Staker Paving & Construction Company, Incorporated
Staker Paving & Construction Company, Incorporated (FMSHRC WEST 86-120-M): Back-up alarm citation affirmed with S&S designation removed
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Plain-English summary
MSHA cited Staker Paving after a front-end loader operated without an audible back-up alarm or an observer, even though maintenance reports had documented the defect. The company admitted the violation and abated it in six days after obtaining a replacement part. Judge John J. Morris found that the violation was serious but that the evidence did not establish a reasonable likelihood of a reasonably serious injury, so he struck the significant-and-substantial designation. He affirmed the citation as amended and reduced the proposed $700 penalty to $250.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standard: 30 C.F.R. § 56.9087
- Outcome: The citation was affirmed as amended with the significant-and-substantial designation removed, and the penalty was set at $250.
- Key point: A violation can remain serious and support a penalty even when the record does not establish the likelihood required for an S&S finding.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
CCASE:
SOL (MSHA) V. STAKER CONSTRUCTION
DDATE:
19870225
TTEXT:
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Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Administrative Law Judges
SECRETARY OF LABOR, CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), Docket No. WEST 86-120-M
PETITIONER A.C. No. 42-01452-05513
v.
Staker-Beck Street Mine
STAKER PAVING & CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Appearances: Margaret A. Miller, Esq., Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Denver, Colorado, for
Petitioner;
Mr. Orval D. Gillen, Staker Paving Construction Company,
Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, pro se.
Before: Judge Morris
The Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, charges respondent with violating a safety
regulation promulgated under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., (the "Act").
After notice to the parties, a hearing on the merits took
place in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 13, 1986.
The parties waived their right to file post-trial briefs.
Issues
The issues are whether an allegation of unwarrantable
failure can be contested in a civil penalty proceeding. Further,
whether the violation was of a significant and substantial
nature. Finally, what penalty is appropriate under the
circumstances in this case.
Citation 2644141
This citation alleges respondent violated 30 C.F.R. §
56.9087 which provides as follows:
§ 56.9087 Audible warning devices and back-up alarms.
Heavy duty mobile equipment shall be provided with
audible warning devices. When the operator of such
equipment has
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an obstructed view to the rear, the equipment shall
have either an automatic reverse signal alarm which
is audible above the surrounding noise level or an
observer to signal when it is safe to back up.
Admission
At the commencement of the hearing respondent admitted the
violation (Tr. 4, 5).
Summary of the Evidence
William W. Wilson, a duly authorized representative of the
Secretary and experienced in mining, inspected respondent on
December 16, 1985 (Tr. 9, 10).
During the inspection he issued Citation 2644141 when he
observed a Michigan 275C front-end loader without an audible
alarm (Tr. 11; Ex. P1). McCoy Evans was operating the vehicle.
During the course of two days the inspector observed a laborer
and a mechanic in the general area of the loader (Tr. 11). The
inspector also did not see anyone spotting for the loader when it
backed up (Tr. 11). The back-up alarm was not audible (Tr. 12).
In the previous week the operator had turned in several daily
reports to the pit foreman (Tr. 13).
The inspector evaluated the operator's negligence as
moderate when he wrote the citation (Tr. 14). The following day
he confirmed that maintenance reports on the defective vehicle
had been written on December 9, 10, 11 and 13 (Tr. 15, 16). On
the final citation the inspector accordingly marked the
negligence as high and further indicated that the circumstances
showed a careless disregard by the operator since no repairs had
been made (Tr. 16, 17).
The hazard involved here could reasonably kill or maim a
miner (Tr. 17, 18). Respondent abated the condition in six days.
It was necessary to obtain a part (Tr. 18).
The inspector indicated he has had some problems with
respondent's employee Van Dyke concerning compliance with safety
regulations (Tr. 19). But there has been a decline in the number
of citations issued against respondent. This has been attributed
to the company's efforts (Tr. 20). Apparently a communication
problem caused the delay in the repair of the alarm (Tr. 21).
Respondent has, on the average, 12 employees (Tr. 24).
Orval D. Gillen, testifying for respondent, indicated he is
the company's safety and training engineer (Tr. 28, 29). The
witness identified the various employees on the site at the time
of the inspection (Tr. 20, 29).
