Freeport Gold Company

Plain-English summary

Daniel S. Alexander alleged that Freeport Gold discharged him because he engaged in safety-related activity protected by the Mine Act. Judge Michael A. Lasher found that Alexander had at most marginally engaged in protected activity, but found no connection between that activity and the discharge. The judge credited the company's evidence that it acted because of Alexander's excessive absenteeism and accident record, and dismissed the discrimination complaint.

Decision snapshot

• Cited provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 801; 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3)
• Outcome: The discrimination complaint was dismissed.
• Key point: The record did not establish that the discharge was motivated in whole or in part by protected safety activity.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
DANIEL ALEXANDER V. FREPORT GOLD
DDATE:
19870622
TTEXT:

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~1112

            Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
                  Office of Administrative Law Judges

DANIEL S. ALEXANDER, DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING
COMPLAINANT
Docket No. WEST 85-106-DM
v. MD 84-60

FREEPORT GOLD COMPANY, Jerrett Canyon Project
RESPONDENT

                                DECISION

Appearances: Thomas L. Stringfield, Esq., Elko, Nevada,
for Complainant; R. Blain Andrus, Esq., Steven,
G. Holloway, Reno, Nevada, for Respondent.

Before: Judge Lasher

 This proceeding arises under Section 105(c)(3) of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 et
seq., (1982) (herein "the Act"). Complainant's initial complaint
with the Labor Department's Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) was dismissed. Both parties were well represented at the
hearing. (FOOTNOTE 1)

 Complainant contends that he was discharged by Respondent on

January 3, 1984, from his position as a permanent mill employee
because of his engagement in activities protected under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act). Respondent
contends that Complainant was discharged for his excessive
absenteeism and, secondarily, because of his accident rate.

                                FINDINGS

General

 The correct name of Respondent is FreeportÄMcMoran Gold

Company. It is a subsidiary of Freeport McMoran, Inc., a Delaware
corporation authorized to do business in the State of

Page 3

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Nevada (IÄT 43Ä44). Respondent owns and operates the subject open
pit gold mine which is located 52 miles northwest of Elko,
Nevada. At the time the events pertinent herein occurred its
payroll was approximately 320 and its current payroll is
approximately 420. Ore tonnage figures for the two periods (then
and now) are 3,200 tons and 4,000 tons, respectively (IÄT. 43,
48). During 1983, the ore was brought from the mine, which was
7Ä9 miles from the mill at which Complainant worked, in haul
trucks and placed in a dump; from the dump a loader would carry
the ore from the dump and deposit it in an area where it was
placed on belts and carried into the mill where it was crushed
(IÄT. 49). During the pertinent period (1983Ä1984) the mine
operated 24Ähours per day (3 8Ähour shifts) seven days a week
(IÄT. 45) and the employees were not represented by a union (IÄT.
51).

 The Complainant, Daniel S. Alexander, commenced employment

with Respondent on December 20, 1982, as a temporary employee. On
February 14, 1983, he became a regular employee in the mill
(where approximately 100 employees worked at the time) and on
April 2, 1983, he was advanced to "Technician D" which was the
first step in a five-step progression to becoming a Mill Operator
Specialist (IÄT. 47). He was still in the Technician D position
at the time of his discharge some eight months later on January
3, 1984.

 Complainant's immediate supervisor for most of 1983 was R.T.

Albright, shift foreman. (IÄT. 50). His immediate supervisor for
the last two months of his employment and when he was discharged
was Mill Foreman Thomas E. Watkins (IÄT. 65). During most of
1983, the next-level supervisor above Albright was Edward G.
Walker, General Mill Foreman, and above Walker was the Mill
Superintendent, Richard Johnson (IÄT. 50, 51). Above Mr. Johnson
in management echelon in most of 1983, but not at the time of
Complainant's discharge was the Mill Manager, David J. Collins.

