National Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Authority decision, August 16, 1983)

Final FLRA decision. This is an Authority order involving an arbitral award under 5 U.S.C. § 7122. Judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) generally does not extend to such an order unless the order involves an unfair labor practice under 5 U.S.C. § 7116. This decision does not state that it involves an unfair labor practice.

Plain-English summary

An arbitrator ruled that the union could schedule hearings for career ladder promotion grievances by the categories in a memorandum of understanding, regardless of when each grievance was invoked. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission challenged the award as an incorrect interpretation of the agreement and an excess of authority. The Authority found that the agency’s objections amounted to disagreement with the arbitrator’s reading of the agreement. It denied the exceptions and left the scheduling award in place.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a).
• Outcome: Agency exceptions denied; arbitration scheduling award stands.
• Key point: Disagreement with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement was not an award defect.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v12 p609 ]

12:0609(113)AR

The decision of the Authority follows:

12 FLRA No. 113

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
(Union)

and

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(Agency)

Case No. O-AR-535

DECISION

This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of Arbitrator Herbert Fishgold filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.

The dispute arose in connection with a series of grievances concerning career ladder promotions. The Agency denied the grievances and the Union invoked arbitration in each case. The parties then entered into a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to divide the grievances into certain categories and according to office lines within categories, and to refer to arbitration a threshold procedural issue involving interpretation of a particular provision of their collective bargaining agreement. The matter referred to the Arbitrator in this case was the order in which grievances would proceed to arbitration hearing or, more specifically, whether the party invoking arbitration could unilaterally choose the order in which grievances would be heard. The Union maintained that under the same provision the grievances had to be heard in the order in which arbitration was invoked. The Arbitrator found that the pertinent agreement provision was silent on the issue in dispute and that the silence presented some ambiguity. In construing the provision, however, the Arbitrator concluded, and ruled as his award, that the Union could proceed to arbitration hearing based upon the grievance divisions set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, regardless of the order in which any individual grievance was appealed to arbitration.

In its exceptions, the Agency contends (1) that the Arbitrator's award failed to interpret and draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and (2) that the Arbitrator violated his jurisdiction to decide the matter in dispute between the parties. In support of its exceptions, the Agency asserts, in essence, that the Arbitrator should have provided an interpretation of the relevant agreement provision that would be applicable to all grievances and not just to the grievances concerning career ladder promotions that gave rise to this dispute and, moreover, that the Arbitrator erred in his interpretation and application of the relevant agreement provision.

Upon careful consideration of the entire record before the Authority, including the contentions of the parties, the Authority concludes that the Agency has failed to establish that the Arbitrator's award is deficient. It is clear that the Agency is merely attempting to relitigate the merits of the case before the Authority and that the thrust of the Agency's exceptions constitutes nothing more than disagreement with the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of the parties' agreement and with his reasoning and conclusions in resolving the dispute before him. It is well-established that such disagreement does not provide a basis for finding the award deficient. E.g., American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1210 and Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8 FLRA No. 17 (1982); Social Security Administration and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local No. 1923, 5 FLRA No. 33 (1981); Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion Repair, United States Navy and Local R4-2, National Association of Government Employees, 5 FLRA No. 29 (1981); American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923, AFL-CIO and Social Security Administration, Headquarters Bureaus and Offices, 4 FLRA 112 (1980). Issued, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1983 Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman Ronald W. Haughton, Member Henry B. Frazier III, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY