Local Union 1110, United Mine Workers of America, et al. v. Consolidation Coal Company (Commission decision, October 27, 1980)
Local Union 1110 v. Consolidation Coal (FMSHRC MORG 76X138): Retaliation finding upheld
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Plain-English summary
A group of miners raised safety concerns about a mine elevator, and a union safety committee declared an imminent danger. An administrative law judge found that Consolidation Coal withheld benefits normally given to miners because they engaged in protected safety activity. On appeal, the company argued that the miners had not all individually complained and disputed their right to compensation under the labor agreement. The Commission agreed that the miners conveyed their concerns through words and actions and that the judge's retaliation finding rested on withheld benefits, not a contractual entitlement to pay. It affirmed the judge's decision.
Decision snapshot
- Governing authority: The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; transfer of the pending appeal under 30 U.S.C. § 961(c)(3).
- Outcome: Judge's discrimination finding affirmed.
- Key point: Safety concerns communicated through collective actions can support a finding of protected activity even when every miner did not complain individually.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
CCASE:
UMWA V. CONSOLIDATION COAL
DDATE:
19801027
TTEXT:
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC
October 27, 1980
LOCAL UNION 1110, UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA)
ET AL.
v. Docket No. MORG 76X138
IBMA No. 77-43
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY
DECISION
This discrimination case arises under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. $801 et seq. (1976)(amended 1977). Consolidation Coal Company ("Consol") appeals from the March 26, 1977, decision of former Administrative Law Judge Michels. Judge Michels, after holding an extensive evidentiary hearing, issued a detailed decision finding that Consol had withheld from miners ordinarily conferred benefits in retaliation for their engaging in protected activities. Consol's appeal was pending before the Interior Department's Board of Mine Operations Appeals on the effective date of 30 U.S.C. $961(c)(3) (Supp.III 1979), and is therefore pending before the Commission for disposition. 1/ We affirm.
Consol's arguments furnish no ground for reversal. Consol attacks the judge's finding that the miners notified the Secretary of the Interior, his authorized representative, or Consol of an alleged danger. The judge found that the miners communicated their fears over safety by both words and deeds, and, based on our review of the record, we agree. Consol also objects to the lack of evidence that each of the miners so
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1/ This case presents no issue under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. $801 et seq. (Supp.III 1979).
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complained. We adopt the judge's reasons for rejecting the argument. 2/ Finally, Consol argues that the miners were not entitled to compensation after the union safety committee declared the mine an imminent danger. This objection apparently refers to certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Consol and the UMWA. As we read the judge's opinion, he rested his decision on his finding that benefits ordinarily conferred were withheld in retaliation for the miners' engaging in protected activity, not that the miners were entitled to compensation by their contract. The judge's finding is supported by the record.
Accordingly, the judge's decision is affirmed.
Richard V. Backley, Chairman
Frank F. Jestrab, Commissioner
A. E. Lawson, Commissioner
Marian Pearlman Nease, Commissioner
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2/ The judge stated:
I further recognize that only a few miners communicated any form of safety complaint to their supervisors. It cannot be concluded from this that the other men failed to make a complaint. They all wanted the safety committee brought in and management believed that the whole shift was involved in the action (Tr. 117, 289). In this kind of a situation in which, as the record shows, the word passes around on what has been done, it would be unrealistic to expect each man to make his own individual complaint to his supervisor. The group learns of and supports the action taken by the few. Terry Marvin testified that a majority rule prevails and that if most believe the elevator to be unsafe none will use it (Tr. 257). It may be inferred that the fears and concerns expressed by the applicants who testified were shared by many of the other applicants. Further, by refusing to use the elevator they communicated their agreement to call the safety committee and their belief that the elevator was unsafe. It is noted on this point the parties stipulated that some of the applicants requested the presence of their safety committee. However, the parties also stipulated that the testimony of applicants' witnesses "shall be used and considered on behalf of each individual applicant without the necessity of each individual applicant's testifying." (Stipulation of Facts Nos. 4 and 6).
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Distribution
Thomas A. Smock, Esq.
David L. Strickler, Esq.
Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley
Whyte and Hardesty
900 Oliver Bldg.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Abraham Pinsky, Esq.
Pinsky, Barnes, Watson, Cuomo & Hinerman
800 Main Street
Wellsburg, West Virginia 26070
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