United States Steel Corporation - Minnesota Ore Operations v. Secretary of Labor

Plain-English summary

U.S. Steel argued that a 1999 final ALJ decision involving the same Minntac Mine barred MSHA from applying the annual grounding-test standard to cables supplying portable welders. Judge David F. Barbour held that the Commission's later precedential decision in Tilden Mining controlled unless reversed, so the earlier contrary ALJ ruling could not give U.S. Steel a mine-specific exception equivalent to a variance. He denied U.S. Steel's summary-decision motion, but also denied the Secretary's cross-motion because U.S. Steel had preserved other challenges to the citation. The contest was stayed pending the Tilden appeal and/or a related penalty proceeding.

Decision snapshot

• Governing provisions: 30 C.F.R. § 56.12028; 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(c) and 815(d)
• Outcome: Both cross-motions for summary decision were denied, and the citation contest was stayed.
• Key point: A controlling Commission decision displaced a contrary earlier ALJ ruling for future purposes, but did not eliminate the operator's other preserved defenses.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

1331 PENNSYLVANIA
AVE., N.W., SUITE 520N

WASHINGTON, DC
20004-1710

TELEPHONE:
202-434-9958 / FAX: 202-434-9949

UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION – MINNESOTA ORE OPERATIONS,

Contestant,

v.

SECRETARY
OF LABOR

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH  

ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),

Respondent.

CONTEST
PROCEEDING:

Docket
No. LAKE 2016-193-RM

Citation
No. 8896708; 02/01/2016

Mine: 
Minntac Mine

Mine
ID:  21-00282

ORDER ON

CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Before:                        Judge
Barbour

This case is
before the court upon a notice of contest filed by United States Steel
Corporation – Minnesota Ore Operations (“the company”) challenging the validity
of a citation (No. 8896708) issued at its Minntac Mine, a surface iron ore
operation located in St. Louis County, Minnesota.  The citation is dated February
1, 2016, and it charges the company with a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.12028, a
mandatory safety standard for the nation’s surface metal and nonmetal mines. 
The standard requires:

Continuity
and resistance of grounding systems

shall
be tested immediately after installation,

repair
and modification; and annually thereafter.

A
record of the resistance measured during the

most
recent tests shall be made available on a

request
by the Secretary or [his inspector].

The
citation states in part:

When
requested, the . . . operator was unable

to
produce current documentation that the

annual
continuity and resistance test of [its]

portable
electric welders had been conducted.

The
continuity/ground resistance test ensures

The
portable welders are properly grounded. 

This
condition exposes the miners using the

portable
welders to burns, shock and/or

electrocution. 

Notice
of Contest, Exh. A.[1]

Shortly after
receiving the citation the company contested its validity asserting the issue
of whether section 56.12028 is applicable to the equipment in question (the
portable welders, including their power cables) previously was decided against
the Secretary and that the citation should be vacated on res judicata grounds.[2] Notice of
Contest (February 26, 2016).

The prior
decision to which the company refers is USX Corporation –Minnesota Ore
Operations, 21 FMSHRC 346 (March 1999) (ALJ), a case that arose at the
Minntac Mine and that involved the same company as the subject case, albeit
under the name of its holding company (USX Corporation).  In the decision, now
retired Commission Administrative Law Judge, T. Todd Hodgdon held that section
56.12028 does not apply to grounding conductors in trailing cables, power cords
and cords supplying power to tools and portable or mobile equipment.  Although
the Secretary of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration issued a policy
statement interpreting the standard as applicable to such cables and cords,
Judge Hodgdon, for several reasons, held that the policy statement constituted
a substantive change in section 56.12028 and that notice and comment
rulemaking, which the Secretary did not institute, was required before the
change could be implemented. 21 FMSHRC at 355.  The decision was not appealed
by the Secretary. 

Despite the lack
of an appeal, the USX case is not the end of the story regarding the
courts and section 56.12028 because in a subsequent proceeding in which an
operator contested the application of the standard to the cables and cords of
its electrical equipment and power tools, a case decided on cross motions for
summary decision, Commission Administrative Law Judge Alan Paez reached a different
conclusion. Tilden Mining Company, LC, 33 FMSHRC 876 (April 2011). 
Unlike Judge Hodgdon, Judge Paez found the Secretary’s interpretation that the
standard applied to such cables and cords to be both reasonable and entitled to
deference. 33 FMSHRC at 880-881.  Judge Paez concluded that rulemaking was not
required (33 FMSHRC at 880-883), and he therefore affirmed the contested
citations and granted the Secretary’s cross motion for summary decision. 33
FMSHRC at 885.  The matter was appealed to the Commission, which affirmed Judge
Paez in all respects. 36 FMSHRC 1965 (Aug. 2014).  The Commission’s decision
then was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which has yet to rule. D.C. Cir. 14-1170 (2014).

In the case
before the court, U.S. Steel asserts the primacy of the USX decision and
seeks to foreclose re-litigation of an issue it contends was tried and decided
as to U.S. Steel and its mine in a final judgment on the merits, a judgement
that involved the same parties as the subject case.  The company argues that
the “issue of the applicability of the standard is a matter of res judicata between
the parties and that the issuance of the [c]itation is improper and
illegal.” Company’s Mot. For Sum. Dec. 2. 

The doctrine of res
judicata encompasses limits on both the claims and the issues that may be
raised in subsequent proceedings, and the company essentially contends that
both forms of preclusion apply in this case. Id.3-7.  The Secretary
asserts they do not, and the parties argue at length about it. See
Company’s Mot. for Sum. Dec.; Company’s Mem. of Law In Support of Mot. for Sum.
Dec.; Company’s Reply Br.; Sec.’s Response to [Co.’s] Mot.for Sum. Dec. and
Sec.’s Cross Mot. for Sum. Dec.  While the court appreciates the parties’
efforts, it concludes that a more fundamental concept compels the court to
short circuit the issue of preclusion and succinctly rule in the Secretary’s
favor.

RULING

Summary
judgement on behalf of the company is inappropriate because the court is
compelled to follow the Commission, which has spoken on the issue.  Unless and
until the D.C. Circuit reverses the Commission’s holding, the court must
conform to the Commission’s decision.  As the Secretary notes, “[Tilden]
is binding precedent.”[3]
Resp. to [Co.]’s Mot. For Sum. Dec. 8.  Were the court to rule in favor of the
company and follow Judge Hodgdon, the court would allow the preclusions argued
for by the company to trump res judicata, and the result would be to grant
U.S. Steel a variance from a requirement that governs all other of the nation’s
metal and nonmetal mine operators.[4]
See. Sec.’s Resp 11 (“To . . . allow [the company] to abide by the 1999
decision rather than current law would accord [the company] different treatment
from that given to other miner operators. Id.]  Section 101(c) of the
Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. §, 811(c), provides a way to obtain a variance, but the Act
does not allow an operator to end run a principal that assures even handed
uniformity in the application of the law.

For these
reasons the court holds that the cited standard applies to the cited
equipment.  Therefore, the company’s motion for summary judgement IS DENIED. 
While it is clear from the record that the company did not annually test the
grounding systems for its electric welders and hence did not (and indeed, could
not) produce documentation that the annual tests were conducted, the company
asserts this proceeding should continue so there can be “a full record
surrounding the issuance of the [c]itation.” Company’s Rep. Br. 10.  In arguing
for further proceedings, the company is not taking a new position.  In its
notice of contest the company raised reasons other than res judicata as
to why the contested citation is invalid. Notice of Contest 2 at 3 (a) – 3(c). 
The company is entitled to prove these reasons.  Accordingly, the Secretary’s
cross motion also IS DENIED.  This proceeding IS STAYED
pending a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Tilden and/or the assessment of a proposed civil
penalty for the violation alleged in Citation No. 8896708 followed by the
subsequent filing of a civil penalty petition by the Secretary.

/s/ David F.
Barbour

David
F. Barbour

Administrative
Law Judge

Distribution: 
(1st Class U.S. Mail)

Barbara
M. Villalobos, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 230 S.
Dearborn St., 8th Flr., Chicago, IL     60604

R.
Henry Moore, Esq.; Arthur M. Wolfson, Esq.; Patrick W. Dennison, Esq.; Jessica
M. Jurasko, Esq., Jackson Kelly, PLLC, Three Gateway Center, 401 Liberty Ave,
Suite 1500, Pittsburgh, PA     15222

/db

[1]  The citation also contains findings
that the cited condition was unlikely to cause a fatal injury and was the
result of the company’s low negligence. Notice of Contest, Exh. A.

[2]  Although Citation No. 8896708
refers to a failure to document resistance testing of portable welders, it is
clear that the citation was issued for a failure to test the power cables or
cords supplying power to the welders.  The court reaches this conclusion
because the parties essentially agree that the issue before the court is the
applicability of section 56.12028 to cords supplying power to the welders. See,
Secretary’s Response 13; Company’s Reply Br. 3

[3]  Moreover, and again as the
Secretary points out, Tilden represents a change in controlling legal
principles and therefore cautions against the application of res judicata. “[A]
subsequent modification in controlling legal principles . . . may make [a]
prior determination obsolete for future purposes.” Sec.’s Resp. to Contestant’s
Mot. For Sum. Dec. 11 (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
598-599 (1948).

[4]  The company and the court
clearly hold opposite views as to whether the Commission’s decision in Tilden
is controlling.  As stated, the Secretary and the court believe a Commission
decision must be followed until it is reversed or otherwise nullified and that
carving out exceptions based on a prior contrary decision is not allowed.  The
company finds this belief to be “without merit.” Company’s Reply Br.3 n. 3.