Lone Star Industries, Inc.
Lone Star Industries, Inc. (FMSHRC CENT 88-112-M): Two safety citations vacated
Apply this to your situation
This order from 1990 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ask about your situation and see what the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent say, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Lone Star Industries operated a cement-producing quarry and mill where an engineer entered a clinker cooler dust chamber through an inspection door during maintenance work. His right leg became entangled in an operating screw conveyor and was severed about mid-thigh. The judge found that the inspection door was not a designated or regularly used means of access under the safe-access standard, and that the lockout standard did not apply because no repair or maintenance was being performed on the screw conveyor itself. Both citations were vacated, along with their proposed penalties.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standards: 30 C.F.R. § 56.11001; 30 C.F.R. § 56.12016; alternative 30 C.F.R. § 56.14029.
- Outcome: Citations 2870909 and 2870908, and all proposed penalties, were vacated.
- Key point: An accident does not by itself establish a regulatory violation, and the standards did not apply to the route and activity shown by this record.
Full text (FMSHRC public release)
~195
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (F.M.S.H.R.C.)
Office of Administrative Law Judges
SECRETARY OF LABOR, CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), Docket No. CENT 88-112-M
PETITIONER A.C. No. 14-00111-05511
v. Lone Star Quarry and Mill
LONE STAR INDUSTRIES, INC.,
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Appearances: Charles A. Mangum, Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Kansas City, Missouri,
for the Petitioner;
Michael T. Heenan, Esq., Smith, Heenan & Althen,
Washington, D.C.,
for the Respondent.
Before: Judge Morris
The Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA), charges respondent with violating
two safety regulations promulgated under the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., (the Act).
After notice to the parties a hearing was held in Kansas
City, Missouri.
The parties filed post-trial briefs.
Summary of the Case
Citation No. 2870909 charges respondent with violating 30
C.F.R. 56.11001, which provides as follows:
56.11001 Safe access.
Safe means of access shall be provided and main-
tained to all working places.
The citation reads as follows:
A safe means of access was not provided into the
#3 clinker cooler dust chamber. An employee was
entering the shut down #3 clinker cooler dust
chamber that was undergoing repairs to take some
measurements. A permanently disabling injury
occurred on 12-4-87 at about 1440 hours, when an
employee's right leg became entangled in the #2
and #3 clinker cooler dust screw conveyor and was
severed about mid-thigh.
~196
Citation No. 2870908 charges respondent with violating 30 C.F.R.
56.12016, which provides as follows
56.12016 Work on electrically-powered equipment.
Electrically powered equipment shall be de-
energized before mechanical work is done on
such equipment. Power switches shall be locked
out or other measures taken which shall prevent
the equipment from being energized without the
knowledge of the individuals working on it.
Suitable warning notices shall be posted at the
power switch and signed by the individuals who
are to do the work. Such locks or preventive
devices shall be removed only by the persons who
installed them or by authorized personnel.
The citation reads as follows:
The electrical power for the #2 and #3 clinker
cooler dust screw conveyor was not turned off,
locked and tagged out. A permanently disabling
injury occurred on 12-4-87 at about 1440 hours
when an employee's right leg became entangled
in the screw conveyor and was severed at about
mid-thigh.
Issues
The issues are whether respondent violated the regulations.
Stipulation
At the commencement of the hearing the parties stipulated as
follows:
1. The quarry mill involved in these citations is a moderate
to large operation. On an annual basis there are 200,000 to
300,000 man hours at the mill.
2. The operator's prior history is contained in a computer
printout for the 24 months prior to the accident in question. The
computer printout may be received in evidence as Exhibit P-1.
3. The company abated the alleged violations within a
reasonable time.
4. The imposition of the proposed civil penalties will not
affect the company's ability to continue in business.
(Tr. 13, 14)
~197
The Evidence
ELDON E. RAMAGE, an MSHA inspector for 11 years, has
extensive training in mining. He has been a certified electrician
and safety coordinator in the metal and nonmetal industry. He has
experience in hazard recognition. In addition, he has conducted
some 3000 MSHA inspections.
The witness has inspected Lone Star many times at the Bonner
Springs plant where the company operates an open pit quarry;
cement is produced.
In December 1987 he learned of an accident at the plant and
he conducted a subsequent investigation. The investigation report
was received in evidence as Exhibit P-2.
During the inspection of the scene Mr. Ramage was
accompanied by management representatives Green, Metzker and
Krause.
Lone Star's cement producing process is illustrated by
Exhibit R-1. A limestone slurry initially enters a kiln. The
chamber, which rotates, in turn discharges its clinkers into a
cooler. The clinkers flow from the kiln to the cooler through a
clinker dust chamber. Clinker dust accumulates in the dust
chamber and a slide, or chute, permits the dust to fall into a
screw conveyor located at ground level.
This 16-inch screw conveyor, 49.83 feet in length, is driven
by a 25 hp electric motor. It rotates at 60 r.p.m.
On the day of this accident temporary scaffolding had been
erected to perform maintenance work in the clinker dust chamber.
Exhibit P-3(a) shows the position of the scaffolding in the dust
chamber. Repair and maintenance occurs about once a year when the
kiln is shut down.
On this repair and maintenance day four workers were using
impact tools to install grates in the dust chamber. These workmen
had entered the dust chamber from the top via a ladder.
At the bottom of the dust chamber there are four inspection
doors located just above the auger (Exhibit P-3(a)). The above
described doors are not posted with any directions that they
should not be used for access to the chamber.
In the above situation Lone Star's engineer Ronald E.
Roebuck entered the dust chamber through the second inspection
door from the left. Light and extension cords, as well as air
lines, had been taken into the dust chamber through one of the
~198
inspection doors. The repairmen working in the dust chamber had
gained access through the top of the chamber. Due to the
closeness of the shroud to the side of the dust chamber, Roebuck
(who was a big man) apparently decided to enter through the
inspection door of the dust chamber.1 By entering the chamber
through the inspection door he could ascend to the temporary
scaffolding where the repairmen were working. He could then go
into the air duct area to obtain some measurements.
When he entered Roebuck did not deenergize and lock out the
screw conveyor. As he was attempting to climb up the metal slide
or chute to the scaffolding something caught on the chute. He
lost his footing and slid back down through the feed opening
below the inspection door he had just entered. This permitted his
right foot to pass through the opening into the rotating screw
conveyor. His right foot became entangled in the rotating screw
which pulled his foot and leg into the conveyor. His right leg
was severed about mid-thigh.
Fellow employees heard Roebuck's screams for help and they
went to his assistance. To reach Roebuck they descended from the
scaffold to the bottom of the dust chamber and exited via an
inspection door. Roebuck was then sitting outside the chamber and
a fellow employee immediately went to the burner floor and shut
off the conveyor.
Discussion
In The Hanna Mining Company, 3 FMSHRC 2045 (1981) the
Commission considered the "safe access" regulation and ruled that
"the standard requires that each "means of access' to a working
place be safe." In addition, the Commission observed that "(t)his
does not mean necessarily that an operator must assure that every
conceivable route to a working place no matter how circuitous or
improbable, be safe." 3 FMSHRC at 2046.
The regulation in contest here is generally listed under the
category of "Travelways." Accordingly, it is appropriate to
consider whether a travelway was involved here. Section 56.1
defines a travelway as "a passage, walk or way regularly used and
designated for persons to go from one place to another."
~199
As a threshold matter the record here fails to disclose that a
route via the inspection door was regularly used by employees. I
recognize that this incident occurred during a repair and
maintenance mode. (In fact, due to excessive heat generated by
the process, workers cannot enter the clinker cooler when it is
operational.)
After extensive testimony on the issue of whether employees
regularly went through the inspection doors, respondent moved to
strike portions of the testimony of the inspector (Tr. 81-82).
The judge reserved his ruling until the conclusion of the case
and at that point he ruled that no credible evidence supported the
view that workmen used the inspection door to enter the dust
chamber (Tr. 110-111).
It is further apparent that the inspection door was not
designated as an entry door. The ordinary definitions of
"designate" are "to point out the location," or to
"indicate."2 The testimony, scale drawings and photographs do
not show that the inspection doors were designated as entry
doors. (Exhibits P-4, P-5, P-6 and P-7 are photographs of the
inspection doors.)
With the Commission's mandate in Hanna it is necessary to
further review the evidence to determine whether an inspection
door presented a reasonable means of access.
As a threshold matter it is apparent these four inspection
doors were to be opened to inspect the flow of material entering
the screw conveyor (Tr. 75). No evidence indicates they are
access doors to be used by workers to enter the dust chamber.
At the hearing there was no testimony as to the size of the
opening. The only evidence is contained in the scale drawing
(Exhibit P-3(a)). This exhibit indicates a door was 3 feet high
by 2 feet 8 inches wide. Entry from the bottom of the chamber
would be, at best, difficult for any person.
