Genicom Corporation

Plain-English summary

Genicom Corporation manufactured computer printers and precision electronic relays at a facility in Waynesboro, Virginia, where it generated waste cyanide solutions. A pipe failure led to two off-site releases, one of 136 pounds of cyanide and another of 27.5 pounds. The Board held that Genicom had to notify the required authorities after learning of reportable releases, even without proof of off-site risk, and that the two releases were separate violations for penalty purposes. It also rejected Genicom's argument that notice to the State Water Control Board could be imputed to the Virginia Emergency Response Council because the issue was not raised below. The Board affirmed the $74,812.50 penalty.

Decision snapshot

• Cited authorities: CERCLA § 103, EPCRA § 304, 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.27(b), 22.30, 302.4, and 355.20.
• Outcome: The Presiding Officer's findings were affirmed and a total penalty of $74,812.50 was assessed.
• Key point: EPCRA reporting is triggered by knowledge of a reportable release from the facility. A separate penalty may apply to each distinct release.

Full text (EPA EAB public release)

426 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

IN THE MATTER OF GENICOM CORPORATION
EPCRA Appeal No. 92-2

FINAL DECISION

Decided December 15, 1992

Syllabus

Genicom Corporation (“Genicom”) has appealed from the assessment of a penalty
against it in the amount of $74,812.50 for violations of Section 103 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and Section 304 of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The violations arose
out of the failure of Genicom to timely notify appropriate governmental response
authorities when it discovered two releases of reportable quantities of a hazardous
substance, waste cyanide solutions, from its plating operations at Waynesboro, Vir-
ginia. Genicom asserts that the Initial Decision of the Presiding Officer from which
it appeals was in error in four respects:

(1) The application of the Agency penalty policy in this case was unduly harsh
and the penalty policy should not have formed the basis of penalties.

(2) The Presiding Officer failed to consider Genicom’s argument that EPCRA
notification was not required because there was no off-site risk.

(3) The second release should not have been considered a second violation for
penalty purposes since both releases were discovered simultaneously.

(4) Notice to the State Water Control Board could be imputed to the Virginia
Emergency Response Council and therefore there was no failure to notify the Council.

Held: The first three bases for appeal are rejected since two distinct violations
were involved, no off-site risk need be shown, and the penalty policy was applied
appropriately. The final basis is rejected because it was not raised in the proceedings
below. A penalty of $74,812.50 is therefore assessed.

Before Environmental Appeals Judges Nancy B. Firestone,
Ronald L. McCallum, and Edward E. Reich.

Opinion of the Board by Judge Reich:
Genicom Corporation (“Genicom”) has appealed the Initial Deci-

sion of the Presiding Officer, arising out of enforcement actions
brought against Genicom by U.S. EPA Region III. These enforcement

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GENICOM CORPORATION 427

actions alleged violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”). The
CERCLA and EPCRA actions were consolidated below. This appeal
is timely filed with the Board pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §22.30(a), 57
Fed. Reg. 5326 (February 13, 1992).

The enforcement actions which led to this appeal relate to re-
quirements of CERCLA (§ 1038, 42 U.S.C. §9603) and EPCRA (§ 304,
42 U.S.C. § 11004) which both require certain notifications to be given
in the event of a release of a hazardous substance in amounts exceed-
ing specified quantities. Genicom does not dispute that two releases
of hazardous substances occurred but does challenge the finding of
the EPCRA violations and the penalty assessment for all the viola-
tions. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Presiding
Officer’s findings and conclusions were well-founded and assess a
total penalty of $74,812.50.

I. BACKGROUND

Genicom is a corporation which manufactures computer printers
and precision electronic relays at its facility in Waynesboro, Virginia.
In its operations at the Waynesboro facility, it generates waste cya-
nide solutions from the plating of metal parts. The spent cyanide
solutions are pumped from the plating facility to a storage tank
at Genicom’s wastewater treatment facility through pipes contained
in an underground conduit. At the wastewater treatment plant, the
wastewaters are treated and then discharged to the South River
pursuant to the company’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit.1

Genicom has admitted that a structural failure in a pipe connect-
ing the plating plant to the wastewater treatment facility led to
releases of “substantially untreated” waste cyanide solutions to an
effluent channel which then led to the South River.2 These releases
occurred on October 11, 1990, in the amount of 136 pounds of cyanide
and October 30, 1990, in the amount of 27.5 pounds.3 These releases
occurred because the leak from the broken pipe allowed waste cyanide
solution to escape into a containment area in the wastewater treat-
ment facility, from which the solution went through a drain and

1Genicom’s Brief in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, at 2.

2This was stipulated to at the hearing (transcript (“Tr.”) at 10), and is included
in Genicom’s proposed Findings of Fact on appeal.

3Id.

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428 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

was routed through the treatment plant at a time when the plant
was not configured to treat cyanide.4 As a result, a listed hazardous
substance, cyanide, was released off-site of Genicom’s facility and
into the South River.

Genicom had its first indication of a problem when it received
on October 30 the results of a laboratory analysis of a sample of
its October 11 effluent sent off for routine analysis. The results
showed an abnormally high level of cyanide. Genicom asked the lab-
oratory to verify its results and such verification was received on
October 31. Also on October 31, Genicom personnel noted a red liquid
coming from the covered trench in the containment area. This liquid
was found to contain cyanide. After an examination of its records,
comparing what had been pumped out of the plating room and what
had been received at the wastewater treatment plant, the existence
and approximate quantities of the two releases were confirmed.

There is no dispute that the amount of the releases exceeded
the “reportable quantity” for spent cyanide plating bath solutions,
which is 10 pounds.6 In the case of CERCLA, § 103(a) requires that
as soon as any person in charge of a facility (or vessel) has knowledge
of the release of a hazardous substance in an amount equal to or
exceeding a reportable quantity, that person shall immediately notify
the National Response Center (“NRC”) of such release. In this in-
stance, Genicom notified the National Response Center at 6:00 p.m.
on October 31, 1990, of both the October 11 and October 30 releases.”

In the case of EPCRA, § 304 requires that whenever a notification
is required by §103(a) of CERCLA, the owner or operator of the
facility shall immediately give notice to “the community emergency
coordinator for the local emergency planning committees * * * for
any area likely to be affected by the release and to the State emer-
gency planning commission of any State likely to be affected by the
release.” For the Waynesboro, Virginia facility, the notice would be
required to go to the Virginia Emergency Response Council and the
Augusta County Joint Local Emergency Planning Committee. No no-

4Tr. at 65.
5Initial Decision at 6-7.

640 C.F.R. §302.4, Table 302.4 (F007 wastes) for CERCLA, and applied to EPCRA
through the definition of reportable quantity at 40 C.F.R. § 355.20. However, as dis-
cussed later in this opinion, Genicom disputes whether notification under EPCRA
was required “because there was no off-site risk to human health.” Notice of Appeal,
at 1.

7Initial Decision at 8.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 429

tice was given to either of these committees,8 although Genicom ar-
gues for the first time on appeal that its notice to the Virginia
State Water Control Board pursuant to its NPDES permit should
be imputed to the Virginia Emergency Response Council, of which
the State Water Control Board is a member, thus satisfying any
notification requirement relative to the Council. The notification to
the State Water Control Board was made at approximately 4:00 p.m.
on October 31, 1990.

In its complaints, the Region sought penalties of $99,500 for
the alleged EPCRA violations and $49,750 for the alleged CERCLA
violations. At the hearing on the consolidated actions, the Region
therefore sought a total penalty of $149,250. After due consideration,
the Presiding Officer assessed a penalty in the amount of $74,812.50
based on his application of the applicable Agency penalty policy as
discussed below.

In its Notice of Appeal, Genicom raises four instances of alleged
error in the Initial Decision. These are:

(1) The application of the Agency penalty policy in
this case was unduly harsh and the penalty policy
should not have formed the basis of penalties.

(2) The Presiding Officer failed to consider Genicom’s
argument that EPCRA notification was not required
because there was no off-site risk.

(3) The October 30, 1990 release should not have
been considered a second violation since the October
11 and 30 releases were discovered simultaneously.

(4) Notice to the State Water Control Board could
be imputed to the Virginia Emergency Response
Council and therefore there was no failure to notify
the Council.

II. DISCUSSION

Genicom’s first basis for appeal is that the penalty policy should
not have been used in determining the appropriate penalties for any
violations. The policy used in this case was the “Final Penalty Policy
for Sections 302, 303, 304, 311, and 312 of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act and Section 103 of the Com-

8Initial Decision at 5.

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430 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act”
dated June 13, 1990 (“Penalty Policy”). This policy requires the cal-
culation of a base penalty through a matrix which considers the
nature, extent, gravity and circumstances of the violation, and then
provides for certain adjustments, based on factors specific to the
violator.

In accordance with 40 C.F.R. §22.27(b), a Presiding Officer is
required to “consider” any civil penalty guidelines issued for the ap-
propriate statute, but is not required to follow them. In re 3M Com-
pany, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, at 19 n.20 (CJO, Feb. 28, 1992). The
Presiding Officer followed the penalty policy in this case, although
applying it to arrive at a lower penalty than was assessed in the
complaint.

Genicom argues that the use of the penalty policy was inappropri-
ate because it “at all times acted responsibly,” prevented additional
releases on October 31, notified the NRC, complied with other EPCRA
requirements, and notified the State Water Control Board, a member
of the Virginia Emergency Response Council. Genicom also argues
that, although it did not notify the local emergency planning commit-
tee, “neither personnel on-site or off-site were threatened by the
releases, and the releases had already occurred and dissipated, fore-
closing any potential response actions by the {local emergency plan-
ning committee] or [state emergency response commission].” Appel-
lant’s Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal at 7.

In support of its position, Genicom’s brief contains an extensive
discussion of a decision by Chief Administrative Law Judge Frazier
in In the Matter of Thoro Products Company, Docket No. EPCRA
VIII-90-04 (May 19, 1992). Genicom focuses particularly on the fol-
lowing language:

In assessing each of these three factors—extent,
gravity and circumstances—the penalty policy and
EPA’s application of that policy in this case empha-
size the need for immediate notification of the release
and the potential consequences—the potential threat
to human health and the environment—absent such
immediate notification. I find that the Agency’s as-
sessment of these factors bears little relationship to
the actual facts in the case and greatly exaggerates
the potential consequences—the potential threat to
human health and the environment in the Arvada
area—as a result of Respondent’s failure to report.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 431

Thoro Products at 40. This point is discussed later in the opinion
where the Presiding Officer states:

Since the incident was essentially over before the
duty to report arose, there was little, if any, potential
for emergency personnel, the community and/or the
environment to be exposed to hazards as the result
of noncompliance with the reporting requirements.
While the first responders and emergency managers
encountered some real problems, these did not result
from the failure to notify after knowledge of the re-
lease of an RQ was acquired by Respondent. These
problems resulted from the release itself and a lack
of knowledge about the nature and source of the
chlorine cloud.

Thoro Products at 44. Genicom finds this situation analogous to its
own since, at the time the obligation to notify arose, the releases
had already been diluted by the river to harmless levels. As such,
even with timely notification, there was nothing that emergency re-
sponse officials could, or needed to, do.

We do not find this argument persuasive. In terms of whether
the penalty policy should apply, as opposed to how it was applied,
we see no reason that it should not apply. The violations here are
precisely those contemplated by the policy. The policy reasonably
implements the statutory criteria, with a range of penalties to reflect
differing circumstances.9 Even Genicom seems to concede that the
result it seeks, a substantially lower penalty, could derive from “a
proper application of EPA’s penalty policy.” 1°

Genicom’s argument, relying on the language quoted from Thoro
Products, is that the policy should not apply or that the penalty
should be reduced because, by the time the duty to notify arose,
“the incident was essentially over.” We note that the Presiding Officer
in this case specifically rejected this argument, stating that the notifi-
cation requirement is triggered by knowledge of the release without

9 As stated by the Agency’s Chief Judicial Officer in discussing the Agency’s TSCA
penalty policy, the policy “facilitate[s] the application of the statutory penalty factors
to individual cases in a systematic fashion, and thus provides a sound framework
for the exercise of an appellate tribunal’s discretion.” In re ALM Corporation, TSCA
Appeal No. 90-4, at 7 (CJO, Oct. 11, 1991). That statement is equally true for the
penalty policy at issue here.

10Respondent’s Brief in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, at 14, 18.

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432 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

regard to a person’s view of the possible lack of harm. The Presiding
Officer then stated that:

Weighing the seriousness of the violation by the
delay in notification, rather than by the harm actu-
ally caused by the release in a particular case, en-
sures that notification will serve its purpose of pro-
viding a mechanism whereby the public authorities
are notified of every potentially hazardous release
as soon as possible, leaving to them the decision
of what response is necessary or feasible.

Initial Decision at 12-13.

In the penalty policy, the Agency discusses the purpose of the
emergency notification provisions and the potential for harm from
violations of those requirements. The potential for harm is measured
by both potential for exposure to hazards posed by noncompliance
and “the adverse effect noncompliance has on the statutory or regu-
latory purposes or procedures for implementing the CERCLA § 103/
EPCRA program.” 11

In Thoro Products, the Presiding Officer focused exclusively on
the potential threat to human health and the environment arising
from a lack of immediate notification. Thoro Products at 40. There
was no discussion of the adverse impact that failure to report has
on the statutory purposes of CERCLA and EPCRA. However, we
believe this is an important consideration and the failure to recognize
this in Thoro Products was erroneous.

Immediate notification of an emergency release serves the statu-
tory purpose of alerting public authorities to a potential hazard. Po-
tential hazards are defined in terms of releases of reportable quan-
tities of specified substances. The fact that there may not have been
any actual exposure to the hazardous substance does not vitiate the
serious adverse effect noncompliance has on this statutory purpose.
In addition, the fact that the incident was “essentially over” at the
time notification was required does not in any way mitigate the
violation. It would seriously weaken the emergency notification provi-
sions if the longer the delay in discovery and notification of a release,
and the higher likelihood that any adverse effects had already oc-

11 Penalty Policy, at 18.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 433

curred, the lower the penalty on the grounds that there is nothing
left for the public authorities to do at the time of notification.12

For all these reasons, we conclude that application of the penalty
policy to these violations was appropriate.

Genicom’s second basis for appeal was that the Presiding Officer
failed to address its argument that EPCRA notification was not re-
quired because there was no off-site risk to human health. Genicom
argues that Section 304 of EPCRA requires notification only if the
release poses a potential human health risk to persons off the site
of the release. In support of its contention, it notes that notification
must be made to any state or local area “likely to be affected by
the release.” Section 304(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(1). Genicom also
cites the implementing regulation which contains an exemption for
“[a]ny release which results in exposure to persons solely within
the boundaries of the facility.” 40 C.F.R. §355.40(a)(2). Finally,
Genicom points to provisions concerning the information to be in-
cluded in the notifications which refer to health risks and proper
precautions, Section 304(b)(2)(F) and (G), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(F)
and (G).

Genicom reasons that the only off-site exposure was exposure
to dissolved cyanide solution downstream of the discharge in the
South River. Since the instream concentrations were less than the
State’s health-based water quality standard for cyanide,!5 there was
no risk to human health off-site and EPCRA notification was not
required. In other words, absent such a risk, neither the State nor
the local area is “likely to be affected by the release.”

The Region responds that Genicom’s position contradicts the clear
and unambiguous requirement for reporting under Section 304. It

12Under the penalty policy, the gravity and extent factors are used to determine
a cell on the matrix for determining the base penalty. Each cell contains a penalty
range, with the circumstances of the violation being used to establish a penalty within
that range. One circumstance relates to risk of exposure, with the greater the risk
of exposure, the greater the likelihood that the maximum penalty in that range will
be assessed. Penalty Policy at 19. In this case, the maximum penalty within the
range was assessed because of the substantial delay and even disregard for the notifica-
tion requirements. Initial Decision at 11-12.

13 Genicom has stated, and the Region has not disputed, that it calculated instream
concentrations of cyanide in the South River as approximately 0.08 milligrams per
liter for the October 11 release and 0.04 milligrams per liter for the October 30
release. Tr. at 60-62. The State water quality standard is 0.7 milligrams per liter.
Respondent’s Brief in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
n. 3 at 8.

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434 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

argues that Section 304 does not speak in terms of off-site risk.
In fact, the Region argues that to condition a reporting requirement
on a determination of off-site risk would defeat the prophylactic in-
tent of the statute and risk the very injuries the statute was designed
to prevent. 14

We will address each of Genicom’s arguments in turn. Section
304(a) provides in pertinent part:

If a release of an extremely hazardous substance re-
ferred to in section 11002(a) of this title occurs from
a facility at which a hazardous chemical is produced,
used, or stored, and such release requires a notifica-
tion under section 103(a) of [CERCLA], the owner
or operator of the facility shall immediately provide
notice as described in subsection (b) of this section.

Section 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1).

Since Section 304(a) refers to releases under Section 103 of
CERCLA, it is necessary to first examine the structure of Section

103. (We note that Genicom has not argued that Section 103 requires
     off-site risk to establish a violation.) Section 103 requires notification
     for quantities equal to or greater than those determined pursuant
     to Section 102 (“reportable quantities”). Section 102 requires the Ad-
     ministrator to designate “such elements, compounds, mixtures, solu-
     tions, and substances which, when released into the environment
     may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or
     the environment, and * * * promulgate regulations establishing that
     quantity of any hazardous substance the release of which shall be
     reported pursuant to section 9603 of this title.” Section 102(a), 42
     U.S.C. § 9602(a).

Therefore, Section 102 establishes which substances, and at what
levels, present a sufficient danger to warrant reporting. Once these
substances and levels are established, there is a clear, unambiguous
requirement to notify under Section 103. Relevant risk considerations
are dealt with in establishing reportable quantities, not in subsequent
decisions on whether releases of reportable quantities should be re-
ported.

14Brief of Complainant-Appellee in Response to Genicom’s Notice of Appeal and
Brief in Support of Appeal, at 12-15.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 435

Genicom argues that a requirement for actual risk is found in
EPCRA Section 304 in the language that requires notification of
the State and local agencies “likely to be affected.” However, Genicom
has provided no support for its position that a State or local area
is “likely to be affected” only if off-site risk can be demonstrated.

The “likely to be affected” language originated in an amendment
introduced by Senator Lautenberg that ultimately became Section
304 of EPCRA.15 Senator Lautenberg stated in introducing this pro-
posed amendment:

These provisions would improve the notification and
penalties provisions of the existing Superfund pro-
gram by requiring immediate notification of State
and local officials in the event of a release of a “re-
portable quantity” of a hazardous substance covered
by Superfund.

A Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthor-
ization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-499), S. PRT. 101-120, Volume
II at 1000 (1990). Senator Lautenberg further stated:

[T]he amendment would require immediate notifica-
tion upon the release of a reportable quantity under
Superfund. Facilities experiencing such a release
would be required to notify the National Response
Center, as provided under current law, but also
would have to notify the appropriate emergency plan-
ning committees, their Governor, and in the absence
of planning committees, State and local emergency
response officials.

Id. at 1037. Thus, Senator Lautenberg envisioned his amendment
as requiring notice to State and local officials of any reportable re-
lease under Superfund. Senator Lautenberg saw the purposes of this
notification to extend beyond response to the immediate emergency,

15A Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (Public Law 99-499), S. PRT. 101-120, Volume II at 1036 (1990). The “likely
to be affected” language was derived from Senator Lautenberg’s proposed amendment
to Section 103 of CERCLA, a proposed new Section 103(j), which ultimately became
the basis of Section 304 of EPCRA. (EPCRA was developed in conjunction with amend-
ments to Superfund and was included as Title III of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986. All references to legislative history relate to Section
304 of EPCRA.)

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436 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

to include such things as tracking patterns of releases and aiding
in designating facilities for emergency planning.!6

As described by Senator Lautenberg, his amendment was in-
tended to require that any facility with a reportable release would
have to “notify the National Response Center, as provided under
current law, but also would have to notify [appropriate State and
local officials].” This intended parallelism between the EPCRA Sec-
tion 304 obligation to notify State and local agencies and the
CERCLA Section 103 obligation to notify the Federal government
would not exist if an evaluation of potential risk were permissible
before notifying a State or local agency when such an analysis is
not permissible before notifying the Federal government. Further,
a misjudgment as to potential risk could have serious environmental
consequences and not reporting all releases could undercut the value
of Section 304 in support of the emergency planning aspects of
EPCRA. There is no reason to read Section 304 as Genicom suggests
when the legislative history of EPCRA makes clear that the purpose
of the amendment was to require notification to State and local
agencies of any release requiring notification to the Federal govern-
ment.!7

Having determined that there is an obligation to notify States
and localities “likely to be affected” by any reportable release, we
recognize that the scope of the notification may vary depending upon
the extent and nature of the release. For example, in certain cir-
cumstances many jurisdictions may be potentially affected. However,
if the obligation to notify means anything, it must at a minimum
extend to at least the State and the locality where the release first

16In describing the purpose of his proposed amendment to Superfund to extend

notification to State and local response officials, in what ultimately formed the basis
for Section 304, Senator Lautenberg said:

This notification requirement simply expands upon a provision

I authored in S. 51. [These] requirements are expected to provide

a means for the local planning committees, the Governor, and

the National Response Center to track facilities that may have

a record of releases, and should serve as an aid in designating

additional facilities to participate in community emergency plan-

ning. These notification requirements are effective immediately

upon enactment of the Superfund Improvement Act of 1985.
A Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(Public Law 99-499), S. PRT. 101-120, Volume II at 1038 (1990). Thus, Senator
Lautenberg clearly envisioned local planning and other benefits which go beyond those
dealing with the immediate response to the particular release.

17 Id. at 1000 and 1037.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 437

enters the environment off-site of the facility. Here, as noted, that
would mean notice to the State of Virginia and Augusta County.

Genicom’s reliance on the exception for releases resulting in expo-
sure to persons solely within the facility is also misplaced. Indeed,
contrary to Genicom’s position, the Agency expressly rejected the
notion that there must be off-site exposure and risk before the notice
requirement is triggered. The Agency’s response to comment on the
proposed implementing regulations for EPCRA dealing with the ex-
emption cited by Genicom explained a change in language used in
the final rule from that contained in the proposal. The Agency stated
in the preamble to the final regulations that:

The phrase “results in exposure to persons solely
within the boundaries of the facility” was substituted
for “results in exposure to persons outside the bound-
aries of the facility.” Thus, releases need not result
in actual exposure to persons off-site in order to be
subject to the release reporting requirements.

52 Fed. Reg. 13380-81 (April 22, 1987). This change was made to
conform this exemption to the language of the statute, which provides
at Section 304(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §11004(a)(4), that Section 304 does
not apply “to any release which results in exposure to persons solely
within the site or sites on which a facility is located.”

Requiring proof of off-site risk would also be contrary to the
legislative history, which explained that the subject language provides
that “for a release to be reportable under this section it must extend
beyond the site on which the facility is located. On-site releases
that do not extend off-site are exempt from the requirements.” 18
Thus, all this provision means is that if the release does not extend
off-site, and thus the only persons potentially exposed were on-site,
the reporting requirement does not apply. This neither imposes nor
suggests any requirement for either actual exposure or risk for re-
leases which go beyond the boundaries of the facility.

Finally, Genicom argues that the language in Section 304(b)
which describes the contents of the notice to be given under Section
304(a), demonstrates that without an off-site risk, no notice is re-
quired. It is true, as Genicom indicates, that the notification must
include information about “any known or anticipated acute or chronic

18 Conference Report 99-962, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, 132 Cong. Rec. H9113-14 (Oct. 3, 1986).

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438 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

health effects” associated with the release (Section 304(b)(2)(F)) and
“proper precautions to take as a result of the release” (Section
304(b)(2)(G)). However, the notice also includes much broader infor-
mation about the release, such as the name of the chemical sub-
stance; the quantity, time and duration of the release; and the me-
dium or media into which the release occurred (Sections 304(b)(2)(A)
and (C)-(E). While it is certainly logical that any notice include
information about health effects (if there were any), Genicom has
presented no argument as to why this language should be read as
limiting the obligation to provide notification of any release reportable
under Section 103 of CERCLA.!9

We conclude that Section 304(a) does not require that actual
exposure to harmful levels of a hazardous substance must be shown
to establish an EPCRA reporting violation. Under EPCRA Section
304(a), once the facility owner or operator has knowledge of a release
of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance from the facility,
the obligation to notify is triggered without further consideration
of risk.

Accordingly, we find that the Presiding Officer’s determination
that EPCRA reporting was required was correct.2° Even if we were
to conclude that the Presiding Officer was in error in not explicitly
discussing this issue in the Initial Decision, as Genicom has alleged,
it would be at worst harmless error and would not affect the deter-
mination of liability or the assessment of the penalty.

