FMSHRC ALJ decision Docket WEST 2013-81-R Decided November 27, 2012 Procedural Judge William B. Moran

Bridger Coal Company

Bridger Coal Company (FMSHRC WEST 2013-81-R): Expedited hearing denied, prompt hearing directed

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Final order, not Commission precedent
This decision by a FMSHRC Administrative Law Judge became the final decision of the Commission 40 days after issuance because the Commission did not direct review (30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1)). It binds the parties but is not binding on the Commission in other cases. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Bridger Coal contested a citation issued after MSHA demanded copies of miner statements taken during an accident investigation. Bridger claimed work-product protection and asked for expedited review, while the Secretary argued there was no continuing harm or hardship. Judge William B. Moran found no sufficient basis for expedited treatment because the legal issue could proceed after discovery on stipulated facts. He denied the motion but directed the parties to arrange a prompt hearing.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited provisions: 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a) and 815(d)
  • Outcome: Expedited treatment was denied, but the case was ordered toward a prompt hearing.
  • Key point: A significant legal dispute does not alone justify expedited proceedings when ordinary discovery and a prompt hearing can address it.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004-1710

Telephone No.: 202-434-9933

Telecopier No.: 202-434-9954

November 27, 2012

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY,

Contestant

v.

SECRETARY OF LABOR,   

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH    

ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),  

Respondent

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CONTEST PROCEEDING

Docket No. WEST 2013-81-R

Citation No. 8477831; 09/25/2012 

Bridger Underground Coal Mine

Mine ID 48-01646

ORDER ON MOTION FOR EXPEDITED PROCEEDING

Before the Court is Contestant Bridger Coal Company’s Motion for Expedited
Proceeding. The Secretary filed an opposition to the motion; Bridger then filed a reply,
following which the Secretary filed a sur-reply. All submissions were considered. Upon consideration, the Court DENIES Bridger Coal’s Motion but directs the parties to
participate in a conference call on Wednesday, December 5, 2012, at a time to be determined,

for the purpose of setting the matter for a hearing

to be conducted in late January or during
February 2013.

Contestant, Bridger, simultaneously filed its Motion for Expedited Proceeding with its
Notice of Contest in this matter. The controversy may be succinctly stated. In connection with
an MSHA investigation of an accident at Bridger’s mine, MSHA sought copies of miners’
statements made to Bridger pertaining to that accident. Bridger initially refused to turn over the
statements. However, when faced with the specter of the issuance of a section 104(b) Order,
Bridger acceded to the demand for the statements. Bridger maintains that section 103(a) of the
Mine Act “does not require mine operators to give MSHA inspectors, on demand, copies of any
internal company statements . . . .”

In seeking expedited review, Bridger contends that, at least in the context of a citation and
the threat of a order being issued for failing to provide the statements, MSHA’s demand for those
statements is an “unprecedented assertion of authority” which amounts to “extorting confidential
company documents . . . by means of unlawful enforcement threats.” Motion at 1. Without an
expedited proceeding, Bridger maintains that MSHA will make other unlawful demands of that
ilk. Thus, Bridger asserts that because “substantial legal issues [are] at stake” and because it
maintains there is a “high probability” that MSHA will repeat its conduct, an expedited
proceeding is justified. Id. at 4.

In its Opposition, the Secretary ticks off all the events which did not occur in connection
with the Citation. Among these, it was not designated as “S&S,” there was no prolonged
abatement period, as it was terminated fifteen minutes after being issued, no high gravity was
claimed, nor was high negligence asserted. The Secretary notes, correctly in the Court’s view,

that the only genuine issue is whether MSHA exceeded its enforcement authority in demanding
the statements.

While Bridger’s Reply maintains that the matter is both extraordinary and unique, and as
such warrants expedited review by the Court, the Secretary’s Sur-Reply asserts that the absence
of any continuing harm or hardship surrounding the citation in issue, is fatal to Contestant’s
effort for an expedited hearing.

The Court agrees that Bridger has failed to establish a sufficiently legitimate basis for
expedited review. Instead, the heart of the matter here is whether, due to Bridger’s claim of the
work-product privilege, it is entitled to withhold from MSHA the statements from its miners
taken by Bridger and pertaining to the accident at the mine. As noted earlier, this seems to be
an issue that the parties could submit to the Court, following discovery, and then upon stipulated
facts, for a legal determination.

However, determining that an expedited proceeding is not warranted does not mean that
the matter may be permitted to laze about, relegated to position itself in queue with all other
matters being litigated, akin to taking a number at a deli. The Contestant has, after all, filed a
notice of contest and it is entitled to a prompt, albeit not expedited, hearing. The Secretary has
inferentially agreed that Bridger is so entitled to a prompt hearing, as cases it cited in arguing that
expedited treatment is unjustified note that an expedited basis is warranted by virtue of “invoking
the contest provisions of Section 105(d) of the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §
815(d), wherein an operator may elect to contest a citation without waiting for a civil penalty to
be proposed.” See, Consolidation Coal, 16 FMSHRC 495, 1994 WL 170800, at * 496, February
14, 1994 and Energy West Mine Co.,15 FMSHRC 2223, 1993 WL 560283 at * 2224, (1993).
Secretary’s Sur-Reply at 1.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Contestant Bridger’s Motion is DENIED but the
matter is still to be set for a prompt hearing per the instructions in this Order.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ William B. Moran

William B. Moran

Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Daniel W. Wolff, Esquire

Crowell & Moring, LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2595

Karen E. Bobela, Esquire

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor

1999 Broadway, Suite 1600

Denver, CO 80202-5708

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