Burwick, employed by Burwick Construction Co. (Commission decision, May 21, 1993)

Burwick, employed by Burwick Construction Co. (FMSHRC CENT 92-341-M): Default order vacated and case remanded

Decision type
Commission decision
Docket
CENT 92-341-M
Decided
May 21, 1993
Outcome
Remanded
Precedential status
Citable Commission precedent
Checked against source
2026-08-14

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This is citable Commission precedent from 1993, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1993
The MSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Decision of the Commission
The Commission vacated a $400 default order and sent the case back for the judge to determine whether default was warranted. This order did not decide the penalty. The full text below is from the official FMSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FMSHRC release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (fmshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

The ALJ entered a default order against Glen Burwick, an employee of Burwick Construction Company, after he failed to answer a proposed civil penalty or an order to show cause. The judge assessed the Secretary's proposed $400 penalty. The Commission treated a later letter as a timely petition for discretionary review, vacated the default order, and remanded the case. The ALJ was directed to determine whether a default order was warranted after considering the respondent's position.

Decision snapshot

  • Governing provisions: 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.69(b) and 2700.70(a)
  • Outcome: The $400 default penalty order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
  • Key point: The Commission treated Burwick's post-default letter as a timely review petition and returned the default question to the judge.

Full text (FMSHRC public release)

CCASE:
SOL (MSHA) V. GLEN BURWICK
DDATE:
19930521
TTEXT:


Page 2

~775

May 21, 1993

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
:
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
:
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)
:
:
v. : Docket No. CENT 92-341-M
:
GLEN BURWICK,
:
Employed by Burwick
:
Construction Co.
:
:

BEFORE: Holen, Chairman; Backley, Doyle and Nelson, Commissioners

ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. (1988)("Mine Act"). On April 22, 1993, Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin issued an Order of Default, finding respondent Glen Burwick, an employee of Burwick Construction Co., in default for failing to answer the notice of proposed civil penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor or the judge's February 9, 1993, Order to Show Cause. The judge assessed the civil penalty of $400 proposed by the Secretary. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the default order and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Commission has received a letter from Ms. Tanya Burwick dated April 27, 1993, stating that on February 22, 1993, Glen and Therell Burwick responded to the Proposal, showing their opposition to the charges brought against them. The February 22 letter contained no docket numbers and was filed only in the official record in Therell Burwick, emp. by Burwick Construction Co., Docket No. CENT 92-340-M, a related case.

The judge's jurisdiction over this case terminated when his decision was issued on April 22, 1993. 29 C.F.R. 2700.69(b). Under the Mine Act and the Commission's procedural rules, relief from a judge's decision may be sought by filing a petition for discretionary review with the Commission within 30 days of its issuance. 30 U.S.C. 823(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. 2700.70(a). We deem the April 27 letter to be a timely filed Petition for Discretionary Review, which we grant. See, e.g., Middle States Resources, Inc., 10 FMSHRC 1130 (September 1988). On the basis of the present record, we are unable to evaluate the merits of the respondent's position. In the interest of justice, we remand this matter to the judge, who shall determine whether a default order is warranted.


Page 3

~776
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the judge's default order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Arlene Holen, Chairman

Richard V. Backley, Commissioner

Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner

L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner

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