Westrick Coal Company (Commission decision, July 8, 1988)

Westrick Coal Company (FMSHRC PENN 88-119): Default decision vacated and remanded

Decision type
Commission decision
Docket
PENN 88-119
Decided
July 8, 1988
Outcome
Remanded
Precedential status
Citable Commission precedent
Checked against source
2026-08-20

Apply this precedent to your situation

This is citable Commission precedent from 1988, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1988
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
The Commission vacated the Judge's default decision so Westrick could explain its failures to respond and the Secretary could object to relief. The Judge still had to decide whether relief from default was appropriate and, if so, address the civil penalty issues. This order did not decide those issues. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Westrick Coal Company requested a hearing to contest an alleged violation but did not respond to the administrative law judge's pre-hearing and show-cause orders. The judge entered a default decision, and Westrick petitioned for discretionary review. The Commission majority vacated the default decision and remanded so the operator could explain its failures and the Secretary could object to any request for relief. The dissent would have upheld the default because Westrick repeatedly failed to participate in the hearing process.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standards: None stated in the decision.
  • Outcome: The ALJ's default decision was vacated and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
  • Key point: The Commission majority allowed an opportunity to address the unexplained failure to respond to the judge's orders, while a dissent argued that repeated nonparticipation justified default.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
MSHA V. WESTRICK COAL

DDATE:
19880708

TTEXT:

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.
July 8, 1988

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v. Docket No. PENN 88-119

WESTRICK COAL COMPANY

BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Backley, Doyle and Lastowka, Commissioners

ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

Respondent, Westrick Coal Company, after requesting a hearing to contest an alleged violation, failed to respond to the administrative law judge's pre-hearing and show cause orders. On May 25, 1988 the administrative law judge issued a default decision. Respondent filed a Petition for Discretionary Review on June 24, 1988.

The record does not reveal the reasons for the Respondent's failure to respond to the judge's orders. We grant the petition and vacate the judge's default decision in order to allow this operator, who is apparently acting pro se an opportunity to present the reasons for these failures, and for the Secretary to interpose any objections to relief from the default decision. Should the judge determine that relief from default is appropriate, he should proceed with the civil penalty issues in this matter.


Page 2

~854
Commissioner Lastowka, dissenting:

In my opinion the administrative law judge properly entered an order of default in this proceeding. Indeed, the persistent failure of Westrick Coal Company to do anything to participate in the hearing process left the judge no choice. While I endorse the Commission's previously expressed preference for dispositions on the merits over procedural defaults, that policy cannot be without limits. I believe that to order further proceedings in the circumstances of this case exceeds appropriate bounds.

The Mine Act provides a mine operator with an opportunity for a hearing before this Commission on citations or orders issued by MSHA. Westrick exercised this right by requesting a hearing on citation number 269767. In order to obtain the requested hearing, however, Westrick was required to participate in the hearing process. Westrick ignored every request by the judge and the Secretary that it do so. On March 22, 1988, the judge issued an order directing that the parties confer and exchange information, and noting that failure to do so could lead to default. The record indicates that Mr. Westrick received this order. Westrick did not respond. On March 25 the Secretary sent a letter to Mr. Westrick indicating that attempts to contact him by phone had been unsuccessful and asking Westrick to call the Secretary for purposes of complying with the judge's order. Westrick did not respond. On April 11 the Secretary recited the above chronology in a motion filed with the judge requesting the issuance of a default judgment. Westrick did not respond. On April 21 the judge issued an order directing Westrick to comply by May 2 with his previous order or to show cause why it should not be held in default for failing to respond. The record shows that Mr. Westrick received this order. Westrick did not respond. Accordingly, on May 25 the judge issued a default order. Mr. Westrick's petition for discretionary review of the judge's default order offers no explanation whatsoever for Westrick's persistent failure to heretofore respond and participate in the hearing process. */

In these circumstances the judge committed no error in defaulting Westrick. The judge and the Secretary have followed the proper course in pursuing and resolving this proceeding, yet find themselves having to once again expend their time and resources in an attempt to provide a hearing to a party who declines to participate in the hearing process. Because I believe no error was committed below, I must respectfully dissent from the remand for further proceedings.


Page 3

___
*/ Westrick's failure to offer any explanation for its failure to respond distinguishes this matter from other default situations where colorable claims of confusion over procedures or nonreceipt of served documents have been raised. See e.g., Rivco Dredging Corp., 10 FMSHRC 624 (May 1988); Perry Drilling Co., 9 FMSHRC 379 (March 1987); Patroit Coal Co., 9 FMSHRC 382 (March 1987); Doug Connelly Sand & Gravel, 9 FMSHRC 385 (March 1987).


Page 4

~855
Distribution

Therese I. Salus, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
3535 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Mr. Ray Westrick, Owner
Westrick Coal Company
Patton, PA 16668

Judge Avram Weisberger
Office of the Administrative Law Judge
2 Skyline, lOth Floor
Falls Church, Virginia 222041

Does this precedent still control your case?

Ezel checks whether it still stands, including any court review since, and applies it to your situation with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace