FMSHRC Commission decision Docket SE 2009-261-R, SE 2009-487 Decided July 25, 2013 Remanded

Secretary of Labor v. Oak Grove Resources, LLC

Secretary of Labor v. Oak Grove Resources, LLC (FMSHRC SE 2009-261-R et al.): Safeguard against pushing cars was valid

Apply this precedent to your situation

This is citable Commission precedent from 2013, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 2013
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
This is a decision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the highest level of agency review, citable as Commission precedent. It may have been appealed again to a U.S. Court of Appeals under 30 U.S.C. § 816; check subsequent history before relying on it. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

A miner was fatally pinned while a 24-ton shearer body was being moved along Oak Grove's main haulage road. MSHA cited the mine under a safeguard that prohibited pushing cars on main haulage roads except in a limited situation. The judge vacated the citation after finding that the safeguard did not identify the specific hazard it addressed. The Commission majority reversed, holding that the safeguard adequately identified the hazardous condition and the required remedy without listing every possible resulting harm. It remanded the case for the judge to decide whether Oak Grove violated the safeguard. Commissioner Young dissented because he believed the safeguard failed to describe a specific hazardous condition.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 874(b); 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.1403-1 and 75.1403-10(b)
  • Outcome: The ruling that the safeguard was invalid was reversed, and the alleged violation was remanded for decision.
  • Key point: A safeguard must identify the hazardous condition and required corrective conduct, but it need not catalog every injury mechanism that could result.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, SUITE 520N

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-1710

July 25, 2013

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v.

OAK GROVE RESOURCES, LLC

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Docket Nos. SE 2009-261-R

SE 2009-487

BEFORE: Jordan, Chairman; Young and Nakamura, Commissioners

DECISION

BY:     Jordan, Chairman, and Nakamura, Commissioner

In these matters arising under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq. (2006) (“Mine Act” of “Act”), Administrative Law Judge William B. Moran
vacated a citation that was issued by the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health
Administration (“MSHA”) to Oak Grove Resources, LLC (“Oak Grove”). 33 FMSHRC 846,
854 (Mar. 2011) (ALJ). The citation alleged that Oak Grove violated a notice of safeguard
(“safeguard”) which had been issued to the mine pursuant to section 314(b) of the Mine Act, 30
U.S.C. § 874(b).

OG Ex. 1.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

Oak Grove operates an underground coal mine in Jefferson County, Alabama. Gov. Ex. 4
at 2. On May 22, 2008, a fatal accident occurred at the mine as miners were transporting the 24-ton body of a shearing machine

along the main haulage road. 33 FMSHRC at 847.

The miners were attempting to move the shearer to the mine’s working face using four
locomotive motors. Id. Two of the motors were used to pull and two motors were used to push
the shearer. Id. Specifically, Motor No. 8 was the lead pulling car. Id. Motor No. 3 followed
and was connected to Motor No. 8 by a rigid coupling device. Id. Behind Motor No. 3 was the
shearer carrier which held the shearer body. Id. The shearer body itself was connected to Motor
No. 3 by a flexible wire rope. Id. Motor No. 4 followed and was connected to the carrier by a
solid drawbar. Id. Finally, the rear of Motor No. 4 was connected to Motor No. 9 by a rigid
coupling device. Id. The wire rope that connected Motor No. 3 and the shearer body was the
only flexible connection. Id.

The shearer carrier periodically derailed from the track as it moved inby the mine. Gov.
Ex. 4 at 6. A derailment occurred as the carrier traveled up an incline in the mine floor. 33
FMSHRC at 847; Gov. Ex. 4 at 6. This derailment caused Lee Graham, the operator of Motor
No. 3, to exit his vehicle and walk over to the carrier. 33 FMSHRC at 847. While Graham was
standing on the tracks examining the situation, Motor Nos. 8 and 3 either slid or rolled downhill
and pinned him against the carrier. Id. at 847-48; Tr. 57. He was fatally injured. 33 FMSHRC
at 847.

MSHA Inspector David Allen investigated the accident. Id. at 848. On January 8, 2009,
he issued Citation No. 7696616 to Oak Grove. Id.; OG Ex. 1. The citation states:

A fatal accident occurred on May 22, 2008, when a motorman was
crushed between a derailed haulage car and the locomotive he had
been operating. The haulage car was being pushed on the main
haulage road. The victim would not have been exposed to the pinch
point between the locomotive and the haulage car if the car was
being pulled instead of pushed on the main haul road.

