House Analysis & Associates & Fred Powell

Plain-English summary

House Analysis & Associates and Fred Powell appealed a default order under the Clean Air Act after failing to provide information about asbestos-containing materials stored at a facility in Southampton, Pennsylvania. EPA had requested information under Section 114 and later issued a compliance order under Section 113, but the respondents did not provide the required information or comply with a prehearing exchange order. The Environmental Appeals Board held that the default order was properly issued and that the penalty calculation was supported by EPA's penalty policy. It affirmed the $51,000 civil penalty.

Decision snapshot

• Cited authorities: Clean Air Act §§ 113 and 114; 40 C.F.R. Part 22 and Part 61, Subpart M; 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c).
• Outcome: The default order was affirmed and a $51,000 civil penalty was assessed.
• Key point: Failure to comply with a prehearing order can support a default, and the EAB may uphold a penalty calculated under the applicable civil penalty policy.

Full text (EPA EAB public release)

HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 501
IN THE MATTER OF HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES
& FRED POWELL
CAA Appeal No. 93-1
FINAL DECISION
Decided February 2, 1993
Syllabus

House Analysis and Associates and Fred Powell (collectively referred to as “re-
spondent”) appeal the issuance of a default order finding respondent in violation
of the Clean Air Act and assessing a civil penalty of $51,000. Respondent was found
in violation of Sections 114 and 113 of the Clean Air Act for failure to respond
adequately to an information request letter and compliance order, both requiring sub-
mission of certain information. The information related to asbestos-containing mate-
rials found in a storage unit utilized by respondent. The information was being sought
to determine compliance with regulations applicable to asbestos under 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M.

A complaint was issued by Region III in this matter and an answer timely
filed. However, when respondent did not comply with an order on prehearing exchange
or respond to a motion for a default order, a default order was issued. On appeal,
respondent asserts governmental misconduct in conducting the inspection and also
denies receipt of any documents other than the complaint.

Held: The default order was properly issued and a penalty of $51,000 properly
assessed.

Before Environmental Appeals Judges Nancy B. Firestone,
Ronald L. McCallum, and Edward E. Reich.

Opinion of the Board by Judge Reich:

I. BACKGROUND

House Analysis & Associates and Fred Powell, collectively re-
ferred to as the “respondent,”! appeal the issuance of an Order on

1Fred Powell is a contractor doing business as House Analysis & Associates.
Judge Greene found Mr. Powell to be an asbestos contractor though Mr. Powell denies
this. Whether or not Mr. Powell is an “asbestos contractor” is immaterial for purposes

Continued
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502 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Default issued by Administrative Law Judge Greene on December
16, 1992. Judge Greene found that respondent violated certain re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and as-
sessed a civil penalty of $51,000 for these violations. Respondent's
appeal to the Board is pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(a) and was
timely filed.

This case arises from the alleged failure of respondent to provide
certain information concerning asbestos-containing materials found
in a rental storage facility utilized by respondent.2 This material
was found when an EPA inspector conducted an inspection of storage
unit J264 of Public Storage Rental Spaces at 950 Jaymor Road in
Southampton, Pennsylvania. The inspector observed approximately
60 bags and several open boxes of asbestos-containing duct and piping
insulation.? Subsequent laboratory analysis confirmed the presence
of chrysotile asbestos.4 The storage unit in question was rented by
respondent through Sue Powell, wife of Fred Powell.5

On April 6, 1992, pursuant to the authority of, inter alia, Section
114(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a), EPA Region III

sent a letter to respondent in order to obtain certain information
regarding the stored materials (“Section 114 letter”). The purpose
of the request was to determine whether respondent was in violation
of the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(“NESHAP”) for asbestos found at 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M.
The letter required the information to be submitted within 14 cal-
endar days of the date of receipt of the letter.®
of this decision since the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated apply
to any “person” and there is no question that Mr. Powell is a person for such purposes.

2This summary of the facts is based on a review of the administrative record
and the findings made by Judge Greene in her order. While respondent disputes
some of the factual allegations in the complaint, his default constitutes an admission
of all the facts alleged in the complaint. 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a).

3 Order on Default, at 2.

4]Id.; Complainant's Prehearing Exchange Exhibit 7.

SOrder on Default, at 5. Powell admits that the storage unit was leased by
Sue Powell but denies that either he or his wife placed the asbestos-containing material
there. Appeal at J] 6 and 7.

6 Letter to Fred Powell from Thomas J. Maslany, Director, Air, Radiation & Toxics
Division, Region III, dated April 6, 1992. The letter required the submission of the
following information:

(1) Describe in detail the origin(s) of the bagged and unbagged
stored asbestos material, including, but not limited to, the
name and address of each and every site from which this
stored asbestos material was originally removed;

(2) State exactly what work was undertaken by you or your com-

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HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 503
Mr. Powell responded to the Section 114 letter on April 16, 1992.7
EPA considered this response to be inadequate and incomplete, a
finding subsequently confirmed by Judge Greene.® In light of this
inadequate response, Region III issued a compliance order to respond-
ent on April 30, 1992, under the authority of Section 113(a)(3)(B)
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)(B), requiring submission
of all of the information required to be submitted in the Section
114 letter.2 This information was required to be submitted within
5 calendar days of receipt of the order. Respondent failed to submit
the information required by this order.
Region III then issued a complaint to respondent on June 30,
1992, alleging violations of both Section 114(a) and Section 113(a)(3)
pany at each and every location identified in Number 1 imme-
diately above;
(3) Describe any asbestos-containing material of any kind that
you and/or your company stripped or removed from any site
or location identified in Number 1 immediately above, and
estimate the volume of material stripped or removed from
each such site or location;
(4) Describe in detail the manner in which the stored asbestos
material was disposed of, including, but not limited to, the
following information:
(a) location(s) at which the stored asbestos material was dis-
posed;
(b) copies of waste shipment manifests or other records;
(c) evidence, including air monitoring results, that storage
unit J264 was properly decontaminated in accordance
with 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M;
(a) the names of any and all persons who participated in
the disposal and/or cleanup of the stored asbestos mate-
rial located in said storage unit.
(5) Provide the names, titles, addresses, and telephone numbers
of all personnel or employees of you and/or your company
who performed any type of work related to the stored asbestos
material;
(6) List all previous violations assessed by any federal, state or
local regulatory agency against House Analysis & Associates,
associated with the handling of asbestos; and
(7) Provide any notice(s) of any demolition or renovation operation
involving friable asbestos-containing material which you have
ever submitted pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M
for every location identified in Number 1 immediately above.
This letter also required submission of certain information under Section 11(c) of
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2610(c), not of relevance here.
7The response is included as Exhibit 2 to Complainant's Prehearing Exchange.
8 Order on Default, at 6.
°Complainant’s Prehearing Exchange, Exhibit 3.
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504 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

of the Clean Air Act for failure to comply with the two information
demands.!° For these violations, the Region proposed to assess a
civil penalty of $51,000. This penalty was derived in accordance with
Section 113 of the Clean Air Act and, more particularly, EPA’s “Clean
Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy” of October 25, 1991
(“Penalty Policy”).

Respondent submitted his answer to the complaint, dated July
30, 1992, on or about August 4, 1992. Respondent denied the sub-
stantive allegations of the complaint, alleging instead governmental
misconduct relative to the EPA inspection. (Mr. Powell believes that
the asbestos-containing material was “planted” by government agents.
Answer to Section 114 Letter, at 1.) The matter was then scheduled
for hearing pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 22.

As part of the prehearing proceedings, Judge Greene duly issued
an Order for Pretrial Exchange dated August 25, 1992. This order
required the parties to submit a list of proposed witnesses and a
copy of each document to be offered in evidence, by September 25,
1992. The order further required that:

Evidence regarding the appropriateness of the pen-

alty proposed by complainant shall be exchanged if

there is a dispute regarding the penalty. In any case,

complainant shall be prepared to support its penalty

request. If respondent intends to assert that it can-

not afford to pay a penalty in the amount proposed

in the complaint, respondent shall exchange evidence

to support its position.
Complainant complied with this order, filing its prehearing exchange
on September 22, 1992. Respondent did not comply and did not ex-
plain his failure to do so.1!

Complainant then moved for an accelerated decision or, in the
alternative, an order on default, citing respondent’s failure to comply
with the Order for Pretrial Exchange. This motion was dated Septem-
ber 30, 1992. The certificate of service shows that the motion was

ToJudge Greene subsequently confirmed that failure to comply with the order
was a separate violation from failure to comply with the Section 114 request. Order
on Default, at 8.

11 Order on Default, at 8.

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HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 505
served on respondent by certified mail on that date.!? Respondent
did not file any reply to this motion. On December 16, 1992, having
determined that respondent’s failure to comply with the pretrial order
constitutes a default,13 Judge Greene issued the Order on Default
which has been appealed to the Board.

IL. DISCUSSION
Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we note that Region
III has urged denial of the appeal on procedural grounds, as follows:
Powell’s “Appeal and Explanation to Dismiss Order
on Default and Entire Case Matter at Bar” is defec-
tive in that it fails to set forth alternative findings
of fact, alternative conclusions of law, relevant ref-
erences to the record or the Order on Default, and
a statement of the issues presented for review, as
required by the Consolidated Rules of Practice, 40
C.F.R. § 22.30(a). Therefore, Powell’s Appeal should
be denied based on these procedural defects and the
Order on Default upheld in its entirety.
Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee, at 3-4 n.1. The fact that re-
spondent Powell, who apparently is not a lawyer, chooses to represent
himself and House Analysis & Associates does not excuse respondent
from the responsibility of complying with the applicable rules of pro-
cedure.14 However, while it is true that this appeal does not conform
in all respects to 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(a), we believe it is appropriate
to deal with it on its merits. Respondent has communicated his objec-
tions to the default order and the relief requested with sufficient
clarity to enable us to consider the substance of his appeal.®
32 Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a), any motion for a default order shall be served
on all parties and the alleged defaulting party shall have 20 days from service of
the motion to reply.
180Qrder on Default, at 8. A default also constitutes a waiver of a hearing on
the factual allegations. 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a).
14See In re Turner Copter Services, Inc., FIFRA Appeal No. 85-4, at 3 (CJO,
Nov. 5, 1985).
18See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 539
(1970) (Agency may relax procedural rules when justice so requires). See also In
re Waste Technologies Industries, RCRA Appeal Nos. 92-7 et alia, at 4 n.3 (EAB
July 24, 1992).
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506 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
A. Validity of Order on Default
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a), a party may be found in default
“after motion or sua sponte, upon failure to comply with a prehearing
or hearing order of the Presiding Officer * * .” When a Presiding
Officer finds that a default has occurred, he or she shall issue a
default order which shall constitute the initial decision. 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.17(b).16
There is no dispute that an order for Prehearing Exchange was
issued in this case, that it required the exchange of certain informa-
tion by September 25, 1992, and that respondent failed to provide
the information required. This, on its face, would appear to confirm
the validity of the issuance of the default order. However, respondent,
makes one assertion in his appeal which needs to be addressed.
He states that “[t]he only material that we ever received in matter
at bar was the original complaint. No other material or mailings
were ever received by Mr. Fred Powell.” 17
Respondent thus denies receiving either the Order on Prehearing
Exchange or Complainant’s Motion for Accelerated Decision or Motion
for Default. The Region, in its response to the appeal, discusses
at some length the various communications with respondent.18
The Order on Prehearing Exchange was served by mail on Fred
Powell on August 26, 1992. The order was apparently served by
first class rather than certified mail, and thus there is no record
of its receipt.19 However, as the Region notes, the order was served
1640 C.F.R. § 22.17(d) also provides that a Presiding Officer may set aside a
default order “for good cause shown.” Respondent did not move for setting aside
the default order pursuant to that provision.
37 Appeal at 13.
18 Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee, at 5-9.
19Tt appears that the Order on Prehearing Exchange should have been sent by
certified mail. 40 C.F.R. § 22.06 provides in part that “[clopies of such rulings, orders,
decisions, or other documents shall be served personally, or by certified mail, return
receipt requested, upon all parties by the Environmental Appeals Board, the Regional
Administrator, the Regional Judicial Officer, or the Presiding Officer, as appropriate.”
(Emphasis added.) However, we believe any objection respondent may have had in
this respect has been waived. As will be discussed subsequently, we conclude that
respondent received Complainant’s Motion for Accelerated Decision or Motion for De-
fault. According to 40 C.F.R. § 22.16(b), if no response is filed to a motion within
the designated period, “the parties may be deemed to have waived any objection
to the granting of the motion.” No response was filed. If respondent had an objection
to the issuance of a default order based on the failure to receive proper service
of the Order on Prehearing Exchange, it was incumbent upon him to raise it at
that time. Having failed to do so, any objection on this basis is deemed waived.
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HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 507
on the same business address successfully used to deliver the Section
114 letter, the compliance order, the complaint, and the Order on
Default.2° In addition, the order was referenced in Complainant’s
Prehearing Exchange, which was sent to respondent by certified mail
and signed for by Suzanne Powell.?1 It is reasonable to assume that
respondent would have inquired about the referenced order with ei-
ther Region III or Judge Greene after receiving Complainant’s Pre-
hearing Exchange or, at the latest, after receiving the Order on
Default.

As to the Motion for Accelerated Decision or Motion for Default,
it was served by Region III by certified mail, to respondent’s business
address.22 Despite two notices of attempted delivery, it was returned
to EPA marked “unclaimed.”23 Thereupon, EPA both faxed the mo-
tion to Powell at the fax number used by Powell in serving his
answer on EPA,?4 and hand-delivered it to his home, serving it upon
one Mary Burns at that address.?>

The provision governing service of documents other than the
complaint, rulings, orders, and decisions, 40 C.F.R. § 22.05, states
that such documents may be served personally or by certified or
first class mail. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 22.07(c), for documents
served by mail, “[slervice of the complaint is complete when the
return receipt is signed. Service of all other pleadings and documents
is complete upon mailing.” Thus, service was legally completed here
when the motion was properly mailed, despite respondent’s obvious
attempts to forestall its actual receipt.?6 In addition, while not essen-
tial to our ruling, we are confident that respondent did actually
receive the motion, through the fax and personal delivery.

20This is the same address used in the present appeal as well.

21 Certificate of Service and receipt, Attachment 8 to Reply Brief of Complainant-
Appellee.

22Certificate of Service, Attachment 9 to Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee.

23 Attachment 10 to Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee.

24 Attachment 11 to Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee.

25The record does not explain what relationship Ms. Burns has to the respondent,

although she took the document and entered the Powells’ house. Attachment 12 to
Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee.
26The Region argues that this result is compelled by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Reply Brief of Complainant-Appellee, at 11. However, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are not binding upon administrative agencies. In re Detroit Plastic
Molding, TSCA Appeal No. 87-7, at 7 (CJO, March 1, 1990). We reach the same
result solely in reliance upon the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 22 cited.
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508 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
In light of the foregoing, we find that respondent did indeed
default by failing to respond to the Order on Prehearing Exchange,
and that the issuance of a default order was proper.
B. The Penalty Assessed
As previously noted, Judge Greene assessed a penalty of $51,000
in accordance with the Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty
Policy dated October 25, 1991. The operative provision of the rules
relating to the assessment of a civil penalty is 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b),
which reads as follows:
(b) Amount of civil penalty. If the Presiding Officer
determines that a violation has occurred, the Presid-
ing Officer shall determine the dollar amount of the
recommended civil penalty to be assessed in the ini-
tial decision in accordance with any criteria set forth
in the Act relating to the proper amount of a civil
penalty, and must consider any civil penalty guide-
lines issued under the Act. If the Presiding Officer
decides to assess a penalty different in amount from
the penalty recommended to be assessed in the com-
plaint, the Presiding Officer shall set forth in the
initial decision the specific reasons for the increase
or decrease. The Presiding Officer shall not raise
a penalty from that recommended to be assessed in
the complaint if the respondent has defaulted.
In this instance, the Presiding Officer assessed a penalty identical
to the amount assessed in the complaint.

