault occurred you could reasonably expect a shock or serious
burn (Tr. 18, 19).


Page 6

~1912
The inspector did not check the inside of the heater to see
whether or not it was double insulated (Tr. 43). The back of this
appliance had a "UL" stamp of approval on it (Tr. 43).

 The methods approved by the Secretary for grounding

equipment (30 C.F.R. 77.701Ä1) are the methods to be used for AC
equipment (Tr. 43, 44).

 The inspector did not check to see whether the power system

from which this heater received its power was ungrounded.
However, he explained that the heater itself was not grounded.
And if a fault occurred on the heater, the fault could not go to
ground (Tr. 46, 48).

 The inspector was not sure if MSHA has a policy concerning

the grounding of appliances (Tr. 49).

 In the inspector's opinion, the metal heater could have been

grounded by an extra wire back into the wall socket. Also a three
prong plug would have grounded it (Tr. 50, 51).

 Witness Dovey, testifying for respondent, confirmed that the

heater lacked a three prong plug. However, the building where the
device was plugged was grounded and equipped with circuit
breakers (Tr. 111).

 Witness Dinkel, called as an expert witness for the

Secretary in rebuttal, indicated that equipment of this type must
be grounded regardless of UL approval (Tr. 220Ä222).

 Witness Veneskey, testifying for P & M, expressed the

opinion that 77.701 applies to appliances (Tr. 159). The
witness expressed his views as to the 77.516 and the National
Electrical Code (Tr. 160Ä162). The heater fits into the NEC
criteria (Tr. 162). The witness was not aware of any MSHA
requirement that appliances when brought out to the mine be
modified to include a ground plug if they do not have one from
the manufacturer (Tr. 163).

 In cross examination, the witness agreed the possibility

existed that the metal frame might become alive through a failure
of insulation or a contact or an energizing of the parts (Tr.
164, 165, 168).

                              Discussion

 Section 77.701 is not applicable or that it applies only to

electrical equipment from ungrounded AC power system. P & M, in


Page 7

~1913
support of its position, cites the Secretary's regulations,
77.516 and 77.701Ä1. (FOOTNOTE 2)

 An analysis of relevant regulations indicates that   77.516

was enacted under "Subpart F¬Electrical Equipment¬General". I
would be inclined to agree with P & M's views but 77.701,
violated here, was enacted in "Subpart H¬Grounding". In sum, the
Secretary has enacted general regulations relating to equipment
as he did in Subpart F and he may generally require that such
equipment meet the NEC. He may then impose stricter limitations,
as he did, in relation to the grounding of such equipment as in
77.700.

 P & M further states that   77.701Ä1 controls the scope of

77.701. It contends that 77.701Ä1 by its terms limits 77.701
to ungrounded equipment. I do not agree. Section 77.701 by its
terms generally covers grounding. There is no indication the
subsequent regulation was enacted so as to limit 77.701.

 The cases and textbook cited by P & M deal with general

rules of statutory construction and they are not inopposite the
views expressed herein.

 P & M's final argument is that MSHA has issued no policy or

interpretation requiring the replacement of two-prong plugs.


Page 8

~1914
Therefore, the inspector's abatement requirements amount to
nothing more than his personal preference.

 The regulation, in effect, provides that potentially

energized parts shall be grounded by methods approved by the duly
authorized representative of the Secretary, that is, the
inspector.

 Several methods of grounding were available but in the

instant case a three way plug was required. It was not shown in
this case that the inspector exceeded his authority.

 Citation No. 2831955 should be affirmed.

                         Citation No. 2831956

 This citation alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R.   77.502

which in its entirety provides:

   77.502 Electric equipment; examination, testing, and
          maintenance.

      Electric equipment shall be frequently examined,
      tested, and properly maintained by a qualified person
      to assure safe operating conditions. When a potentially
      dangerous condition is found on electric equipment,
      such equipment shall be removed from service until such
      condition is corrected. A record of such examinations
      shall be kept.

