Matter of Darwish (Board decision, April 4, 1973)

Matter of Darwish (BIA ID 2191, 1973): missing divorce proof defeats spouse visa petition

Decision type
Board decision
Dockets
ID 2191, A-19245744
Decided
April 4, 1973
Outcome
Affirmed
Precedential status
Citable Board precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-14
Cited standards

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This is citable Board precedent from 1973, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1973
The immigration statutes and regulations may have been amended, and later Board or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.
Final BIA decision
This published precedent is a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals on the visa petition. Under the Board's Policy Manual, Chapter 1.4(d), an order issued by the Board is final unless and until it is stayed, modified, rescinded, or overruled by the Board, the Attorney General, or a federal court, and it is effective as of its issuance date unless the order provides otherwise. This is a published precedent decision, not an unpublished party-only disposition.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official BIA release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Transcribed from a scanned original: BIA released this decision as an image-only file. The full text below is a machine transcription, proofread against the scan. Check the official release before quoting exact language.
Read the official release (justice.gov)

Plain-English summary

A lawful permanent resident sought a spouse visa preference for the woman he married in Jerusalem. He submitted a Dominican court decree divorcing his earlier wife but no proof that the Civil Registry had pronounced the decree, as Dominican law required to end the marriage. The Board held that he had not established that his earlier marriage was legally terminated. His Jerusalem marriage might be valid under Jordanian law as a plural marriage, but the Board would recognize it for immigration purposes only if he showed it was monogamous. The Board dismissed his appeal and left him free to file a new petition with the required proof.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited authorities: 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2); Dominican divorce law; Jordanian Family Rights Law, Law No. 92 of 1951, Article 10.
  • Outcome: Appeal dismissed; denial of spouse visa petition sustained without prejudice to a new petition.
  • Key point: A court divorce decree alone did not prove termination of the prior marriage under Dominican law, and a plural marriage could not be recognized for immigration purposes.

Full text (BIA official public release)

Interim Decision #2191

MATTER OF DARWISH

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-19245744

Decided by Board April 4, 1973
Under the law of the Dominican Republic, a divorce decree issued by a court of law does not suffice per se to dissolve the marriage bonds; this is accomplished by a "declaration" or pronouncement by the Official of the Civil Registry. Hence, in the absence of a showing by petitioner that his decree of divorce issued by a court in the Dominican Republic in 1971 was pronounced by the Office of Civil Registry, he has failed to establish that his prior marriage was legally terminated. Notwithstanding the subsequent marriage in Jerusalem in 1972 of petitioner and beneficiary (Muslim citizens of Jordan) may be valid under applicable Jordanian-Muslim law as a plural marriage, irrespective of whether his prior marriage was legally terminated, plural marriages offend the public policy of the United States and such subsequent marriage cannot be accorded recognition for immigration purposes in the absence of a showing that it is a monogamous marriage. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Abraham Kaufman, Esquire 521 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10017

This case comes forward on appeal from an order of the Acting Officer in Charge, Athens, Greece, dated May 31, 1972, denying the visa petition for the reason that the petitioner's previous marriage was not shown to have been terminated. We shall dismiss the appeal. The petitioner, a male lawful permanent resident alien, has applied for visa preference classification of the beneficiary as his spouse. Both are natives and citizens of Jordan. The petitioner himself obtained permanent resident status in the United States on June 30, 1971, by virtue of marriage to a permanent resident of the United States. He claims that this earlier marriage, which was to a Dominican woman, was terminated by divorce. The regulations require that a visa petition on behalf of a spouse be accompanied by proof of marriage to the beneficiary and proof of legal termination of prior marriages, 8 CFR 204.2(c)(2). A marriage certificate was submitted showing that the petitioner and the beneficiary contracted marriage in the Sheriya (Muslim 307
Interim Decision #2191
Religious) Court of Jerusalem on April 23,1972. A decree of divorce issued by a court in the Dominican Republic on November 23, 1971, was submitted as evidence of the termination of the prior marriage; no evidence has been submitted that the decree was pronounced by an official of the Civil Registry. A report prepared for us by the Library of Congress, dated January 1973, concerning this case informs us that: A divorce decree issued by a court of law of the Dominican Republic does not suffice per se to dissolve the marriage bonds. This is accomplished by a "declaration" or pronouncement by the Official of the Civil Registry that must be made together with the registration in that office of the divorce decree issued by the court. To this effect, in cases of mutual consent divorce petitions, Article 31 of the divorce law provides that:
The spouses . . . are responsible for registering the divorce decree in the Office of the Civil Registry. The decree shall be pronounced . . . no less than eight days after the decree was issued.
Furthermore, Article 19 of the divorce law states that:
The plaintiff who fails to act within the term of [eight days] shall lose the benefits granted to him by the decree thus obtained, .. .
Because no evidence has been presented by the petitioner that his divorce was pronounced (by the Office of the Civil Registry) as required by Dominican law, he has not established that the di- vorce action was completed and that the divorce took effect. Consequently, he has not established that his prior marriage was legally terminated. Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner's first marriage may not have been legally terminated, his marriage to the be- neficiary would nevertheless be a valid marriage in Jerusalem because the law there permits plural marriages. According to the report prepared for us by the Library of Congress, Israeli law controls in Jerusalem. Pursuant to Israeli law, Muslim religious courts have jurisdiction over matters of personal status of Muslims.' For citizens of Jordan, Israeli law 2 requires that the Muslim religious courts apply the law of Jordan. The petitioner and the beneficiary are Muslim citizens of Jordan. Thus, Jorda- nian law governs their marriage in Jerusalem. Article 10 of the Family Rights Law of Jordan, Law No. 92 of 1951, permits a man to have four wives. Plural marriages, however, offend the public policy of the Un- ited States, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Matter of G—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 9 (BIA, 1953). Thus, even though the petitioner's second marriage

1 Articles 51 and 52 of the Palestine (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1922-1947, still in force per Article 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1, 5708- 1948. 2 Article 52.

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Interim Decision #2191 may be valid according to Jordanian law as a plural marriage, irrespective of whether his prior marriage was legally terminated, this Board cannot accord recognition to it, unless he can show that it is a monogamous marriage. In visa petition proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of establishing eligibility for the benefit sought,Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493, 495 (BIA, 1966); Matter of Soo Hoo, 11 I. & N. Dec. 151, 152 (BIA, 1965); Matter of Yee, 11 I. & N. Dec. 27, 30 (BIA, 1964); and Matter of B —, 9 I. & N. Dec. 521, 523 (BIA, 1961). The petitioner has not met this burden. Our decision is, of course, without prejudice to submission by the petitioner of a new visa petition accompanied by the requisite proof. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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