Buck Mountain Coal Company

Plain-English summary

Buck Mountain Coal Company's anthracite mine experienced a methane explosion that burned three miners and led MSHA to issue a section 103(k) withdrawal order covering the underground workings. The company challenged the order and objected to MSHA's conditions requiring continuous fan operation, closer line brattice, and a pressure-reading gauge before the mine could resume normal operations. Judge David F. Barbour found that the explosion properly triggered MSHA's authority and that the conditions were reasonably related to protecting miners while the ventilation system was investigated. The evidence showed methane at potentially dangerous levels, uncertainty about its source, and deficiencies in the mine map and ventilation controls. The judge denied the contest and affirmed Order No. 3082392.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 30 U.S.C. § 813(k); 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.311, 75.330(b)(2), 75.371(1), and 50.2(h)(5)
• Outcome: The contest was denied and the section 103(k) withdrawal order was affirmed.
• Key point: After a mine accident, MSHA may require temporary ventilation safeguards reasonably related to investigating hazards and protecting miners before allowing mining to resume.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
BUCK MOUNTAIN V. SOL (MSHA)
DDATE:
19930324
TTEXT:

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FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

                      OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                             2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                              5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                         FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041

BUCK MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, : CONTEST PROCEEDING
Contestant :
: Docket No. PENN 93-221-R
v. : Order No. 3082392, 3/05/93
:
SECRETARY OF LABOR, : Buck Mountain Slope Mine
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH : Mine I.D. No. 36-02053
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), :
Respondent :

                                   DECISION

Appearances: Richard Kocher, Buck Mountain Coal Company, R.D.4,
Pine Grove, Pennsylvania, for Contestant;
Gretchen Lucken, Esq., Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Arlington, Virginia
for Respondent.

Before: Judge Barbour

  This proceeding concerns a Notice of Contest filed by Buck

Mountain Coal Company ("Buck Mountain") pursuant to Section 105
of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
801 et seq. (1988) (the "Mine Act" or "Act"), challenging th
propriety of an order of withdrawal, issued pursuant to section
103(k) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. 813(k), at its Buck Mountain Slope
Mine on March 5, 1993. The notice of contest was received by the
Commission shortly before the close of business, Friday,
March 12, 1993. In addition to contesting the order of
withdrawal, Buck Mountain requested that the contest be heard on
an expedited basis. Pursuant to that request a hearing was
convened on Thursday, March 18, 1993, in Tremont,
Pennsylvania.(Footnote 1)

1 It is appropriate to note that the hearing could not have been held on
such short notice without the complete cooperation of counsel for the
Secretary and the representative of Buck Mountain and without the assistance
of the representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources, Bureau of Deep Mine Safety, who went out of their way to
accommodate the parties and the Commission by making space available for the
hearing at the Department's office in Tremont.

        It is also appropriate to note that due to the need for expedited

resolution of the case, this decision has been prepared without the benefit of
the transcript.

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BACKGROUND OF THE CONTEST

  Buck Mountain Slope Mine is an anthracite coal mine located in eastern

Pennsylvania, approximately 70 miles north and east of Harrisburg. The mine
employs five to six miners who work a single shift. The mine is owned and
operated by Buck Mountain, a partnership composed of three partners.

  On the morning of March 5, 1993, a methane explosion occurred in the

underground portion of the mine, on the No. 4 Level East Gangway Section.
Three miners were burned and taken to the hospital. (As of the date of the
hearing, one miner remained hospitalized.) The accident was immediately
reported and a MSHA rescue and investigation team was sent to the mine. To
insure the safety of persons in the mine and to control the situation while
MSHA conducted its accident investigation, MSHA issued the section 103(k)
order that is the subject of this proceeding. The order states:

        The mine has experienced a three (3) miner non-fatal
        ignition accident in the underground No. 4 Level East
        Gangway Section. This order is to assure the safety
        of any person in the coal mine. An investigation will
        be conducted to determine the safety of the mine.
        Only those persons selected from company officials,
        the Pennsylvania State Officials, miners
        representatives, and others deemed by MSHA to have
        information relevant to the investigation may enter or
        remain in the affected area.

Exh. G-3 at 2.

  The order was issued at 9:35 a.m., and it affected the entire

underground portion of the mine. Forty minutes later it was modified as
follows:

        The 103(k) Order No. 3082392, dated 3-5-93, is
        modified to ensure that there is no misunderstanding
        of the following requirements associated with the
        order.

        They are:

        (1) ventilation facilities and fan operations will
        not be altered and changed without prior approval; (2)
        the plans to restore the mine to normal operation must
        be approved by MSHA prior to this investigation; (3)
        relocation or changing of mine equipment material or
        facilities must be approved by MSHA prior to their
        init[i]ation[;]

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(4) relocation or changing of mine equipment material
or facilities must be approved by MSHA prior to
implementation.

G. Exh. 3 at 3.

  Following issuance and modification of the order, the MSHA accident

investigation commenced. As of the hearing date, the immediate investigation
had been completed, although a report of the investigation and its findings
had not been issued. In addition, John Shutack, District Manager of MSHA
District No. 1, the district in which the mine is located, testified that he
and District No. 1 personnel still must conduct a review and evaluation of the
entire ventilation system at the mine.

  On March 11, 1993, Shutack sent to Buck Mountain three (3) letters, each

advising Buck Mountain that portions of its ventilation plan had been revoked
in conjunction with the investigation. The first letter revoked a portion of
the plan which had been granted on January 11, 1988, and which allowed Buck
Mountain a waiver from the requirement that its mine fan be continuously in
operation. See G. Exh. 4 at 1; G. Exh. 1 at 1. Under regulations in effect
when the waiver was granted, an MSHA District Manager could waive the
requirement that a main mine fan be kept in continuous operation if he was
satisfied that the waiver would provide no less than the same measure of
protection to miners. See 30 CFR 75.300, 75.3001-1, 75.300-3
(1988).(Footnote 2)

    The letter states, "This is to advise you that your request for waiver

from continuously operation of the main fan, approved on January 11, 1988, for
your Buck Mountain Slope Mine, has been reviewed in conjunction with the
investigation of the explosion of methane gas accident that occurred on March
5, 1993, and is hereby revoked." G. Exh. 4 at 1. Similarly worded letters
revoked Buck Mountain's "request for waiver from line brattice maintained
within 10 feet of the face" and Buck Mountain's "waiver to equip your fan with
a manometer [rather than with a pressure-reading gage.]" Id. at 2-3. (See 30
CFR
75.330(b)(2)(1988) and 30 CFR 75.371(1)(1992); 30 CFR
75.300-2(a)(3)(1988) and 30 CFR 75.310(a)(4)(1992).)

  Buck Mountain was adamantly opposed to the revocations. Buck Mountain

personnel expressed to MSHA District 1 personnel, including Shutack, their
opposition to any requirements to continuously operate the main mine fan;
install line brattice to within 10 feet of the face and equip the fan with a

2 The regulation was subsequently revised, and the regulation currently in
effect states in pertinent part, "[m]ain mine fans shall be continuously
operated, except as otherwise approved in the ventilation plan." 30 CFR
75.311 (1992).

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pressure-reading gage rather than a manometer. Buck Mountain, which had not
resumed mining since the accident, believed that if it turned on the fan in
order to begin again to mine, it would signal its acceptance of the waivers
and be unable to turn it off without being in violation of its ventilation
plan. It had similar concerns regarding the other two revocations.

  When Buck Mountain was unable to persuade Shutack to rescind the

revocations, Richard Kocher, the foreman at Buck Mountain, filed the notice of
contest on Buck Mountain's behalf. The pleading states in pertinent part:

        Main fan stoppage plan had a waiver to shut fan off
        after men are out of coal mine. The Arlington
        Inv[estigation] Team shut down all ventilation . . .
        now they want to run fan 24 hrs. . . . There is not
        any reason to operate fan 24 hrs. a day[,] 7 days a
        week.

        The same reasons I have stated go on the line brattice
        petition and waiver to equip fan with a manometer.

        The fan operated like this for 7 years, starting 1 hr.
        before preshift, and never had any methane trouble.

Notice of Contest.

  At the commencement of the hearing, Richard Kocher, stated that he would

represent Buck Mountain.(Footnote 3) The Secretary was represented by
Gretchen Lucken, who called Shutack and MSHA Inspector Clyde Turner to testify
on MSHA's behalf. At the close of the hearing the parties orally presented
their positions and waived briefing of the issues.

                            THE EVIDENCE

  District Manager Shutack was the first to testify. Shutack stated that

in 1987 Buck Mountain had applied for the waivers that are at the center of
the current controversy, and he identified copies of Buck Mountain's
applications. G. Exh. 2. Shutack explained that the applications were
investigated and

3 Also present at the hearing to advise or consult with Kocher were David
Williams, a certified mining engineer, and Ronald Lickman, owner of the Buck
Mountain coal rights and of the land on which the mine is situated. With the
agreement of counsel for the Secretary, Williams and Lickman were permitted to
not only consult with Kocher, but also to cross-examine the Secretary's
witnesses and to make statements on Buck Mountain's behalf.

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that as a result of the investigations, he approved the waivers. G. Exh. 1.
Shutack noted the language in the letters of approval that the approvals "may
be modified or terminated if warranted by subsequent changing conditions or in
the event an inspection or investigation reveals . . . [non]compliance with .
. . [the waivers'] provisions." Id.

  With regard to the waiver of the requirement to operate the fan

continuously, Shutack stated that the assertion on Buck Mountain's application
that in the five years prior to applying for the waiver the mine had an
average methane percentage of "0 percent" was checked against MSHA inspection
records and was found to be accurate. G. Exh. 2 at 2. (In other words, prior
to granting the waiver, MSHA was satisfied that there was no history of
methane at the mine.)

  Shutack, then described the events of March 5, 1993, how he was advised

of the explosion and how he immediately went to the mine where the section
103(k) order was issued. MSHA's investigation of the accident followed,
during which MSHA sought to re-establish ventilation in the mine in order to
thoroughly examine the mine in search of the cause of the explosion. Shutack
explained that during the course of the investigation, it was determined that
the mine was subject to erratic liberations of methane, ranging from 1 percent
to 5 percent or higher.(Footnote 4) According to Shutack, it was also
determined that Buck Mountain was not maintaining line brattice to within 20
feet of the face, as required under its waiver and that the mine map was not
accurate.(Footnote 5) This latter finding was disturbing to Shutack in that
the map showed seals existing in the intake air slope which were not, in fact,
in existence. Shutack feared that methane or carbon monoxide could seep into
the mine from the unsealed and worked-out-areas. Shutack stated that without
accurate knowledge of the conditions potentially affecting ventilation he
could not be certain the mine was adequately ventilated and could not consider
any waivers from the mandatory ventilation requirements.
Shutack agreed, however, that during the course of the investigation the
main mine fan was not run continuously and that there even were times on March
6 when electrical problems caused

4 Methane presents an explosion hazard when found in concentrations
between 5 percent and 15 percent. See Wyoming Fuel Co., 13 FMSHRC 1210, 1213
n. 3 (August 1991).

5 Although citations were issued alleging violations of mandatory safety
standards by Buck Mountain due to these and other conditions, the merits of
the alleged violations are not at issue in this proceeding.

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the fan to be shut off while MSHA inspection personnel were underground.
However, Shutack maintained that MSHA personnel were specially trained for
underground investigative work and were alert to the dangers of inadequate
ventilation.

  Shutack was asked about air samples taken during the course of the

inspection. He stated that on March 6 very little methane had been found.
(See G. Exh. 6 at 1). However, immediately after the explosion, explosive
methane levels and higher were found in the chute and gangway near the
explosion area. (Bottle sample No. I6765 revealed 13.3 percent methane in the
No. 6 Chute and bottle sample No. F3032 revealed 22.86 percent methane in the
No. 4 Level Gangway - No. 6 Chute. Id. at 3-4.) Shutack did not know,
however, if any samples were taken to establish whether the methane that was
detected had come from the unsealed, worked-out areas of the mine, and he
admitted that he could not say for certain that these areas were a source for
methane or other air contaminants. In fact, he did not know the source of the
methane that had exploded and that continued to be found in the mine.

  Finally, Shutack testified that the area where the explosion had

occurred was a "blind area," a dead end which was difficult to ventilate. He
agreed that if the No. 5 and No. 6 Chutes were connected, ventilation would be
improved greatly and methane would be much less likely to accumulate.

