Matter of Nodahl (Board decision, July 28, 1967)

Matter of Nodahl (BIA ID 1761, 1967): child injury conviction supported deportation

Decision type
Board decision
Dockets
ID 1761, A-12615416
Decided
July 28, 1967
Outcome
Affirmed
Precedential status
Citable Board precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-15
Cited standards

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This is citable Board precedent from 1967, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1967
The immigration statutes and regulations may have been amended, and later Board or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.
Final BIA decision
The Board dismissed the appeal and affirmed the deportation order. Under the Board's Policy Manual, Chapter 1.4(d), a Board order is final unless and until it is stayed, modified, rescinded, or overruled by the Board, the Attorney General, or a federal court.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official BIA release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Transcribed from a scanned original: BIA released this decision as an image-only file. The full text below is a machine transcription, proofread against the scan. Check the official release before quoting exact language.
Read the official release (justice.gov)

Plain-English summary

A lawful permanent resident challenged a deportation order based on her California conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a child. She argued that the offense did not necessarily involve moral turpitude because it could result from a quick temper or weak character. The Board held that the statute's requirement of cruel or inhuman injury resulting in a traumatic condition described conduct involving moral turpitude. It affirmed the deportation order and dismissed her appeal.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited authorities: INA § 241(a)(4); California Penal Code § 273(d).
  • Outcome: Deportation order affirmed; appeal dismissed.
  • Key point: A conviction under California Penal Code § 273(d) for cruel or inhuman injury to a child involved moral turpitude.

Full text (BIA official public release)

Interim Decision #1761

MATTER OF NODAHL

In Deportation Proceedings
A-12615416
Decided by Board July 28, 1967
Conviction of the offense of inflicting upon a child corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition in violation of section 273(d) of the California Penal Code is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)]—Convicted of crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry, to wit, child beating.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Howard R. Harris, Esquire
Sam I. Feldman
1019 National Avenue
Trial Attorney
National City, Calif. 92050
(Brief filed)
(Brief filed)

The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on May 18, 1967 which directs her deportation to Mexico on the charge that within five years after her entry, she was convicted of a crime involving moral tur- pitude, to wit, child beating, in violation of section 273(d) of the California Penal Code. Exceptions have been taken to the finding that the crime defined by section 273(d) of the California Penal Code involves moral turpitude. The respondent is a female married alien, 35 years of age, who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on June 14, 1961 at the port of San Ysidro, California. She was convicted in the Superior Court of the State of California on April 15, 1965 for the offense of inflicting corporal injury upon a child, in violation of sec- tion 273(d) of the California Penal Code. She was sentenced to con- finement in the California Institution for Women for a term of not more than two years as provided by the statute. It is conceded by counsel that the respondent was convicted of the offense defined by section 273(d) of the California Penal Code. Sec- tion 273(d) reads in pertinent part as follows:
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Interim Decision #1761
. . . any person who wilfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition is guilty of a felony . . . Counsel argues that section 273(d) of the California Penal Code does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Counsel maintains that the conduct of a person convicted of a violation of section 273(d) could be the result of a quickness of temper or a weakness of character and not be accompanied by a vicious and corrupted mind. The information filed against the respondent on February 24, 1965 reads in part as follows: Between the 25th day of December 1964, and the 7th day of January 1965 (the respondent) . . . did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make an assault and inflict a corporal injury upon Oscar Nodahl, then and there a minor child under the age of 21 years, to wit, of the age of 9 years, and that the said assault did result in a traumatic injury to the said Oscar Nodahl, a human being. Moral turpitude refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile or depraved and contrary to accepted rules of morality. The term “child,” as used in section 273(d) (supra) includes children of tender years, who by reason of their physical immaturity are helpless against the cruelty of their parents. The California statute by its very terms defines an assault upon a child which is “cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury” which results in a “traumatic condition.” A traumatic condition has been defined as a wound or other abnormal bodily condition resulting from the application of some external force. People v. Stewart, 188 C.A. 2, 88, 10 C.R. 217. We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that section 273(d) of the California Penal Code defines an act of baseness, vileness, or de- pravity contrary to the accepted mores of society. We affirm the order entered by the special inquiry officer and will dismiss the appeal. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

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