When Roebuck entered the dust chamber he had to physically
pass over the enclosed screw conveyor. He would then be entering
the chamber onto a sharply inclined dusty or gritty chute. The
testimony does not disclose the angle of the chute. However,
Exhibit P-3(a) shows the scaffolding and the chute.
~200
The point where Roebuck's leg slipped into the screw conveyor was
normally guarded by a grizzly. It was apparently not guarded on
this occasion. However, the failure to guard the conveyor does
not convert this route to a travelway. It is uncontroverted that
the grizzly was not a man guard nor was it designed to prevent a
person from being caught in the screw auger (Tr. 94-95).
It is true that air lines and hoses had been passed through
the door opening to the workmen on the scaffolding but that fact,
in and of itself, would not convert this inspection door and
route into a passageway.
It is further true that Roebuck's fellow workers came down
from the scaffold and reached him through the inspection door.
However, this was in response to his calls for help and after he
had been injured.
The Secretary argues that a violation of 56.11001 was
established by the very absence of a safe travelway into the dust
chamber (Brief at 5). Indeed, she argues the accident would not
have occurred if respondent had designated a safe passage for
employees to regularly use.
The evidence does not support the Secretary's argument.
Entry through the top of the dust chamber was not shown to be
unsafe. In fact, the four workmen entered through the top and
performed their maintenance work from the scaffold (Tr. 74). The
testimony is unclear but access through the top involved a three
foot by four foot opening (Tr. 89).
The regulation requires an operator to furnish safe access.
It does not require an operator to assure that every conceivable
route to a working place be safe.
The Secretary further argues that the accident itself
establishes that the means of access used by Roebuck was unsafe.
The Secretary's arguments are rejected. It is well
establishted that an accident, in and of itself, does not prove a
violation of a regulation. Texas Industries, Incorporated, 4
FMSHRC 352 (1982).
In sum, on the evidence presented here I conclude the entry
through the inspection door was not a means of access within the
meaning of the standard. Further, there was no reasonable
possibility that a miner would use this route as a means of
reaching a work place.
Citation No. 2870909 should be vacated.
~201
Citation No. 2870908
This citation charges respondent with violating 30 C.F.R.
56.12016, cited, supra.
During the hearing the Secretary was granted leave to
allege, in the alternative, that the operator violated 30 C.F.R.
56.14029.
The uncontroverted facts indicate that Roebuck entered the
dust chamber without turning off and locking out the screw auger.
The uncontroverted facts further establish that no repairs or
maintenance was being performed on the screw auger at the time.
Both of the regulations cited here forbid repairs or
maintenance on moving machinery except where motion is necessary
to make adjustments. In the instant case the screw auger was
moving but no repairs or maintenance were being performed on it.
The cited regulations are not applicable in this factual situation.
For a case illustrating this principle, see the
well-reasoned decision of Judge James A. Broderick in United
States Steel Corporation, 4 FMSHRC 906 (1982).
The matter of taking measurements (as Roebuck intended to
do) and the workmen installing grates cannot be stretched to
include a repair or maintenance of the screw auger.
Various other cases demonstrate the proper application of
the standards: Cf. Greenville Quarries, Inc., 9 FMSHRC 1390
(1987) (Koutras, J); North American Sand & Gravel Co., 2 FMSHRC
2017 (1980), (Moore, J); Brown Brothers Sand Co., 3 FMSHRC 734
(1981) (Cook, J).
The Secretary argues the standards should be broadly
construed to include those situations where employees are
required to crawl, step or jump over moving machine parts to
reach a destination. I decline to construe the regulation as
requested. If such a regulation is appropriate the Secretary can
enact it through her rule-making authority.
For the foregoing reasons Citation No. 2870908 should be
vacated.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law I enter the following order:
1. Citation 2870909 and all proposed penalties therefor are
vacated.
2. Citation 2870908 and all proposed penalties therefor are
vacated.
John J. Morris
Administrative Law Judge
FOOTNOTE START HERE
1. Roebuck did not testify and the inspector indicated
Roebuck did not give him any reason as to why he entered through
the inspection door (Tr. 40).
2. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, at 305.
3. The standard reads as follows:
56.14029 Machinery repairs and maintenance.
Repairs or maintenance shall not be performed on
machinery until the power is off and the machinery blocked
against motion, except where machinery motion is necessary to
make adjustments.
Get today's answer for your situation
You just read what one judge decided for one employer in 1990, and it binds only those parties. Ezel checks the current MSHA standards and Commission precedent and answers your specific situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the authority it relies on.