Secretary of Labor v. Hoover Excavating & Trucking, Inc., and its successors

Plain-English summary

MSHA cited Hoover Excavating after the company drilled and blasted in a highwall bench area that remained subject to a withdrawal order. During a later inspection, owner Reginald Hoover refused to answer questions or open a truck used to transport explosives, then drove the truck away from inspectors. When the truck was inspected, it lacked required explosives placards and two multipurpose dry-chemical fire extinguishers. Judge Margaret A. Miller affirmed all three violations, finding high negligence for working in the withdrawn area and impeding inspection, and high negligence plus unwarrantable failure for the explosives-transport violation. The assessed penalties were upheld in full at $6,421.

Decision snapshot

• Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a) and 814(b); 30 C.F.R. § 56.6202(a)
• Outcome: All three violations and their proposed penalties were affirmed, totaling $6,421.
• Key point: An operator may not work in a withdrawn area, obstruct an MSHA inspection, or transport explosives without the required vehicle safeguards.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

721 19TH STREET, SUITE
443

DENVER, CO 80202-2500

TELEPHONE:
303-844-5266 / FAX: 303-844-5268

November 13,
2019

SECRETARY
OF LABOR

MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH   

ADMINISTRATION,
(MSHA),

Petitioner,

v.

HOOVER
EXCAVATING & TRUCKING, INC., and its successors,

Respondent,

CIVIL
PENALTY PROCEEDINGS

Docket
No. WEST 2019-0268

A.C.
No. 35-03805-485254

Docket
No. WEST 2019-0269

A.C.
No. 35-03805-485254

Mine:
Plant #2

DECISION AND
ORDER

Appearances:  
Rebecca W. Mullins, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Arlington,
Virginia, for Petitioner;

Reginald
S. Hoover, pro se , Coquille, Oregon, for Respondent.

Before:                        Judge
Miller

These cases are
before me upon petition for assessment of civil penalties filed by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (“the Act”). These cases involve two
citations issued pursuant to Section 104(a) and one order issued pursuant to
Section 104(d)(1) of the Act, with originally proposed penalties totaling
$6,421.00. The parties presented testimony and evidence regarding the violations
at a hearing held in Eugene, Oregon on September 18, 2019. Based upon the
parties’ stipulations, my review of the entire record, my observation of the
demeanors of the witnesses, and consideration of the parties’ legal arguments,
I find the violations have been established and uphold the penalties as
assessed.

I.        FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Hoover Excavating & Trucking, Inc.
(“Hoover Excavating”) operates Plant #2, a surface crushed and broken stone
mine located in Myrtle Point, Oregon. (Tr. 12). Hoover Excavating is an
“operator” as defined in Section 3(d) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 803(d), and thus
the mine is subject to the provisions of the Mine Act and the jurisdiction of
the Commission.

The three violations at issue in these
cases arise from two separate inspections of Plant #2. Both inspections were
conducted by Inspector Jed McGinnis, who has worked for MSHA for three and a
half years as an inspector and also has 13 years of experience working in a
copper and gold mine. (Tr. 83–84).  I found Inspector McGinnis to be credible
and thorough in his description of the events. Mine owner Reginald S. Hoover
represented Hoover Excavating at the hearing, and I found him to be less
credible.

Because the facts associated with each
inspection differ significantly, I analyze the violations below in accordance
with their corresponding inspection date, rather than by docket number.

A.     January 29, 2019
Inspection

a.       Factual
Background

Prior to the January 29, 2019 inspection
at issue here, Inspector McGinnis conducted two pertinent inspections of Plant

2 in late 2018. The first occurred on November 27, 2018. On that date, McGinnis

traveled to Plant #2 for a spot inspection and issued Citation No. 9376035 for
a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.3131. That regulation mandates that “loose or
unconsolidated material shall be sloped to the angle of repose or stripped back
for at least 10 feet from the top of the pit or quarry wall” in places where
people work or travel in performing assigned tasks. 30 C.F.R. § 56.3131. The
citation described the condition at the mine as follows:

The loose and
unconsolidated material along the perimeter of the high wall was not sloped to
the angle of repose or stripped back ten feet, other conditions existed that
created a fall of material hazard to miners. Large rocks had fallen on the
drill area where work had recently been completed. Unconsolidated material was
witnessed falling from the top of the high wall during the inspection and a
large boulder was witnessed falling from the second bench during the
inspection. Other areas on the high wall were undercut creating a fall of
material hazard to miners. The pit was accessed daily to mine rock for the
crusher. A fatal injury could result if a miner was struck by the falling
material. The owner had cut a tree from the top of the high wall where the
material was not stripped back or sloped to the angle of repose.

McGinnis
determined that a fatal injury was reasonably likely to occur, that one person
would be affected, and that the operator’s negligence was high. Though Hoover
Excavating initially contested this citation, it was assessed as issued
pursuant to settlement in Docket No. WEST 2019-0204. It is therefore admitted
and unreviewable here.

On December 10, 2018, Inspector McGinnis
returned to Plant #2 to conduct a follow-up inspection of the mine. While there,
he issued Section 104(b) Withdrawal Order No. 9376048. Section 104(b) provides
as follows:

If, upon any
follow-up inspection of a coal or other mine, an authorized representative of
the Secretary finds (1) that a violation described in a citation issued
pursuant to subsection (a) has not been totally abated within the period of
time as originally fixed therein or as subsequently extended, and (2) that the
period of time for the abatement should not be further extended, he shall
determine the extent of the area affected by the violation and shall promptly
issue an order requiring the operator of such mine or his agent to immediately
cause all persons, except those persons referred to in subsection (c), to be
withdrawn from, and to be prohibited from entering, such area until an
authorized representative of the Secretary determines that such violation has
been abated.

30 U.S.C. § 814(b).
The order described the continuing violation:

The loose and
unconsolidated material had not been removed from the face of the high wall and
a berm had not been established at the base of the high wall on the “bench” that
had been cleared for drilling and blasting. Work had been started to strip the
top of the pit back ten feet, weather conditions prohibited any further work
until conditions improved.

McGinnis explained at hearing that he
issued the withdrawal order because, although some work had begun on the high
wall, “no work had been started (to abate the violation) and no scaling had been
done” on the bench section. (Tr. 85). The order required that a specific section
of the high wall be removed from operation until the underlying violation was
abated by the operator. Sec’y Ex. 6. McGinnis served a copy of the withdrawal
order on Hoover Excavating foreman Casey Sabin, explained the scope of the
order to him, and determined that he understood the scope and implications of
the order.  (Tr. 86). Hoover Excavating did not contest the withdrawal order
and it is thus admitted and unreviewable.

b.       Citation No.
9376074 (Docket No. WEST 2019-0268)

On January 29, 2019, McGinnis again
traveled to Plant #2 , and observed that Hoover Excavating had continued to
work on the high wall in the face of the 104(b) withdrawal order. As a result,
he issued Citation No. 9376074 for a violation of Section 104(b) of the Act. The
citation, as modified, described the condition as follows:

The “bench”
section of the high wall was not removed from operation as required by Order of
Withdrawal No. 9376048 dated 12/10/2018. The mine operator had continued to
work on the “bench” preparing the area to be drilled and blasted. The area
where work had been performed was below loose and unconsolidated material. The
operator had not taken any action to mitigate the hazards on the high wall
before working on the “bench”. The Order has not been modified, vacated, or
terminated. This condition has not been designated as “significant and
substantial” because the conduct violated a provision of the Mine Act rather
than a mandatory safety or health standard.

Because this is a violation of the Act, rather
than of mandatory health and safety standards, gravity and significant and
substantial designations do not apply. McGinnis determined that the negligence
level was high.

McGinnis explained at hearing that he
observed a shock tube which had not been present when the 104(b) order was
issued on December 10. A shock tube is used only for the purpose of blasting. McGinnis
stated that he discussed the hazardous condition with Hoover, who confirmed
that he had in fact drilled and blasted the bench. (Tr. 87).  Photos taken
during this inspection and admitted into evidence at the hearing show the
still-present hazardous unconsolidated material as well as the white detonating
cord and shock tube that had been placed in the area at some point after the
104(b) order was issued. Sec’y Ex. 5.

