FMSHRC ALJ decision Docket LAKE 92-247-RM, LAKE 92-248-RM, LAKE 92-249-RM Decided June 16, 1993 Mixed result Judge David F. Barbour Transcribed from scan

U.S. Steel Group, Minnesota Ore Operations

U.S. Steel Group, Minnesota Ore Operations (FMSHRC LAKE 92-247-RM): Imminent-danger findings modified after crusher hearing

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Currency note: this decision dates from 1993
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Final ALJ decision, not Commission precedent
This decision became final under the 40-day rule in 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1) because no later Commission review appears in the official index. It binds the parties but is not Commission precedent. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
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Plain-English summary

U.S. Steel Group, Minnesota Ore Operations contested an imminent-danger withdrawal order and two citations issued during repair work near the primary crusher at its Minntac taconite plant. Judge David F. Barbour vacated the imminent-danger and S&S findings connected to the unsecured crusher hatches and directed that the order be modified to a section 104(a) citation. He affirmed the warning-sign citation but vacated its S&S designation, and he affirmed the citation for failing to install a stopblock or derail device. The decision therefore left the underlying violations in place while narrowing the enforcement findings.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standards: 30 C.F.R. §§ 56.14105, 56.20011, and 56.9302
  • Outcome: The imminent-danger and S&S findings for Order/Citation 4097164 were vacated and the order was to be modified; Citation 4097166 was affirmed with its S&S finding deleted; Citation 4097167 was affirmed.
  • Key point: Existing warning lights and computerized rail controls did not replace physical blocking or derail devices where the safety standard required protection from hazardous motion or runaway equipment.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

                       OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                              2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                               5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                          FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041

U.S. STEEL GROUP, MINNESOTA : CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
ORE OPERATIONS, :
Contestant : Docket No. LAKE 92-247-RM
: Order No. 4097164; 2/25/92
v. :
: Docket No. LAKE 92-248-RM
SECRETARY OF LABOR, : Citation No. 4097166; 2/25/92
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH :
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), : Docket No. LAKE 92-249-RM
Respondent : Citation No. 4097167; 2/25/92
and :
:
UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF :
AMERICA, LOCAL 1938, :
Miners :

                                       DECISION

Appearances: Miguel J. Carmona, Esq., Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Chicago, Illinois,
for Respondent;
William M. Tennant, General Attorney, U.S.,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Contestant;
James Ranta, Representative, United Steel Workers
of America, Local 1938, for Miners.

Before: Judge Barbour

                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE

  In this proceeding arising under the Federal Mine Safety and

Health Act of 1977 ("Mine Act" or "Act"), 30 U.S.C. § 801 et
seq., U.S. Steel Group, Minnesota Ore Operations ("U.S. Steel")
contests the validity of an imminent danger order of withdrawal
issued pursuant to section 107(a) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 817(a),
and the citation for a violation of a mandatory safety standard
issued in association with the order pursuant to section 104(a)
of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 814(a). In addition, U.S. Steel contests
the validity of two other section 104(a) citations. The order
and the citations were issued at U.S. Steel's Minntac Plant, a
taconite processing plant located in St. Louis County, Minnesota,
and they involve work done in the vicinity of the plant's primary
crusher on the morning of February 25, 1992.

  Pursuant to notice the proceeding was heard in Duluth,

Minnesota.(Footnote 1) William M. Tennant represented U.S. Steel
and Miguel J. Carmona, represented the Secretary of Labor, Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration ("MESA"). In addition, the
United Steelworkers of America, Local 1938 ("Steelworkers"),
sought and was granted party status. James Ranta represented the
Steelworkers.

  With regard to the section 107(a) order/section 104(a)

citation, U.S. Steel contests the inspector's allegation that the
cited conditions constituted an imminent danger, the inspector's
finding that the same conditions constituted a violation of a
mandatory safety standard and the inspector's finding that the
violation was a significant and substantial contribution to a
mine safety hazard ("S&S" violation). With respect to one of the
two other section 104(a) citations, U.S. Steel challenges the
inspector's finding of a violation and his S&S finding and with
respect to the other, U.S. Steel challenges his finding of a
violation.

  Following the receipt of the transcript, counsels submitted

helpful briefs.

                       DOCKET NO. LAKE 92-247-RM

                  ORDER/CITATION NO. 4097164, 2/25/92

Order/Citation No. 4097164 charges as follows:

                        Coarse Crusher - Step 2

        The power was "on", and the step 2 primary
        crusher hatches were not blocked against
        inadvertent motions. One employee had been
        working below the unsecured hatches,
        suspended in a work basket (with two anchor
        points), and hoisted through the hatches
        utilizing a 15-ton capacity P&H bridge type
        crane. All work at the No. 2 Course Crusher
        shall be halted until persons are protected
        from hazardous motion.

1
Due to an industrial accident in the area, the hearing had to be
suddenly and unexpectedly adjourned and reconvened at a location outside the
city. Had it not been for the diligence and cooperation of all involved --
counsels, the representative of miners, the witnesses, and the reporter --
this would not have been possible and the hearing would not have been
completed within the time originally allotted.

Resp.'s Exh. 1. The order/citation further alleges that the condition
constituted an S&S violation on 30 C.F.R. § 56.14105.(Footnote 2)

                       THE SECRETARY'S WITNESSES

                            Arthur Toscano

  Arthur J. Toscano, a metal and nonmetal Mine Safety and Health ("MSHA")

inspector since 1975, stated that on February 25, 1992, he went to the Minntac
Plant to conduct an inspection as part of an ongoing inspection by MSHA of the
entire facility. The inspection was in the morning, and during the inspection
Toscano was accompanied by miners' representative Tim Kangas and by U.S. Steel
safety engineer Robert Tomassoni. Tr. 15-16.

  Toscano arrived at the mine at approximately 8:00 a.m. Following an

opening conference with Kangas and Tomassoni, during which the group discussed
what they would do during the course of the day, the inspection party drove to
the crusher building. While on their way to the crusher site, Toscano
testified that he advised Tomassoni that he, Toscano, had received an MSHA
policy memorandum dealing with the hoisting of men in work baskets and that
"if [he] saw a man in a basket that didn't meet MSHA's requirements, that [he]
would issue a citation." Tr. 18.

  The inspection party arrived at the crusher building at approximately

9:40 a.m. As they entered the building Toscano observed David Tacchio, a
certified electrician, suspended in a work basket. Tr. 19, 72-73. The basket
was hanging from an overhead traveling bridge-type crane. According to
Toscano, Tomassoni asked if Toscano wanted to inspect the basket and Toscano
said that he did. Tr. 19. Tomassoni shouting instructions to the crane
operator who brought the work basket to the plant floor. Id. Toscano
testified that at this time his sole concern was with the nature of the
basket's cable connections. Tr. 42.

  Toscano testified that Tocchio unhooked his safety line and left the

basket. Tr. 44. Toscano was sure that while Tocchio was in the basket he had
on all of his personal safety equipment, including a safety belt and line.
Tr. 44. However, because the basket had two cable connections rather than
four, Toscano told Tomassoni that he would issue a citation for a violation.
He


2
Section 56.14105 requires in pertinent part that:

              Repairs or maintenance of machinery or
              equipment shall be performed only after
              the power is off and the machinery or
              equipment has been blocked against
              hazardous motion.

stated that he understood the MSHA policy memorandum and an applicable
mandatory safety standard (he did not specify which) to require four
connections. Tr. 20.(Footnote 3)

  Toscano then spoke with Tocchio and the crane operator about their

training and the job they were about to do. They explained to Toscano that
they were in the process of preparing the crusher for some electrical repair
work. Tocchio also stated that prior to Toscano arriving that morning, he
already had done some preliminary work inside the crusher. Tr. 23, see also
Tr. 26.

  Toscano testified that as he looked over the railing into the crusher he

noticed that two doors covering the crusher
(the "hatch doors") were open. (They were in a vertical position rather than
lying in a horizontal position across the crusher opening. Tr. 21.) The
hatch doors were constructed of steel plate, were approximately 12 feet by 15
feet in size and weighed several tons each. Tr. 27, 29. Toscano stated that
when closed, the doors fitted together tightly.

  Toscano also stated that the doors were opened and closed by an electric

winch that let out and retrieved wire ropes attached to the doors by eyelets.
Tr.28. The purpose of the doors was to keep dust and noise from reaching the
upper floors of the crusher building. Tr. 55.

  Upon further investigation Toscano discovered that the doors were not

de-energized or physically blocked against unintentional motion.(Footnote 4)
Tr. 25-26. Toscano stated, "the electrical control circuit was in the on or
energized position and there was no physical means of blocking those vertical
hatch doors from unintentionally being lowered in the work area." Id. To
physically block the hatch doors, U.S. Steel personnel usually pinned each
door with a steel bar. The bar kept the doors in an upright position if the
cables were activated for some reason or if they failed.

  Toscano did not know why the bars were missing.

Tr. 26-27. He feared that if someone were purposefully or accidentally to
activate the winch's start/stop buttons (and Toscano stated that he noticed
miners work gloves, a broom and other materials used by miners within inches
of the start/stop


3
The following day Toscano spoke with his supervisor and was advised that
two connections were acceptable to MSHA. Toscano told Tomassoni about the
error and did not issue a citation for two cable connections.
Tr. 20-21.


4
However, Toscano determined that the crusher was locked out and that
everything else that should have been blocked against motion was blocked. Tr.
42.

buttons) nothing would have prevented the hatch doors from moving down into a
closed position. Tr. 29. Toscano agreed, however, that the start/stop
buttons were probably spring loaded and that if they were working properly
they would only have activated the winch so long as whatever contacted them
remained in touch to keep them engaged. Toscano was asked whether the buttons
could have stuck and he stated that if they were just touched they probably
would not have stuck. They would have had to be "smashed." Tr. 50. He also
stated that he had not inspected the buttons. Id., 67.

  Toscano believed that he advised Tomassoni that he was issuing a

imminent danger order of withdrawal and that there would be no work done in
the area until the doors were de-energized and until they were physically
blocked. (Toscano did not recall exactly what he told Tomassoni and the
others who were with Tomassoni when he issued the order, but whatever he said,
he did not actually write the order of withdrawal until later in the
afternoon. Id.) Tr. 46.

   Toscano testified that when he first observed Tocchio, Tocchio was

suspended about four or five feet above the floor and was being moved toward
the crusher cavity. Tr. 40-41. To reach the work area Tocchio would have had
to be lowered through the upraised, unblocked, energized hatch doors. Tr. 30,
57.

  After the order was issued, Tomassoni promptly ordered that corrective

measures be taken and the order was terminated when U.S. Steel personnel
placed steel bars through the eyelets blocking all unintentional motion on the
hatch doors and when they also de-energized and electrically locked out the
doors. Tr. 38.

  Toscano stated that after the order was issued he determined that when

preliminary work had been done on the crusher earlier in the shift, the crew
doing the work, including Tocchio had gained access to the crusher by using
man-doors at and below the floor level of the work station from which he had
observed Tocchio being lowered. Tr. 45. They had not, as first he had
supposed, gone down in the basket. To reflect the fact that the
order/citation was issued prior to Tocchio actually having been lowered past
the doors, Toscano modified the order in part as follows:

              One employee had been assigned repair work
              below the unsecured hatches and was
              observed suspended in a work basket (with
              two anchor points.) He was in the process
              of being hoisted through the opening
              created by the vertical hatches, which
              were not de-energized and were not blocked
              against

         hazardous motion, utilizing a P&H-type over-
         head crane.

Resp. Exh. 1 at 2 (emphasis in original).

Toscano described the imminent danger that he believed existed:

         [T]here was a very . . . likely occurrence
         of an energized motor being started up,
         sometimes accidentally, and beginning a
         downward motion of these doors . . . the cables [of
         the basket] could get tangled in the closing action of
         the doors, you could bounce the man around . . . If
         [the doors] made it all the way down to the closed
         position, [the doors] could . . . crimp . . . kink . .
         . or . . . cut . . . [the] wire rope[s] to drop the
         basket with the man in it.

Tr. 29-30. Later Toscano expanded upon what he believed the imminent danger
to be:

         [T]he worst scenario in my mind would be if
         an eyelet or a connection anywhere around
         the support cables failed, it would cause
         a gravity dropping or slamming motion . . . [I]f
         someone just touched the button . . . [i]t would just
         be enough to cause high stress points on the support
         cables in an eyelet on the door and if the eyelets
         failed or the rope broke or a coupling . . . it would
         be a slam.

Tr. 59.(Footnote 5) He also stated that even though Tocchio wore a safety
line, he could have been jostled and thrown from the basket and if he did not
have the right length of line Tocchio could have fallen head first into the
crusher. Tr. 34, 59.(Footnote 6) Moreover, if either of the doors had hit the
basket, they could have crushed portions of the basket and caused a fatal
injury. Tr. 33.

  Toscano stated his understanding of the concept of imminent danger:

5
Toscano testified that he had inspected the hoisting ropes and found
nothing wrong with them. He did not inspect the electrical system that
powered the opening and closing of the hatch doors. Tr. 67.


6
Toscano stated that Tocchio's safety line was approximately three feet
long. Tr. 43. He did not recall how Tocchio had secured the line.
Tr. 44.

         [S]ection 107(a) provides for . . . [an
         inspector] to withdraw people from an area
         [in] which he feels a person could be hurt
         . . . if nothing is done and everything remains the
         same and a job is allowed to continue, [and] an
         inspector feels that there's a good likelihood that
         somebody is going to get seriously hurt and that's
         when I exercise . . . authority under section 107(a).

Tr. 32-33.

  Toscano was shown a company document entitled Safe Job Procedure. Resp.

Exh. 4.(Footnote 7) Toscano was of the opinion that it stated safety
procedures required when repair work, such as that done on February 25, was
performed on the crusher. Toscano interpreted safety procedure 7.b., which
states "[l]ock out overhead doors over crusher cavity," to mandate that the
hatch doors be de-energized. Tr. 37.

  According to Toscano, U.S. Steel's failure to de-energize the doors and

to pin them so they could not move prior to miners working on, around and
under them, in addition to creating an imminent danger, also constituted a
violation of section
56.14105. Tr. 33. With regard to the "hazardous motion" against which the
standard is to guard, Toscano stated that he had seen the doors close and he
estimated they took approximately 20 seconds for them to do so. Tr. 47. If
they struck the basket or its supporting wires they could cause serious or
even fatal injuries. Id., 38.

  He also believed it highly likely that such an accident would occur.

Because the doors were not de-energized they could start closing if the
stop/start buttons were pushed accidentally or on purpose. Tr. 29, 38. Or,
they could start down if an electric short ran through their control circuit.
Id.

                              DAVID TOCCHIO

  Tocchio testified under subpoena. He stated that on February 25, he had

been assigned to change a broken conduit underneath the crusher. Tr. 73.
When Tocchio first saw Toscano and the inspection party he was suspended in
the basket about four feet off of the floor. Tocchio explained that the
basket had to be lifted from the floor of the work station, over a


7
The document sets forth safety procedures to be followed by the
electronic repair department at the Minntac Plant. It states that it is for
the following job: "052 Crusher Mantal Position Trouble Shoot and Calibrate --
Step I & II." Resp. Exh. 4.

railing, swung out over the crusher and lowered through the hatch doors into
the crusher and that when Tomassoni stopped the procedure the basket had just
started to move toward the hatch doors. Tr. 75. Had it not been stopped, it
would have taken approximately 20 to 30 seconds for him to be lowered through
the hatch doors. Tr. 75-76.

  Once inside the crusher Tocchio would not have left the basket, but

rather would have worked from it. Tr. 77. Before Tocchio could change the
conduit he had to clean rock from the crusher. Normally, such work was done
by maintenance personnel and that was why he never had any training in safe
job procedures for being lowered into the crusher through the hatch doors.
Tr. 77.

  However, he was aware that pins were used to block the hatch doors

because he had done a job one other time requiring him to be lowered through
the doors and he had been told about the pins and had put them in place. Tr.

  1. In addition, the doors had been de-energized and locked out. Tr. 79. He
    did not know why the pins had not been installed this time, except that
    "[m]aintenance just normally did it." Tr. 82, see also Tr. 78. He did not
    check to see if the pins were in place before he got into the basket. He
    observed, "It's not a very good excuse I guess." Tr. 83.

                         U.S. STEEL'S WITNESS
    
                           ROBERT TOMASSONI
    

    Robert Tomassoni, safety engineer for U.S. Steel, was the company's sole
    witness. (Tomassoni testified that he has been the company's safety engineer
    for approximately one year.
    Tr. 144.) Tomassoni stated that upon entering the crusher building he saw
    Tocchio who was in the process of getting into he basket and was putting on
    his safety belt. Tr. 87. Tomassoni saw also that the basket only had two
    cable connections and he asked if Toscano would cite that as a violation?
    According to Tomassoni, Toscano said he would and Tomassoni immediately
    signaled for Tocchio and the basket to be returned to the work station. As
    Tomassoni remembered it, Tocchio had gotten only three or four feet above the
    floor. The basket had been ascending vertically and Tomassoni did not believe
    that it had yet moved laterally toward the crusher. Tr. 88.

    Tomassoni called his supervisor to report what had happened and when the
    call was concluded Toscano asked to see the pin locations and the electrical
    disconnect for the hoist mechanism for the doors. Tr. 90.

    After Toscano found out that the pins were not in place and the hoist
    mechanism was not de-energized or locked out, Tomassoni

was made aware that U.S. Steel would receive a citation for a violation of a
mandatory standard. He stated that he was not made aware that an imminent
danger order of withdrawal would be issued and, as best he could recall, he
did not know that an order had been issued until an hour or two after the
inspection party had observed the conditions. Tr. 93-94. In addition, even
though the order/citation on its face stated that it was terminated at 10:40
a.m., 45 minutes after it was issued, Tomassoni did not recall Toscano telling
him about the termination. Tr. 94.

  In any event, Tomassoni did not believe that the cited conditions

constituted an imminent danger. In his opinion, it was highly improbable that
"someone would . . . push the buttons or the cables would break." Tr. 95.

  Tomassoni testified that there are two spring-activated buttons for the

doors -- one to raise them and one to lower them. After the order/citation
had been issued the buttons were tested and found in good working condition.
As described by Tomassoni, the buttons have a chrome safety guard over their
tops so that they can not be activated by being leaned on or by being struck
from above. Tr. 95-96.

  Tomassoni stated that it takes thirty-one seconds to lower the doors to

a horizontal position. Tr. 96. One door lowers approximately two to three
seconds ahead of the other. If the cables attached to the doors were to
break, the doors would come down much quicker, but Tomassoni was not unaware
of any cable failures at the plant. Tr. 102-103. If Tocchio had been lowered
into the crusher, Tocchio would have been approximately fifteen feet from the
control panel for the doors. Tr. 98. Had he wanted to get the attention of
someone near the control panel he probably would have had to yell because of
the noise in the plant. Tr. 98. (Tomassoni agreed, however, if the doors had
fallen, yelling would have done no good. Tr. 103.)

  Tomassoni indicated the reason the doors were not pinned, de-energized

and locked out was because Tocchio had not made sure it was done.

                           IMMINENT DANGER

  Section 3(j) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(j), defines an imminent danger

as "the existence of any condition or practice in a coal or other mine which
could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before
such condition or practice can be abated." The Commission has noted that "the
U.S. Courts of Appeals have eschewed a narrow construction and have refused to
limit the concept of imminent danger to hazards that pose an immediate
danger." Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 11 FMSHRC 2159, 2163 (November 1989)
(citations omitted). The Commission

also has noted that the courts have held that "an imminent danger exists when
the condition or practice observed could reasonably be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm to a miner if normal mining operations were permitted
to proceed in the area before the dangerous condition is eliminated." Id.,
quoting Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Op. Appl., 491
F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1974). Finally, the Commission has adopted the
Seventh Circuit's holding that an inspector's finding of an imminent danger
must be supported "unless there is evidence that he has abused his discretion
or authority." ll FMSHRC at 2164, quoting Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd.
of Mine Op. App. 523 F.2d 25,31 (7th Cir. 1975), see also Wyoming Fuel Co., 14
FMSHRC 1282, 1291 (August 1992).

  While the inspector has considerable discretion in determining whether

an imminent danger exists, there must be some degree of imminence to support
an imminent danger finding, and the Commission also has observed that use of
the word imminent means the danger must be "ready to take place[;] near at
hand[;] impending . . . [;] hanging threateningly over one's head[;]
menacingly near." Utah Power & Light Co., 13 FMSHRC 1617, 1621 (October 1991).

  In challenging the validity of the order, U.S. Steel in essence argues

the evidence does not establish that if normal mining operations had continued
it was reasonably likely that the feared accident would have occurred. U.S.
Steel catalogues the reasons why:

        The hoist and ropes had no safety-
        related problems and the control
        buttons operated the doors properly.
        The buttons were spring-loaded and
        guarded against accidental contact.
        Tocchio was tied off . . . and could
        communicate with the other employees if a
        descending door presented a hazard.
        Barring a total failure of a cable
        (which had no observable defect),
        someone would have had to stand at the
        control panel in view of Tocchio and
        depress the button . . . to get the
        doors to a position where they could
        create a hazard. Under such circumstances
        it is inconceivable that Tocchio could
        have been killed or seriously injured
        by the conditions cited on February 25,
        1992.

U.S. Steel Br. 9.

  The Secretary counters that he need not prove that a reasonable

likelihood of an accident existed, that the test to be applied is what a
reasonable person with the experience and eduction of a qualified MSHA
inspector would consider an imminent danger. Sec. Br. 9. Here, according to
the Secretary, he has proven that the cited doors were energized and not
blocked against motion at the time Tocchio was going to be lowered through the
doors with the resulting danger of him being crushed or thrown from the
basket. Id.

  I believe U.S. Steel has the better part of the argument and that the

Secretary has not established the existence of an imminent danger. It is
undisputed that the doors were not pinned and that they were not de-energized
and locked out. Under U.S. Steel's own safe job procedures these steps
should have been taken.(Footnote 8) Tocchio testified without contradiction
that when he had done a similar job in the past, the procedures had been
implemented. Tr. 79, 82, see also Tr. 105-106. I conclude from this that
without implementation of these safety precautions, a hazard existed to miners
working in the vicinity of the doors. Indeed, common sense compels such a
conclusion. The descent of a 12 feet by 15 feet steel door or doors onto a
work basket or onto hoisting cables attached to the basket clearly would
subject any person in the basket to the danger of being jostled and thrown
from the basket if not of being crushed outright.

  Still, the existence of a hazard alone does not warrant imposition of a

withdrawal order pursuant to section 107(a). As noted above the hazard must
be imminent, that is there must be a reasonable potential to cause death or
serious harm within a short period of time, and I conclude that it is here the
Secretary's case fails.

  Toscano viewed the start up of the motor controlling the doors as "very

likely". Tr. 29. Yet, the circumstances which would have caused this to
happen were anything but. Someone would have had to purposefully activate the
button controlling the winch, a circumstance that was extremely remote since,
as U.S. Steel points out, any person standing at the button would also have a
view of a person suspended in the work basket. Or, the button would have had
to be activated accidentally by being "smashed", simply touching the button
would not have kept the doors in motion. Tr. 50. Toscano offered no
convincing


8
Tomassoni believed that pinning of the doors was all that was required
under U.S. Steel's safety procedures at the time the order was issued. He
stated "pinning the doors was satisfactory because the doors are not powered
in the down position, it's gravity controlled, gravity descent." Tr. 106.
However, Resp. Exh. R-4 indicates the power also should have been turned off
and Tocchio's testimony of his past work practice strongly suggests this was
in fact the rule.

explanation of how the button could reasonably have been expected to be struck
hard, let alone have been "smashed."

  Toscano did offer a "worse case" scenario for how the doors could have

fallen. In this version of the hazard the cables or the eyelets would have
failed. Tr. 59. Yet, once Toscano inspected the cables he found that they
were not defective and there is simply no evidence indicating that cable
failure was reasonable to anticipate. Further, Tomassoni's testimony that he
was unaware of any previous cable failures at the Minntac Plant, was not
refuted and suggests that such failures were unheard of since U.S. Steel's
safety engineer would certainly have known about them had they occurred. Tr.

  1. In addition, no testimony or documentary evidence was offered concerning
    the eyelets.

    Finally, Toscano made a passing reference to the doors starting to close
    if activated by an electric short in their control circuit. Tr. 38. However,
    no credible evidence was offered to prove that there was any reasonable
    likelihood that such a thing could occur and without the doors closing there
    could have been no reasonable expectation of serious injury or death.

    Obviously, almost anything can happen. But the fact that conditions
    create circumstances in which hazards can occur does not make them imminently
    dangerous. The Secretary must establish more than the speculative possibility
    that a miner or miners may be endangered. Because he has not done so, the
    inspector's finding of an imminent danger must be vacated.

                     VIOLATION OF SECTION 56.14105
    

    As previously noted, section 56.14105 requires that when repairs or
    maintenance are performed on machinery or equipment the machinery or equipment
    shall be blocked against hazardous motion. The doors were not pinned and, as
    Toscano testified, the motion against which pinning would have guarded was
    their downward descent. Tr. 47. The motion was hazardous because it could
    have subjected Tocchio to serious injury or even death. Tr. 33-34.

    U.S. Steel argues that this is not a violation of the cited standard
    because the crusher was the machinery being repaired, not the doors. U.S.
    Steel Br. 13-14. U.S. Steel observes that the crusher was locked out and de-
    energized. I reject this argument and find that the violation existed as
    charged. The doors, while not part of the mechanism that did the actual
    crushing of the ore at the plant, were an integral part of the crusher unit.
    They covered the crusher mechanism and, as Toscano

explained, were designed to keep the dust and noise produced by the crushing
of ore from the upper levels of the plant. Tr. 55. As part of the crusher
unit which could cause injury to mine personnel if they descended, the doors
should have been blocked against motion.

                                  S&S

  The Commission has held that a violation is "significant and

substantial" if, based on the particular facts surrounding the violation,
there exists a "reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will
result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature." Cement
Division, National Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822, 825 April 1981). In Mathies Coal
Co., 6 FMSHRC 1, 3-4 (January 1984), the Commission further explained:

        In order to establish that a violation
        of a mandatory safety standard is
        significant and substantial under
        National Gypsum, the Secretary . . . must
        prove: (1) the underlying violation of
        a mandatory safety standard; (2) a
        discrete safety hazard -- that is, a
        measure of danger to safety --
        contributed to by the violation; (3) a
        reasonable likelihood that the hazard
        contributed to will result in an injury; and
        (4) a reasonable likelihood that the injury
        in question will be of a reasonably serious
        nature.

Here I have concluded that a violation of mandatory safety standard section
56.14105 existed as charged. Moreover, the evidence establishes there was a
discrete safety hazard contributed to by the violation in that there was a
possibility, however remote, the cables or eyelets holding the doors in place
could have failed or that the buttons controlling the descent of the doors
could have been "smashed" and that the doors could have fallen endangering
anyone passing in the work basket. Moreover, any injuries a person in the
basket would have suffered from having been struck by the doors or jostled in
the basket or thrown from it reasonably could have been expected to be of a
serious nature.

  As is frequently the case when the Secretary alleges that a violation is

S&S, the question is whether the Secretary has established a reasonably
likelihood that the hazard would have resulted in an injury? In other words,
had normal mining operations continued would there have been a reasonable
likelihood of "an event in which there [would have been] an injury?" U.S.
Steel Mining Co., 6 FMSHRC 1834, 1836 (August 1984). I conclude the answer is
"no."

  As I have stated in discussing the nature of the Secretary's imminent

danger allegation, in my view the Secretary has established only an extremely
remote possibility of an injury causing event. To prove S&S he must do more.
There is no evidence regarding the likelihood of cable or eyelet failure or
the likelihood of objects smashing the start/stop buttons. (Indeed, the
testimony of Tomassoni suggests that such occurrences would be highly unusual.
Tr. 103.) Therefore, I conclude that the violation of section 56.14105 was
not S&S. Section l07(a) Order/Citation No. 4097164 must be modified to a
section 104(a) citation. The inspector's finding of an imminent danger must
be vacated and his S&S finding must be deleted.

                       DOCKET NO. LAKE 92-428-RM

                    CITATION NO. 4097166, 2/25/92

Citation No. 4097166 charges as follows:

                        Step 2 - Coarse Crusher

        An employee was observed working below
        the primary crusher dumping station. A
        readily visible warning sign or signs were
        not posted at all approaches, notifying
        persons above that work was being done
        below the open, unbarricaded dump station.
        The hazard to the employee of dumping,
        dropping or throwing material into the
        opening, would not be readily obvious to
        persons working, traveling, or cleaning-up
        at track level.

Resp. Exh. 2. The citation alleges that the conditions constituted a
violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.20011 and that the alleged violation was
S&S.(Footnote 9)

                          SECRETARY'S WITNESS

  Toscano testified that after the inspection party had completed its

observation of the area of the hatch doors, the party entered the area of the
primary dump site (also known as the lower crusher area) where the ore cars
dump into the crusher. Tr. 108. Toscano stated that from his discussion with
Tocchio, he knew that earlier in the shift Tocchio had been working in this
area. In addition, Toscano said that Tocchio told him that


9
Section 56.20011 requires in pertinent part that "[A]reas where
. . . safety hazards exist that are not immediately obvious to employees shall
be barricaded or warning signs shall be posted at all approaches."

millwrights also had worked there earlier in the shift. Tr. 110, 130, 135.
Toscano feared that given the area where Tocchio and others had been working
and where Tocchio would have been required to work had the job gone ahead as
planned, train loads of ore could have been dumped on the men or material
could have been thrown down upon them because they could not have been seen
from the dumping area above.

  Toscano observed that there were no signs posted to warn anyone on the

upper level that persons were working below.
Tr. 109. Nor were there any barricades. Tr. 113. When asked what
constituted the violation Toscano replied:

        The violation would be . . . the failure
        to post at all approaches an appropriate
        sign describing what protective action
        would be needed. [T]he person who
        would be protected would be for instance
         . . . Tocchio or any other persons working
        below . . . the main dumping station. The
        person who would not know . . . Tocchio [was]
        there is the person who would have to be
        able to see the sign if he was traveling
        or working or walking through the area.

Tr. 110. Although Toscano did not see anyone working in the area that he
believed should have been posted, he thought that he recalled having seen
miners walking through it. Tr. 110-111.

  The standard requires where there is not an immediately obvious health

or safety hazard existing, the area should be posted or barricaded. Toscano
explained that under normal operating procedures, a locomotive would pull ore
cars into the dumping station. The cars would be grabbed by a rock dumping
mechanism, be rotated and they would each in sequence dump up to 100 tons of
ore into the hopper feeding the crusher. The ore would fall 20 to 25 feet to
the lower level where Tocchio had been. Tr. 111-112.

  Not only would the dumping of the cars endanger anyone working below,

but, in Toscano's opinion, it would not be unusual for a miner walking the
track to pick up spillage from the cars and "throw it where it [was] going to
go anyhow." Tr. 113.

  Toscano admitted however that should material fall from above, anyone in

the basket would have been provided some protection in that the basket was
enclosed on three sides to waist height. Also, the person would have been
afforded protection by the basket's overhead canopy. Tr. 123. In addition, a
"safety tub" could be lowered around the basket and the tub would have
provided additional protection. Tr. 125-127.

  Toscano recognized that there were safety lights outside the crusher

building that were used to signal the train operator not to enter and dump.
Tr. 129-130. There was also a warning light inside that Toscano believed a
train operator could probably see. Tr. 136. All rail traffic was controlled
by computer from a building separate from the crusher building. Tr. 137.

  Toscano stated that he believed it was reasonably likely for someone who

was not aware of miners working below to throw something down to the lower
level. Tr. 114. He also stated that he knew of an incident in 1977 in which
a miner was fatally injured by having rock dumped on him while working in the
hopper unbeknownst to the person who dumped the rock. Tr. 114-115.
Nonetheless, he agreed that when he observed the pertinent area on February
25, it was clean and there were no ore cars present nor other equipment
present (such as a backhoe) capable of dumping material into the crusher. Tr.

  1. Moreover, the doors to the crusher building were closed and Toscano
    stated that ordinarily he would not expect a locomotive to pull loaded cars
    into the building under those circumstances. Tr. 118-119.

    Finally, Toscano stated that the violation was timely abated when the
    company provided readily visible signs reading "danger, men working below."
    Tr. 118, 147.

                         U.S. STEEL'S WITNESS
    

    Tomassoni described the system of rail traffic control at the crusher
    building. He stated that inside the building there were warning lights at the
    crusher dump station and also at the site where the train dumped its load.
    When the lights were "on", they indicate that there is to be "no dumping."
    Tr. 139. However, he agreed that the placement of the inside lights was such
    that anyone using an end-loader or moving materials by hand would have had his
    back to the lights. Tr. 144.

    With regard to the outside lights Tomassoni's testimony was
    conflicting -- although he stated he believed a red light outside on the
    building indicated "no dumping," he also testified, "We do not look at the
    outside lights on the building." Id. However, he added that he was unaware of
    any instances in which loads had been dumped even though the red lights were
    on. Tr. 144. He also acknowledged that lights burn out and that burned out
    lights were a problem at the plant. Tr. 145.

    Tomassoni did not consider the lack of signs a violation of the cited
    standard, because the people working in the crusher building were a small,
    closely knit group and their jobs were coordinated. Further, the area had been
    cleaned and Tocchio was "well protected" while in the basket. Tr. 141.
    Moreover, in his opinion, the basket could have been observed from the track
    level. Tr. 142.

                         STEELWORKERS' WITNESS
    

    Timothy Kangas testified on behalf of the Steelworkers. Kangas, a
    millwright at Minntac, is also the acting co-chairman of the union safety
    committee. He testified that in 1989, he monitored an investigation of an
    incident when a train pulled into the dump area against a red light and
    directly over an electrician working from a work basket. Tr. 148-149.

                     VIOLATION OF SECTION 56.20011
    

    U.S. Steel observes that the standard does not require warning signs in
    all areas where work is being performed, but only in areas where safety
    hazards exist that are not immediately obvious to employees and it argues, in
    effect, that at the time the citation was issued, its employees were aware of
    the potential hazard to Tocchio. "The employees in the area, i.e., the crane
    operator, electrician, and attendant, were there to assist Tocchio; it is
    unreasonable to believe that they would drop material on him." U.S. Steel Br.
    15.

    I conclude otherwise. While I accept the testimony of Tomassoni that
    those working in the crusher building were a closely-knit group who knew one
    another's job assignments, it seems to me that the purpose of the standard is
    to remind such personnel that one or more of their number who is not always
    readily observable is in a potentially hazardous area -- people do afterall
    forget -- as well as to advise other miners coming into the area of the
    situation existing therein.

    Here the presence of miners working below was not immediately obvious.
    The basket may well have been observable from the track area if one looked,
    but it would have been suspended below the track level and one would have had
    to look. Also, any miners working below and not in the basket would have been
    even less obvious.

    Further, there was a potential for injury. Trains could have entered
    the building and dumped while Tocchio was suspended or others were working
    below. Even though the doors to the buildings were closed, even though there
    were warning lights in existence, even though, as discussed infra, Toscano
    later accepted U.S. Steel's explanation that when he cited the violation the
    switching system for the rail line to the crusher was in such a position that
    trains were shunted away from the building, all such added protective features
    could have failed. Thus, Tocchio and any other of his colleagues working on
    the crusher were in a hazardous position and warning signs should have been
    posted. I conclude, therefore, that in failing to post

the warning signs or to barricade the area U.S. Steel violated section
56.20001.(Footnote 10)

                                  S&S

  The violation existed as charged. As I have stated in finding that the

violation existed, the warning signs would have served as an ever-present
reminder to others that a miner or miners, who were not immediately obvious,
were at work in a potentially hazardous area. They would have jogged the
memory of not only those on the section who were aware of the presence of such
miners but also they would have advised newcomers of the miners' situation.
Thus, they would have protected miners from what was in fact a discrete safety
hazard, the potential of having material dumped or thrown down upon them.
Obviously, if such had happened, any miner struck would have been lucky to
have escaped with only serious injuries.

  As with consideration of the S&S nature of the previous violation, the

critical question is whether the Secretary has established a reasonable
likelihood of an event in which there would have been an injury had normal
mining operations continued? Again I conclude that the answer is "no."

  Continued normal mining operations did not mean the usual movement of

trains to the crusher but rather the repair of the crusher. That was the work
being undertaken in the crusher building on February 25. When the work was
completed, trains would again purposefully enter the building to discharge
their loads. However, by that time, the crusher would have been repaired and
Tocchio and any others working on it would have left.

  Thus, under normal mining operations Tocchio or others repairing the

crusher would have been subjected to the likelihood of injury from the dumping
of ore only if trains entered the crusher building in spite of the protection
afforded by the building's closed doors, warning light system and, most
important, by the switches thrown to shunt trains away from the building. See
discussion, infra. The chance that these precautions would have been ignored
or would have failed is, in


10
The essence of U.S. Steel's arguments that it did not violate the
standard really go to the question of how likely an accident would been under
the circumstances, a question whose answer is essential in resolving the issue
of S&S.

my opinion, remote at best.(Footnote 11) Therefore, I cannot find that on
February 25, had normal mining operations continued there would have been a
reasonable likelihood of "an event in which there [would have been] an
injury." U.S. Steel, 6 FMSHRC at 1836.(Footnote 12)

         For the foregoing reasons I conclude that the violation of section

56.20011 was not S&S. The citation must be modified to delete the inspector's
S&S finding.

                       DOCKET NO. LAKE 92-249-RM

                     CITATION NO. 4097167, 2/25/92

Citation No. 4097167 charges as follows:

                        Step 2 - Course Crusher

        An employee was observed performing work
        on the primary crusher. He was situated be-
        low the railroad track level and adjacent
        to the dump station and feeder. Although a
        red light was "on" to "block" trains
        approaching, the employee was not protected
        from moving or runaway rail equipment with
        a stop block, detailer or other stopping
        device.

Resp. Exh. 3. The citation alleges that the conditions constituted a
violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.9302.(Footnote 13) Although Toscano originally
found that the alleged violation was S&S, subsequently he modified the
citation to indicate injury was


11
The danger of a rail car discharging onto Tocchio and any others working
to repair the crusher is the "event in which there [would have been] an
injury." U.S. Steel, 6 FMSHRC at 1836. Toscano agreed that the area along the
track had been cleaned and there being nothing for backhoes to pick up, nor
any backhoes present, it seems unlikely that any danger would have come from
that source or from any miner picking up spillage and throwing it into the
crusher.


12
While I was impressed with the testimony of Kangas involving a previous
incident at the plant where a train had moved into the dumping area and was
preparing to dump not only against the lights but over an electrician in a
work basket -- the very thing Toscano feared -- there was no testimony
indicating the train also had entered in spite of the crusher building's
closed doors and because of a failed railroad switch or switches.


13
Section 56.9302 states:

              Stopblocks, derail devices, or other
              devices that protect against moving or
              runaway rail equipment shall be installed
              whenever necessary to protect persons.

unlikely and to delete the S&S designation. He based the modification upon
the fact that:

        Additional information indicated that at the
        time of this citation, [a] track switch was
        thrown to direct track movements away from the Step 2
        Crusher. The switch and . . . track were in view of
        the mine traffic controller, who had 2-way radio
        communication with mine trains.

Id. at 2.

                          SECRETARY'S WITNESS

  Toscano testified that continuing the inspection of the same general

area that Tocchio had been assigned to work, he walked up the track, in the
direction from which loaded trains would have come, and he asked if any
derailer or other device to prevent unauthorized entry of trains into the area
was present? When none was found, Toscano told Tomassoni that the company was
in violation of section 56.9302. Tr. 152-153.

  Toscano stated that Tocchio would have been exposed to any runaway train

or rail car entering the area. Toscano believed a stopblock or derailer
should have been placed far enough from the dumping area so that any runaway
would derail before it entered the area. Tr. 153. No trains were traveling
the track at the time Toscano issued the citation. Id.

  Later in the day Kangas told Toscano that he thought the company had a

safe job procedure requiring the installation of a derailer. Tr. 156.

  Approximately three or four days later Toscano stated he conferred with

Tomassoni and Kangas about the citation. Tomassoni emphasized the existence
of the warning light system used to prevent trains from entering the building
and from dumping. Also, Tomassoni showed Toscano the computerized control
center that directed rail traffic and switches at the plant. It was then
brought to Toscano's attention that on the morning of February 25, 1992, the
switching system had been activated to prevent trail traffic from entering the
building. Toscano therefore changed his assessment of the likelihood of
injury due to the violation from reasonably likely to unlikely and he deleted
the S&S finding. Tr. 156-157.

  However, Toscano did not agree with Tomassoni that the lights and the

computerized control system were the equivalent of a stopblock or a derailer
and he refused to vacate the citation. Toscano rejected Tomassoni's
connection because in his experience and for various reasons (ice, rain,
moisture), switches have been

known to fail so that the person operating the control system will think they
have been thrown when, in fact, they have not. Tr. 158. On the other hand a
stopblock or derailer "is a physical means when other systems fail to make
sure that approaching equipment does not get into a danger zone." Id.

  Toscano stated that the violation was abated when a derailer was

installed. Tr. 159-160.

                         U.S. STEEL'S WITNESS

  Tomassoni described rail traffic control at the Minntac Plant as being

under the direction of a clerk and a control supervisor. It is the control
supervisor's job to direct all rail traffic hauling ore to the crushers for
processing. Tr. 166. This is done in part through computers logging the
direction of locomotives and switches. Because information regarding all
switches that are thrown is stored in the computer's memory, Tomassoni was
able to determine that on the day the subject citation was issued switches had
been in such a position that all rail traffic would have been turned away from
the crusher building. Tr. 168. Thus, he was sure that no rail traffic had
been routed to the crusher building on February 25. Moreover, Tomassoni
stated that the control supervisor had been advised early on February 25 that
the No. 2 Crusher was "down" that day. For these reasons, Tomassoni did not
believe that U.S. Steel had violated section 56.9302. Tomassoni admitted
however that a company safe job procedure in effect when the citation was
issued required a derail device. Tr. 170, 173, see also Resp. Exh. 4 at 2.

                     VIOLATION OF SECTION 56.9302

  There is no dispute a device that could stop or derail a moving or

runaway train or rail car was not in place on the track leading to the No. 2
Crusher dump area. The question is whether, given the circumstances at issue,
such a device was, in the words of the regulation, "necessary to protect
persons?" I conclude that it was.

  As Toscano noted, Tocchio was working that day in the area of the

primary crusher. The testimony also makes clear that other miners
occasionally worked and traveled the area. These people needed protection
from moving or runaway trains or rail cars, and I agree with Toscano that the
computerized traffic control system and switch monitoring system at the plant,
while lessening the chances of miners being injured by such vehicles, did not
obviate the need to comply with the standard. Toscano put it well, the
required devices are "a . . . means when other systems fail to make sure that
approaching equipment does not get into a danger zone." Tr. 157.

  Toscano's testimony that the switches could malfunction due to ice, rain

or humidity was not refuted. Further, the warning light system, while it
hopefully would have alerted a locomotive operator not to enter the crusher
building, obviously would have had no effect on a runaway train or rail-car.
In addition, the control supervisor could have forgotten the crusher was
"down" or could have been unaware that a failed switch had not responded as
the system indicated. All of which may be why the need for such a device was
not recognized by government regulation alone but was also required by U.S.
Steel's own safety procedures, as Tomassoni candidly admitted.

  Therefore, I find that in failing to have installed a

stopblock, derail device or other device on the track leading to the No. 2
Crusher dump area, U.S. Steel violated section 56.9302.

                         FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

  Based on the forgoing it is concluded that Order/Citation No. 4097164,

2/25/92, properly sets forth a violation of section 56.14105 but fails to
validly state a condition or practice constituting an imminent danger and
fails validly to state that the violation was S&S. It also is concluded that
Citation

No. 4097166, 2/25/92, properly sets forth a violation of
section 56.20011 but fails validly to state that the violation was S&S.
Finally, it is concluded that Citation No. 4097167, 2/25/92, properly sets
forth a violation of section 56.9302.

                                   ORDER

  The findings of imminent danger and S&S made in connection with

Order/Citation No. 4097164 are VACATED. The Secretary is ordered to MODIFY
the Order/Citation to a citation issued pursuant to section 104(a) of the Act.

  Citation No. 4097166 is AFFIRMED. The S&S finding made in connection

with the citation is vacated. The Secretary is ORDERED to modify the citation
accordingly.

    Citation No. 4097167 is AFFIRMED.


                                  David F. Barbour
                                  Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Billy M. Tennant, Esq., U.S. Steel Corporation, 600 Grant Street, Room 1580,
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 (Certified Mail)

Miquel J. Carmona, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor,
230 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, Il 60604 (Certified Mail)

Mr. James Ranta, United Steelworkers of America, Local 1938, 307 First Street,
North, Virginia, MN 55792 (Certified Mail)

/epy

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