 The violative condition is described in the citation as

follows:

      The electrical equipment located in the Sorenson Draw
      tunnel is not being properly inspected and maintained,
      in that the 24 volt telephone system has electrical
      wires exposed and a toggle switch added allowing coal
      dust to enter inside the telephone.

                        Summary of the Evidence

 Inspector Potter inspected the 24Ävolt telephone in the

Sorenson Draw tunnel. He found the metal encased battery powered
system had a switch and two connectors on the outside of the
phone. It also had external connecting terminals that run to the
surface (Tr. 19, Ex. R1, R2). There was coal dust on the
terminals and on the batteries (Tr. 20, 32). The external bare
clamps which carry 24Ävolt current and the toggle switch were not
on the phone. This allowed coal dust to enter the phone where the
wires were located. The bare wires were attached to a bare clamp
on the outside of the phone (Tr. 21, 22). There was also coal
dust in and around the clamps. The terminals, an inch and half
apart, could have provided a source of ignition (Tr. 22). Coal
dust would provide the fuel for the explosion. Small explosions
can keep expanding throughout an area (Tr. 24).


Page 9

~1915
The tunnel has conveyor belts; also one or two maintenance people
work there (Tr. 24).

 The toggle switch was on the outside of the phone (Tr. 24,

25). It was not dust tight. You could see through to the switch
when you opened the door of the telephone (Tr. 25).

 In the inspector's opinion, there was sufficient coal dust

on the interior of the phone to create a hazard (Tr. 26). The
opening in the phone could create a flame path to the exterior of
the phone (Tr. 27). Most phones have a sealed rubber type boot
over the switch (Tr. 27, 28). The boot prevents dust from
entering into the electrical components of the phone. The
inspector had never seen a telephone with an unprotected toggle
switch (Tr. 28). The telephone was tagged "approved for methane
only". Approval for methane is not equivalent to approval for
dust (Tr. 29). Coal dust is more violatile than methane. Methane
will burn itself out but coal dust just "keeps going" (Tr. 30).

 This was a permanently installed phone and the tunnel was

always dusty (Tr. 30, 31). In view of these conditions you could
reasonably expect a mine explosion. This tunnel has been cited
for coal dust in the past (Tr. 31).

 In cross examination, the inspector read from the definition

30 C.F.R. Part 23(d) (Tr. 34). Under the definition
permissible phone could or could not be permissible in both gassy
and dusty locations (Tr. 36, 37). This particular phone was
methane proof, a higher standard than dust proof.

 Witness Dovey, testifying for respondent, described the use

of the telephone. During the inspection Dovey did not see any
light coming through the toggle switch hole. Further, there was
no hole at the toggle switch (Tr. 91).

 After the citation was issued Dovey researched the

telephone. He produced the maintenance manual for the telephones
in the tunnel. The manual had been obtained from the electrical
department. Dave Ravnikar also stated that the toggle switch had
not been added (Tr. 93, 94). Dovey copied the identifying number
from the telephone. But he didn't recall the manufacturer (Tr.
96). Further, he didn't recall the ID number. In addition, he
couldn't say if it was the number that appears on the front page
of the exhibit. However, he took the document down to compare it
to see if he had exactly the same phone (Tr. 96). Dovey didn't
know who published the exhibit (R5). The maintenance department
maintains manuals for the equipment at the mine (Tr. 97). Such
records are generally maintained with a mine issuance number but
there is no such number on the phone (Tr. 97, 98). But he had
taken the information from the door on the phone (Tr. 98). A
manufacturer's name was present but Dovey did not recall it (Tr.
98). Dovey also didn't know if there had been any after acquired
phones (Tr. 98).


Page 10

~1916
Comparisons between Exhibit R5 and photographs of the telephone
previously received in evidence indicates there was no speaker,
nameplate or labels on the telephone as depicted in the offered
exhibit (FOOTNOTE 3) (Tr. 94Ä102, Ex. R5).