Genicom’s third basis for appeal was that the October 30, 1990
release should not have been considered a separate violation for pen-
alty policy purposes since the October 11 and October 30 releases
were discovered simultaneously. Genicom argues that “[t]here was
clearly no knowledge on the part of Genicom which could have been
used to prevent the second release since both were discovered simul-
taneously.” 21

However, the violation of CERCLA §103/EPCRA §304 relates
to the failure to notify, not the failure to prevent a second occurrence.
As noted in the Initial Decision, CERCLA and EPCRA impose an

19The information required would be valuable, even absent actual exposure or
risk, for the purposes intended by Senator Lautenberg. See note 16, supra.

20In this respect, we believe that Administrative Law Judge Yost’s Order on
Motion in Holly Farm Foods, Inc., Docket No. EPCRA-III-059 and CERCLA-III-
0057, finding that Section 304(a) requires evidence of some exposure to humans,
was wrongly decided.

21 Appellant’s Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal, at 10-11.

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GENICOM CORPORATION 439

obligation to report “any release” and “a release,” respectively. Clear-
ly, the October 11 and October 30 releases were distinct releases.
As the Presiding Officer noted:

Speaking in the singular, as they do, the require-
ments are properly construed as placing a separate
obligation, subject to its own penalty, to report each
release, since each release will have its own data
with respect to time, place, quantities, circumstances
etc.

Initial Decision at 13. We find this reasoning persuasive and find
that it was appropriate to assess a separate penalty for each viola-
tion.22

Finally, Genicom argues that it did not violate Section 304(a)
by failing to notify the Virginia Emergency Response Council because
its notice to the State Water Control Board could be imputed to
the Council. Region III has objected to Genicom’s raising this issue
because Genicom has not previously raised this argument. Region
III has filed a Motion to Strike this argument, citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.30(c), which provides in part that “the appeal of the initial deci-
sion shall be limited to those issues raised by the parties during
the course of the proceeding.” 23

Genicom has filed a response to this motion. In this response,
it asserts that the issue was raised below by Government Exhibit
10 and the Presiding Officer’s reference at page 15 and footnote
31 of the Initial Decision.24

Government Exhibit 10 is simply a letter from the Virginia Emer-
gency Response Council to Region III confirming that they had not
received notifications of either release. The only reference to the
State Water Control Board is in the listing of agencies on the letter-

22We note that the Presiding Officer did consider the simultaneous discovery
of the two violations in rejecting the complainant’s proposed assessment of treble
damages for the second violation. He stated that there was no greater fault as to
the second violation since it was discovered and reported at the same time as the
first. “Triple penalties for a second violation make sense when a person after having
failed to report a release it knew about repeats the same violation.” In the facts
of this case however, he determined that they would be merely punitive and not
serve as an added deterrent. Initial Decision at 14.

23 Brief of Complainant-Appellee in Response to Genicom’s Notice of Appeal and
Brief in Support of Appeal, at 26-27.

24 Appellant’s Response to the Appellee’s Motion to Strike and Supporting Memo-
randum.

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440 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

head. On page 15 of the Initial Decision, the Presiding Officer indi-
cates that while Genicom failed to notify the designated State and
local emergency response committees, it did notify the Water Control
Board and cites this as one of the factors justifying a downward
adjustment to the penalty. He states in footnote 31 that “[i]t is
to be noted that the SWCB is a member of the Virginia Emergency
Response Council.”

We do not believe that these two references, neither of which
were raised by Genicom, constituted a raising of the issue Genicom
now argues on appeal. Nowhere in the record prior to appeal does
Genicom argue that its notice to the Water Control Board should
be imputed to the Council. Appellee’s motion is well-founded and
is hereby granted.25

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the penalty assessed by the Presiding Officer
was proper and appropriate. Therefore, we assess a penalty in the
amount of $74,812.50, for the reasons discussed in the Initial Deci-
sion.

Respondent shall pay the full amount of the penalty within thirty
(30) days of the effective date of this final order. Payment shall
be made by cashier’s or certified check payable to “Treasurer, United
States of America.” The check shall be sent to:

EPA—Region III
Regional Hearing Clerk
P.O. Box 360515M
Pittsburgh, PA 15251

So ordered.

25Not only was this issue not previously raised but also we note that Genicom
actually stipulated that it did not notify the Virginia Emergency Response Council.
Tr. at 11.

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