Dickenson-Russell Coal Co., LLC v. Secretary of Labor (ALJ decision, September 3, 2014)

Dickenson-Russell Coal Co., LLC v. Secretary of Labor (FMSHRC VA 2014-163-R): Direct safeguard contest dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Decision type
ALJ decision
Docket
VA 2014-163-R
Decided
September 3, 2014
Presiding judge
Outcome
Procedural
Precedential status
Final order, not precedent
Checked against source
2026-08-02

Apply this to your situation

This order from 2014 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 2014
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Final ALJ decision, not Commission precedent
This decision became final under the 40-day rule in 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1) because no later Commission review appears in the official index. It binds the parties but is not Commission precedent. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Dickenson-Russell Coal challenged an MSHA notice requiring sanding devices on certain track-mounted personnel carriers before MSHA issued any citation or order for violating the safeguard. The operator argued that the safeguard functioned like a citation and that due process required immediate Commission review. Judge William B. Moran held that section 105(d) authorizes review of specified citations, orders, penalties, and abatement periods but does not independently authorize a contest of a safeguard notice. He concluded that the operator could challenge the safeguard after MSHA issued an enforcement citation or order, which also provided adequate process. Because the docket contained only the safeguard notice, the judge dismissed the contest for lack of jurisdiction.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing authority: 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.1403 and 75.1403-1(b); 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d) and 874(b)
  • Outcome: The safeguard contest was dismissed for lack of Commission jurisdiction.
  • Key point: A notice to provide a safeguard is not itself a citation or order reviewable under section 105(d); Commission review becomes available after an alleged safeguard violation produces enforcement action.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL� MINE� SAFETY� AND� HEALTH�
REVIEW� COMMISSION

OFFICE� OF� ADMINISTRATIVE�
LAW� JUDGES

1331� PENNSYLVANIA� AVE.,�
N.W.,� SUITE� 520N

WASHINGTON,� DC� 20004-1710

TELEPHONE:� 202-434-9933�
/� FAX:� 202-434-9949

����������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������� �September� 3,� 2014

DICKENSON�
�� RUSSELL� COAL� CO.� LLC

�����
����� ������������������������������������Contestant,

�����

����������������������� �����������

����������������������� v.

SECRETARY�
OF� LABOR,

MINE�
SAFETY� AND� HEALTH������������������������� ADMINISTRATION� (MSHA)

�
��������������������� ��������������Respondent

CONTEST�
PROCEEDING

Docket�
No.� VA� 2014-163-R

Citation�
No.� 8208673-01;� 01/15/2014

Cherokee�
Mine

Mine�
ID� 44-06864

�����������

ORDER� OF� DISMISSAL

Before:����������� �����
Judge� William� B.� Moran

����������� Contestant,�
Dickenson-Russell� Coal� Company� (�Contestant�� or� �DRC�),� has� filed� a� Notice� of� Contest� challenging� the� issuance� of� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard,� pursuant� to� Section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Safety� and� Health� Act� of� 1977� (�Mine� Act�).[1]��� In� turn,� the� Secretary� filed� an� Answer,� and� Motion� to� Dismiss,� together� with� a� memorandum� in� support� thereof� (�Response�).[2]

Contestant�s�
Contest� and� Associated� Filings

����������� In� its� Statement�
in� Opposition� to� the� Secretary�s� Motion� to� Dismiss� its� Notice� of� Contest� (�Contestant�s� Opposition�),� Contestant� first� mentions� some� history� with� a� prior� safeguard� at� this� mine,[3]� which� background� the� Court� considers� to� be� immaterial� as,� at� the� end� of� the� day,� this� matter� still� comes� down� to� the� safeguard� issued� on� January� 21,� 2014,� to� Dickenson-Russell.[4]���

����������� No�
citation� has� been� issued� in� connection� with� this� safeguard� notice� but� the� Contestant� still� maintains� that� the� Commission� has� jurisdiction� over� the� matter� as� soon� as� such� a� notice� is� issued,� regardless� of� whether� a� citation� has� been� issued.��� With� no� Commission� level� decision� addressing� its� claim,� the� Contestant� points� particularly� to� the� decision� issued� by� administrative� law� judge� William� Steele� in� Affinity� Coal� Co.� v.� Secretary,� Unpublished� Order� (Aug� 29,� 2013).��� Essentially,� and� fairly� characterizing� its� argument,� the� Contestant�s� Opposition� mirrors� the� points� made� by� Judge� Steele� in� his� decision,� citing� cases� such� as� Drummond� Co.,� Inc.,� 14� FMSHRC� 661� (May� 1992),� involving� review� of� a� program� policy� letter� (�PPL�).��� Referencing� Drummond,� Contestant�s� position� is� that� since� the� Commission� has,� in� other� contexts,� broadly� interpreted� its� jurisdiction,� it� may� therefore� do� so� whenever� the� Secretary�s� actions� adversely� affect� an� operator.��� Opposition� at� 5.��� Contestant� also� maintains� that� section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Act,� �which� was� published� under� Title� III� of� the� Act,� is� an� interim� mandatory� safety� standard� applicable� to� all� underground� coal� mines,� and� because� a� �mandatory� health� or� safety� standard�� is� defined� to� include� interim� mandatory� health� or� safety� standards� under� Title� III,� section� 314(b)� is� a� mandatory� safety� standard.� 30� U.S.C.� �� 803(l).�� Opposition� at� 6.��� Contestant� then� continues� that,� �when� an� inspector� .� .� .� issues� a� notice� of� safeguard,� the� inspector� is,� in� effect,� issuing� a� citation� under� section� 104(a)� for� the� violation� of� a� mandatory� safety� standard.���� Id.� (italics� added).�

����������� As�
a� separate� basis� for� its� position,� Dickenson-Russell� contends� that� due� process� also� requires� that� a� mine� operator� be� able� to� immediately� contest� a� notice� of� contest� upon� its� issuance.� For� this� portion� of� its� argument,� Contestant� points� to� Mathews� v.� Eldridge,� 424� U.S.� 319� (1976),� for� support,� noting� that� �three� distinct� factors� are� considered:��� [� ]� the� private� interest� that� will� be� affected� by� the� official� action;� [�
]� the� risk� of� an� erroneous� deprivation� of� such� interest� through� the� procedures� used,� and� the� probable� value,� if� any,� of� additional� or� substitute� procedural� safeguards;� and� [� ],� the� Government's� interest,� including� the� function� involved� and� the� fiscal� and� administrative� burdens� that� the� additional� or� substitute� procedural� requirement� would� entail.���� Opposition� at� 7� (quoting� Mathews� v.� Eldridge,� 424� U.S.� at� 335).�

����������� Applying�
those� factors,� Contestant� asserts� that� its� affected� interests� are� substantial:� �[t]he� instant� Safeguard� will� require� three� personnel� carriers� to� be� retro-fitted� with� sanding� devices,� at� considerable� expense� to� the� mine.� [� ]� These� three� personnel� carriers� are� used� on� a� daily� basis.����� As� a� result� of� the� Safeguard,� however,� all� three� are� currently� out� of� service� and� cannot� be� used.��� This� unnecessarily� and� negatively� impacts� the� mine�s� operations� and� employees.�� Opposition� at� 7-8,� citations� to� declaration� omitted).��� Nor,� it� contends� can� it� wait� to� receive� a� citation,� because� there� is� no� �guarantee� of� when� a� citation� will� be� issued�� and� that� route� also� exposes� it� to� civil� penalties.��� Finally,� Contestant� contends� that� allowing� operators� to� contest� notices� of� safeguard� upon� issuance� will� not� unduly� burden� the� Secretary.� Opposition� at� 7-8.���

����������� As� noted,� a� particular� case� cited� by� the� Contestant� as� authority� is� Affinity� Coal� Co.� v.� Secretary,� Unpublished� Order� (Aug� 29,� 2013).��� That� case� does� involve� the� same� issue[5]� but,� as� the� parties� well� know,� the� decision� of� another� administrative� law� judge� has� no� precedential� effect.��� Its� value� is� limited� to� the� persuasiveness� of� the� reasoning� in� the� decision� upon� another� judge� who� is� presented� with� a� similar� situation.��� The� judge� in� Affinity� was� persuaded� by� the� argument� that� a� mine� need� not� wait� for� a� citation� to� be� issued,� on� the� basis� that� section� 105(d)� allows� an� operator� to� contest� an� order� or� a� citation� upon� the� view� that� �[a]� notice� of� safeguard� is� just� that� �� a� violation� of� a� provision� of� the� Mine� Act.���� This� Court� does� not� share� that� perspective� because� a� notice� to� provide� a� safeguard� is� plainly� not� a� violation.��� Instead,� it� is� analogous� to� the� promulgation� of� a� safety� and� health� standard,� albeit� it� comes� into� existence� through� a� different,� but� Congressionally� prescribed,� procedure� to� address� hazards� with� respect� to� the� transportation� of� men� and� materials.[6]

