San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1617 (Authority decision, September 22, 1983)

Final FLRA decision. This is a final order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority involving an arbitral award under 5 U.S.C. § 7122. Judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) generally does not extend to such an order unless the order involves an unfair labor practice under 5 U.S.C. § 7116. This decision resolves exceptions to an arbitration award and does not state that it involves an unfair labor practice.

Plain-English summary

An arbitrator upheld a one-day suspension after an employee left a required counseling session despite an order to remain. The union argued that the award punished protected expression and was influenced by her husband’s union position. The Authority found that the arbitrator had based the discipline on refusal to participate in counseling and had rejected the claimed union motive. It denied the union’s exception and left the award standing.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a).
• Outcome: Union exception denied; one-day suspension award stands.
• Key point: Unsupported claims about protected expression and family union activity did not show the award violated law.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v13 p66 ]

13:0066(14)AR

The decision of the Authority follows:

13 FLRA No. 14

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER,
KELLY AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS
Activity

and

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1617, AFL-CIO
Union

Case No. O-AR-235

DECISION

This matter is before the Authority on an exception to the award of Arbitrator Joe D. Woodward filed by the Union under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Agency filed an opposition.

The dispute in this matter concerns the suspension of the grievant for one day primarily as a result of her conduct during a counseling session with her supervisors. During the session the grievant refused to remain and left the session despite being ordered by her supervisor to remain and being advised that her refusal to remain would result in disciplinary action. Ultimately, the grievant was suspended and she filed a grievance which was submitted to arbitration on the issue of whether the discipline was for just cause and, if so, whether the suspension was reasonable.

The Arbitrator determined that the grievant had a duty to attend the counseling session and remain until the session was completed. He explained that if she found the session disagreeable, she had the right under the parties' collective bargaining agreement to resort to the grievance procedure to challenge the propriety of the counseling session. He therefore ruled that the grievant inappropriately resorted to the self-help of abruptly leaving and refusing to be counseled. Consequently, he found that there was just cause for discipline and that the one-day suspension imposed was a reasonable penalty. In so finding, the Arbitrator rejected the Union's allegation that the grievant was discriminated against because her husband was the business agent of the Union. The Arbitrator held that the Union had not sustained by evidence to even the slightest degree that consideration of the position of the grievant's husband had motivated the disciplinary action against her. Accordingly, as the award, the Arbitrator denied the grievance.

In its exception the Union contends that the award is contrary to law. Specifically, the Union maintains that the award is constitutionally deficient primarily because the discipline was partly based on the grievant's protected expression of her views of her supervisor. The Union also maintains that the award is contrary to the Statute because the discipline of the grievant was based on consideration of the union activities of her husband.

The Authority concludes that the Union fails to establish that the award is contrary to law. As noted, the Arbitrator expressly determined that the one-day suspension of the grievant was warranted solely on the basis of the grievant's misconduct in refusing to be counseled. Consequently, the Arbitrator did not find it necessary to consider the Agency's additional allegations of misconduct and the Union's arguments with respect to them. Thus, the Union's argument that the other allegations of misconduct involved constitutionally protected expression by the grievant provides no basis for finding the Arbitrator's award deficient. Similarly, the Arbitrator expressly rejected the argument that the grievant's suspension was improperly motivated by a consideration of union activities, and the Union by repeating this argument in its exception without substantiation fails to establish otherwise. Accordingly, the Union's exception is denied. Issued, Washington, D.C., September 22, 1983 Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman Ronald W. Haughton, Member Henry B. Frazier III, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY