Secretary of Labor v. Litts & Son Stone Company (ALJ decision, December 18, 2009)

Secretary of Labor v. Litts & Son Stone Company (FMSHRC PENN 2009-273-M): Retaliation counterclaim dismissed

Decision type
ALJ decision
Docket
PENN 2009-273-M
Decided
December 18, 2009
Presiding judge
Outcome
Procedural
Precedential status
Final order, not precedent
Checked against source
2026-08-08
Cited standards

Apply this to your situation

This order from 2009 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 2009
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Interlocutory ALJ order, not Commission precedent
This order dismissed a counterclaim while the civil penalty case involving 13 alleged violations continued. It did not dispose of the case or become a final decision under the 40-day rule in 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1). It is not Commission precedent. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Litts & Son Stone Company alleged that MSHA inspectors had taken retaliatory or vindictive actions that violated the company's First Amendment rights. It asked the Judge to enjoin further retaliation and require MSHA to assign a fair and impartial inspector. Judge David F. Barbour held that the Commission has only the authority Congress granted under the Mine Act. Because the Act did not authorize Commission judges to direct MSHA's internal personnel policies or provide the requested injunction, he dismissed the counterclaim. The underlying penalty case continued under an earlier order to confer and report.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing provision: 30 U.S.C. § 815(d)
  • Outcome: The Secretary's motion to dismiss the operator's counterclaim was granted.
  • Key point: Commission judges cannot grant relief over MSHA personnel assignments or practices when the Mine Act provides no such jurisdiction.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FMSHRC ALJ Decision

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

601 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 9500

WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2021

TELEPHONE: 202-434-9964 / FAX: 202-434-9949

December 18, 2009

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),

Petitioner

v.

LITTS & SON STONE COMPANY,

Respondent

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CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING

Docket No. PENN 2009-273-M

A. C. No. 36-09655-170239-02

Mine: Buckhorn

ORDER GRANTING SECRETARY’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

This case concerns a proposal for assessment of civil penalty filed pursuant to Section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“the Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 815(d), seeking a civil penalty assessment for 13 alleged violations of mandatory safety standards found in Parts 47 and 56, Title 30, Code of Federal Regulations. The Secretary filed the Petition for Assessment of Civil Penalty on February 19, 2009, and the Respondent answered and asserted a counterclaim on March 19, 2009. The Secretary has filed a motion to dismiss the Respondent’s counterclaim.

The respondent alleges that it has been the victim of a series of retaliatory and/or vindictive actions since the spring and summer of 2008 by MSHA inspectors, in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Answer at 6. In the Secretary’s motion, she moves that the counterclaim be dismissed. She asserts the Commission does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue, or, if it does, that the Respondent has failed to state a cognizable cause of action. Motion at 3.

In ruling on the Secretary’s motion, it is important to first identify the relief the Respondent seeks. The Respondent argues that because employees of the agency created by the Act (MSHA) deprived the company of the full exercise of the company’s First Amendment rights, I should enjoin the agency “from taking further vindictive retaliatory actions against [the Respondent]” and direct MSHA to assign “a fair and impartial inspector . . . to [the Repsondent’s] facilities.” Answer at 6-7. I cannot fulfill these requests. As counsel for the Secretary rightly points out, my jurisdiction is restricted to that which is granted by the Act. Motion at 2. Administrative agencies such as the Commission have only the jurisdiction that Congress gives. This core principle of administrative law has long been recognized as applicable to the Commission and its judges. Kaiser Coal Corp., 10 FMSHRC 1165, 1169 (September 1988). While the Act establishes specific enforcement proceedings, contest proceedings and other forms of action over which the Commission presides, nowhere does it grant to the Commission and its judges the authority to rule on and to direct MSHA’s internal personnel policies and practices. Because there is no way under the Act that I can grant what the Respondent asks, the counterclaim must be dismissed. See Agronics, Inc., CENT 98-151-M (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Remand) (August 21, 1998) (Chief ALJ Merlin) (unpublished). This is not to say the Respondent is without a remedy.

It is simply to say that
the remedy it seeks is not available before the Commission. Accordingly, the Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss Alleged Counterclaim IS GRANTED, and the parties are directed to comply with the Order to Confer and Report dated November 5, 2009.

David F. Barbour

Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Jodeen Hobbs, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, The Curtis Center, Suite 630E, 170 S. Independence Mall West, Philadelphia, PA 19106-3306

John G. Dean, Esq., Elliott, Greenleaf & Dean, 201 Penn Avenue, Suite 202, Scranton, PA 18503

/ej

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