Secretary of Labor on behalf of Jeromy Coots v. Lone Mountain Processing, Inc.

Plain-English summary

Jeromy Coots alleged that Lone Mountain directed him to replace dislodged roof bolts in a 12-foot-high rehabilitation area without using an automated temporary roof-support system because setting it up took too long. He continued raising the issue, was struck and injured by falling material, and again raised the concern at a safety meeting. According to MSHA's investigator, management sent him home after that meeting and fired him the next day. Lone Mountain withdrew its request for a temporary-reinstatement hearing. Judge Janet G. Harner found the complaint was not frivolously brought and ordered Coots immediately returned to his former job with his former pay, overtime, and benefits pending final disposition.

Decision snapshot

• Governing authority: 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45
• Outcome: The hearing request was withdrawn, and Coots was temporarily reinstated with his former compensation and benefits.
• Key point: When an operator does not pursue a hearing, temporary reinstatement follows if the Secretary's application shows a discrimination complaint that appears to have merit.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

7 PARKWAY CENTER,
SUITE 290

875 GREENTREE ROAD

PITTSBURGH, PA 15220

TELEPHONE: 412-920-7240
/ FAX: 412-928-8689

July 18, 2014

SECRETARY
OF LABOR

MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH   

ADMINISTRATION
(MSHA),

on
behalf of JEROMY COOTS,

Complainant

v.

LONE
MOUNTAIN PROCESSING, INC.,

Respondent

CIVIL
PENALTY PROCEEDING

Docket
No. KENT 2014-609-D

Case
No. BARB-CD 2014-05

Mine
ID: 15-18647

Mine:
Clover Fork No. 1

ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW

REQUEST FOR
HEARING AND

ORDER GRANTING
TEMPORARY REINSTATEMENT

OF JEROMY COOTS

Before:
Judge Harner

Pursuant
to section 105 (c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 801, et.
seq., and 29 C.F.R. §2700.45, the
Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) on July 2,
2104, filed an Application for Temporary Reinstatement of miner Jeromy Coots (“Complainant”)
to his former position with Lone Mountain Processing, Inc. (“Respondent”) at the Clover
Fork No. 1 Mine pending final hearing and disposition of the case.

The
case was assigned to me on July 7, 2014, and Respondent filed its timely
Request for Hearing on July 9, 2014. Following conference calls with the
parties, Respondent later filed its Motion to Withdraw Request for Hearing on
July 17, 2014. For the following reasons, the temporary reinstatement of Jeromy
Coots is hereby GRANTED.

Section
105(c) of the Mine Act prohibits discrimination against miners for exercising
any protected right under the Mine Act. The purpose of the protection is to
encourage miners “to play an
active part in the enforcement of the [Mine Act]” recognizing that, “if miners are to
be encouraged to be active in matters of safety and health, they must be
protected against any possible discrimination which they might suffer as a
result of their participation.” S. Rep. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
35 (1977), reprinted in Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Human
Resources, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Legislative History
of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, at 623 (1978).

The
Commission’s regulations control the temporary reinstatement procedures. Once
an application for temporary reinstatement is served on the person against whom
relief is sought, that person shall notify the Chief Administrative Law Judge
or his designee within 10 calendar days whether a hearing on the application is
requested. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45(b). If no hearing is requested,[1]
the Judge assigned to the matter shall review immediately the Secretary’s
application and, if based on the contents thereof the Judge determines that the
miner’s complaint was not frivolously brought, s[he] shall issue immediately a
written order of temporary reinstatement. Id.

In
adopting section 105(c) of the Act, Congress indicated that a complaint is not
frivolously brought if it “appears to have merit.” S. Rep. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36-37 (1977), reprinted in Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Committee
on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 2nd Sess., Legislative History of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, at 624-25 (1978). In addition to
Congress’ “appears to have
merit” standard, the
Commission and the courts have also equated “not frivolously brought” to “reasonable cause
to believe” and “not
insubstantial.” Sec'y of Labor
on behalf of Price v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 9 FMSHRC 1305, 1306 (Aug.
1987), aff'd, 920 F.2d 738, 747 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1990). The plain
language of the Act states that “if the Secretary finds that such complaint was
not frivolously brought, the Commission, on an expedited basis upon application
of the Secretary, shall order the immediate reinstatement of the miner pending
final order on the complaint.” 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). The judge must determine
whether the complaint of the miner “is supported substantial evidence and is
consistent with applicable law.”[2]
Sec’y of Labor on
behalf of Peters v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 15 FMSHRC 2425, 2426 (Dec.
1993). 

The
Declaration of Freddie Fugate was filed with the Complainant’s Application for
Temporary Reinstatement and asserts the following:

1.      Mr. Fugate is a
special investigator with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”)
and was assigned to conduct an investigation into a complaint filed by the Complainant.
Decl. 1-2.

2.      The Complainant
was employed at the Clover Fork No. 1 Mine (“Mine”) and was assigned to replace
roof bolts that had become dislodged in the rehab section of the Mine. Decl.
2a-2b.

3.      The roof of the
rehab section was 12 feet tall, and the Complainant initially used the
Automated Temporary Roof Support System (“ATRSS”) to support the roof while
roof bolting. Decl. 2b. However, the Complainant was advised after a short time
that this system could no longer be used because it took too long to set in
place. Decl. 2c.

4.      On that same
day, the Complainant inquired why the ATRSS could no longer be used, to which
he received a response from mine management that the work needed to be done
quickly. Decl. 2d.

5.      The Complainant
continued to work on the rehab section without the ATRSS for six days, but
continued to complain to mine management. Decl. 2e.

6.      The Complainant
was struck and injured by falling material, and he raised the issue of the
ATRSS at a mine safety meeting on May 12, 2014. Decl. 2f-2g.

7.      Immediately
following the meeting, the Complainant was called to the General Mine Foreman’s
office where it was explained that the ATRSS took too much time to set up, and
the work needed to be done quickly. Decl. 2h. The Complainant was then sent
home for the day. Id.

8.      On May 13, 2014,
the Complainant was fired. Decl. 2i.

Based
upon the affidavit of the special investigator and the asserted facts therein,
I find that the Secretary’s complaint is not frivolously brought. WHEREFORE,
it is hereby ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw Request for
Hearing is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Jeromy Coots be TEMPORARILY
REINSTATED to his former job at his former rate of pay, overtime and
benefits pending final order on the complaint.

/s/Janet
G. Harner

Janet
G. Harner

Administrative
Law Judge

Distribution:

Mary
Sue Taylor, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 618 Church
Street, Suite 230, Nashville, TN 37219-2456

Jeromy
Coots, P.O. Box 167, Grays Knob, KY 40829

Wes
Addington, Esq., Appalachian Citizens Law Center, 317 Main Street, Whitesburg,
KY 41858

Tony
Oppegard, Esq., P.O. Box 22446, Lexington, KY 40522

Noelle
Holladay True, Esq., Rajokovich, Williams, Kilpatrick & True, PLLC, 3151
Beaumont Centre Circle, Suite 375, Lexington, KY 40513

C
T Corporation System, 306 W. Main Street, Suite 152, Frankfurt, KY 40601

/kmb

[1] As noted, Respondent has
withdrawn its request for hearing, which was timely filed. I shall grant
Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw its hearing request and proceed as required by
29 C.F.R. § 2700.45(c).

[2] “Substantial
evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reliable mind might
accept as adequate to support [the judge’s] conclusion.” Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 11
FMSHRC 2159, 2163 (Nov. 1989) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).