 Dovey is familiar with the concept of permissible

communication systems in coal mines. Such a system can be placed
in a dusty, gaseous area. This particular tunnel has never been
classified (Tr. 106). According to the company brochure the phone
system was permissible (Tr. 107). This particular phone has a
sticker saying it is "MESA¬approved permissible." Permissible
equipment is sealed to prevent dust or gas from entering (Tr.
108). It is, accordingly, dust ignition proof.

 The telephone was maintained in a proper operating condition

(Tr. 109). The connectors on the telephones were in the proper
holes (Tr. 109, 110). The toggle switch was intact and tight.
There was no dust in the telephone. It was a 12 volt phone and
the batteries were connected in parallel (Tr. 110).

 TERRANCE DINKEL, called as an expert rebuttal witness by the

Secretary, was identified as an electrical engineer for MSHA (Tr.
193Ä195).

 In Dinkel's opinion the telephone system was not

intrinsically or inherently safe. Intrinsically safe means a
device has insufficient energy to ignite the atmosphere present.
A 24Ävolt or a 12Ävolt, or a flashlight battery can ignite coal.
The light coming through the switch indicates the units were not
sealed (Tr. 197, 198, 203). Section 27Ä7(d) of C.F.R. 30 requires
batteries to be in sealed containers. Since there was dust inside
the cabinet it was not sealed (Tr. 199, 201).

 The telephone, as inspected by Mr. Potter, was potentially

dangerous. It is a matter of time before moisture and dust
accumulate and cause a short (Tr. 205).

 Protection from methane does not constitute protection from

coal dust. Coal can conduct current from one terminal to another
(Tr. 211). Even though approved for methane a faulted circuit
could ignite the coal dust lying in its path (Tr. 219).

 Witness Dinkel further stated that a device designated

permissible by MSHA is permissible in both dusty and gassy
locations (Tr. 226).

 In rebuttal Inspector Potter testified the telephone was

tagged as "permissible MESA for methane only" (Tr. 240).


Page 11

~1917
The inspector's notes made at the time of the inspection stated
there was dust on the inside of the compartment. You could rub
your fingers and they would come up black (Tr. 242, 243, Ex. P2).
However, the wind and coal dust was blowing in the tunnel but the
dust in the telephone did not go into suspension (Tr. 245). There
was some coal dust in suspension in the tunnel (Tr. 246).

 James T. Veneskey, a person experienced in mining, serves as

the director of safety for P & M (Tr. 152Ä154).

 In the opinion of the witness a 12 or 24 volt system will

not ignite coal dust. Coal dust must be in suspension before it
will explode (Tr. 157). With the MSHA approval label the
telephones were intrinsically safe but not designed to be totally
dust proof. But they were to be used in a dusty and gassy
atmosphere (Tr. 157Ä159). The enclosure was not permissible so as
to reduce a flame path (Tr. 158).

 Witness Dovey testified there was a sticker on the telephone

stating "MESA permissible" (Tr. 239).

                              Discussion

 The pivitol issue here concerns whether the telephone was

"potentially dangerous" within the meaning of 77.502.

 In connection with this citation I credit the testimony of

Inspector Potter and witness Dinkel. Briefly, the inspector found
coal dust on the terminals and on the batteries in the telephone.
In addition, bare wires were attached to a bare clamp on the
outside of the phone. Both witnesses concluded the terminals, an
inch and a half apart, could provide a source of ignition for the
coal dust. The telephone, with a hole at the toggle switch, in a
coal dusty tunnel, was "potentially dangerous" within the meaning
of the regulation.

 P & M contends MSHA is attempting to penalize it through the

use of conjecture and deceit. Specifically, it contends MSHA's
case is based on the failure to maintain electrical equipment,
i.e., exposed electrical wires and a defective toggle switch. But
at the trial MSHA mutated the case into allegations of a
dangerous accumulation of coal dust.

 I disagree with P & M's claim. The facts presented at the

hearing are fairly within the allegations of the citation. The
violative condition is described as follows:

      The electrical equiptment [sic] located in the Sorenson
      draw off tunnel is not being properly inspected and
      maintained, in that the 24 volt telephone system has
      electrical wire's exposed and a toggle switch added
      allowing coal dust to enter inside the telephone.

Page 12

~1918
P & M states that, in any event, MSHA's evidence is woefully
lacking of proof to establish the conditions necessary to create
a hazardous condition. P & M cites The Pittsburg and Midway Coal
Mining Company, 7 FMSHRC 2072 (1985). It is true that in the
above case Judge Koutras concluded that accumulations of coal
dust which are merely black in color are not dangerous. 7 FMSHRC
at 2104.

 The evidence in the instant case shows a minimal amount of

coal dust accumulation. Inspector Potter saw dust over the inside
of the phone. You could rub your fingers across the compartment
and they would come up black (Tr. 242, 243). However, the
potentially dangerous condition consisted of all of the facets
involved here. These were the hole at the toggle switch, the coal
dust between the terminals of the batteries (an ignition source)
and the coal dust blowing in the 14 foot by 20 foot tunnel (Tr.
245, 246).

 More persuasive than Judge Koutras' decision is the

Commission decision in Pittsburg and Midway Coal Mining Company 8
FMSHRC 4 (1986). In this case the Commission was dealing with a
related standard, 30 C.F.R. 77.202 (FOOTNOTE 4)

     Specifically, the Commission stated as follows:

      P & M argues on review that the judge erred in finding
      a violation because the judge did not require the
      Secretary to establish the existence of a present,
      actual ignition source in the vicinity of the
      accumulation at the time of the inspection. Rather, the
      judge concluded that under section 77.202, if a
      "potential" ignition source is present in the vicinity
      of an accumulation, the accumulation is dangerous
      within the meaning of the standard. 6 FMSHRC at 1349.
      We agree with the judge's conclusion. It is well
      established that the Mine Act and the standards
      promulgated thereunder are to be interpreted to ensure,
      insofar as possible, safe and healthful working
      conditions for miners.

      Further, the Commission observed that:

      Section 77.202, like most coal mine safety standards,
      is aimed at the elimination of potential dangers before
      they become present dangers. %y(3)5C 8 FMSHRC at 6.

 In sum, in the instant scenario, the telephone was

"potentially dangerous".


Page 13

~1919
P & M also contends the telephone was permissible for this
location and therefore complied with 30 C.F.R. 23.2(d).
(FOOTNOTE 5)

 On this issue the credible evidence shows that the telephone

was marked as "approved for methane only" (Tr. 28, 29). Further,
according to MSHA's electrical engineer, Dinkel, methane gas is
not a conductor but coal dust can be (Tr. 210, 211, 217). Even
though permissible for methane the presence of coal dust would
still present a potentially hazardous situation (Tr. 218, 219).
In addition, to the above factors, the telephone was obviously
not permissible in view of the hole at the toggle switch.

 P & M further argues that it was impossible for Inspector

Potter to see a hole at the toggle switch. He did not have a
flashlight and the location of the telephone and its position in
the tunnel preclude such an observation.

 I disagree. Witness Davey indicated there was light in the

tunnel behind the telephone as well as directly overhead (Tr. 89,
90). Inspector Potter indicated there were lights on the ceiling,
sides and behind (Tr. 39, 40). When the telephone door was opened
you could see through the hole at the toggle switch (Tr. 39).

 For the foregoing reasons Citation 2831956 should be

affirmed.

                            Civil Penalties

 The statutory criteria to assess civil penalties is

contained in Section 110(i) of the Act.

 The evidence establishes that P & M has a minimal adverse

prior history. The company has three violations for the two year
period ending May 5, 1986 (Ex. P1). The record fails to disclose
the size of the operator. The record does not present any
information concerning the operator's financial condition.
Therefore, in the absence of any facts to the contrary, I
conclude that the payment of penalties will not cause the
operator to discontinue its business. Buffalo Mining Co., 1 IBMA
226 (1973) and Associated Drilling, Inc., 3 IBMA 164 (1974). The
operator was negligent as to the ungrounded space heater inasmuch
as this condition was open and obvious. The operator also was
negligent as to the telephone equipment. Periodic checks, such as
are required by 77.502, would have disclosed these defects. The
gravity of each violation was high. A miner could have been


Page 14

~1920
burned or electrocuted by the electrical space heater. The
defective telephone could have caused an explosion. The operator
is to be credited for statutory good faith since the violative
conditions were abated.

 On balance, I deem that a civil penalty of $150 is proper

for each citation affirmed herein.
Briefs

 The parties have filed detailed briefs which have been most

helpful in analyzing the record and defining the issues. I have
reviewed and considered these excellent briefs. However, to the
extent they are inconsistent with this decision, they are
rejected.

                          Conclusions of Law

 Based on the entire record and the factual findings made in

the narrative portion of this decision, the following conclusions
of law are entered:

 1. The Commission has jurisdiction to decide this case.

 2. Respondent did not violate 30 C.F.R.      75.603 and

Citation No. 2831954 should be vacated.

 3. Respondent violated 30 C.F.R.      77.701 and Citation No.

2831955 should be affirmed.

 4. Respondent violated 30 C.F.R.      77.502 and Citation No.

2831956 should be affirmed.

 Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of

law I enter the following:

                                    ORDER

 1. Citation No. 2831954 and all penalties therefor are

vacated.

 2. Citation No. 2831955 is affirmed and a civil penalty of

$150 is assessed.

 3. Citation No. 2831956 is affirmed and a penalty of $150 is

assessed.

                             John J. Morris
                             Administrative Law Judge

FOOTNOTE_ONE
1 A straining clamp goes on the cable to prevent strain on
the cable inside the box itself (Tr. 7).

FOOTNOTE_TWO
2


Page 15

        77.516 Electric wiring and equipment; installation

and maintenance.
In addition to the requirements of 77.503 and
77.506, all wiring and electrical equipment installed after June
30, 1971, shall meet the requirements of the National Electric
Code in effect at the time of installation.
77.701Ä1 Approved methods of grounding of equipment
receiving power from ungrounded alternating current power
systems.
For purposes of grounding metallic frames, casings and
other enclosures of equipment receiving power from ungrounded
alternating current power systems, the following methods of
grounding will be approved.

      (a) A solid connection between the metallic frame;

casing or other metal enclosure and the grounded metallic sheath,
armor or conduit enclosing the power conductor feeding the
electric equipment enclosed;

      (b) A solid connection to metal waterlines having low

resistance to earth;

      (c) A solid connection to a grounding conductor

extending to a low-resistance ground field; and,

      (d) Any other method of grounding, approved by an

authorized representative of the Secretary, which insures that
there is no difference in potential between such metal enclosures
and the earth.

FOOTNOTE_THREE
3 The judge sustained the Secretary's objection and excluded
Exhibit R5 (Tr. 103, 105, 191Ä192, 248).

FOOTNOTE_FOUR
4 The standard reads: Coal dust in the air of, or in or on
the surfaces of, structures, enclosures, or other facilities
shall not be allowed to exist or accumulate in dangerous amounts.

FOOTNOTE_5
5 The cited definition reads:
(d) "Permissible" as used in this part means completely
assembled and conforming in every respect with the design
formally approved by MSHA under this part. (Approvals under this
part are given only to equipment for use in gassy and dusty
mines.)

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read what one judge decided for one employer in 1987, and it binds only those parties. Ezel checks the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the authority it relies on.