Protected Activities

 Complainant engaged in various activities which are

protected by the Act prior to his discharge. Thus he had
complained that a radial stacker needed to be repaired (IÄT.
91Ä92, 114Ä120). Complainant also testified, in very general
terms, that he had filed two written safety complaints, at
unspecified times. The first complaint was a suggestion to modify
a carbon transfer line so that it would not "blow off" and scald
an operator. Complainant was unable to recall the nature of the
second written complaint. Complainant also testified he made
verbal complaints about the radial stacker and about putting up
guards around the feeders (IÄT. 118Ä120); he was but one of
several (IÄT. 88) who made such complaints about the stacker.
Complainant was not shown to be a leader or vanguard of safety
militancy at the mine or even that he was the most vocal, or
particularly vocal, spokesman in safety matters.

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While Complainant engaged in some protected activities, it is
also noted that the quality of such were not heated,
controversial or the type which ordinarily would be provocative
or invitatory of retaliation. Nor does this record reveal any
immediate or spontaneous reaction on the part of any of
Respondent's foremen or management personnel to Complainant's
actions demonstrating hostility or anti-safety animus.

Respondent's Absenteeism Policy

 Respondent's "Employee Handbook" (Exhibit CÄ2) is issued to

new employees. Title III, Benefits, Section I, "Salary
Continuation for Disability" thereof states inter alia:

      "All permanent full-time employees upon the completion
      of 30 consecutive days of Company recognized service
      become eligible to receive continuing income during
      periods of short term disability from illness or
      off-the-job injuries under the Company's wage and
      salary continuation plan."

                              **********

      If you are unable to report for work as scheduled, you
      are expected to notify your supervisor promptly. Except
      for extenuating circumstances, failure to notify your
      supervisor will result in loss of benefits.

                              **********

      "Excessive use or abuse of this program for minor
      illness may result in a review by management to
      determine whether or not the employee may continue
      employment. Two (2) day's absence for minor illness
      each three months will be considered as excessive
      absence and will result in a review."

 Title VII, Personnel Procedures, Section E "Attendance and

Absenteeism" states:

      "Employees are expected to be at work on all working
      days except in the case of illness or other excused
      absences. If you need to be absent from work, you are
      required to obtain authorization from your immediate
      supervisor. Excessive absenteeism for any reason will
      not be tolerated and you will be subject to appropriate
      disciplinary action. You will be notified whenever your
      attendance is unacceptable," (emphasis added).

 Title V, Problem Solving System, Section B, "Basic Areas

Requiring Discipline" of the Employee Handbook states in
pertinent part:

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"1. Definitions of Minor Rule Violations. These are violations
which in themselves, are not reason for discharge. However,
repetitive violation of these rules will result in progressively
more severe discipline and may end in discharge. The following is
illustrative of minor violations: a) Tardiness or absenteeism
(page 27, T.E. C2)."

 The Employee Handbook is but a "guide" to Respondent's

policy (IÄT. 51, IIIÄT. 38, 40, 49, 99).

Summary of Complainant's Absences

 February 6, 1983. Reason: Sick. This absence occurred while

Complainant was a temporary and eight days before be became a
permanent employee.

    April 15, 1983. Reason: SickÄFlu.

    April 20, 1983. Reason: Fixing broken windows.

    April 23, 1983. Reason: Sick.

    April 24, 1983. Reason: Sick.

    May 7, 1983. Reason: Complainant's father-in-law died.

    June 2, 1983. Reason: Flu.

    June 25, 1983. Reason: To repair windows.

    November 17, 1983. Reason: Sick.

    November 18, 1983. Reason: Still sick.

 All 10 of these absences were "excused" absences (IÄT. 7Ä8).

Complainant, however, was absent on January 1, 1984 as a result
of a "Driving Under the Influence" incarceration; this absence
was not excused (IIIÄT. 49) and was a "major" rule violation
(IIIÄT. 75, 76, 100). In his testimony (IIIÄT. 107), Complainant
conceded the existence of alcohol and marital problems and such,
as hereinafter noted, were of some concern to Respondent's
management who took various actions to assist Complainant
therewith. The record demonstrates that the alcohol problem at
least extended up to the time of his discharge.

Complainant's Absence on January 1, 1984.

 Complainant was arrested by the Elko County Sheriff's

Department for DUI (Driving Under the Influence) at approximately
12:30 a.m. on January 1, 1984, and booked at 1:05 a.m. for DUI
(Ex. CÄ4).

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The booking sheet (Ex. CÄ4) reflects that he called his foreman,
Tom Watkins at 1:20 a.m. (FOOTNOTE 2)

 Complainant's version of the events following his arrest

follows:

      Q. What did you do after you were arrested?

      A. I made a phone call to my supervisor Tom Watkins.

      Q. How was that phone call made?

      A. It was made in jail, the jailer dialed the number
      and handed the phone to me.

      Q. Describe the conversation with Mr. Watkins?

      A. I told him that I had been arrested for D.U.I. I was
      trying to make bail to be to work on time in the
      morning and I asked him if I should go ahead and call
      Freeport and tell them I wasn't going to be there or to
      wait and see if I could make bail and get there on time
      or get there at all. And he said if you are not there
      I'll know where you are at and so I just told Tom I
      would get there as soon as I could.

      Q. At that point, did you think you were going to be
      absent that day?

      A. I wasn't for sure, I was hoping I wold get out in
      time.

      Q. Did you make any other phone calls to Tom Watkins
      that morning?

      A. After I was arrested, I went home and I called Tom
      and it was already after the shift had started and I
      told him that I had made bail and that I wanted to
      report to work, I would have a tardy, butÄ

      Q. You hadÄhad you ever gotten a tardy before?

      A. No, I felt it would be better to have a tardy than
      an absentee and I would get there as soon as I could
      and Tom said, well, don't worry about it, just come in
      tomorrow on your regular scheduled shift, so I did.

      Q. Did you come in the next day on your regular shift?

      A. Yes, I did. I worked full shift on January second.

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Q. What happened after the shift?

         A. Directly at the end of the shift, I believe it was
         Tom Watkins who handed me a slip (FOOTNOTE 3) saying that I
         was on suspension and not to return to the mill site
         until January fourth.

         Q. You heard Tom Watkins say you never called him that
         day at all. Did you hear him testify to that effect?

         A. Yes, I heard him say that.

         Q. Is there any question in your mind you talked to him
         that day?

         A. No, there is not.            (IIÄT. 116Ä117).
    Complainant's Accident Record

 March 13, 1983. While using his 992 loader, Complainant

accidentally tore the ladder off the loader (Ex. CÄ3ÄVI).

 April 6, 1983. Complainant's knee was bruised and injured

when a cable snapped while he was helping put a feed chute in
place.

 May 1, 1983. Complainant sustained minor (small) cyanide

burns on both arms while taking cyanide flow meters apart to
clean them.

 June 21, 1983. While not wearing a face shield, Complainant

had cyanide sprayed in his face.

 July 17, 1983. The tip of Complainant's little finger was

smashed while he was placing a piece of rebar under the wheels of
a radial stacker.

 December 21, 1983. Complainant bruised his back when he

slipped and fell on ice while climbing out of a bridge
feeder. (FOOTNOTE 4)

Page 8

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Complainant's Counseling and Disciplinary Record

 On May 13, 1983, Complainant's performance was reviewed with

him by his immediate supervisor, shift foreman R.T. Albright, and
the mill general foreman, E.G. Walker, and Complainant was
counseled concerning his excessive absenteeism (IIÄT. 204Ä207,
219Ä221, 227).

 On June 13, 1983, the Complainant was given a letter of

reprimand for excessive absenteeism by the mill general foreman,
E.G. Walker. The Complainant was advised therein that it was his
responsibility to attend work regularly, he was notified that it
would be necessary for him to provide a doctor's certification
verifying any future illness, and he was warned that if he failed
to fulfill his responsibilities further disciplinary action up to
and including discharge would be taken (IIÄT. 80, 209Ä210,
221Ä225). (FOOTNOTE 5)

 On June 27, 1983, the Complainant was referred by Respondent

to the Community Mental Health Center for counseling. The
Complainant was referred by a counselor, (R.D. Herman, Ph.D.
Cand, M.F.C.) but refused to enter an alcohol and drug
rehabilitation program at Truckee Meadows Hospital in Reno,
Nevada (IIÄT. 211Ä212, 226Ä227).

 Complainant was counseled by the mill manager, D.J. Collins,

on September 26, 1983, about his excessive accident rate. It
appeared at that time that Complainant had had a number of
personal problems and that such were probably the cause of his
accidents (IIÄT. 210, 211, 227Ä232).

 By memo dated November 23, 1983 (Ex. R. 16; IIIÄT. 16Ä18),

Complainant was given the following warning by George D. Harris,
the general mill foreman at the time, concerning the subject of
absenteeism:

      It is the responsibility of every employee to maintain
      his/her personal health in such a manner as to provide
      for regular attendance at work. Your absence of
      November 18, 1983 was the seventh (7th) separate
      absence since April 15, 1983. You have been absent with
      pay for a total of seven (7) days since that date.
      The company is not questioning whether you were in fact
      sick or disabled on the above occasions; however, your
      absenteeism is disruptive to your fellow workers and to
      the efficient operation of your work group.

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This letter is being given to you in order that you will be aware
of your attendance record and to impress upon you that excessive
absenteeism reduces the value of an employee to the company, and
in addition, to notify you at this time that it will be necessary
for you to bring a doctor's certification verifying any future
illness to insure pay for any such absence. I hope that it will
help you to correct your absenteeism problem and that further
discipline will not be necessary.

      If you fail to fulfill your responsibility as an
      employee to maintain your personal health in such a
      manner as to provide for your regular attendance at
      work, then further disciplinary measures will be taken
      up to and including discharge."

 Respondent's Termination Report dated 1/4/84 and signed by

D.S. Barr (then Mill Operations Manager) pertinent to Complainant
reflects that the "Reason for Separation" was
"Absenteeism/Lateness," that the effective date of Complainant's
dismissal was January 3, 1984, that Complainant's Attendance and
Cooperation were "unsatisfactory," that his initiative was
"fair," and that his Job Knowledge and Quality of Work were
"satisfactory". Under the heading "Additional Comments" the
following notation appeared: "Recommended Mental Health
Counseling & Alcohol & Drug Abuse Counseling, general negative
response. Dismissed for unexcused absence, DUI, after written
warning for absenteeism. Also a safety problem." (Ex. RÄ18(a)).

 While Complainant had never been disciplined for engaging in

unsafe practices, he was seen as being a "safety problem" on the
basis of the various accidents he had been involved in during the
year of his employment (IIÄT. 37). Prior to the discharge of
Complainant, Respondent had not discharged any other employee
solely for "excused absences." However, absenteeism can be
excessive, whether or not excused (Employee Handbook, Ex. CÄ2,
Sections E and I; IÄT. 61Ä64; IIIÄT. 73).

 Douglas Scott Barr, Respondent's mill operations manager at

the time, who effectively recommended Complainant's discharge
(IIÄT. 86; IIIÄT. 65, 66, 80, 93), credibly and effectively gave
his reasons for this decision:

      "Q. Let me go back. You said you took into account the
      number of incidences. Did you also take into account
      the type of absences that were reflected in the file?

      A. We did. Primarily they were minor infractions, each
      one. It is just that there was a repetitve series,
      substantial number of them, there were several that
      were at best questionable. But, yet they were excused
      and minor in their own right. The situation that called
      it to our attention, there was a major violation we
      were considering an unexcused absence, he hadn't any
      unexcused absences there before."

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Q. What unexcused absences are you referring to?

      A. The one on the first of January.

                           **********

      Q. Why did you consider the D.U.I. in this case
      particularly grievous?

      A. Well, first off, it's unreported, it'sÄit's in a
      situation where it's a common problem, not saying
      common, but one in which we take a very great care to
      see if we can get people out on the first of January
      and its's a difficult time of the year for us so we
      need all the people we can get. So, a person's absence,
      unexcused, unscheduled and just unexcused, gives us
      gret difficulty at that point. The subject had just
      went through a warning period in November, which I was
      aware of and concerning his absenteeism, and a later
      time it was apparent under the continuation of the type
      of absences, that we had a problem before, an
      individual had been recommended for counseling,
      considering alcoholism, I'm going to say substance
      abuse, that's a better term.

      Q. Did you consider that thereÄthat the fact is that
      you had stated in your additional comments, there was
      negative, general negative response to the
      recommendation for mental health counseling and alcohol
      and drug abuse counseling, particularly significant in
      relationship to the D.U.I. on January 1?

      A. Yes, I think it is. The alcohol abuse, substance
      abuse, was an underlying issue in quite a few of the
      items that were discussed. (IIIÄT. 49Ä51).

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

 In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

under Section 105(c) of the Act, a complaining miner bears the
burden of production and proof to establish (1) that he engaged
in protected activity and (2) that the adverse action complained
of was motivated in any part by that activity. Secretary on
behalf of Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 2786,
2797Ä2800 (October 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.,
1981); and Secretary on behalf of Robinette v. United Castle Coal
Co., 3 FMSHRC 803, 817Ä18 (April 1981). The operator may rebut
the prima facie case by showing either that no protected activity
occurred or that the adverse action was in no part motivated by
protected activity. If an operator cannot rebut the prima facie
case in this manner it may nevertheless affirmatively defend by
proving that (1) it was also motivated by the miner's unprotected

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activities, and (2) it would have taken the adverse action in any
event for the unprotected activities alone. The operator bears
the burden of proof with regard to the affirmative defense. Haro
v. Magma Copper Co., 4 FMSHRC 1935, 1936Ä38 (November 1982). The
ultimate burden of persuasion does not shift from the
complainant. Robinette, 3 FMSHRC at 818 n. 20. See also Boich v.
FSMHRC, 719 F.2d 194, 195Ä96 (6th Cir.1983); Donovan v. Stafford
Constr., Co., 732 F.2d 954, 958Ä59 (D.C.Cir.1984) (specifically
approving the Commission's PasulaÄRobinette test); and Goff v.
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Company, 8 FMSHRC 1860 (December 1986).

 It goes without saying that the concept of discrimination to

be dealt with here is relatively narrow, i.e., that contemplated
by the 1977 Mine Safety. Matters-or allegations-of general
unfairness, failures, or inequities in the employee-employer
relationship are not subject to remedy under this Act. While I
have found that Complainant marginally engaged in protected
activities, there is no nexus between such activities and the
adverse action (discharge) taken by Respondent.

 There is little, if any, direct or indirect evidence of

discriminatory motivation in the record, bearing either on (1)
Respondent's purposes in discharging Complainant, or (2)
Respondent's attitude and approach to the safety activities of
its employees. The great weight of the probative, substantial
evidence supports Respondent's position that it discharged
Complainant because of excessive absenteeism primarily, and his
accident record secondarily, with some documented and sincere
attendant concern for what it perceived to be alcohol/marital
problems in Complainant's life (IIIÄT. 107). Although Complainant
attempted to establish that Respondent discouraged safety
reporting or accident reporting by giving awards and dinners to
employee groups having the best accident-free record, Complainant
himself testified:

      "It was Freeport's policy, as far as anytime you so
      much as got a scratch you were to report it as an
      accident to keep similar accidents from happening, if
      possible and point out hazards and just also to cover
      yourself in caseÄthey give you an example, somebody got
      a scratch and got blood poison and the guy didn't turn
      it in and ended up paying for it out of his own
      pocket." (T. 118).

 Another Complainant's witness, when asked whether he had

observed an atmosphere "discouraging the reporting of minor
accident or complaining about safety" (IÄT. 107), replied:

      "In a sense, it was more of an implied discouragement,
      if people reported too many minor accidents, scraped
      fingers, if they got up to a certain amount, they were
      considered unsafe and had to go to special training or
      had to go to counseling with being an unsafe worker."

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Respondent established that its practices were intended to
encourage and reward good safety practices and that its
activities in this respect were common throughout the industry
(IIÄT. 189).

 Complainant's contention that Respondent was engaged in

conduct calculated to discourage safety reporting is rejected.
Establishment of discriminatory motivation is difficult and
seldom accomplished through direct proof. Secretary of Labor on
behalf of Johnny N. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 FMSHRC 2508
(1981), reconsideration den. 3 FMSHRC 2765 (1981); Brazell v.
Island Creek Coal Company, 4 FMSHRC 1455 (1982). Here,
Complainant did not establish through any probative or convincing
evidence that Respondent had a pattern or policy, formal or
otherwise, of retaliating against miners for making safety
complaints. Again, although the contention was raised, there was
no probative substantial evidence that Respondent had ever
retaliated or taken adverse action against safety complainants in
other matters which might indicate a general pattern or
background of discriminatory conduct. A history of management
hostility to safety complaints, while argued, was not to any
degree of persuasion established on this record. The record is
devoid of admissions or statements by Respondent's management
personnel indicating an anti-safety reporting animus. Nor are
there writings, accounts of conversations, or oral statements
made by Respondent's foremen, or other officers, from which the
existence of a discriminatory animus can be inferred. There is no
evidence of resentment or antagonism on Respondent's part
traceable to any of Complainant's activities protected under the
Act. Complainant's evidence, apparently of necessity, was general
and unpersuasive in these regards. Further belying the existence
of discriminatory motivation were Respondent's various efforts to
assist Complainant with his background difficulties. In short, I
find no probative evidence from which it can be determined or
inferred that Respondent's motivation, solely or in part, was
discriminatory toward Complainant for his engagement in any
protected activity. It is concluded that Complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination recognizable under
the Act.

 Even assuming arguendo, and such is not the situation here,

that Complainant did establish that part of Respondent's
motivation was his engagement in protected activities, based on
Complainant's absence and accident record and its own impressive
record of prior counseling and warnings to Complainant in 1983,
Respondent established a clear and strong justification for
discharging Complainant for his unprotected activites and that
such action was taken and would have been taken for such
unprotected activities alone. See Gravely v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 6
FMSHRC 799 (1984).

ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS

 Complainant failed to establish by substantial probative

evidence that his discharge was motivated in any part by his

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~1123
engagement in protected activities. Thus, Complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Section
105(c) of the Act.

 Even assuming arguendo that Complainant did establish by a

preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence
that his discharge was motivated in some part by his protected
activities, Respondent clearly showed by a strong preponderance
of the evidence that it was motivated by Complainant's
unprotected activities, i.e., his absenteeism and accident
record, and that it would have taken the adverse action
(discharge of Complainant) in any event for such unprotected
activities.

                             ORDER


 Complainant having failed to establish Mine Act

discrimination on the part of Respondent, his complaint is
DISMISSED.

                         Michael A. Lasher, Jr.
                         Administrative Law Judge

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ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
~FOOTNOTE_ONE
1 The hearing was held during a 3Äday period, October 27, 28
and 29, 1986. For each day of hearing there is a separate
transcript beginning with page one. Accordingly, transcript
citations will be prefaced with "I" "II" and "III", respectively,
in this manner: "IÄT.", "IIÄT." and "IIIÄT."

~FOOTNOTE_TWO
2 While Watkins denied receiving such telephone call (IÄT.
53Ä54), such denial is not credited in view of the testimony of
the arresting officer, Carl L. Marr, and the booking officer,
James L. Black, to the contrary (IÄT. 74, 77Ä79). Complainant's
account of this conversation (IIÄT. 116) is accepted.

~FOOTNOTE_THREE
3 Ex. RÄ17.

~FOOTNOTE_FOUR
4 While Complainant contends that the reports of the six
accidents he was involved in in 1983 were safety complaints,
these reports were completed by Respondent's management personnel
on standard forms and in the course of Respondent's normal
procedure for documenting accidents. The strong preponderance of
the evidence is that the accident reports are not safety
complaints. If Complainant's logic were carried out to its normal
conclusion the more accidents a miner were involved in the more
protected safety activities he would be seen to have engaged in.
The concept of this argument has no credible foundation in the
record and is rejected. Respondent is found justified in
considering Complainant's overall accident record as part of its
determination to discharge Complainant following the DUI absence
on January 1, 1984.

~FOOTNOTE_FIVE
5 As above noted, Title V, Problem Solving System, Section
B, "Basic Areas Requiring Discipline" of the Employee Handbook
(Ex. CÄ2 at p. 27) provides that minor rule violations, if
repetitive, can result in progressively more severe discipline
and may end in discharge. "Absenteeism" was specifically listed
as an illustration of this principle.