Dickenson-Russell Coal Co., LLC v. Secretary of Labor (ALJ decision, September 3, 2014)
Dickenson-Russell Coal Co., LLC v. Secretary of Labor (FMSHRC VA 2014-163-R): Direct safeguard contest dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Apply this to your situation
This order from 2014 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Dickenson-Russell Coal challenged an MSHA notice requiring sanding devices on certain track-mounted personnel carriers before MSHA issued any citation or order for violating the safeguard. The operator argued that the safeguard functioned like a citation and that due process required immediate Commission review. Judge William B. Moran held that section 105(d) authorizes review of specified citations, orders, penalties, and abatement periods but does not independently authorize a contest of a safeguard notice. He concluded that the operator could challenge the safeguard after MSHA issued an enforcement citation or order, which also provided adequate process. Because the docket contained only the safeguard notice, the judge dismissed the contest for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision snapshot
- Governing authority: 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.1403 and 75.1403-1(b); 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d) and 874(b)
- Outcome: The safeguard contest was dismissed for lack of Commission jurisdiction.
- Key point: A notice to provide a safeguard is not itself a citation or order reviewable under section 105(d); Commission review becomes available after an alleged safeguard violation produces enforcement action.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
FEDERAL� MINE� SAFETY� AND� HEALTH�
REVIEW� COMMISSION
OFFICE� OF� ADMINISTRATIVE�
LAW� JUDGES
1331� PENNSYLVANIA� AVE.,�
N.W.,� SUITE� 520N
WASHINGTON,� DC� 20004-1710
TELEPHONE:� 202-434-9933�
/� FAX:� 202-434-9949
����������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������� �September� 3,� 2014
DICKENSON�
�� RUSSELL� COAL� CO.� LLC
�����
����� ������������������������������������Contestant,
�����
����������������������� �����������
����������������������� v.
SECRETARY�
OF� LABOR,
MINE�
SAFETY� AND� HEALTH������������������������� ADMINISTRATION� (MSHA)
�
��������������������� ��������������Respondent
CONTEST�
PROCEEDING
Docket�
No.� VA� 2014-163-R
Citation�
No.� 8208673-01;� 01/15/2014
Cherokee�
Mine
Mine�
ID� 44-06864
�����������
ORDER� OF� DISMISSAL
Before:����������� �����
Judge� William� B.� Moran
����������� Contestant,�
Dickenson-Russell� Coal� Company� (�Contestant�� or� �DRC�),� has� filed� a� Notice� of� Contest� challenging� the� issuance� of� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard,� pursuant� to� Section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Safety� and� Health� Act� of� 1977� (�Mine� Act�).[1]��� In� turn,� the� Secretary� filed� an� Answer,� and� Motion� to� Dismiss,� together� with� a� memorandum� in� support� thereof� (�Response�).[2]
Contestant�s�
Contest� and� Associated� Filings
����������� In� its� Statement�
in� Opposition� to� the� Secretary�s� Motion� to� Dismiss� its� Notice� of� Contest� (�Contestant�s� Opposition�),� Contestant� first� mentions� some� history� with� a� prior� safeguard� at� this� mine,[3]� which� background� the� Court� considers� to� be� immaterial� as,� at� the� end� of� the� day,� this� matter� still� comes� down� to� the� safeguard� issued� on� January� 21,� 2014,� to� Dickenson-Russell.[4]���
����������� No�
citation� has� been� issued� in� connection� with� this� safeguard� notice� but� the� Contestant� still� maintains� that� the� Commission� has� jurisdiction� over� the� matter� as� soon� as� such� a� notice� is� issued,� regardless� of� whether� a� citation� has� been� issued.��� With� no� Commission� level� decision� addressing� its� claim,� the� Contestant� points� particularly� to� the� decision� issued� by� administrative� law� judge� William� Steele� in� Affinity� Coal� Co.� v.� Secretary,� Unpublished� Order� (Aug� 29,� 2013).��� Essentially,� and� fairly� characterizing� its� argument,� the� Contestant�s� Opposition� mirrors� the� points� made� by� Judge� Steele� in� his� decision,� citing� cases� such� as� Drummond� Co.,� Inc.,� 14� FMSHRC� 661� (May� 1992),� involving� review� of� a� program� policy� letter� (�PPL�).��� Referencing� Drummond,� Contestant�s� position� is� that� since� the� Commission� has,� in� other� contexts,� broadly� interpreted� its� jurisdiction,� it� may� therefore� do� so� whenever� the� Secretary�s� actions� adversely� affect� an� operator.��� Opposition� at� 5.��� Contestant� also� maintains� that� section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Act,� �which� was� published� under� Title� III� of� the� Act,� is� an� interim� mandatory� safety� standard� applicable� to� all� underground� coal� mines,� and� because� a� �mandatory� health� or� safety� standard�� is� defined� to� include� interim� mandatory� health� or� safety� standards� under� Title� III,� section� 314(b)� is� a� mandatory� safety� standard.� 30� U.S.C.� �� 803(l).�� Opposition� at� 6.��� Contestant� then� continues� that,� �when� an� inspector� .� .� .� issues� a� notice� of� safeguard,� the� inspector� is,� in� effect,� issuing� a� citation� under� section� 104(a)� for� the� violation� of� a� mandatory� safety� standard.���� Id.� (italics� added).�
����������� As�
a� separate� basis� for� its� position,� Dickenson-Russell� contends� that� due� process� also� requires� that� a� mine� operator� be� able� to� immediately� contest� a� notice� of� contest� upon� its� issuance.� For� this� portion� of� its� argument,� Contestant� points� to� Mathews� v.� Eldridge,� 424� U.S.� 319� (1976),� for� support,� noting� that� �three� distinct� factors� are� considered:��� [� ]� the� private� interest� that� will� be� affected� by� the� official� action;� [�
]� the� risk� of� an� erroneous� deprivation� of� such� interest� through� the� procedures� used,� and� the� probable� value,� if� any,� of� additional� or� substitute� procedural� safeguards;� and� [� ],� the� Government's� interest,� including� the� function� involved� and� the� fiscal� and� administrative� burdens� that� the� additional� or� substitute� procedural� requirement� would� entail.���� Opposition� at� 7� (quoting� Mathews� v.� Eldridge,� 424� U.S.� at� 335).�
����������� Applying�
those� factors,� Contestant� asserts� that� its� affected� interests� are� substantial:� �[t]he� instant� Safeguard� will� require� three� personnel� carriers� to� be� retro-fitted� with� sanding� devices,� at� considerable� expense� to� the� mine.� [� ]� These� three� personnel� carriers� are� used� on� a� daily� basis.����� As� a� result� of� the� Safeguard,� however,� all� three� are� currently� out� of� service� and� cannot� be� used.��� This� unnecessarily� and� negatively� impacts� the� mine�s� operations� and� employees.�� Opposition� at� 7-8,� citations� to� declaration� omitted).��� Nor,� it� contends� can� it� wait� to� receive� a� citation,� because� there� is� no� �guarantee� of� when� a� citation� will� be� issued�� and� that� route� also� exposes� it� to� civil� penalties.��� Finally,� Contestant� contends� that� allowing� operators� to� contest� notices� of� safeguard� upon� issuance� will� not� unduly� burden� the� Secretary.� Opposition� at� 7-8.���
����������� As� noted,� a� particular� case� cited� by� the� Contestant� as� authority� is� Affinity� Coal� Co.� v.� Secretary,� Unpublished� Order� (Aug� 29,� 2013).��� That� case� does� involve� the� same� issue[5]� but,� as� the� parties� well� know,� the� decision� of� another� administrative� law� judge� has� no� precedential� effect.��� Its� value� is� limited� to� the� persuasiveness� of� the� reasoning� in� the� decision� upon� another� judge� who� is� presented� with� a� similar� situation.��� The� judge� in� Affinity� was� persuaded� by� the� argument� that� a� mine� need� not� wait� for� a� citation� to� be� issued,� on� the� basis� that� section� 105(d)� allows� an� operator� to� contest� an� order� or� a� citation� upon� the� view� that� �[a]� notice� of� safeguard� is� just� that� �� a� violation� of� a� provision� of� the� Mine� Act.���� This� Court� does� not� share� that� perspective� because� a� notice� to� provide� a� safeguard� is� plainly� not� a� violation.��� Instead,� it� is� analogous� to� the� promulgation� of� a� safety� and� health� standard,� albeit� it� comes� into� existence� through� a� different,� but� Congressionally� prescribed,� procedure� to� address� hazards� with� respect� to� the� transportation� of� men� and� materials.[6]
����������� In�
short,� this� Court� believes� that,� so� to� speak,� the� other� shoe� must� drop� before� litigation� of� a� safeguard� can� commence.��� Accordingly,� this� Court� cannot� adopt� the� rationale� expressed� in� the� Affinity� decision� that� �jurisdiction� is� conferred� in� the� Commission� because� Affinity� is� specifically� alleged� to� have� violated� a� mandatory� health� or� safety� standard.���� Affinity� at� 6.��� This� is� because� in� point� of� fact� the� Secretary� has� not� made� such� an� allegation� at� the� point� in� time� the� safeguard� notice� is� created� and� issued.��� For� this� reason,� the� Contestant�s� claim� that� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard� is� in� effect� the� equivalent� as� issuing� a� citation� or� order,� does� not� mean� that� the� two� are� the� same.���
����������� Although�
the� judge� in� Affinity� rested� his� conclusion� on� the� theory� that� Section� 105(d)� confers� jurisdiction,� he� also� rested� his� view� on� due� process� grounds.��� The� example� offered� by� the� judge� was� a� mine� operator� having� to� wait� twenty-two� years� before� having� the� ability� to� challenge� the� validity� of� an� underlying� safeguard� notice.��� However,� while� that� recounting� is� a� dramatic� characterization� of� such� an� instance,� it� is� misleading� in� a� sense� because� there� is� nothing� to� prevent� a� mine� operator� from� simply� refusing� to� comply� with� a� safeguard� notice.��� Once� that� refusal� happens� and� a� citation� then� follows,� the� mine� can� then� challenge� the� validity� of� the� safeguard,� together� with� the� citation� and� the� appropriateness� of� the� penalty� proposed� by� the� government� for� that� citation.��� Such� a� challenge� can� occur� immediately� after� the� citation� is� issued,� putting� all� issues� on� the� table.���
The�
Secretary�s� Response
����������� The� Secretary�s�
central� contention� is� that� the� Mine� Act� does� not� give� the� Commission� jurisdiction� to� review� a� safeguard� notice� until� there� has� first� been� a� subsequent� citation� or� order� issued� in� connection� with� that� notice.��� The� basis� for� its� position� is� simple� and� direct,� noting� that� the� section� of� the� Act� addressing� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction,� section� 105(d),� pertains� to� �MSHA�s� issuance� or� modification� of� orders,� (2)� MSHA�s� issuance� or� modification� of� citations� and� proposed� assessments� of� penalties;� and� (3)� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� time� that� MSHA� sets� for� abatement.�[7]� Response� at� 4.��� Thus,� the� Secretary� contends� that� as� section� 105(d)� makes� no� mention� of� a� safeguard� notice,� nor� the� provision� from� which� it� is� derived,� section� 314(b)� of� the� Act,� the� Commission� lacks� jurisdiction.[8]��� Unlike� a� reviewable� citation� under� section� 105(d),� which� stems� from� the� Secretary�s� allegation� that� a� mine� operator� has� violated� the� Act,� or� any� mandatory� health� or� safety� standard,� rule,� order,� or� regulation� promulgated� pursuant� to� the� Act,� the� safeguard� notice� is� analogous� to� a� mine-specific� mandatory� standard.����� Both,� the� Secretary� notes,� establish� required� conduct,� and� both,� when� violated� can� be� cited� for� failing� to� comply� with� such� conduct.[9]�
����������� Perhaps�
more� importantly,� at� least� from� the� Court�s� perspective,� as� the� Secretary� notes,� the� issuance� of� a� safeguard� notice� does� not� assert� that� a� mine� operator� has� committed� any� violation.[10]��� Instead,� a� violation� can� only� occur� later� in� time,� upon� a� mine� operator�s� subsequent��� failure� to� comply� with� the� safeguard� notice.��� Naturally,� this� also� means� that� there� is� no� civil� penalty� proposed� either.��� That� too� only� occurs� upon� a� subsequent� failure� to� comply� with� the� safeguard� notice.��� It� is� true� that,� upon� issuance� of� the� notice� to� provide� a� safeguard,� a� standard� is� created,� but� as� with� every� other� safety� standard,� no� civil� penalty� occurs� when� the� standard� is� created;� rather� it� is� only� when� the� standard,� however� it� comes� into� being,� is� thereafter� violated.��� Accordingly,� it� is� the� Secretary�s� contention� that� no� Commission� jurisdiction� attaches� until� after� the� safeguard� notice� comes� into� existence� and� then,� following� that,� there� is� issued� a� citation� or� order� asserting� that� the� safeguard� was� violated.[11]� �� ��
�����������
In� Pocahontas� Coal� Company,� LLC� v.�
Secretary� of� Labor,� 2014� WL� 2809893� (June� 11,� 2014)� (�Pocahontas�),� another� administrative� law� judge� addressed� the� same� issue.��� As� in� the� case� presently� before� this� Court� and� in� the� Affinity� Coal� matter� (supra),� notices� to� provide� safeguards� were� issued� to� Pocahontas� pertaining� to� the� transportation� of� men� or� materials,� and� the� mine� filed� notices� of� contest� for� each� notice.��� The� Secretary,� again� as� in� this� case,� filed� a� motion� to� dismiss� on� the� grounds� that� the� Commission� lacks� jurisdiction� to� hear� such� a� contest� until� after� a� citation� or� order� is� issued� for� a� violation� of� the� underlying� safeguard� notice.��� The� judge� in� Pocahontas� noted� that� the� Commission� has� addressed� a� safeguard� challenge� only� in� the� context� of� when� it� has� been� accompanied� by� a� citation� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard.[12]��� Reduced� to� its� essential� conclusion,� the� judge� in� Pocahontas� concluded� that� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction� is� limited� under� section� 105(d)� of� the� Mine� Act� to� particular� challenges,� but� that� challenging� a� safeguard� notice� itself,� unaccompanied� by� citation� or� order� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard� notice� is� not� one� of� those� bases� for� Commission� jurisdiction.��� The� judge� in� Pocahontas� also� concluded� that� the� ability� for� a� mine� to� challenge� a� safeguard� notice,� once� the� triggering� event� of� a� citation� or� order� occurs,� also� answers� the� claim� that� due� process� demands� review� prior� to� the� allegation� that� the� notice� has� been� violated.��� In� that� regard,� the� judge� noted� that� it� �cannot� create� jurisdiction� where� none� exists� .� .� .� [and� that]� less� formal� mechanisms,� such� as� a� request� for� a� technical� citation,� .� .� .� could� seemingly� be� used� to� immediately� contest� the� issue� on� an� expedited� basis� .� .� .� [and� also� that]� the� operator� [could]� bring� a� facial� challenge� [to� that� safeguard� notice]� in� Federal� District� Court.���� Id.� at� *4.��� Last,� the� judge� in� Pocahontas� observed� that� �the� government� interest� in� flexibly� and� quickly� addressing� hazards� related� to� the� transportation� of� men� and� materials� is� an� extremely� compelling� one.���� Id.���
This� Court� agrees� with� both� conclusions�
by� the� judge� in� Pocahontas;� section� 105� review� of� a� challenge� to� a� safeguard� is� limited� to� instances� when� a� citation� or� order� has� been� issued� alleging� a� violation� of� that� safeguard� notice;� and� due� process� is� achieved� through� that� challenge� mechanism.[13]���
As� this� docket� contains� no� citations�
or� orders,� but� only� the� notice� to� provide� safeguard� that� was� issued� to� the� mine,� the� above� captioned� contest� proceeding� is� DISMISSED.
����������� ����������������������������������������������������������� /s/ William B. Moran
����������������������������������������������������������� ����������� William B. Moran�
����������������������������������������������������������������������� Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:
�����������������������
K.�
Brad� Oakley
Jackson�
Kelly� PLLC
175�
East� Main� Street,� Suite� 500
Lexington,�
KY� 40507
859-255-9500
859-281-6478�
fax
R.�
Henry� Moore
Jackson�
Kelly� PLLC
Three�
Gateway� Center,� Suite� 1500
401�
Liberty� Avenue
Pittsburgh,�
PA��� 15222
412-434-8055
412-434-8062�
fax
Matthew�
N.� Babington,� Esq.
U.S.�
Department� of� Labor
Office�
of� the� Regional� Solicitor
1100�
Wilson� Boulevard
22nd�
Floor� West
Arlington,�
VA��� 22209-3939
[1]�
A� notice�
of� safeguard� is� issued� under� the� Mine� Act� pursuant� to� section� 314(b)� of� the� Mine� Act,� 30� U.S.C.� �� 874(b)� which� provides:� �Other� safeguards� adequate,� in� the� judgment� of� an� authorized� representative� of� the� Secretary,� to� minimize� hazards� with� respect� to� transportation� of� men� and� materials� shall� be� provided.���� Section� 75.1403� of� the� Secretary's� regulations� repeats� verbatim� the� provisions� of� section� 314(b)� of� the� Act.��� The� procedure� for� issuing� citations� for� safeguard� violations� under� section� 75.1403� is� described� as:� The� authorized� representative� of� the� Secretary� shall� in� writing� advise� the� operator� of� a� specific� safeguard� which� is� required� pursuant� to� �� 75.1403� and� shall� fix� a� time� in� which� the� operator� shall� provide� and� thereafter� maintain� such� safeguard.� If� the� safeguard� is� not� provided� within� the� time� fixed� and� if� it� is� not� maintained� thereafter,� a� notice� shall� be� issued� to� the� operator� pursuant� to� section� 104� of� the� Act.��� 30� C.F.R.� 75.1403-1(b).��� See� generally� Southern� Ohio� Coal� Co.,� 14� FMSHRC� 1� (Jan.� 1992),� Cyprus� Cumberland� Resources� Corp.,� 19� FMSHRC� 1781� (Nov.� 1997).
[2]�
Also� filed�
was� DRC�s� Motion� to� Expedite� and� the� Secretary�s� Opposition� thereto;� DRC�s� Opposition� to� the� Secretary�s� Motion� to� Dismiss� and� its� Notice� of� Additional� Authority� and� the� Secretary�s� Reply� to� DRC�s� Opposition.��� All� filings� were� considered.
[3]�
It� is� questionable�
whether� the� history� offered� by� the� Contestant� actually� creates� a� sympathetic� picture.��� Apparently� intended� to� show� that� MSHA� erred� by� originally� relying� on� an� earlier-issued� safeguard,� which� applied� to� personnel� carriers� transporting� six� or� more� miners,� the� personnel� carrier� cited� in� January� 2014� carried� less� than� six� miners.��� The� new� safeguard� was� then� issued� to� cover� personnel� carriers� transporting� five� or� less� miners.��� It� is� true� that� a� new� safeguard� had� to� be� issued� but,� that� said,� it� should� not� be� lost� that� both� safeguards� addressed� MSHA�s� perceived� need� for� sanding� devices� on� those� personnel� carriers� and� that� both� originated� from� a� perceived� hazard� of� losing� control� on� a� slippery� and� wet� track.���
[4]�
�The� condition�
or� practice� on� this� citation� should� have� read:� The� Co.� #DM39� Brookeville� track� mounted� personnel� carrier,� used� at� this� mine� to� transport� miners,� was� not� equipped� with� sanding� devices.��� This� personnel� carrier� was� in� the� motor� barn� and� available� for� immediate� use� by� the� miners.��� This� is� a� notice� to� provide� safeguard(s)� requiring� that� the� Brookeville� Co.�
DM39� personnel� carrier� and� all� other� track� mounted� personnel� carriers� that� transport� 5� men� or� less� be� equipped� with� properly� installed� and� well� maintained� sanding� devices.��� This� mine� has� a� slope� which� runs� from� the� motor� barn� on� the� surface� to� the� mine� portal,� with� a� sharp� curve� at� the� bottom.��� This� slope� is� outside� and� exposed� to� rain,� snow,� ice� and� other� inclement� weather.��� An� accident� has� previously� occurred� on� this� slope.��� The� track� entry� at� this� mine� has� several� dips� and� hills� and� was� wet� at� the� time� of� inspection.� ��The� foreman� stated� that� when� this� ride� is� used,� miners� carry� sand� in� the� front� passenger� compartment� and� reach� out� and� sand� the� track� as� needed.��� The� hazard� exist� of� loosing�
[sic]� control� of� the� personnel� carrier� due� to� slick� track� conditions,� and� loss� of� braking� ability,� resulting� in� de-railing,� colliding� with� other� personnel� carriers� and/or� running� over� miners� on� foot.���� Contestant�s� Opposition� at� 2-3,� quoting� from� January� 21,� 2014,� condition� or� practice� identified� in� safeguard.�
[5]�
In� Affinity,�
five� safeguard� notices� had� been� issued� following� a� fatality� and� the� mine� then� filed� notices� of� contest.��� The� Secretary� took� the� same� stance� as� here:� the� Commission�s� jurisdiction� is� limited� under� section� 105(d)� and� as� such� it� does� not� extend� to� notices� of� contest.��� Instead,� a� mine� must� wait� until� a� citation� is� issued� for� not� complying� with� the� safeguard� notice.�
[6]�
Although� the�
judge� in� Affinity� also� stated� that� �the� Commission� has� jurisdiction� to� hear� all� disputes� arising� out� the� Mine� Act��� .� .� .� and� make� a� determination� upon,� any� proceeding� instituted� before� the� Commission,�� the� Court� believes� that� jurisdiction� must� exist� first� and� that� instituting� a� proceeding� does� not� by� itself� confer� jurisdiction.
�
[7]�
The� full�
text� of� section� 105(d)� provides:� (d)� If,� within� 30� days� of� receipt� thereof,� an� operator� of� a� coal� or� other� mine� notifies� the� Secretary� that� he� intends� to� contest� the� issuance� or� modification� of� an� order� issued� under� section� 104,� or� citation� or� a� notification� of� proposed� assessment� of� a� penalty� issued� under� subsection� (a)� or� (b)� of� this� section,� or� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� abatement� time� fixed� in� a� citation� or� modification� thereof� issued� under� section� 104,� or� any� miner� or� representative� of� miners� notifies� the� Secretary� of� an� intention� to� contest� the� issuance,� modification,� or� termination� of� any� order� issued� under� section� 104,� or� the� reasonableness� of� the� length� of� time� set� for� abatement� by� a� citation� or� modification� thereof� issued� under� section� 104,� the� Secretary� shall� immediately� advise� the� Commission� of� such� notification,� and� the� Commission� shall� afford� an� opportunity� for� a� hearing� (in� accordance� with� section� 554� of� title� 5,� United� States� Code,� but� without� regard� to� subsection� (a)(3)� of� such� section),� and� thereafter� shall� issue� an� order,� based� on� findings� of� fact,� affirming,� modifying,� or� vacating� the� Secretary's� citation,� order,� or� proposed� penalty,� or� directing� other� appropriate� relief.� Such� order� shall� become� final� 30� days� after� its� issuance.� The� rules� of� procedure� prescribed� by� the� Commission� shall� provide� affected� miners� or� representatives� of� affected� miners� an� opportunity� to� participate� as� parties� to� hearings� under� this� section.� The� Commission� shall� take� whatever� action� is� necessary� to� expedite� proceedings� for� hearing� appeals� of� orders� issued� under� section� 104.���
[8]�
The� Secretary�
has� also� taken� note� that� the� Contestant,� DRC,� did� not� cite� to� any� specific� provision� of� the� Mine� Act� as� supplying� jurisdiction� to� the� Commission� in� DRC�s� Notice� of� Contest.��� Response� at� n.1.
[9]�
Nor,� the�
Secretary� notes,� is� a� safeguard� analogous� to� an� Order� issued� under� section� 104,� as� the� latter� requires� withdrawal� from� an� area� of� a� mine,� but� the� former� does� not.��� Response� at� 5.�
[10]�
A� reply� was�
also� filed� by� the� Secretary.��� Much� of� the� Secretary�s� reply� echoes� the� points� it� already� made� but� it� emphasizes� that� without� jurisdiction� first� being� present� to� hear� the� challenge� the� Commission� cannot� reach� a� due� process� claim.� Jurisdiction,� then,� is� a� condition� precedent� to� addressing� a� due� process� claim.���
[11]�
If� the� Contestant�s�
action� is� a� request� for� declaratory� relief,� which� it� appears� to� be,� the� Secretary� also� notes� that� the� Commission� provides� such� �relief� only� �where� jurisdiction� otherwise� exists�� based� on� Section� 105(d)� or� another� one� of� the� Mine� Act�s� delegations� of� authority� to� the� Commission.� Response� at� 8� (citing� Kaiser� Coal,� 10� FMSHRC� 1165,� 1170-71� (Sept.� 1988);� Drummond� Company,� Inc.,� 14� FMSHRC� 661,� 671-76� (May� 1992)).��� Thus,� the� Secretary� argues� that� jurisdiction� is� a� condition� precedent� to� declaratory� relief.���
[12]�
The� judge�
also� noted� that� it� is� not� bound� by� the� opinion� of� another� administrative� law� judge� and� that� she� did� not� concur� with� the� reasoning� of� the� judge� decision� in� Affiinity.� On� both� those� points,� this� Court� shares� the� views� of� the� decision� in� Pocahontas.
[13]�
It� is� also�
noted� that� the� Court�s� conclusions� regarding� reviewability� and� due� process� are� fully� consonant� with� the� Commission�s� most� recent� observations� on� these� subjects,� as� reflected� in� Secretary� of� Labor� (MSHA)� v.� Brody� Mining,� LLC,� 36� FMSHRC� ___,� slip� op.,� No.� WEVA� 2014-82-R� (Aug.� 28,� 2014).���
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