����������� In�
short,� this� Court� believes� that,� so� to� speak,� the� other� shoe� must� drop� before� litigation� of� a� safeguard� can� commence.��� Accordingly,� this� Court� cannot� adopt� the� rationale� expressed� in� the� Affinity� decision� that� �jurisdiction� is� conferred� in� the� Commission� because� Affinity� is� specifically� alleged� to� have� violated� a� mandatory� health� or� safety� standard.���� Affinity� at� 6.��� This� is� because� in� point� of� fact� the� Secretary� has� not� made� such� an� allegation� at� the� point� in� time� the� safeguard� notice� is� created� and� issued.��� For� this� reason,� the� Contestant�s� claim� that� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard� is� in� effect� the� equivalent� as� issuing� a� citation� or� order,� does� not� mean� that� the� two� are� the� same.���

����������� Although�
the� judge� in� Affinity� rested� his� conclusion� on� the� theory� that� Section� 105(d)� confers� jurisdiction,� he� also� rested� his� view� on� due� process� grounds.��� The� example� offered� by� the� judge� was� a� mine� operator� having� to� wait� twenty-two� years� before� having� the� ability� to� challenge� the� validity� of� an� underlying� safeguard� notice.��� However,� while� that� recounting� is� a� dramatic� characterization� of� such� an� instance,� it� is� misleading� in� a� sense� because� there� is� nothing� to� prevent� a� mine� operator� from� simply� refusing� to� comply� with� a� safeguard� notice.��� Once� that� refusal� happens� and� a� citation� then� follows,� the� mine� can� then� challenge� the� validity� of� the� safeguard,� together� with� the� citation� and� the� appropriateness� of� the� penalty� proposed� by� the� government� for� that� citation.��� Such� a� challenge� can� occur� immediately� after� the� citation� is� issued,� putting� all� issues� on� the� table.���

The�
Secretary�s� Response

����������� The� Secretary�s�
central� contention� is� that� the� Mine� Act� does� not� give� the� Commission� jurisdiction� to� review� a� safeguard� notice� until� there� has� first� been� a� subsequent� citation� or� order� issued� in� connection� with� that� notice.��� The� basis� for� its� position� is� simple� and� direct,� noting� that� the� section� of� the� Act� addressing� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction,� section� 105(d),� pertains� to� �MSHA�s� issuance� or� modification� of� orders,� (2)� MSHA�s� issuance� or� modification� of� citations� and� proposed� assessments� of� penalties;� and� (3)� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� time� that� MSHA� sets� for� abatement.�[7]� Response� at� 4.��� Thus,� the� Secretary� contends� that� as� section� 105(d)� makes� no� mention� of� a� safeguard� notice,� nor� the� provision� from� which� it� is� derived,� section� 314(b)� of� the� Act,� the� Commission� lacks� jurisdiction.[8]��� Unlike� a� reviewable� citation� under� section� 105(d),� which� stems� from� the� Secretary�s� allegation� that� a� mine� operator� has� violated� the� Act,� or� any� mandatory� health� or� safety� standard,� rule,� order,� or� regulation� promulgated� pursuant� to� the� Act,� the� safeguard� notice� is� analogous� to� a� mine-specific� mandatory� standard.����� Both,� the� Secretary� notes,� establish� required� conduct,� and� both,� when� violated� can� be� cited� for� failing� to� comply� with� such� conduct.[9]�

����������� Perhaps�
more� importantly,� at� least� from� the� Court�s� perspective,� as� the� Secretary� notes,� the� issuance� of� a� safeguard� notice� does� not� assert� that� a� mine� operator� has� committed� any� violation.[10]��� Instead,� a� violation� can� only� occur� later� in� time,� upon� a� mine� operator�s� subsequent��� failure� to� comply� with� the� safeguard� notice.��� Naturally,� this� also� means� that� there� is� no� civil� penalty� proposed� either.��� That� too� only� occurs� upon� a� subsequent� failure� to� comply� with� the� safeguard� notice.��� It� is� true� that,� upon� issuance� of� the� notice� to� provide� a� safeguard,� a� standard� is� created,� but� as� with� every� other� safety� standard,� no� civil� penalty� occurs� when� the� standard� is� created;� rather� it� is� only� when� the� standard,� however� it� comes� into� being,� is� thereafter� violated.��� Accordingly,� it� is� the� Secretary�s� contention� that� no� Commission� jurisdiction� attaches� until� after� the� safeguard� notice� comes� into� existence� and� then,� following� that,� there� is� issued� a� citation� or� order� asserting� that� the� safeguard� was� violated.[11]� �� ��

�����������

In� Pocahontas� Coal� Company,� LLC� v.�
Secretary� of� Labor,� 2014� WL� 2809893� (June� 11,� 2014)� (�Pocahontas�),� another� administrative� law� judge� addressed� the� same� issue.��� As� in� the� case� presently� before� this� Court� and� in� the� Affinity� Coal� matter� (supra),� notices� to� provide� safeguards� were� issued� to� Pocahontas� pertaining� to� the� transportation� of� men� or� materials,� and� the� mine� filed� notices� of� contest� for� each� notice.��� The� Secretary,� again� as� in� this� case,� filed� a� motion� to� dismiss� on� the� grounds� that� the� Commission� lacks� jurisdiction� to� hear� such� a� contest� until� after� a� citation� or� order� is� issued� for� a� violation� of� the� underlying� safeguard� notice.��� The� judge� in� Pocahontas� noted� that� the� Commission� has� addressed� a� safeguard� challenge� only� in� the� context� of� when� it� has� been� accompanied� by� a� citation� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard.[12]��� Reduced� to� its� essential� conclusion,� the� judge� in� Pocahontas� concluded� that� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction� is� limited� under� section� 105(d)� of� the� Mine� Act� to� particular� challenges,� but� that� challenging� a� safeguard� notice� itself,� unaccompanied� by� citation� or� order� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard� notice� is� not� one� of� those� bases� for� Commission� jurisdiction.��� The� judge� in� Pocahontas� also� concluded� that� the� ability� for� a� mine� to� challenge� a� safeguard� notice,� once� the� triggering� event� of� a� citation� or� order� occurs,� also� answers� the� claim� that� due� process� demands� review� prior� to� the� allegation� that� the� notice� has� been� violated.��� In� that� regard,� the� judge� noted� that� it� �cannot� create� jurisdiction� where� none� exists� .� .� .� [and� that]� less� formal� mechanisms,� such� as� a� request� for� a� technical� citation,� .� .� .� could� seemingly� be� used� to� immediately� contest� the� issue� on� an� expedited� basis� .� .� .� [and� also� that]� the� operator� [could]� bring� a� facial� challenge� [to� that� safeguard� notice]� in� Federal� District� Court.���� Id.� at� *4.��� Last,� the� judge� in� Pocahontas� observed� that� �the� government� interest� in� flexibly� and� quickly� addressing� hazards� related� to� the� transportation� of� men� and� materials� is� an� extremely� compelling� one.���� Id.���

This� Court� agrees� with� both� conclusions�
by� the� judge� in� Pocahontas;� section� 105� review� of� a� challenge� to� a� safeguard� is� limited� to� instances� when� a� citation� or� order� has� been� issued� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard� notice;� and� due� process� is� achieved� through� that� challenge� mechanism.[13]���

As� this� docket� contains� no� citations�
or� orders,� but� only� the� notice� to� provide� safeguard� that� was� issued� to� the� mine,� the� above� captioned� contest� proceeding� is� DISMISSED.

����������� ����������������������������������������������������������� /s/ William B. Moran

����������������������������������������������������������� ����������� William B. Moran�

����������������������������������������������������������������������� Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

�����������������������

K.�
Brad� Oakley

Jackson�
Kelly� PLLC

175�
East� Main� Street,� Suite� 500

Lexington,�
KY� 40507

859-255-9500

859-281-6478�
fax

R.�
Henry� Moore

Jackson�
Kelly� PLLC

Three�
Gateway� Center,� Suite� 1500

401�
Liberty� Avenue

Pittsburgh,�
PA��� 15222

412-434-8055

412-434-8062�
fax

Matthew�
N.� Babington,� Esq.

U.S.�
Department� of� Labor

Office�
of� the� Regional� Solicitor

1100�
Wilson� Boulevard

22nd�
Floor� West

Arlington,�
VA��� 22209-3939

[1]�
A� notice�
of� safeguard� is� issued� under� the� Mine� Act� pursuant� to� section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Act,� 30� U.S.C.� �� 874(b)� which� provides:� �Other� safeguards� adequate,� in� the� judgment� of� an� authorized� representative� of� the� Secretary,� to� minimize� hazards� with� respect� to� transportation� of� men� and� materials� shall� be� provided.���� Section� 75.1403� of� the� Secretary's� regulations� repeats� verbatim� the� provisions� of� section� 314(b)� of� the� Act.��� The� procedure� for� issuing� citations� for� safeguard� violations� under� section� 75.1403� is� described� as:� The� authorized� representative� of� the� Secretary� shall� in� writing� advise� the� operator� of� a� specific� safeguard� which� is� required� pursuant� to� �� 75.1403� and� shall� fix� a� time� in� which� the� operator� shall� provide� and� thereafter� maintain� such� safeguard.� If� the� safeguard� is� not� provided� within� the� time� fixed� and� if� it� is� not� maintained� thereafter,� a� notice� shall� be� issued� to� the� operator� pursuant� to� section� 104� of� the� Act.��� 30� C.F.R.� 75.1403-1(b).��� See� generally� Southern� Ohio� Coal� Co.,� 14� FMSHRC� 1� (Jan.� 1992),� Cyprus� Cumberland� Resources� Corp.,� 19� FMSHRC� 1781� (Nov.� 1997).

[2]�
Also� filed�
was� DRC�s� Motion� to� Expedite� and� the� Secretary�s� Opposition� thereto;� DRC�s� Opposition� to� the� Secretary�s� Motion� to� Dismiss� and� its� Notice� of� Additional� Authority� and� the� Secretary�s� Reply� to� DRC�s� Opposition.��� All� filings� were� considered.

[3]�
It� is� questionable�
whether� the� history� offered� by� the� Contestant� actually� creates� a� sympathetic� picture.��� Apparently� intended� to� show� that� MSHA� erred� by� originally� relying� on� an� earlier-issued� safeguard,� which� applied� to� personnel� carriers� transporting� six� or� more� miners,� the� personnel� carrier� cited� in� January� 2014� carried� less� than� six� miners.��� The� new� safeguard� was� then� issued� to� cover� personnel� carriers� transporting� five� or� less� miners.��� It� is� true� that� a� new� safeguard� had� to� be� issued� but,� that� said,� it� should� not� be� lost� that� both� safeguards� addressed� MSHA�s� perceived� need� for� sanding� devices� on� those� personnel� carriers� and� that� both� originated� from� a� perceived� hazard� of� losing� control� on� a� slippery� and� wet� track.���

[4]�
�The� condition�
or� practice� on� this� citation� should� have� read:� The� Co.� #DM39� Brookeville� track� mounted� personnel� carrier,� used� at� this� mine� to� transport� miners,� was� not� equipped� with� sanding� devices.��� This� personnel� carrier� was� in� the� motor� barn� and� available� for� immediate� use� by� the� miners.��� This� is� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard(s)� requiring� that� the� Brookeville� Co.�

DM39� personnel� carrier� and� all� other� track� mounted� personnel� carriers� that� transport� 5� men� or� less� be� equipped� with� properly� installed� and� well� maintained� sanding� devices.��� This� mine� has� a� slope� which� runs� from� the� motor� barn� on� the� surface� to� the� mine� portal,� with� a� sharp� curve� at� the� bottom.��� This� slope� is� outside� and� exposed� to� rain,� snow,� ice� and� other� inclement� weather.��� An� accident� has� previously� occurred� on� this� slope.��� The� track� entry� at� this� mine� has� several� dips� and� hills� and� was� wet� at� the� time� of� inspection.� ��The� foreman� stated� that� when� this� ride� is� used,� miners� carry� sand� in� the� front� passenger� compartment� and� reach� out� and� sand� the� track� as� needed.��� The� hazard� exist� of� loosing�

[sic]� control� of� the� personnel� carrier� due� to� slick� track� conditions,� and� loss� of� braking� ability,� resulting� in� de-railing,� colliding� with� other� personnel� carriers� and/or� running� over� miners� on� foot.���� Contestant�s� Opposition� at� 2-3,� quoting� from� January� 21,� 2014,� condition� or� practice� identified� in� safeguard.�

[5]�
In� Affinity,�
five� safeguard� notices� had� been� issued� following� a� fatality� and� the� mine� then� filed� notices� of� contest.��� The� Secretary� took� the� same� stance� as� here:� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction� is� limited� under� section� 105(d)� and� as� such� it� does� not� extend� to� notices� of� contest.��� Instead,� a� mine� must� wait� until� a� citation� is� issued� for� not� complying� with� the� safeguard� notice.�

[6]�
Although� the�
judge� in� Affinity� also� stated� that� �the� Commission� has� jurisdiction� to� hear� all� disputes� arising� out� the� Mine� Act��� .� .� .� and� make� a� determination� upon,� any� proceeding� instituted� before� the� Commission,�� the� Court� believes� that� jurisdiction� must� exist� first� and� that� instituting� a� proceeding� does� not� by� itself� confer� jurisdiction.

