Stansley Mineral Resources, Inc.
Stansley Mineral Resources, Inc. (FMSHRC LAKE 2011-693-M): Penalty raised to statutory $2,000 minimum
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Plain-English summary
Stansley Mineral Resources admitted a machine-guarding violation, and the administrative law judge found it significant and substantial and caused by unwarrantable failure. The judge considered the statutory penalty factors but reduced the Secretary's proposed $2,000 penalty to $1,000 because of the operator's size, history, and good-faith abatement. The Commission held that judges retain broad penalty discretion but cannot go below the Mine Act's express minimum for a section 104(d)(1) citation. It vacated the $1,000 assessment and imposed the required $2,000 penalty.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standard: 30 C.F.R. § 56.14107(a)
- Outcome: The penalty was increased from $1,000 to the statutory minimum of $2,000.
- Key point: The six penalty factors do not authorize a judge to assess less than the Mine Act's mandatory minimum for a section 104(d) citation or order.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, SUITE 520N
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-1710
May 9, 2013
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)
v.
STANSLEY MINERAL RESOURCES, INC.
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Docket No. LAKE 2011-693-M
BEFORE: Jordan, Chairman; Young and Nakamura, Commissioners
DECISION
BY THE COMMISSION:
This proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §
801 et seq. (2006) (“Mine Act” or “Act”). The Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health
Administration (“MSHA”) issued a citation to Stansley Mineral Resources, Inc. (“Stansley”)
pursuant to section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Administrative Law Judge
David F. Barbour assessed a penalty of $1,000 for the violation. 34 FMSHRC 1500, 1510 (June
2012) (ALJ).
The Commission granted the Secretary of Labor’s petition for discretionary review. For the
following reasons, we vacate the judge’s penalty assessment and impose the $2,000 minimum
penalty required by the Mine Act.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Stansley owns and operates a sand and gravel processing facility in Tecumseh, Michigan.
Id. at 1500. On November 8, 2010, MSHA issued Citation No. 6504341, alleging that Stansley
violated 30 C.F.R. § 56.14107(a),
that the violation was a significant and substantial (“S&S”)
contribution to a mine safety hazard, and that it was caused by Stansley’s unwarrantable failure to
comply with the standard.
Id. The Secretary proposed a penalty of $2,000. Id. Stansley admitted
that it violated section 56.14107(a), but disputed the S&S and unwarrantable designations. Id. at
1505.
The judge found that the violation was S&S and the result of Stansley’s unwarrantable
failure. Id. at 1506-07. The judge identified the third issue in dispute as the “amount of the civil
penalty that must be assessed for the violation, taking into consideration the civil penalty criteria set
forth in section 110(i) of the Act.” Id. at 1505. The judge analyzed the six statutory criteria as they
applied to this case and concluded that the penalty of $2,000 proposed by the Secretary was
excessive in view of Stansley’s small violation history, small size, and good faith abatement of the
violation in a timely manner. Id. at 1510. As a result, the judge assessed a penalty of $1,000. Id.
II.
Disposition
Section 110(i) of the Mine Act grants the Commission “authority to assess all civil penalties
provided [under the Act].” It further directs that the Commission, in determining penalty amounts,
shall consider:
the operator’s history of previous violations, the appropriateness of
such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged,
whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator’s
ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the
demonstrated good faith of the person charged in attempting to
achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation.
30 U.S.C. § 820(i). The penalty assessment for a particular violation is within the sound discretion
of the administrative law judge so long as the six statutory criteria are given due consideration.
Sellersburg Stone Co. v. FMSHRC, 736 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1984); Mize Granite Quarries,
Inc., 34 FMSHRC 1760, 1764 (Aug. 2012); Cantera Green, 22 FMSHRC 616, 620 (May 2000).
In 2006, Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act
(“MINER Act”). Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (2006). Among other things, the MINER
Act amended section 110(a) of the Mine Act, by adding the following provisions:
(3)(A) The minimum penalty for any citation or order issued under
section 104(d)(1) shall be $2,000.