  Shutack testified that the immediate post-accident investigation

revealed the need for a survey and evaluation of the entire ventilation system
at the mine to make certain methane was being diluted, rendered harmless and
carried away. He had determined that the section 103(k) order could not be
modified or terminated and the survey could not begin until Buck Mountain
agreed to run continuously the main mine fan (under
the waiver the company had been allowed to start it one-half hour before the
mine was preshifted), to install line brattice to within 10 feet of the face
(rather than to within 20 feet as allowed under the waiver) and to install
a main fan pressure-reading gage (rather than to use a manometer as allowed
under the waiver).

  Shutack further stated that he orally informed Kocher of these

conditions and formally advised the company of them by the letter dated March
11, 1993, G. Exh. 4.(Footnote 6) If Buck Mountain complied with these
conditions, a review of the entire ventilation system of the mine could
commence. In addition, Buck Mountain would be required to submit a new
ventilation plan.

6 In addition to representing conditions for the lifting or modification
of the Section 103(k) order, the letters are also understood by the parties to
constitute revocation of part of the mine's ventilation plan.

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On cross-examination, Shutack agreed there were potential hazards to the
miners from the fan running continuously. In the winter the slope could ice-
up and the buggy could derail. Further, there was little, if any, clearance
along the slope from which men could work to remove ice.

  Shutack testified, that he was not forever wedded to the revocation of

the waivers and that he was not precluding the approval of similar waivers in
the future. However, given the accident and the information currently at his
disposal, he believed he had to insist that Buck Mountain accept revocation of
the waivers before the section 103(k) order could be terminated.

                            CLYDE TURNER

  MSHA Inspector Clyde Turner testified that he was a member of the MSHA

team that investigated the accident. Turner described that part of the
investigation in which he participated. According to Turner, on March 10,
1993, the main mine fan was started at 6:00 a.m., prior to the investigation
team entering the mine. The team went underground and around 11:45 a.m.,
turned off the underground auxiliary fans and air movers. Team personnel were
stationed at various spots and instructed to monitor methane levels. Turner
testified that after approximately 30 minutes, .2 percent methane was detected
in the gangway. At the face of the No. 5 Chute methane was found to be .5
percent and in the No. 6 Chute methane was found at levels of up to 1 percent.
Turner believed that if the main mine fan had been stopped methane would have
accumulated to the explosive range in two and one-half to three hours.

  Turner also believed that the problem with not having the fan running

continuously was that methane could build up to levels above the explosive
range while the fan was shut off. Once the fan started the levels would begin
to decrease, which would result in methane in the explosive range spreading
through the mine as the ventilation moved the methane around and ultimately
out of the mine. Turner could think of no circumstances under which it would
be safe to allow methane levels to build up and, as he stated, the first and
most effective defense to methane was to ventilate it, which was why
continuous fan operation was required unless specifically exempted by the
ventilation plan. Turner believed that unless continuous fan operation was
required, the explosion of March 5, would recur sooner or later.

  Turner was asked his opinion why the mine, which had been virtually free

of methane, had begun to experience methane liberations. He stated that the
depth at which mining was taking place could be a factor in that methane was
more likely to be released at greater depths. Further, he stated that methane
was known to be liberated in "pockets" and Buck Mountain might be

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mining through such a pocket. He admitted that as mining progressed it was
possible the area currently liberating methane could be by-passed and the mine
could again be virtually methane-free. However, he did not expect that this
would be the case. He stated that in his experience once methane was
encountered the problem persisted.

  Under questioning from Kocher, Turner agreed that on March 7, the day

mine ventilation was restored, all methane in the mine had been rendered
harmless and carried away within one hour. (On March 7 the fan had not run
continuously.) He also agreed that if the fan ran continuously there was a
good possibility of winter ice building up on the slope. Men would have to
chop the ice to remove it and in so doing could fall and injure themselves.
He further agreed that because operation of the fan would prevent closure of
the door at the slope portal, there was a potential fire hazard in that a
brush fire in the area of the mine could enter the mine through the portal
door opening. However, Turner was quick to note that these hazards were
speculative, whereas the hazard about which he was concerned -- methane -- was
actually present. (Footnote 7)

