Matter of Castillo-Godoy (Board decision, November 17, 1967)

Matter of Castillo-Godoy (BIA ID 1812, 1967): missing labor certification defeated motion to reopen

Decision type
Board decision
Dockets
ID 1812, A-14611583
Decided
November 17, 1967
Outcome
Procedural
Precedential status
Citable Board precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-14

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This is citable Board precedent from 1967, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1967
The immigration statutes and regulations may have been amended, and later Board or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.
Final BIA decision
The Board denied the motion to reopen the deportation proceeding. Under the Board's Policy Manual, Chapter 1.4(d), a Board order is final unless and until it is stayed, modified, rescinded, or overruled by the Board, the Attorney General, or a federal court.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official BIA release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Transcribed from a scanned original: BIA released this decision as an image-only file. The full text below is a machine transcription, proofread against the scan. Check the official release before quoting exact language.
Read the official release (justice.gov)

Plain-English summary

A Mexican citizen entered the United States to work after obtaining a visa through a marriage that the Board found was solely for immigration purposes. He asked the Board to reopen his deportation case after marrying the mother of his child, a U.S. citizen, arguing that he was now the parent of a U.S. citizen and eligible for relief under former INA § 241(f). The Board said that even if the new family relationship qualified, the statute required him to have been otherwise admissible when he entered, apart from visa fraud. He had needed a labor certification at entry and did not have one. The Board therefore denied the motion to reopen.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited authorities: Former INA §§ 241(a)(1), 241(f), and 212(a)(14), (19), (20).
  • Outcome: Motion to reopen denied; existing deportability ruling left in place.
  • Key point: Visa fraud relief did not cure the separate absence of a required labor certification at entry.

Full text (BIA official public release)

Interim Decision #1812

MATTER OF CASTILLO-GODOY

In Deportation Proceedings

A-14611583

Decided by Board November 17, 1967

Notwithstanding requisite family relationship, respondent, who entered the United States on the basis of a fraudulent marriage to a United States citizen and was thus exempt from the presentation of a labor certification, is statutorily ineligible for the benefits of section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, because he was inadmissible at entry under section 212(a)(14) of the Act, as amended, and, therefore, was not “otherwise admissible” at entry except for grounds arising from visa fraud or misrepresentation.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at entry: (1) Visa procured by fraud or willful misrepresentation (sec. 212(a)(19)); (2) Immigrant, no visa (sec. 212(a)(20)); (3) Entering for labor, no certification (sec. 212(a)(14)).

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
Rodolfo Victoria, Esquire
Newman and Newman
354 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90013

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Reece R. Robertson
Trial Attorney

Respondent, a 32-year-old married male, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted on February 5, 1966 upon surrender of a visa issued to him as an alien born in an independent country of the Western Hemisphere. Although coming to perform unskilled labor he was exempted from the labor certification requirement because he was married to Luna, a citizen of the United States. The marriage was not a bona fide one: respondent married solely to obtain entry under the immigration laws.

On May 29, 1967, the special inquiry officer found respondent deportable upon the grounds stated in the caption and ineligible for section 241(f) relief. Timely appeal was filed. In September the case was transcribed and submitted to the Board which on October 5, 1967

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Interim Decision #1812:

ruled that respondent was not within section 241(f) because the relationship on which he based his eligibility was to his illegitimate child.

On October 18, 1967 respondent filed a motion to reopen the hearing: to establish that respondent had obtained a final divorce from Luna on August 8, 1967, that he had married the mother of his child on August 26, 1967, that she is a United States citizen, that the marriage legitimated the child and that respondent is now a “parent” of a United States citizen for the purpose of section 241 (f).

Opposing the motion, the Service contends that even if respondent is a “parent” he is not eligible for relief under section 241(f). The Service points out the benefits of the section are available only to an alien who is admissible at the time of entry except for the fact that he secured a visa or other documentation by fraud or misrepresentation. The respondent, the Service contends, was inadmissible on a ground in addition to those arising out of the procurement of a visa by fraud—he did not have the labor certification required by section 212(a)(14) of the Act.

If the allegations of the motion are true, the respondent is the “parent” of a United States citizen child and would come within the terms of section 241(f) if he were admissible except for the fraud. However, we find that respondent was not so admissible: at the time of entry, he needed a labor certification, but he did not have one. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended section 241(f) to apply to an alien who had entered without the proper labor certification.

Since we find that respondent was otherwise inadmissible than by reason of his fraud, we do not believe that reopening would serve any purpose. The motion will therefore be denied.

ORDER: It is ordered that the motion to reopen be and the same is hereby denied.

521

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