(B) The minimum penalty for any order issued under section
104(d)(2) shall be $4,000.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent an
operator from obtaining a review, in accordance with section 106, of
an order imposing a penalty described in this subsection. If a court,
in making such review, sustains the order, the court shall apply at
least the minimum penalties required under this subsection.
30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(3) - (4) (emphasis added). Prior to this amendment, the Act had not specified a
minimum penalty for section 104(d) citations or orders.
The Secretary argues that the judge erred in this case by assessing a penalty below the
statutory minimum for a violation resulting in a section 104(d)(1) citation. He maintains that,
pursuant to section 110(a)(3)(A) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(3)(A), the judge cannot assess a
penalty for such a violation below the statutorily mandated minimum of $2,000.
In this case, the judge resolved all competing claims and determined that Stansley’s violation
rose to the level of a section 104(d)(1) citation under the Mine Act. 34 FMSHRC at 1505-09. The
judge fully explained how his findings contributed to his penalty assessment, giving each of the six
statutory criteria in section 110(i) due consideration, and explaining his deviation from the
Secretary’s proposed penalty. Id. at 1510; see, e.g., Sellersburg Stone Co., 5 FMSHRC 287,
293 (Mar. 1983); Hubb Corp., 22 FMSHRC 606, 612 (May 2000); Cantera Green, 22 FMSHRC
at 620-23 (citations omitted). However, although the judge properly applied the statutory criteria in
section 110(i), he did not additionally address the language of section 110(a)(3)(A).
The issue before us is whether the Commission and its judges are strictly bound by the
minimum penalty assessment provisions of section 110(a)(3) and whether those provisions can be
reconciled with the broad discretion granted to the Commission in section 110(i). We conclude that
the language of section 110(a)(3) is clear, and that it is consistent with the penalty assessment
provisions in section 110(i).
Read together, the two subsections do confer broad discretionary
authority upon the Commission and its judges to apply the criteria in section 110(i), but require that
no penalty for a section 104(d) citation or order may be assessed at less than the statutory minimums
in section 110(a)(3). This reading comports with a “fundamental rule of construction . . . that
effect must be given to every part of a statute . . . so that no part will be meaningless.” Daanen &
Janssen, Inc., 20 FMSHRC 189, 194 (Mar. 1998) (citing Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 454 (3d
Cir. 1994)).
Our conclusion that Congress intended that the Commission adhere to the minimum penalty
assessment amounts in section 110(a)(3) is further confirmed by section 110(a)(4) of the Act, 30
U.S.C. § 820(a)(4), which dictates that courts of appeals, in reviewing Commission decisions
pursuant to section 106, 30 U.S.C. § 816, “shall apply at least the minimum penalties required
under this subsection.” Accordingly, a court of appeals would be required to reverse any final
Commission decision imposing a penalty less than the relevant minimum amount in section
110(a)(3).
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the judge erred by assessing a penalty of less
than $2,000 for a violation under section 104(d)(1), in conflict with section 110(a)(3)(A) of the
Mine Act. We therefore vacate the judge’s penalty assessment. Finding no fault otherwise in the
reasoning underlying his assessment, we impose the $2,000 minimum penalty required by the Mine
Act.
/s/ Mary Lu Jordan
Mary Lu Jordan, Chairman
/s/Michael G. Young
Michael G. Young, Commissioner
/s/ Patrick K. Nakamura
Patrick K. Nakamura, Commissioner
Distribution:
Brian B. Barger
Brady, Coyle & Schmidt, Ltd.
4052 Holland-Sylvania Rd.
Toledo, OH 63623
Matthew Ross, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
1100 Wilson Blvd., 22nd Floor West
Arlington, VA 22209-2247
W. Christian Schumann, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
1100 Wilson Blvd., Room 2220
Arlington, VA 22209-2296
Melanie Garris
Office of Civil Penalty Compliance
MSHA
U.S. Dept. of Labor
1100 Wilson Blvd., 25th Floor
Arlington, VA 22209-3939
Administrative Law Judge David F. Barbour
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
Office of Administrative Law Judges
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Suite 520N
Washington, D.C. 20004
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