�

[7]�
The� full�
text� of� section� 105(d)� provides:� (d)� If,� within� 30� days� of� receipt� thereof,� an� operator� of� a� coal� or� other� mine� notifies� the� Secretary� that� he� intends� to� contest� the� issuance� or� modification� of� an� order� issued� under� section� 104,� or� citation� or� a� notification� of� proposed� assessment� of� a� penalty� issued� under� subsection� (a)� or� (b)� of� this� section,� or� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� abatement� time� fixed� in� a� citation� or� modification� thereof� issued� under� section� 104,� or� any� miner� or� representative� of� miners� notifies� the� Secretary� of� an� intention� to� contest� the� issuance,� modification,� or� termination� of� any� order� issued� under� section� 104,� or� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� time� set� for� abatement� by� a� citation� or� modification� thereof� issued� under� section� 104,� the� Secretary� shall� immediately� advise� the� Commission� of� such� notification,� and� the� Commission� shall� afford� an� opportunity� for� a� hearing� (in� accordance� with� section� 554� of� title� 5,� United� States� Code,� but� without� regard� to� subsection� (a)(3)� of� such� section),� and� thereafter� shall� issue� an� order,� based� on� findings� of� fact,� affirming,� modifying,� or� vacating� the� Secretary's� citation,� order,� or� proposed� penalty,� or� directing� other� appropriate� relief.� Such� order� shall� become� final� 30� days� after� its� issuance.� The� rules� of� procedure� prescribed� by� the� Commission� shall� provide� affected� miners� or� representatives� of� affected� miners� an� opportunity� to� participate� as� parties� to� hearings� under� this� section.� The� Commission� shall� take� whatever� action� is� necessary� to� expedite� proceedings� for� hearing� appeals� of� orders� issued� under� section� 104.���

[8]�
The� Secretary�
has� also� taken� note� that� the� Contestant,� DRC,� did� not� cite� to� any� specific� provision� of� the� Mine� Act� as� supplying� jurisdiction� to� the� Commission� in� DRC�s� Notice� of� Contest.��� Response� at� n.1.

[9]�
Nor,� the�
Secretary� notes,� is� a� safeguard� analogous� to� an� Order� issued� under� section� 104,� as� the� latter� requires� withdrawal� from� an� area� of� a� mine,� but� the� former� does� not.��� Response� at� 5.�

[10]�
A� reply� was�
also� filed� by� the� Secretary.��� Much� of� the� Secretary�s� reply� echoes� the� points� it� already� made� but� it� emphasizes� that� without� jurisdiction� first� being� present� to� hear� the� challenge� the� Commission� cannot� reach� a� due� process� claim.� Jurisdiction,� then,� is� a� condition� precedent� to� addressing� a� due� process� claim.���

[11]�
If� the� Contestant�s�
action� is� a� request� for� declaratory� relief,� which� it� appears� to� be,� the� Secretary� also� notes� that� the� Commission� provides� such� �relief� only� �where� jurisdiction� otherwise� exists�� based� on� Section� 105(d)� or� another� one� of� the� Mine� Act�s� delegations� of� authority� to� the� Commission.� Response� at� 8� (citing� Kaiser� Coal,� 10� FMSHRC� 1165,� 1170-71� (Sept.� 1988);� Drummond� Company,� Inc.,� 14� FMSHRC� 661,� 671-76� (May� 1992)).��� Thus,� the� Secretary� argues� that� jurisdiction� is� a� condition� precedent� to� declaratory� relief.���

[12]�
The� judge�
also� noted� that� it� is� not� bound� by� the� opinion� of� another� administrative� law� judge� and� that� she� did� not� concur� with� the� reasoning� of� the� judge� decision� in� Affiinity.� On� both� those� points,� this� Court� shares� the� views� of� the� decision� in� Pocahontas.

[13]�
It� is� also�
noted� that� the� Court�s� conclusions� regarding� reviewability� and� due� process� are� fully� consonant� with� the� Commission�s� most� recent� observations� on� these� subjects,� as� reflected� in� Secretary� of� Labor� (MSHA)� v.� Brody� Mining,� LLC,� 36� FMSHRC� ___,� slip� op.,� No.� WEVA� 2014-82-R� (Aug.� 28,� 2014).���

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