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Mr. Gillen believed the equipment operator, as they normally do,
should have immediately notified the shop people of the defect
(Tr. 30, 31). The notification can be by telephone or radio,
located at the crusher (Tr. 31). The instructions to the
operators to proceed in this fashion are verbal and were given
during training (Tr. 32).
The pit's size is about 100 by 300. When the citation was
issued there were six people at the site (Tr. 32, 34).
After this citation the operators involved were again
verbally instructed as to the proper procedure (Tr. 33).
The company employs as many as 500 people but most of them
are under OSHA's jurisdiction (Tr. 34).
Payment of the proposed penalty would not affect the
company's ability to continue in business (Tr. 25, 37).
Discussion
Since the operator admits the violation the citation should
be affirmed.
An additional issue concerns respondent's contest of the
allegations of unwarrantable failure. The ruling at the hearing
is reiterated at this time: unwarrantable failure cannot be
litigated in a civil penalty proceedings, Clinchfield Coal
Company, 2 FMSHRC 290 (1980).
A further issue concerns whether the violation was of a
significant and substantial nature.
A decision as to whether a violation has been properly
designated as being significant and substantial must be made in
light of the Commission's rulings in that area. The term
"significant and substantial" was first defined by the Commission
in National Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822 (1981) at page 825, where
the Commission stated:
We hold that a violation is of such a nature as could
significantly and substantially contribute to the cause
and effect of a mine safety and health hazard if, based
upon the particular facts surrounding that violation,
there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard
contributed to will result in an injury or an illness
of a reasonably serious nature.
In this case the facts fail to establish that was a
reasonable likelihood that an injury of a reasonable serious
nature would result from the violative condition. The evidence establishes there were workers in the 100 by 300 pit. But, it is
impossible to ascertain if the described measurements are in feet
or yards. Further, no evidence indicates any workers were
directly in danger due to the defective back-up alarm on the
loader.
For the foregoing reasons the S & S allegations should be
stricken from the citation.
The final issue concerns the appropriate penalty to be
assessed.
The statutory criteria to assess a civil penalty is
contained in Section 110(i) of the Act. The provision, now
codified as 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(i), provides as follows:
The Commission shall have authority to assess all civil
penalties provided in this Act. In assessing civil
monetary penalties, the Commission shall consider the
operator's history of previous violations, the
appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the
business of the operator charged, whether the operator
was negligent, the effect on the operator's ability to
continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and
the demonstrated good faith of the person charged in
attempting to achieve rapid compliance after
notification of a violation.
In relation to the criteria the computer print-out shows
that respondent incurred 19 violations for the two year period
ending December 15, 1985. This showed an improvement over the 28
violations assessed before December 16, 1983. The penalty
hereafter assessed appears appropriate in relation to the size of
the business of this small operator. While the operator at times
has as many as 500 employees, the majority of them are not under
MSHA's jurisdiction. In fact, there were apparently only six
employees at this site. The operator was negligent since four
maintenance reports had mentioned the defect. The operator has
indicated that the imposition of the proposed penalty of $700
would not affect the company's ability to continue in business.
The gravity of the violation should be considered as high because
a serious injury or a fatality could result. Under the broad
umbrella of good faith it is to respondent's credit that it
abated the violation. Further, the respondent at this point has
demonstrated a certain dedication to the safety of its workers.
On balance, I deem that a civil penalty of $250 is an
appropriate penalty.
Conclusions of Law
Based on the entire record and the factual findings made in
the narrative portion of this decision, the following conclusions
of law are entered:
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1. The Commission has jurisdiction to decide this case.
2. Respondent violated 30 C.F.R. § 56.9087.
3. The allegations that the violation was significant and
substantial should be stricken.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law I enter the following:
ORDER
1. The allegations that the violation was significant and
substantial are stricken.
2. Citation 2644141, as amended, is affirmed.
3. A civil penalty of $250 is assessed.
4. Respondent is ordered to pay the sum of $250 to the
Secretary within 40 days of the date of this decision.
John J. Morris
Administrative Law Judge
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