                           RICHARD KOCHER

  Buck Mountain's case was presented through cross-examination of the

Secretary's witnesses and through the statements of Kocher. Kocher presented
as evidence and read into the record two statements explaining why, in Buck
Mountain's view, the main mine fan does not have to be run continuously to
remove methane from the mine. See C. Exhs. 1 and 2. Kocher pointed out that
during his preshift examinations of March 6 and 7, before ventilation was re-
established in the affected area, he found varying amounts of methane in
varying locations, the highest amount being 4.8 percent on March 7 in the No.
6 Chute, C. Exh. 1 at 2. However, after ventilation was re-established the
most found was .9 percent and most tests revealed much less -- either .2 or .1
percent or no methane at all. Id. at 3-4.

  Further, Kocher contended that methane found by MSHA officials was in

the "blind" No. 6 Chute, the chute where ventilation will be greatly enhanced
when the chute is cut through to the No. 5 Chute. C. Exh. 2 at 1. (This
contention, however, flies in the face of the MSHA bottle sample results which
showed traces of methane inby the main fan before ventilation was restored.
G. Exh. 6 at 1 and 2.) Further, Kocher contended that during MSHA's
investigation on March 5-11, when the fan was shut off all night, no methane
was found in the mine. C. Exh. 2 at 1. (This contention, however, is

7 At the close of Turner's testimony, the Secretary rested. Buck
Mountain, through Lickman, moved for a directed verdict. I denied the motion.

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contradicted by Turner's uncontested testimony concerning the results of his
in-mine methane tests on March 10.) Kocher, also noted that ventilation at
the last open cross-cut in the mine was 12,000 cubic feet per minute, more
than twice the 5,000 cubic feet per minute required by the regulations. Id.
(MSHA does not dispute this contention.)

  Kocher emphasized that for the past 7 years, with the exception of the

March 5 accident, there had been no accident at the mine. He maintained that
since the mine has been in operation the fan has been started in the morning
and has been shut off after work; and that given the dedication to safety at
the mine and the fact that no methane was found at the mine prior to March 5,
there is no reason to change the ventilation plan because "with the
ventilation plan we already have & the large quantity of air flow that [the]
fan produces[,] [the methane] is proven controllable." C. Exh. 2.

                           RONALD LICKMAN

  In his closing statement, Lickman summed up Buck Mountain's position:

That the Secretary had not proven the existence of methane in such dangerous
quantities that the fan should be run around-the-clock, especially when
continuous operation of the fan could lead to other hazards endangering
miners.
THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER

  Section 103(k) of the Act, the section under which the contested order

was issued, states:

        In the event of any accident occurring in a coal or
        other mine, an authorized representative of the
        Secretary, when present, may issue such orders as he
        deems appropriate to insure the safety of any person
        in the coal or other mine, and the operator of such
        mine shall obtain the approval of such representative,
        in consultation with appropriate State
        representatives, when feasible, of any plan to recover
        any person in such mine or to recover the coal or
        other mine or return affected areas of such mine to
        normal.

30 U.S.C. 813(k).

  The section gives MSHA plenary power to make post-accident orders for

the protection and safety of all persons. Miller Mining Company, Inc. v.
FMSHRC, 713 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1983). Section 3(k) of the Act, 30 U.S.C.
802(k), includes an explosion within the statutory definition of "accident"
as does

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the Secretary's regulatory statutory definition of "accident", found at 30 CFR
50.2(h)(5). Thus, there can be no doubt the explosion of March 5, 1993, wa
the type of occurrence that properly could trigger a section 103(k) order to
insure the safety of persons in the mine.

  It is likewise clear that given the issuance of the order, Buck Mountain

cannot resume mining without the approval of MSHA, provided MSHA's conditions
for the resumption of mining are reasonably related to insuring the safety of
persons in the mine. The testimony establishes that MSHA is ready and willing
to approve such a resumption provided Buck Mountain accepts the conditions
upon which MSHA insists. There is no suggestion that the conditions are
incapable of being carried out. Moreover, I am persuaded that under the
present circumstances, they are both reasonable and necessary to insure
safety.

  The explosion of March 5 is a calamity that overshadows this proceeding.

The distress and concern of Buck Mountain's representative and consultants
over what has occurred was readily apparent at the hearing. The only thing
fortunate about the accident is that the three miners involved were injured,
rather than killed, which is cold comfort indeed.

  The thrust of Shutack's testimony is that he believes Buck Mountain

should be required to continuously operate the fan, advance line brattice
within 10 feet of the face and install a manometer at least until there has
been a complete review of the mine's ventilation system. Shutack credibly
testified that without the institution of these procedures, he will be unable
to initiate and complete that review.

  The evidence suggests that at this time implementation of the provisions

enhance, not diminish, the effectiveness of the mine ventilation system's
ability to dilute, render harmless and carry away methane. Given the fact
methane is being liberated now in potentially dangerous quantities, as
graphically established by the explosion; the fact that the source of the
methane is, at this point, uncertain; and given the fact the old, worked-out
areas are not effectively sealed off from the intake, as MSHA had supposed, it
seems the height of responsibility and reason to insist upon Buck Mountain's
acceptance of the provisions prior to modifying or terminating the order.

   It is, afterall, the Secretary's duty systematically to evaluate the

conditions and practices at the mine and keep the section 103(k) order in
effect until he can determine the hazards that caused the explosion have been
corrected and will not recur. In light of the current conditions at the Buck
Mountain Slope Mine, I conclude that, to make such a determination, the
Secretary may insist that Buck Mountain implement the three provisions at
issue.

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Therefore, I find Order No. 3082392 was properly issued and is valid.

                      THE SECTION 103(K) ORDER
                                 AND
                      THE MINE VENTILATION PLAN
  There is an aspect of this case that deserves further comment. As the

parties recognize and as the record reveals the three provisions MSHA insists
be implemented before MSHA will terminate or modify the section 103(k) order
are contrary to provisions in Buck Mountain's current ventilation plan.
Should Buck Mountain choose to implement the provisions in order to allow MSHA
to terminate or modify the section 103(k) order while MSHA conducts its
complete review of the miner's ventilation system, Buck Mountain will not, in
my view, be signaling the acceptance of the provisions as a permanent part of
its ventilation plan. Rather, the effect of Buck Mountain's acceptance would
be temporarily to suspend the provisions of the ventilation plan while MSHA
initiates and completes its review of the ventilation system. When the review
is finished, the suspension will no longer be in effect, and MSHA must then
advise Buck Mountain regarding the results of its studies and regarding any
changes it proposes in the existing ventilation plan.

  It will be at this point that the well recognized principles of

Secretarial approval and operator adoption of a ventilation plan come into
effect. If differences then exist between the Secretary and Buck Mountain
concerning the provisions, the Secretary and Buck Mountain must negotiate in
good faith and for a reasonable period concerning the dispute. If they remain
at odds, review may be obtained by Buck Mountain refusing to adopt the
disputed provision or provisions, thus triggering litigation before the
Commission. See Carbon County Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 1367, 1371 (September 1985).

  It must be emphasized that the validity of the provisions currently in

dispute as a part of Buck Mountain's ventilation plan is not at issued in this
case, and it would be improper to express any opinion in that regard. Because
there is no allegation by the Secretary that Buck Mountain is in violation of
its ventilation plan, the plan is not before me. Rather, the sole issue is
the validity of the section 103(k) order. To rule on the merits of the
ventilation plan would be to express the kind of declaratory judgement the
Commission has cautioned is unwarranted under the Mine Act. Kaiser Coal
Corp., 10 FMSHRC 1165, 1170-1171 (September 1988).

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ORDER

  In view of the foregoing, Buck Mountain's contest is DENIED and Section

103(k) Order No. 3082392 is AFFIRMED.

                               David F. Barbour
                               Administrative Law Judge
                               (703)756-5232

Distribution:

Gretchen Lucken, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 4015
Wilson Boulevard, Suite 516, Arlington, VA 22203
(Certified Mail)

Richard Kocher, Partner, Buck Mountain Coal Company No. 2,
R.D. 4, Pine Grove, PA 17963 (Certified Mail)

Richard Lickman, 101 N. Centre Street, Suite 309,
Pottsville, PA 17901 (Certified Mail)

/epy