Appleton Papers, Inc., Lower Fox River and Green Bay Site (Board decision, December 18, 2012)
In re Appleton Papers, Inc. (EAB CERCLA § 106(b) Petition No. 12-04): reimbursement petition dismissed without prejudice
Apply this precedent to your situation
This is citable Board precedent from 2012, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.
Plain-English summary
EPA Region 5 issued a unilateral administrative order requiring Appleton Papers and other potentially responsible parties to perform cleanup work at the Lower Fox River and Green Bay Superfund Site. Appleton Papers petitioned for reimbursement of about $174 million in costs, arguing that a federal court had ruled it was not liable under CERCLA. The Board held that the court's ruling was not final and that the required cleanup action had not been completed, so the reimbursement petition was premature. It dismissed the petition without prejudice and stated that Appleton Papers could refile on the same or similar grounds when the matter became ripe. The Board did not decide whether Appleton Papers ultimately qualified for reimbursement.
Decision snapshot
- Cited authorities: 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9606, and 9607
- Outcome: The reimbursement petition was dismissed without prejudice as premature.
- Key point: A CERCLA reimbursement petition cannot proceed while the underlying liability ruling remains nonfinal and the required response action is incomplete.
Full text (EPA EAB public release)
BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOA
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION A y
WASHINGTON, DC DEC 1 8 2012
pals Board
)
In re: )
)
Appleton Papers, Inc. ) CERCLA § 106(b) Petition No. 12-04 (Lower Fox River & Green Bay Site) )
)
--------------------------)
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR REIMBURSEMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On November 13, 2007, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Region 5 ("Region") issued a unilateral administrative order ("UAO") under section 106 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
("CERCLA"). The UAO required Appleton Papers, Inc. ("API") and other potentially ·
responsible parties ("PRPs") to conduct remedial action, including dredging, capping and
covering of contaminated sediments, and long-term monitoring and maintenance, to address
polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated sediments at the Lower Fox River and Green Bay
Superfund Site ("Site") in northwestern Wisconsin. When the remedial actions have been
completed, the UAO requires certain procedures to be followed, including notification by
respondents and certification by the Region, for determining that respondents have performed the
required actions at the Site in full satisfaction of the UAO.
- 1
On June 8, 2012, API filed a petition with the Environmental Appeals Board ("Board")
for reimbursement in the above-captioned matter seeking to recover approximately $174 million
in costs API had incurred in complying with the UAO. Petition for Reimbursement of Costs
(June 8,2012) ("Petition") at 2. Although it is undisputed that all of the cleanup actions
contemplated by the UAO have not been completed, API nevertheless asserts that it is entitled to
reimbursement under CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.c. § 9606(b), because in an ongoing
enforcement action initiated by the United States and the State of Wisconsin in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 1 the District Court ruled that API is not a liable party
under CERCLA. The District Court's order is attached as Exhibit 4 to API's Petition. See
Decision Granting Motion for Reconsideration (Apr. 10,2012) ("District Court Order"). API
asserts that due to the District Court Order ruling that API is not liable under CERCLA, all of .
API's required actions under the UAO should be deemed completed for purposes of its
reimbursement petition. Petition at 4.
The Region filed a response seeking dismissal of the petition on the ground that API has
not completed the actions required by the UAO. In the alternative, the Region moves for a stay
of the proceedings because the issue of API's liability currently is being litigated in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See Motion to Dismiss the Petition of
Appleton Papers Inc. orin the Alternative Motion to Stay Proceedings (July 13,2012) ("Motion
to Dismiss"). API filed a reply to the Region's response, in which API urges this Board to deny
the Region's Motion to Dismiss. See Memorandum of Appleton Papers Inc. In Opposition to
IThe enforcement action is captioned: United States and State of Wisconsin v. NCR
Corp., et ai, Case No.1 O-CV-910 (E.D. Wis.).
-2
EPA's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Reimbursement (Aug. 1,2012) ("API's Reply"). API
asserts that even though the work required by the UAO has not been completed, CERCLA's
reimbursement provisions must be interpreted flexibly where, as here, a recipient of a UAO "was
adjudicated by a federal court to have no CERCLA liability." API's Reply at 2. API states
further that the Region has failed to articulate any basis for staying this matter.
By order dated August 16, 2012, the Board sought clarification from the Region on three
issues raised in the Petition and in the Region's Motion to Dismiss: the status of the District
Court Order and the timing ofthe appeals process; whether API is entitled to reimbursement if
the District Court Order is affinned on appeal; and the relevance of a cost sharing arrangement
between API and other PRP's. See Order for Clarification (Aug. 16,2012). The Region filed a
response to the Order for Clarification on October 11,2012. See EPA's Response to Order for
Clarification. API filed a reply on November 1, 2012. See Memorandum of Appleton Papers
Inc. in reply to the Board's Order for Clarification ("API Clarification Reply").
Section 106(b)(2) of CERCLA allows any person who has complied with an
administrative order issued by EPA or another federal agency under section I06(a) ofCERCLA
to petition for reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred in complying with the order, plus
interest. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). To establish a claim for reimbursement, a petitioner must
demonstrate it was not liable for response costs under CERCLA section I07(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), or that EPA's selection of the ordered response action was arbitrary and capricious or
was otherwise not in accordance with law. CERCLA § I06(b)(2)(C) - (D), 42 U.S.c.
§ 9606(b)(2)(C) - (D). As this Board previously has stated, completion of the required action is
-3
one of four express statutory conditions for seeking reimbursement. 2 CERCLA § 106(b),
42 U.S.C. § 9606(b); see In re Glidden Co., 10 E.A.D. 738, 746 (EAB 2002); In re A&W
Smelters and Refiners, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 302, 315 (EAB 1996), affd962 F. Supp 1232 (N.D. Cal.
1997), aff'd in part & rev 'd in part other grounds, 146 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). The "required
action" refers to the specific cleanup actions required by the terms of the UAO. Once a party
completes these actions, it can seek reimbursement for the costs under CERCLA § 106(b),
42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 1995).
API does not dispute that completion of the required action is a statutory prerequisite to
seeking reimbursement. Rather, API asserts that the Board should hold that the required action is
complete in this case because, pursuant to the District Court Order, API is not a liable party
under CERCLA. According to API, "while the remediation itself is not yet complete, it is
undisputed that all of the 'required action' by API under the [UAO] is now complete. The
'completion of the required action' was on April 10, 2012," upon issuance of the District Court
Order. Petition at 10. Although API does not cite to any case law, nor is the Board aware of any
case law, explicitly holding that a prior determination of non-liability constitutes "completion of
the required action" for purposes of CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. section 9606(b)(2)(A),
API asserts that such a holding is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Employers
Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656,663 (7th Cir. 1995). See Petition at 9-10. In Wausau,
the Seventh Circuit made clear that a party can seek reimbursement only when it completes the
2 The other prerequisites the petitioner must establish before the Board will consider the
merits of a reimbursement request are that the petitioner: 1) complied with the order; 2) submitted the petition within sixty days of completing the action; and 3) incurred costs responding to the order. CERCLA § 106(b); 42 U.S.C. § 106(b); see In re A&W Smelters and Refiners, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 302, 315 (EAB 1996).
-4
actions required by the terms of the UAO. Wausau, F.3d at 663. Under certain
circumstances, however, the court opined that than of the actions
required by the UAO may be sufficient for purposes of ""''-'XU£,LF. reimbursement, where, for
example, a party cannot U£lJ'''''''' the required action for reasons beyond its control, where the
agency takes steps to postpone completion or unreasonably refuses to certify completion, or
where the UAO is overly broad. Id. at 663-65. Under circumstances, the court suggested
the need for flexibility in interpreting reimbursement provisions. Id. at 665. API
this Board to such flexibility in this case given District Court's liability
determination.
The issue of whether a prior determination of non-liability constitutes "completion of the
required action" for purposes of CERCLA 106(b) is one of first impression and one that
thorough review and analysis at appropriate time. However, as the """'.F.£'U'H points out in its
Motion to and as API has conceded, see Clarification Reply at 1, the District
Court's liability determination is nota final order and is subject to appeal. It would be highly
inefficient Board to an Agency ruling on this issue District Court
Order is subject to revision before entry final judgment 3 or reversal on appeaL See, e.g., re
Desert Rock Energy PSD Appeal Nos. 08-03 through 08-06, slip op. at 18
Sept. 2009) (stating that it would be highly inefficient for the Board to a ona
permit where the was contemplating vu"'.. <...,~'" to permit), 14 _ ; In re Titan
3 See Fed. Civ. 54(b) (absent a final an order or decision "that
adjudicates than all claims or the than all parties does not the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.").
5
---------
Tire § 106(b) Petition No. 10-01, at 4 10,2010) (Order Granting
Stay of Proceedings) (staying CERCLA 106(b) proceedings before the Board on judicial
economy grounds where liability central to the Board's deliberations is concurrently being
in federal district court). Under these circumstances, the Board has determined that the
Petition is not ripe review at the present time. 4 At a minimum, Board consideration of API's
petition must be delayed until final judgment is "'...."'. . "'," and the time for an appeal has
In its reply to the Region's Motion to Dismiss, API asserts that the delay resulting from
the dismissal of Petition this matter would result injustice" to API. Reply
at 2. "UIPH'>" the Board notes that API could have moved for certification of the District Court
Order as a final judgment and thereby potentially avoided or minimized this delay. See
Civ. Pro. 54(b) ("When an action ",,."''''''M more than one claim * * * or when multiple
are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
than all, claims or parties only the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.").5 Had API filed such a motion, the District Court would had the opportunity to
4 The Region also has that API failed to comply with certain requirements of the
UAO during 2011 and 2012. See Motion to Dismiss at 11-14. As points out, it was during this time period that API was challenging its liability in the enforcement action, an action which resulted in the district court's liability determination. Because any Board review of the merits of this assertion might be by a final judgment on liability, the Board does not reach this issue at the present time.
5 purpose of rule 54(b) "is to avoid the possible injustice a delay in
judgment on a distinctly separate claim or as to fewer than all of the parties until a final adjudication of the entire case by making an immediate appeal available. 10 Charles A. Wright et aI., Federal Practice and Procedure § at 33 (3d ed. 1998). "The rule attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of more than one appeal in a action and the need for making review available in multi-party or multi-claim situations at a time that best serves the
-6
weigh the equities and determine if entry of a final judgment was appropriate. 6 See Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, (1980) (the task of weighing and balancing
contending factors regarding certification under Rule 54(b) is peculiarly one for the trial judge; a
trial judge's determination on certification is entitled to substantial deference on review). By
failing to seek certification of the District Court Order as a final judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b), API bears at least partial responsibility for any delay in the Board's review
of the Petition for Reimbursement under CERCLA § 106(b). Further, API has failed to convince
the Board that API will suffer any "gross injustice" from today's dismissal without prejUdice.
For the reasons stated above, API ' s Petition is hereby dismissed without prejudice as
premature. In re Cozinco, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 708, 724-25 (EAB 1998) (remedy for prematurely filed
petition for reimbursement is dismissal without prejudice). This order solely addresses the
timeliness of the Petition and in no way precludes API from re-filing the Petition based on the
same or similar grounds when the matter is ripe for Board review.
So ordered.7
Dated: .iLtc . fEr e5W/OV ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
BY: ~Y1t- · ~
Leslye M. Fraser
Environmental Appeals Judge
needs of the litigants." Id. at 35 .
In responding to the Board's August 16, 2012 Order for Clarification, the Region stated,
6
and API has not disputed, that no party sought certification under Rule 54(b). See EPA's Response to Order for Clarification at 1 (Oct. 11,2011).
7 The two-member panel deciding this matter includes Environmental Appeals Judges
Leslye M. Fraser and Kathie A. Stein.
-7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the forgoing Order Dismissing Petition for Reimbursement
Without Prejudice in the matter of Appleton Papers, Inc., CERCLA § 106(b) Petition No. 12-04, were sent to the following persons in the manner indicated:
By First Class Mail : Ronald R. Ragatz
Dennis P. Birke
Megan A. Senatori
DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C.
Two East Mifflin Street
Madison, WI 53703
Gregory A. Krauss
1629 K St., NW, Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20006
Heidi Davidson Melzer
Melzer Law, LLC
4469 Wyandot Trail
Green Bay, WI 54313
By Pouch Mail: Richard M. Murawski
Associate Regional Counsel (C-14J)
U.S. EPA Region 5
77 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60604
By Inter-Office Mail: Antoinette Powell-Dickson (2271A)
Office of Site Remediation Enforcement
U.S. EPA
Dated:
DEC 1 8 2012
Secretary
Does this precedent still control your case?
Ezel checks whether it still stands, including any court review since, and applies it to your situation with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace