Ravenna Gravel
Ravenna Gravel (FMSHRC LAKE 90-l27-M): Late request to reopen final order denied
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This is citable Commission precedent from 1992, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Ravenna Gravel failed to answer a civil penalty proceeding, and the chief administrative law judge entered a default decision. The decision became final after Ravenna did not seek discretionary review within the statutory period. More than a year later, Ravenna asked for relief, explaining that it had paid a related individual penalty and did not understand that a separate company penalty remained due. The Commission denied the request because it was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which limits this type of request to no more than one year after the order.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standards: 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(i), 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B), 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1(b), 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a)
- Outcome: The Commission denied Ravenna's late request for relief from the final order.
- Key point: A Rule 60(b) request based on mistake or excusable neglect must be made within the rule's one-year limit.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
May 14, 1992
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)
v. Docket No. LAKE 90-l27-M
RAVENNA GRAVEL
BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Backley, Doyle, Holen, and Nelson, Commissioners
ORDER
BY THE COMMISSION:
Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin entered a decision on March
7, 1991, finding Ravenna Gravel ("Ravenna") in default for failing to timely
file an answer in this civil penalty proceeding arising under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988)(the "Mine Act").
Ravenna failed to file a petition for discretionary review of Judge Merlin's
decision within the 30-day period prescribed by the Mine Act, and the
Commission did not direct review on its own motion. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)
(A)(i), (B); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.70(a). Accordingly, by operation of the
statute, the judge's decision became a final decision of the Commission 40
days after its issuance, i.e., April 16, 1991. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1).
On April 27, 1992, more than one year after the judge's decision became
a final order of the Commission, the Commission received a letter dated April
l7, 1992, from Sue Ann Glovick, Ravenna's Secretary. In her letter, Ms.
Glovick explains that Ravenna paid a civil penalty assessment of $400 in
February 1991. She says that Ravenna received an additional bill for $400
and, upon inquiry, she learned that two civil penalties had been assessed as a
result of the same violative condition. One penalty had been assessed against
Ravenna as the mine operator, pursuant to section 110(a) of the Mine Act,
30 U.S.C. § 820(a), and the other had been assessed against Barry Glovick,
Ravenna's owner, pursuant to section 110(c), 30 U.S.C. § 820(c). Ravenna paid
the penalty assessed against Mr. Glovick, individually, in February 1991, but
did not pay the penalty assessed against the company. Ms. Glovick further
states that "[a]ccording to federal order 60B," Ravenna has the "right to
disagree with [the] fine." She maintains that Ravenna's "neglect is excusable
as we were unaware of the double charge."
Under these circumstances, we construe Ravenna's motion to be a request
for relief from a final Commission order. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1(b) (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure apply in absence of applicable Commission rule); Fed.
Rule Civ. P. 60 (Relief from Judgment or Order)("Rule 60"); Wadding v.
Tunnelton Mining Co., 8 FMSHRC 1142 (August 1986). A Rule 60(b) motion
based
on allegations of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ...
shall be made within a reasonable time, and ... not more than one year after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b). Ravenna's motion was filed on April 27, 1992 (see 29 C.F.R.
§ 2700.5(d)), more than one year after the judge's decision became a final
order of the Commission. The motion is untimely under Rule 60(b). See
generally Wadding, 8 FMSHRC at 1143.
In accordance with the requirements of Rule 60(b), and Commission
precedent, we are constrained to deny Ravenna's motion.
Ford B. Ford, Chairman
Richard V. Backley, Commissioner
Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner
Arlene Holen, Commissioner
L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner
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