Davis Trucking Company, Inc. (Commission decision, May 27, 1993)

Davis Trucking Company, Inc. (FMSHRC LAKE 92-421-M): Default order vacated and case remanded

Decision type
Commission decision
Docket
LAKE 92-421-M
Decided
May 27, 1993
Outcome
Remanded
Precedential status
Citable Commission precedent
Checked against source
2026-08-14

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This is citable Commission precedent from 1993, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1993
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
The Commission vacated the default order and returned the case to the judge to determine whether default was warranted. The proposed civil penalty remained unresolved by this order; judicial review under 30 U.S.C. § 816 depends on a final Commission order. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

This civil penalty proceeding involved Davis Trucking Company's failure to answer the Secretary's proposed civil penalty notice and an administrative law judge's order to show cause. The judge entered an order of default and assessed the proposed $2,000 penalty. Davis's counsel later moved to vacate the default, explaining that the company had been negotiating a settlement and did not understand that a default judgment would be entered during those negotiations. The Commission treated the motion as a timely petition for discretionary review, vacated the default order, and remanded the case for the judge to determine whether default was warranted.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2), 29 C.F.R. § 2700.69(b), and 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a)
  • Outcome: The Commission vacated the default order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
  • Key point: The Commission returned the default question to the judge because the record did not resolve whether default should be imposed while settlement negotiations were ongoing.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

May 27, 1993

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
:
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
:
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)
:
:
v. : Docket No. LAKE 92-421-M
:
DAVIS TRUCKING COMPANY, INC. :

BEFORE: Holen, Chairman; Backley, and Doyle, Commissioners

ORDER

BY: Holen, Chairman; Backley, and Doyle, Commissioners

This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988)("Mine Act"). On April 23, 1993, Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order of Default to Davis Trucking Co. ("Davis") for failing to answer the notice of proposed civil penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor or the judge's February 24, 1993, Order to Show Cause. The judge assessed the civil penalty of $2,000 proposed by the Secretary. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the default order and remand this case for further proceedings.

On April 30, 1993, the Commission received from Davis' counsel a motion to vacate and set aside the default order. Davis' counsel explained that Davis had been negotiating a settlement in this matter, and did not understand that a default judgment would be entered against it during ongoing settlement negotiations.

The judge's jurisdiction over this case terminated when his decision was issued on April 23, 1993. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.69(b). Under the Mine Act and the Commission's procedural rules, relief from a judge's decision may be sought by filing a petition for discretionary review with the Commission within 30 days after its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a). We deem Davis' motion to be a timely filed Petition for Discretionary Review, which we grant. See, e.g., Middle States Resources, Inc., 10 FMSHRC 1130 (September 1988). On the basis of the present record, we are unable to evaluate the merits of Davis' position. In the interest of justice, we remand this matter to the judge, who shall determine whether default is warranted. See Hickory Coal Co., 12 FMSHRC 1201, 1202 (June 1990).

For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the judge's default order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Arlene Holen, Chairman

Richard V. Backley, Commissioner

Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner

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