Layne Hamilton v. Stone Mountain Trucking Company, Inc. (ALJ decision, September 28, 1984)

Layne Hamilton v. Stone Mountain Trucking Company, Inc. (FMSHRC VA 83-46-D): Discrimination complaint dismissed after unanswered show cause order

Decision type
ALJ decision
Docket
VA 83-46-D
Decided
September 28, 1984
Presiding judge
Outcome
Procedural
Precedential status
Final order, not precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-20

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This order from 1984 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1984
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Final order, not Commission precedent
This decision by a FMSHRC Administrative Law Judge became the final decision of the Commission 40 days after issuance because the Commission did not direct review (30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1)). It binds the parties but is not binding on the Commission in other cases. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Transcribed from a scanned original: FMSHRC released this decision as an image-only file. The full text below is a machine transcription, proofread against the scan. Check the official release before quoting exact language.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Layne Hamilton filed a mine safety discrimination complaint against Stone Mountain Trucking after MSHA told him its investigation found no violation. Judge Richard C. Steffey set deadlines for Hamilton to address representation and answer the company's questions. Hamilton did not respond to those deadlines or to a later show cause order, although the return receipt showed he received it. The judge dismissed the complaint for default and granted the company's dismissal motion. The decision does not decide whether discrimination occurred.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 2700.63(a).
  • Outcome: Complaint dismissed for failure to answer the show cause order.
  • Key point: The complainant did not answer the show cause order after missing discovery and representation deadlines.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
5203 LEESBURG PIKE
SEP 28 1984
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041

LAYNE HAMILTON, : DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING
*Complainant :
: Docket No. VA 83-46-D
v. :
: MSHA Case No. NORT CD-83-7
STONE MOUNTAIN TRUCKING
:
COMPANY, INC.,
:
Respondent
:

DEFAULT DECISION
Before: Judge Steffey
A prehearing order was issued on July 2, 1984, in the above-entitled proceeding. That order thoroughly explained to complainant the procedures which are used to handle dis- crimination cases which are filed with the Commission after a complainant has received a letter from the Mine Safety and Health Administration advising him that its investigation of the complaint filed with that agency has resulted in a find- ing that no violation of section 105(c)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 has occurred. The prehear- ing order provided that complainant would be given until August 1, 1984, to advise me as to whether he had obtained an attorney to represent him in this proceeding. The order ex- plained that complainant is not required to obtain an attorney to represent him, but that if he decided to do so, that deci- sion would have to be made by August 1, 1984, so that the attorney would have time to prepare for a hearing to be held in October or November 1984.
Additionally, counsel for respondent served complainant on June 5, 1984, with some interrogatories which complainant has failed to answer. The prehearing order of July 2 ex- plained discovery procedures to complainant and stated that he would be required to answer the questions asked by respond- ent's counsel by August 15, 1984, regardless of whether he had decided to obtain an attorney to represent him in this proceeding. Counsel for respondent filed on July 2, 1984, a motion requesting that I issue a show-cause order to complain- ant requiring him to show cause, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2700. 63(a), why his complaint should not be dismissed for failure to reply to respondent's interrogatories. I explained on page 6 of the prehearing order that a show-cause order would be issued if complainant failed to answer the interrogatories and that the complaint would be dismissed if complainant failed to provide a satisfactory reply to the show-cause order.

'The dates of August 1 and August 15, 1984, passed without my receiving a reply from complainant as to whether he had ob- tained an attorney to represent him and without his submitting answers to respondent's interrogatories. Therefore, on Septem- ber 5, 1984, a show-cause order was issued requiring complain- ant to explain in writing by September 24, 1984, why his com- plaint should not be dismissed for failure to provide the in- formation requested in the prehearing order issued July 2, 1984. The return receipt in the official file shows that com- plainant received the show-cause order on September 11, 1984, but I have received no reply to the show-cause order. Conse- quently, pursuant to section 2700.63(a) of the Commission's rules of procedure, I find respondent to be in default and the complaint in this proceeding will be dismissed as hereinafter ordered.
Respondent's counsel filed on September 6, 1984, a motion requesting that the complaint be dismissed for failure of com- plainant to answer respondent's interrogatories by August 15, 1984, as required by the prehearing order of July 2, 1984. In- asmuch as the motion to dismiss is based upon the default pro- visions of section 2700.63(a), my finding of complainant in default and dismissing the complaint under section 2700.63(a) may be interpreted as granting respondent's motion to dismiss, as hereinafter provided.
WHEREFORE, it is ordered:
(A) The complaint filed in Docket No. VA 83-46-D is dis- missed for the reason that complainant has been found to be in default for failure to reply to the show-cause order issued September 5, 1984, in this proceeding.
(B) Respondent's motion to dismiss filed September 6, 1984, is granted and all further proceedings in Docket No. VA 83-46-D are terminated.

Richard C. Steffey
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:
Mr. Layne Hamilton, 157 Second Avenue West, Big Stone Gap, VA 24219 (Certified Mail) Mark M. Lawson, Esq., White, Elliott & Bundy, Suite 300, Do- minion National Bank Building, 601 State Street, P. O. Box 8400, Bristol, VA 24203-8400 (Certified Mail)

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