The explanation of how the penalty amount was derived is de-
tailed in the Order on Default,27 and respondent has not objected
to any of the specifics of the calculation contained therein. (Of course,
because respondent asserts that it has not committed any violations,
it implicitly objects to the imposition of any penalty.) We believe
the penalty policy reasonably implements the statutory criteria for
Even in default situations, a Presiding Officer has an obligation to articulate
the reasoning supporting his or her penalty assessment. In re Dworkin Electroplaters,
Docket No. RCRA-III-187, at 5-6 (ALJ, Dec. 31, 1992).

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HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 509
assessment of a penalty under the Clean Air Act? and thus will
follow it here as well.29

The calculation 2° of the penalty in the Order on Default was
as follows:
Count I:
1, Actual or possible harm:
a. Level of Violation (This amount is zero be-
cause no violation of an emission standard was
alleged.) ....ssesssessssseessessseesseeseasesnceenecnatesneessessneeeee $0.00
b. Toxicity of Pollutant (This amount is zero be-
cause no violation of an emission standard was
alleged.) ...seesssssssssssssesecssessssnseceneeesneeereeeennneressseess $0.00
c. Sensitivity of Environment (This amount is
zero because no violation of an emission stand-
ard was alleged.) ......s-cssssssssssssseersssneesessnteeeneense $0.00
d. Length of Time of Violation: (Measured from
at least April 28, 1992). .......ssesssessecsrerseesnseeeseeeee $8,000.00

2. Importance to the regulatory scheme:
   Incomplete Response to Section 114 Demand to
   Provide Information ...........::scscsesessesesesseseeeeeeees $15,000.00
3. Size of the violator: 9° (Based on an assumption
   that Respondent’s net worth is between $100,001-—
   Count II:
4. Actual or Possible Harm:
   a. Level of Violation (This amount is zero be-
   cause no violation of an emission standard was
   alleged.) ...s.sssssecssssesesstesseseeeeesenesenseneeneeneenrensesstens $0.00
   b. Toxicity of Pollutant (This amount is zero be-
   cause no violation of an emission standard was
   alleged.) ....ssesssssssessecssecsseessuseserenneetasesnsssnensssenseeese $0.00
   28 Section 113(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), specifies penalty assess-
   ment criteria for administrative and judicial penalties.
   29As stated by the Agency’s Chief Judicial Officer in discussing the Agency's
   TSCA penalty policy, the policy “facilitate[s] the application of the statutory penalty
   factors to individual cases in a systematic fashion, and thus provides a sound frame-
   work for the exercise of an appellate tribunal’s discretion.” In re ALM Corporation,
   TSCA Appeal No. 90-4, at 7 (CJO, Oct. 11, 1991). That statement is equally true
   for the Clean Air Act penalty policy.
   90This factor is considered only for Count 1 because the Penalty Policy provides
   that, when calculating a penalty for multiple violations, this factor “should be figured
   only once for all violations.” Penalty Policy, at 22.
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   510 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
   c. Sensitivity of Environment (This amount is
   zero because no violation of an emission stand-
   ard was alleged.) ......ssssssssssssssssessssnecseneeecnntessneees $0.00
   d. Length of Time of Violation: (Measured from
   at least May 6, 1992). .......sssssssecesesesresseeeneeneeee $8,000.00
5. Importance to the regulatory scheme:
   Violation of Compliance Order .........sseeeeenen $15,000.00
   TOTAL PROPOSED PENALTY: ........0+s0000000 $51,000.00
   Order on Default at 10-11. Count I relates to the Section 114 viola-
   tion and Count II to the violation of the Section 113 order. The
   Order on Default further indicated that:
   EPA considered several other factors set forth in Sec-
   tion 113(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), in deter-
   mining the appropriate penalty for violations of the
   Act. In this case, respondent had no history of viola-
   tion. No adjustment for culpability was appropriate.
   No cleanup costs were incurred by the United States
   in response to respondent’s violations. EPA has not
   argued that respondent gained substantial economic
   benefit as a result of its noncompliance. Thus the
   gravity component for Counts I and II of the Com-
   plaint remained unadjusted.
   Order on Default at 11.

We believe this calculation is correct. In this regard, we make
the following observations as to two of the factors used in the deter-
mination.

As to the importance to the regulatory scheme, the policy estab-
lishes a penalty of $15,000 for failure to respond to a Section 114
letter or a compliance order, and a range of $5,000-$15,000 for an
incomplete response.1 Given that the response to the Section 114
letter was totally lacking in substantive detail, we believe the imposi-
tion of the maximum figure within this range is appropriate.5? (Of

31 Penalty Policy, at 12-13.

32The Penalty Policy provides:

Penalty ranges are provided for incomplete notices, reports, and

recordkeeping to allow the Regions some discretion depending on

the seriousness of the omissions and how critical they are to

the regulatory program. If the source omits information in notices,

reports or records which document the source’s compliance status,
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HOUSE ANALYSIS & ASSOCIATES & FRED POWELL 511
course, since respondent failed to provide any response to the admin-
istrative order, a $15,000 penalty is appropriate for this violation
as well.)

With regard to the length of time for violation, we find the
Penalty Policy somewhat confusing. It assesses dollar figures based
on the length of violation, based on a table reading in part:

Months Dollars
o-1 $5,000
2-3 $8,000
Penalty Policy at 12. This table is not clear as to what figure applies
if the violation exceeds one month but is less than two. The fairest
reading, and the one supported by the Region’s calculations in the
complaint, is to assume that the lower figure applies to any violation
less than 2 months. So interpreted, the Policy was correctly applied
in this matter.53

Finally, we note that the respondent has never raised as a consid-
eration any alleged inability to pay the penalty amount. The penalty
policy appropriately puts the burden of demonstrating inability to
pay upon the defendant. If the violator fails to provide sufficient
information, this factor should be disregarded.?4 The Order on Pre-
hearing Exchange, with which respondent did not comply, specifically
directed respondent to provide any evidence supporting a position
that it cannot afford to pay the penalty if it wanted to assert such
a position. As previously discussed, there was no response to this
order. We therefore conclude, as did Judge Greene, that no adjust-
ment on this basis is warranted.

this omission should be treated as a failure to meet the require-
ment and assessed $15,000.
Id. at 14.

33There is some confusion in the administrative record on the date of receipt
of the Section 114 letter. The Region represents that its receipt is evidenced by
Attachment 1 to its Reply Brief but that receipt is dated May 1, 1992. This would
not appear to be correct in that respondent’s response to the letter was dated April

16, so he must have received it by no later than that date.

Using April 16 as the date of receipt, a response would have been due April
30, and two months of violation would have occurred by the date of the complaint,
thus supporting the $8,000 penalty assessed based on this factor. (The Order on
Default assesses the violation based on two months of noncompliance, measuring
it from April 28, but it is not clear why that particular date was used.)

34 Penalty Policy, at 21.

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512 ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
For these reasons, we conclude that imposition of a penalty of
$51,000 is appropriate and supported by the Penalty Policy.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in this decision, and pursuant to Sec-
tion 113(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d), respondent,
House Analysis & Associates and Fred Powell, is assessed a civil
penalty of $51,000. Payment of the full amount of the penalty as-
sessed shall be made by forwarding a cashier’s or certified check,
payable to the Treasurer of the United States, to the following ad-
dress within sixty (60) days of the date of service of this decision.
EPA Region III
Regional Hearing Clerk
P.O. Box 360515M
Pittsburgh, PA 15251
So ordered.
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