FMSHRC Commission decision Docket KENT 91-1084 Decided June 23, 1992 Remanded

Secretary of Labor v. Gatliff Coal Company, Inc.

Secretary of Labor v. Gatliff Coal Company, Inc. (FMSHRC KENT 91-1084): Default order vacated and case remanded

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Currency note: this decision dates from 1992
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
This is a decision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the highest level of agency review, citable as Commission precedent. It may have been appealed to a U.S. Court of Appeals after issuance under 30 U.S.C. § 816; check subsequent history before relying on it. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
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Plain-English summary

Gatliff Coal failed to answer the Secretary of Labor's civil penalty proposal and a judge's show-cause order, so the ALJ entered a default order assessing the proposed $2,400 penalty. Gatliff told the Commission that clerical errors caused its answer to be filed in another proceeding and asked for discretionary review. The Commission found that Gatliff might have an excusable reason for the default, vacated the default order, and remanded the case so the judge could decide whether relief from default was warranted.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standards: None stated in the order.
  • Outcome: The default order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
  • Key point: A party may receive an opportunity to seek relief from default when inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect may explain its failure to respond.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
MSHA V. GATLIFF COAL
DDATE:
19920623
TTEXT:
~1013
June 23, 1992
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v. Docket No. KENT 91-1084

GATLIFF COAL COMPANY, INC.

BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Backley, Doyle, Holen and Nelson, Commissioners
ORDER
BY THE COMMISSION:
This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. • 801 et seq. (1988). On May 20, 1992,
Commission Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order of
Default finding respondent Gatliff Coal Company, Inc. ("Gatliff") in default
for failure to answer the Secretary of Labor's civil penalty proposal and the
judge's order to show cause. The judge assessed the civil penalty of $2,400
proposed by the Secretary. Gatliff filed a petition for discretionary review
on June 12, 1992, requesting that this matter be reviewed, on the grounds that
it mistakenly believed that it had filed its answer in this proceeding but, in
fact, its answer was filed in another Commission proceeding due to clerical
errors. We grant the petition for discretionary review of the judge's default
order and remand this matter to the judge for further proceedings.
It appears from the record that Gatliff may have an excusable reason for
its failure to respond to the judge's show cause order. See Hickory Coal
Company, 12 FMSHRC 1201 (June 1990). Under the standards set forth in Fed.
R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1), the Commission has afforded relief from default upon a
showing of inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect. E.g., Amber Coal Co.,
11 FMSHRC 131, 132 (February 1989).
We are unable on the basis of the present record to evaluate the merits
of Gatliff's position but, in the interest of justice, we will permit Gatliff
the opportunity to present its position to the judge, who shall determine
whether final relief from the default order is warranted. See, e.g., Kelley
Trucking Co., 8 FMSHRC 1867 (December 1986).
~1014


Page 2

Accordingly, we vacate the judge's default order and remand this matter
for further proceedings.
Ford B. Ford, Chairman
Richard V. Backley, Commissioner
Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner
Arlene Holen, Commissioner
L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner

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