Hoover,
on behalf of Hoover Excavating, explained at hearing that his understanding was
that he could drill on the bench as long as he was 15 feet away from the high
wall. (Tr. 109). He admitted that he was on the area of the bench that was
subject to the withdrawal order in order to drill, and that he did drill, because
he “didn’t feel that there was adequate enough material up there” to build a
berm. (Tr. 109). He did this “to create some material to build a berm . . . not
realizing [he] was in direct violation of the order.” (Tr. 109). According to
McGinnis’s credible testimony, there was plenty of material available to build
a berm without the need to drill and blast in the unsafe area. (Tr. 95–96).

It
is evident from the testimony of both parties and from the photos taken on
January 29, 2019, that the company continued to blast and work in the area in
the face of the withdrawal order. Sec’y Ex. 5. Therefore, I find the violation
has been established.

The Secretary
alleges that this violation was the result of high negligence. The Commission
has recognized that “[e]ach mandatory standard . . . carries with it an
accompanying duty of care to avoid violations of the standard, and an
operator’s failure to meet the appropriate duty can lead to a finding of
negligence if a violation of the standard occurs.” A.H. Smith Stone Co. ,
5 FMSHRC 13, 15 (Jan. 1983). In determining whether an operator met its duty of
care, the judge must consider “what actions would have been taken under the
same circumstances by a reasonably prudent person familiar with the mining
industry, the relevant facts, and the protective purpose of the regulation.” Newtown
Energy Inc. , 38 FMSHRC 2033, 2047 (Aug. 2016); Brody Mining, LLC , 37
FMSHRC 1687, 1702 (Aug. 2015); U.S. Steel Corp. , 6 FMSHRC 1908, 1910
(Aug. 1984).

In
this case, Hoover Excavating should have known of the unsafe condition even
prior to the first citation. Nevertheless, the company was put on definitive notice
of the condition on November 27, 2018, when McGinnis issued the first citation
for a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.3131. During the follow-up inspection on
December 10, 2018, when it became obvious that the mine had done nothing to
abate the violation, the company was reminded of the hazardous condition and
ordered to remove the area from operation until the predicate violation was
abated. Though Hoover himself was not served with the order of withdrawal, he nevertheless
should have known that blasting in the withdrawn (and previously cited) area
was prohibited.

Mitigating
circumstances sufficient to reduce the negligence level of this citation are
not present in this case. In Jeppesen Gravel , the Commission Judge
modified the negligence level of a number of citations issued for working in the
face of a failure to abate order where the Secretary acknowledged that the mine
had put forth effort toward compliance. 37 FMSHRC 2319, 2326 (Oct. 2015) (ALJ).
In that case, the operator had fully abated four and partially abated another
three violations before MSHA issued citations for working in the face of
failure to abate orders. Id . Regarding those citations, the judge found
that a high negligence designation was inappropriate. Id . However, she
determined that, for several other citations at issue in the case where the
operator had not partially or fully abated violations, high negligence was
appropriate. Id . at 2329.

In
this case, I remain unconvinced that Hoover was blasting in the withdrawn area
in order to abate the dangerous condition. As McGinnis stated at trial, “that’s
not customarily how you do mining. You actually build the berm before you drill
and blast. You don’t drill and blast to build a berm.” (Tr. 96–97). Hoover has
ample experience with mining and with MSHA compliance, and I find his testimony
concerning this violation untenable. I accordingly find that the violation had
not been either partially or fully abated at the time McGinnis issued this
citation, and that high negligence is appropriate.

B.      February 5, 2019
Inspection

On February 5, 2019, Inspector McGinnis,
along with his supervisor, Randy Cardwell, returned to Plant #2 to conduct another
inspection of the mine. Upon arriving at the mine, McGinnis noticed that blasting
had occurred recently and developed concerns regarding Hoover Excavating’s
transportation of explosives. He asked Hoover a few questions, which Hoover refused
to answer. McGinnis then asked if he could inspect the back of Hoover’s truck,
and Hoover said that he could not. (Tr. 98).

McGinnis then explained to Hoover that if
he did not allow the inspection he would be issued a citation. Hoover then got
in the truck and drove it across the street. In McGinnis’ opinion, Hoover did
this in order to prevent inspection of the truck. (Tr. 99). Photos entered as
exhibits at hearing show Hoover getting in the truck to drive it off of the
mine site and the truck parked across the street from the mine. Sec’y Ex. 7. Cardwell
then received instruction from his district manager to inform Hoover that local
authorities would be contacted about Hoover’s possible transportation of
explosives in the truck.  After being so informed, Hoover allowed inspection of
the truck. (Tr. 102).

Two violations issued during this inspection
are under consideration here. One is a Section 104(a) citation issued for a
violation of Section 103(a) of the Act, and the other is a Section 104(d)(1)
order issued for a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.6202(a). Each violation is
discussed in turn below.

a.       Citation No. 9376080
(Docket No. WEST 2019-0268)

After Hoover had driven his truck off
mine property, McGinnis issued Citation No. 9376080 for a violation of Section
103(a) of the Act. Section 103(a) directs authorized representatives of the
Secretary to conduct inspections of mines and declares that representatives
conducting such inspections “shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any
coal or other mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 813(a).

The
citation described the violation as follows:

Mr. Reggie
Hoover, owner of Hoover Excavating & Trucking Inc., refused to allow
inspection of the box in the back of the truck that was used to transport
explosives to the mine site and used on the day of the inspection. He would not
open the box on the back of the truck and would not answer questions regarding
the transportation of the explosives to the mine site. Reggie Hoover, owner, drove
the truck off the mine site and parked it across the street from the mine to
avoid having to open the box. This condition has not been designated as
“significant and substantial” because the conduct violated a provision of the
mine act rather than a mandatory safety or health standard.

At hearing, Hoover admitted that he
moved his truck to a parking area across the street.  He claimed that the
parking area was still on mine property, but also stated that he did not feel
that inspection of the truck “was pertinent to the bench thing that they were
there for.” (Tr. 111, 123). He went on, however, to assert that he moved his
truck in order to “g[et] it out of the way of what was going on in the pit.” (Tr.
113). Hoover’s tenuous and inconsistent account of these facts leads me to find
that he is not a credible witness.

I credit McGinnis’ testimony concerning
the facts surrounding this citation. Moreover, whether the truck was driven off
of or remained on mine property is not dispositive of whether a violation
occurred. Hoover refused to answer questions and then drove the truck away from
MSHA inspectors who were actively attempting to inspect the vehicle in the
course of their inspection of the mine. The Act specifically grants inspectors the
right to conduct inspections of mines, and Hoover’s truck, used to transport
explosives to the site, was unquestionably subject to this inspection. I find
that in refusing to answer questions, refusing to open the box, and finally, moving
his truck, an act to which Hoover admitted at trial, Hoover violated Section
103(a) of the Mine Act.

The Secretary alleges that the violation was the
result of high negligence.  McGinnis testified that Hoover’s action were
intentional. I agree. The Commission has held that “an operator’s intentional
violation constitutes high negligence for penalty purposes.” Topper Coal Co. ,
20 FMSHRC 344, 350 (Apr. 1998) ( citing Consolidation Coal Co. , 14 FMSHRC
956, 969-70 (June 1992)). Hoover intentionally impeded an inspection of the truck
and I find the high negligence determination appropriate.

b.       Order No. 9376082
(Docket No. WEST 2019-0269)

After Hoover was informed that
authorities would be contacted if he continued to impede the inspection, he returned
the truck and allowed McGinnis and Cardwell to inspect it. (Tr. 102). Based on
this inspection, McGinnis issued Order No. 9376082 pursuant to Section
104(d)(1) of the Act for a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.6202(a).

Section 104(d)(1) orders are only issued
after 104(d)(1) citations, which are assessed if an inspector finds a violation
that is both significant and substantial and results from an unwarrantable
failure by the operator to comply. Wyoming Fuel Co. , 16 FMSHRC 1618,
1622 n.7 (Aug. 1994). “If, during the same inspection or a subsequent
inspection within 90 days of [issuing the 104(d)(1)] citation, another
violation resulting from unwarrantable failure is found, a withdrawal order is
issued under section 104(d)(1) of the Act.” Id .

30 C.F.R. § 56.6202(a) sets standards
for vehicles containing explosives for use at surface metal and nonmetal mines.
In part, it states as follows:

Vehicles containing
explosive material shall be— (1) Maintained in good condition and shall comply
with the requirements of subpart M of this part; (2) Equipped with sides and
enclosures higher than the explosive material being transported or have the
explosive material secured to a nonconductive pallet; (3) Equipped with a cargo
space that shall contain the explosive material (passenger areas shall not be
considered cargo space); (4) Equipped with at least two multipurpose
dry-chemical fire extinguishers or one such extinguisher and an automatic fire
suppression system; (5) Posted with warning signs that indicate the contents
and are visible from each approach . . .

30
C.F.R. § 56.6202(a). McGinnis, in the citation, described his findings
concerning Hoover’s truck:

The truck used
to transport explosives to the mine site did not have warning signs indicating
the contents and did not have two multipurpose dry-chemical fire extinguishers.
Additionally the container used for the explosives was not approved for
explosives and had exposed metal in the container. The improper transportation
of explosives created an explosion hazard to miners and others. The truck was
used on the day of the inspection for a blast that was completed prior to
arrival. A fatal injury could occur if the explosives were to detonate. The
owner has held a blasting license and ATF permit for approximately twenty years
and knows the requirements for transporting explosives. Citation 9376080 was
issued for the owner not allowing MSHA to inspect the truck. This violation is
an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.

McGinnis determined that an injury was
not likely, that an injury resulting from the violation would be fatal, that one
person would be affected, and that the negligence was high. First, at hearing,
Hoover testified that he did in fact have two fire extinguishers in the truck
at the time of inspection. However, no evidence presented or testimony suggests
he attempted to show them to McGinnis at the time of the inspection. His
invitation, at the hearing , to “walk down to my pickup in front of this
building” to see the two fire extinguishers in the truck leads me to believe
that, at the time of the inspection , two fire extinguishers were not in
the truck. (Tr. 111).

Next,
Hoover admitted at hearing that his truck did not have placards signifying that
the vehicle was used to transport explosives. That fact alone is sufficient to
find a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.6202(a). Because I find that a violation of
the cited standard has been established based on the lack of fire extinguishers
and placards, I do not reach the issue of whether the truck’s box used to
transport explosives was a violation.

I find high negligence an appropriate
designation for this violation. Hoover has been hauling explosives for his
blasting operations for many years. If he did not know the mandatory standards
applicable to doing so, he should have. At hearing, he made it clear that he
knew the standard for the placards, and stated “I know that I’m supposed to
have placards.” (Tr. 111).

In Lhoist North America of Virginia,
Inc. , another judge similarly affirmed a high negligence designation for an
operator’s failure to equip a truck transporting explosives with two
dry-chemical fire extinguishers. 36 FMSHRC 2413, 2428 (Sept. 2014)(ALJ). Here,
the truck not only did not have adequate fire extinguishers, but it was not
marked to signify that it contained explosives. I find Hoover Excavating was
highly negligent in allowing the condition to exist, especially given Hoover’s
longtime familiarity with blasting.

i.      
Unwarrantable
Failure

Order
No. 9376082 was designated as an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard. The unwarrantable failure terminology is taken from Section
104(d) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d). The Commission has explained that
unwarrantable failure is “aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence. [It] is characterized by conduct described as ‘reckless disregard,’
‘intentional misconduct,’ ‘indifference,’ or a ‘serious lack of reasonable
care.’” Consol. Coal Co. , 22 FMSHRC 340, 353 (Mar. 2007) (citing Emery
Mining Corp. , 9 FMSHRC 1997, 2001-04 (Dec. 1987)) (citation omitted). In
determining whether a violation is an unwarrantable failure, the Commission has
instructed its judges to consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances
in the case and determine whether there are any aggravating or mitigating
factors. Id. Aggravating factors to be considered include:

the length of
time that the violation has existed, the extent of the violative condition,
whether the operator has been placed on notice that greater efforts were
necessary for compliance, the operator’s efforts in abating the violative
condition, whether the violation was obvious or posed a high degree of danger,
and the operator’s knowledge of the existence of the violation.

IO Coal Co. , 31 FMSHRC
1346, 1352 (Dec. 2009); see also Consol. , 22 FMSHRC at 353.

I find that Hoover
Excavating made no efforts to abate the violative condition. A lack of
abatement efforts may be excusable if the operator had a reasonable, good faith
belief that the condition did not exist. See IO Coal , 31 FMSHRC at 1356.
Here, Hoover explicitly recognized that he was in violation, at least
concerning the placards. He never intended to abate the violation, and instead
expressed his reasons for purposefully violating the standard. ( See Tr.
111). I find that the lack of fire extinguishers and placards posed a high
degree of danger. I further find that the violation was obvious—it was Hoover’s
personal vehicle which he controlled. Finally, the operator’s knowledge of the
existence of the violation has been established. I find that there was no
evidence that Hoover had been placed on notice that greater efforts were
necessary for compliance and that the violative condition was extensive. Nonetheless,
based on these findings, I find the unwarrantable failure designation
appropriate.

II.     PENALTY

The principles governing the authority of Commission
Administrative Law Judges to assess civil penalties de novo for violations of
the Mine Act are well established. Section 110(i) of the Mine Act delegates to
the Commission and its judges “authority to assess all civil penalties provided
in [the] Act.” 30 U.S.C. § 820(i). Commission Judges are not bound by the
Secretary’s penalty regulations. Am. Coal Co. , 38 FMSHRC 1987, 1990
(Aug. 2016). Rather, the Act requires that in assessing civil monetary
penalties, the judge must consider six statutory penalty criteria: the
operator’s history of violations, its size, whether the operator was negligent,
the effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business, the gravity of
the violation, and whether the violation was abated in good faith. 30 U.S.C. §
820(i).

In keeping with this statutory requirement, the
Commission has explained that judges must make findings of fact on the
statutory penalty criteria. Sellersburg Stone Co. , 5 FMSHRC 287, 292
(Mar. 1983), aff'd , 736 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Cantera Green , 22 FMSHRC 616, 620 (May 2000). Once these findings have been
made, a judge’s penalty assessment for a particular violation is an exercise of
discretion, “bounded by proper consideration of the statutory criteria and the
deterrent purpose underlying the Act’s penalty assessment scheme.” Sellersburg
Stone , 5 FMSHRC at 294. See also Am. Coal , 38 FMSHRC at 1993 (when
assessing a penalty, Commission Judges must make findings of fact under each of
the statutory penalty criteria); Black Beauty Coal Co. , 34 FMSHRC 1856,
1864-68 (Aug. 2012) (deterrence is a central tenet of the Mine Act and its penalty
provisions). The Commission has also explained that a judge may consider
additional relevant facts outside of the six statutory penalty criteria when
assessing a penalty. Am. Coal Co. , 40 FMSHRC 983, 989 (Aug. 2018) (when
considering a proposed settlement, a judge may consider facts that fall outside
of the section 110(i) factors, but that support settlement).

The
history of assessed violations has been admitted into evidence and shows a
reasonable history for this mine. Hoover Excavating is a small operator, but
was highly negligent, as discussed above. Hoover stated at hearing that he
thinks the “fines are a little extravagant.” (Tr. 119). However, he did not put
forth any evidence to demonstrate that the penalties will affect his ability to
continue in business. When asked about the ability to pay, Hoover indicated
that he had not prepared tax returns for many years, but was now working on it,
so had nothing to show. Furthermore, Hoover Excavating did not abate these
violations in good faith.  

Based
upon the penalty criteria, I uphold the penalty amounts as assessed by the
Secretary, which are as follows:

Citation/
Order No.

Originally
Proposed Penalty

Penalty
Assessed

Docket
No. WEST 2019-0268

9376074

$2,000.00

$2,000.00

9376080

$2,000.00

$2,000.00

Docket
No. WEST 2019-0269

9376802

$2,421.00

$2,421.00

TOTALS

$6,421.00

$6,421.00

III.  ORDER

Respondent
is hereby ORDERED to pay the Secretary of Labor the sum of $6,421.00
within 30 days of the date of this decision.

/s/
Margaret A. Miller

Margaret
A. Miller

Administrative
Law Judge

Distribution: (Certified U.S. First Class Mail)

Rebecca W. Mullins, U.S. Department of Labor, Office
of the Solicitor, Division of Mine Safety and Health, 201 12 th
Street, Suite 401, Arlington, VA 22209

Reginald S. Hoover, Hoover Excavating &
Trucking, Inc., P.O. Box 309, Coquille, OR 97423