OG Ex. 1. The citation charged Oak Grove with violating a previously issued safeguard identified
as Safeguard No. 2604892. That document required in pertinent part that “cars on main haulage roads not be pushed except where necessary to push cars from side tracks located near the
working section to the producing entries and rooms.”

OG Ex. 2.

Oak Grove contested both the citation and the validity of the underlying safeguard. 33
FMSHRC at 847, 850 n.4. On March 28, 2011, the judge issued a decision in which he concluded
that the safeguard was invalid, as it failed to identify the “hazard” at which it was directed. Id. at

  1. The citation was thereupon vacated. Id. at 854.  

II.

Disposition

A.        The Requirements for a Valid Safeguard. 

In addition to the mandatory health or safety standards contained in the Mine Act or
promulgated pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking under section 101(a), the Act permits
the Secretary to issue “safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the
Secretary, to minimize hazards with respect to transportation of men and materials . . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 874(b). The safeguard notices are issued on a mine-by-mine basis. Once issued, the
safeguard operates as a mandatory standard for that mine. If the operator does not comply with
the requirements contained in the safeguard, the inspector issues a citation. 30 U.S.C. § 814. 

The Secretary has published general criteria to guide inspectors in determining when a
particular safeguard may be required at a mine. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-1. Any one of these general
criteria may form the basis of a safeguard notice issued at an individual mine. In addition, an
inspector may also issue safeguards that are not included in these published criteria. 30 C.F.R.
§ 75.1403-1(a).

Recognizing that safeguards are implemented “without resorting to otherwise required
rulemaking procedures,” the Commission has determined that “a safeguard notice must identify
with specificity the nature of the hazard at which it is directed and the conduct required of the
operator to remedy such hazard.” Southern Ohio Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 509, 512 (Apr. 1985)
(“SOCCO I”). Although the safety of miners requires that “the hazard of concern to the inspector
is fully understood by the operator, thereby enabling the operator to secure prompt and complete
abatement,” we have recognized that “safeguards are written by inspectors in the field, not by a
team of lawyers” and have cautioned that the requirement of specificity is “not a license for the
raising or acceptance of purely semantic arguments.” Id. at 512, n.2.

B.        The Validity of Safeguard No. 2604892.

Approximately 22 years prior to the fatal accident that led to this proceeding, an MSHA
inspector issued Safeguard No. 2604892, which required “that cars on main haulage roads not be
pushed except where necessary to push cars from side tracks located near the working section to
the producing entries and rooms.”

OG Ex. 2. This prohibition simply repeated the language of
30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-10(b), which as indicated supra lists criteria that may prompt the issuance of
a safeguard. The safeguard was issued after the inspector observed a “battery powered locomotive
[that] was being used to push two loaded supply cars . . . down the graded haulage supply mine
track entry.” OG Ex. 2.

We have recognized that the safeguard criteria contained in section 75.1403-1 et seq., are
“designed to minimize ‘commonly recognized’ transportation hazards.” Southern Ohio Coal Co., 14 FMSHRC 1, 6 (Jan. 1992) (“SOCCO II”).

Thus it has long been commonly recognized that
pushing cars on the main haulage roads of an underground mine is a hazardous practice. See 30
C.F.R. § 75.1403-10(b); see also 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-7(c) (providing that “[m]antrips should not
be pushed”).

Our dissenting colleague claims, without support, that safeguards were intended as only a
“stopgap measure,” slip op. at 9, and he questions the validity of any safeguard based on these
general criteria. In his view, a generally disfavored practice cannot be the subject of a safeguard
issued to a particular mine; it can only be addressed by the issuance of a mandatory standard
prohibiting the conduct. This view, which reads the entire safeguard provision in section 314(b)
out of the Act, was rejected in SOCCO II. In that case the Commission considered “[w]hether a
notice to provide safeguards issued under section 75.1403 is invalid if it addresses conditions that
exist in a significant number of mines.” 14 FMSHRC at 8.

Answering the question in the negative, the Commission determined that:

The rulemaking provisions of sections 101 and 301
of the Mine Act do not circumscribe the authority to
issue safeguards granted to the Secretary in section
314(b). . . . [I]n general, it is within the Secretary’s
sound exercise of discretion to issue mandatory
standards or to issue safeguards for commonly
encountered transportation hazards. . . . We
discern nothing in the Mine Act or its legislative
history expressly requiring that the hazard be unique
to the mine at issue and nothing prohibiting the use
of similar safeguards to address similar unsafe
conditions that may exist at a number of mines.

Id. at 9-10.

The judge below determined that the safeguard was invalid because it failed to identify the
“hazard” at which it was directed. Specifically, since the safeguard failed to indicate that pushing
a supply car could result in such problems as compromised visibility, the lack of positive control,
and the creation of a “pinch-point,” the judge concluded that it failed to comply with the
requirements of SOCCO I and was therefore fatally defective. 33 FMSHRC at 851-53. Even if, arguably, SOCCO I and its progeny could be read as requiring such an outcome, we subsequently
rejected that interpretation in The American Coal Co., 34 FMSHRC 1963 (Aug. 2012).

In American Coal, we expressly rejected the argument that a safeguard must not only
describe a “hazard,” but also describe the potential risks or harms associated with that hazardous
condition. Id. at 1969-1971. Although the Secretary may on occasion choose to include a
description of the potential risks or harms associated with the hazardous condition described in a
safeguard, such inclusion is not necessary under Commission case law. Id. at 1971. Given that
many potential risks can flow from the cited hazardous condition, we concluded that it would be
unreasonable to require the inspector to identify each and every one. Id. at 1969-70. We
indicated that a valid safeguard provides an operator with notice of the conditions considered
hazardous

and the conduct required to comply with the safeguard; it need not foreshadow the
events that may occur if the safeguard is not implemented.

We conclude that Safeguard No. 2604892 is a valid safeguard. It identifies a hazardous
condition, i.e., a locomotive pushing two loaded supply cars, and a remedy, i.e., cars on main
haulage roads are not to be pushed. OG. Ex. 2.

III.

Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that Safeguard No. 2604892 is valid, and we reverse the decision of
the judge. These proceedings are remanded to the judge so that he may determine whether the
Secretary proved that Oak Grove violated Safeguard No. 2604892 as alleged in Citation No.
7696616, and conduct such other proceedings as may be appropriate.

/s/ Mary Lu Jordan

Mary Lu Jordan, Commissioner

/s/ Patrick K. Nakamura

Patrick K. Nakamura, Commissioner

Commissioner Young, dissenting:

I dissent from my colleagues because I believe the judge correctly applied the law to the
safeguard at issue, and properly found it lacking. The majority, in validating the safeguard at
issue, disregards the nature of safeguards as well as the legal requirements we’ve established for
their affirmance.

The majority makes much of an alleged longstanding recognition that “pushing cars on the
main haulage roads of an underground mine is a hazardous practice.” Slip op. at 5, citing 30
C.F.R. §§ 75.1403-7(c), 75.1403-10(b). That cannot logically be true. Were it so, the practice
would be banned by a mandatory safety standard. It is not. Rather, there is a mere expression of
disapproval in a regulation, which serves as a guideline criteria for safeguards, dating from the
inception of MSHA’s regulatory program.

Following the majority’s line of reasoning, we would be required to conclude that MSHA
has identified a hazardous practice for more than 40 years yet has failed to promulgate a
mandatory standard prohibiting it. If the practice is, indeed, hazardous per se, as the majority
suggests, MSHA should protect all miners by banning the pushing of cars on main haulage roads
under properly-promulgated mandatory standards, and failure to do so amounts to dereliction.

Beyond that, there are a number of exceptions to the “prohibition” against pushing. None
of the exceptions is accounted for in section 75.1403-10(b) in a way that clearly implicates a
specific “hazard” as we defined it in American Coal, 34 FMSHRC 1963. There, we endorsed the
ALJ’s definition of “hazard” as a “condition[]/object[] that could affect the safe transportation of
men and materials.” Id. at 1971. Pushing cars is not a “condition;” it is a practice. The
hazardous condition is not self-evident, and it must be.

Aside from being a requirement of the law, articulation of the hazard itself is important.
Safeguard cases are different from those alleging a violation of an express mandatory standard.
Rather than centering on whether the operator’s acts or omissions occurred or were in violation of
the standard, cases such as the one before us today challenge the validity of the standard itself. In
recognizing this, we have not permitted safeguards merely to proscribe a practice. Rather, we
have required the nature of the hazard itself to be described with particularity. SOCCO I, 7
FMSHRC at 512.

From a legal standpoint, doing so ensures that the operator is aware of MSHA’s discreet
concern for safety. See id. (“We further believe that the safety of miners is best advanced by an
interpretive approach that ensures that the hazard of concern to the inspector is fully understood
by the operator, thereby enabling the operator to secure prompt and complete abatement.”) We
have, after all, held that valid safeguards are enforceable as mandatory safety standards, id., and
the choice to use a safeguard in lieu of regulations voids certain due process protections embedded
in that process.

In the present case, the majority attempts to cure this by alleging that the operator had
notice arising from the issuance of the safeguard some 22 years prior to the accident which
prompted the investigation and citation in this case. That is the better part of a career in the
mines, and it would be astonishing if anyone yet working for the operator or MSHA was present
in this mine on both the date of the accident and the date of the safeguard’s initial issuance.
Imputing knowledge of the original safeguard and its meaning in this manner is, practically,
governance by administrative folklore.

That raises the most critical problem with the failure to define the hazard in this case: the
lapse precludes thinking about safety and hazards in an active way. Some practices are patently
unsafe, and no further explanation is necessary. See, e.g., Oak Grove Res., 33 FMSHRC at 853
n.7 (citing obvious fall hazard from operating elevator with door open). Here, the safeguard
simply prohibits cars from being pushed on main haulage roads. However, there is no obvious
danger from pushing equipment.

The danger is variable and circumstantial, as the judge (and
MSHA’s witness below) recognized. See id. at 850-51 (noting several possible hazards).  

Thus, while it is possible to conceive of hazards arising from the practice at issue, the
judge properly observed that the inspector testifying on behalf of the Secretary was required to
“read into” the safeguard the underlying hazards, which could include inability to maintain control
while pushing equipment downgrade, or a lack of visibility where a load obstructs the operator’s
view. Id. The safeguard at issue did not identify these or any other hazards, however. Id. Failure
to do so is fatal to the Secretary’s case.

Finally, it is noteworthy that safeguards were intended as a stopgap measure to ensure
transportation hazards could be addressed efficiently on a mine-by-mine basis in the infancy of the
regulatory program. Section 314 of the Mine Act, which authorizes the use of safeguards, is
among the provisions designated interim mandatory safety standards, pending the approval of
improved mandatory safety standards. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 874, 861(a) (emphasis added). Section
101 of the Mine Act commands the Secretary to develop those improved standards.

30 U.S.C.
§ 811. The majority ignores this completely by seeking to bootstrap its decision on a provision in
the federal regulations which disfavors the practice at issue in all mines without banning it in any
mine. A true concern for safety would require the Secretary to promulgate a mandatory standard
protecting all miners from the hazard.

We have held that safeguards must be specific and must be construed narrowly due to their
unusual status as inspector-generated mandatory standards. The judge correctly understood the
appropriate governing standard and logically applied it in this case. I therefore would affirm his
decision.

/s/ Michael G. Young

Michael G. Young, Commissioner

Distribution:

R. Henry Moore, Esq.

Jackson Kelly, PLLC

Three Gateway Center, Suite 1340

401 Liberty Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Edward Waldman, Esq.

Office of the Solicitor

U.S. Department of Labor

1100 Wilson Blvd., Room 2220

Arlington, VA 22209-2296

W. Christian Schumann, Esq.

Office of the Solicitor

U.S. Department of Labor

1100 Wilson Blvd., Room 2220

Arlington, VA 22209-2296

Melanie Garris

Office of Civil Penalty Compliance

MSHA

U.S. Dept. Of Labor

1100 Wilson Blvd., 25th Floor

Arlington, VA 22209-3939

Administrative Law Judge William Moran

Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission

Office of Administrative Law Judges

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Suite 520N

Washington, D.C. 20004

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read Commission precedent from 2013. Ezel checks whether it still stands, including any court review since, and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the authority it relies on.