Thomas M. Walls v. XMV, Incorporated (Board decision, February 27, 2026)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s award of black lung benefits. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Thomas Walls sought black lung benefits after 23.96 years of underground coal mine work. An administrative law judge found total respiratory disability, applied the fifteen year presumption, and awarded benefits. XMV challenged the disability and rebuttal findings. The Board upheld the judge’s reliance on medical opinions supporting disability and the rejection of an employer opinion that did not adequately rule out coal dust as a cause of Walls’s restrictive lung impairment. It affirmed the benefits award.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Fifteen year presumption and rebuttal under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and 20 C.F.R. § 718.305.
• Outcome: Black lung benefits award affirmed.
• Key point: The employer’s medical opinion did not adequately rule out coal dust exposure as a cause of the impairment.

Full text (BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 25-0135 BLA

THOMAS M. WALLS
)
)
Claimant-Respondent
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)
v. )
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NOT-PUBLISHED
XMV, INCORPORATED
)
)
Employer-Petitioner
) DATE ISSUED: 02/27/2026
)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
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COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
)
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
)
)
Party-in-Interest
)
DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order Awarding Benefits of Theodore W. Annos, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Joseph E. Wolfe and Donna E. Sonner (Wolfe Williams & Austin), Norton, Virginia, for Claimant.

T. Jonathan Cook (Cipriani & Werner, PC), Charleston, West Virginia, for Employer.

Before: GRESH, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, JONES and ULMER, Administrative Appeals Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Employer appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Theodore W. Annos’s Decision and Order Awarding Benefits (2020-BLA-05467) rendered on a claim filed on March 1, 2018,1 pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§901-944 (2018) (Act).

The ALJ found Claimant established 23.96 years of underground coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(b)(2). Thus he concluded Claimant invoked the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(4) of the Act.2 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018). He further found Employer did not rebut the presumption and awarded benefits.

On appeal, Employer argues the ALJ erred in finding Claimant is totally disabled and thereby invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. It also contends the ALJ erred in finding it did not rebut the presumption.3 Claimant responds in support of the award of benefits. The Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, declined to file a response.

The Benefits Review Board’s scope of review is defined by statute. We must affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order if it is rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law.4 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C.
§932(a); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1965).

1 Claimant previously filed three claims that he subsequently withdrew. Director’s Exhibits 1-3. A withdrawn claim is considered “not to have been filed.” 20 C.F.R.
§725.306(b). He took no further action on any of these claims until filing his current claim. Director’s Exhibit 5.
2 Section 411(c)(4) provides a rebuttable presumption that a miner is totally disabled

due to pneumoconiosis if he has at least fifteen years of underground or substantially similar surface coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory impairment. 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018); see 20 C.F.R. §718.305.
3 We affirm, as unchallenged on appeal, the ALJ’s finding that Claimant established

23.96 years of qualifying coal mine employment. Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-710, 1-711 (1983); Decision and Order at 5-7.
4 This Board will apply the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit because Claimant performed his last coal mine employment in West Virginia. See Shupe v. Director, OWCP, 12 BLR 1-200, 1-202 (1989) (en banc); Hearing Transcript at 13.

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 Invocation of the Section 411(c)(4) Presumption – Total Disability

A miner is totally disabled if his pulmonary or respiratory impairment, standing alone, prevents him from performing his usual coal mine work and comparable gainful work. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(1). A claimant may establish total disability based on pulmonary function studies, arterial blood gas studies, evidence of pneumoconiosis and cor pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart failure, or medical opinions. 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(b)(2)(i)-(iv). The ALJ must weigh all relevant supporting evidence against all relevant contrary evidence. See Defore v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 12 BLR 1-27, 1-28-29 (1988); Rafferty v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 9 BLR 1-231, 1-232 (1987); Shedlock v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 9 BLR 1-195, 1-198 (1986), aff’d on recon., 9 BLR 1-236 (1987) (en banc). Qualifying evidence in any of the four categories establishes total disability when there is no “contrary probative evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2). The ALJ found Claimant established total disability based on the medical opinion evidence and the evidence as a whole.5 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv); Decision and Order at 14-15.

Employer asserts the ALJ erred in his consideration of the medical opinion evidence. Employer’s Brief at 3-5. We disagree.

Before weighing the medical opinions, the ALJ found Claimant’s usual coal mine employment was working as an electrician and mechanic, which required “a medium to heavy level of exertion.”6 Decision and Order at 4. The ALJ then considered the medical opinions of Drs. Nader, Habre, and McSharry. Id. at 14-15.

Dr. Nader opined Claimant is totally disabled from a pulmonary standpoint based on his abnormal arterial blood gas studies. Director’s Exhibit 14. He reviewed additional medical records and, in a supplemental report, reiterated his opinion that Claimant is totally disabled based on his arterial blood gas studies; his signs of chronic cough, wheezing, and shortness of breath; and his decrease in diffusion capacity. Director’s Exhibit 22. Dr. Habre diagnosed a disabling lung disease based on his examination; Claimant’s medical and work history, including symptoms of cough, shortness of breath, and obstructive airway disease/chronic bronchitis; and diagnostic testing evidencing obstructive lung disease. Claimant’s Exhibit 2. Dr. McSharry examined Claimant on January 24, 2019,

5 The ALJ found Claimant did not establish total disability based on the pulmonary

function studies or arterial blood gas studies, and there is no evidence of cor pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart failure. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i)-(iii); Decision and Order at 8-13.
6 We affirm, as unchallenged on appeal, the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s last coal

mine job required a medium to heavy level of exertion. See Skrack, 6 BLR at 1-711; Decision and Order at 4.

3 and reviewed Dr. Nader’s report and findings. Director’s Exhibit 26. He found “no evidence of pulmonary impairment” as Claimant’s pulmonary function and blood gas studies were “essentially normal.” Id. at 4. Subsequently, Dr. McSharry evaluated Claimant again on May 16, 2022, reviewed additional records, and diagnosed a moderate restrictive lung disease that precludes Claimant from performing his usual coal mine employment. Employer’s Exhibit 4 at 2.

The ALJ found Drs. Nader, Habre, and McSharry are all board-certified pulmonologists and well-qualified to provide a disability opinion. Decision and Order at

14. He further found that each physician possessed a detailed understanding of the
    exertional requirements of Claimant’s coal mine work, that their unanimous conclusions of total disability are consistent with the deficits identified in Claimant’s treatment records, and that their diagnoses of total disability are therefore well-reasoned. Id. Thus, he found the medical opinion evidence establishes total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv) and total disability is established based on the record as a whole. Id. 14-15.

    Employer first argues the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. McSharry’s initial opinion
    as to an absence of a disabling impairment. It asserts the ALJ, in discounting Dr. McSharry’s opinion as insufficiently reasoned, relied on “an improper reading of regulatory language prohibiting exclusive reliance on radiographs to disprove legal pneumoconiosis.”7 Employer’s Brief at 5. We reject this argument as it conflates the ALJ’s findings as to the existence of disability and disease, which are separate elements of entitlement under the Act.8 See 20 C.F.R. §§718.202(a), 718.204(b)(2). The relevant inquiry at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2) is whether Claimant has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment; the existence of pneumoconiosis is addressed at 20 C.F.R.
    §718.202(a), or in consideration of rebuttal of the Section 411(c)(4) presumption pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §718.305. See 20 C.F.R. §§718.202(a), 718.204(b)(2), 718.305(d); see also Bosco v. Twin Pines Coal Co., 892 F.2d 1473, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1989). Here, although Dr. McSharry initially opined Claimant is not disabled, the ALJ found Dr. McSharry’s subsequent supplemental opinion, that Claimant is totally disabled, reflects his “ultimate” conclusion on the issue of total disability. Decision and Order at 14 n.69. As Employer’s

    7 “Legal pneumoconiosis” includes any chronic lung disease or impairment and its
    sequelae arising out of coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. §718.201(a)(2). The definition includes “any chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. §718.201(b).
    8 The ALJ addressed Dr. McSharry’s reliance on negative x-ray evidence in
    discounting his opinion as insufficient to rebut the presumption of pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 17.

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    assertion concerning the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. McSharry’s opinion as to legal pneumoconiosis has no bearing on this finding, we affirm it. See Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 528, 533 (4th Cir. 1998); Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 441 (4th Cir. 1997).

    Employer additionally argues the ALJ erred in crediting the total disability
    

    diagnoses of Drs. Nader, Habre, and McSharry as well-reasoned because they are contrary to the ALJ’s findings that the pulmonary function and blood gas studies do not establish total disability. Employer’s Brief at 4. Contrary to Employer’s contention, even if total disability cannot be established at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i) or (ii), “total disability may nevertheless be found if a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, concludes that a miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition prevents” him from performing his usual coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv). As Drs. Nader, Habre, and McSharry predicated their opinions on their evaluations of Claimant and as the ALJ found each physician understood the medium-to-heavy exertional demands of Claimant’s usual coal mine work, the ALJ permissibly found their opinions sufficient to establish total disability. See Lane v. Union Carbide Corp., 105 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1997); Eagle v. Armco, Inc., 943 F.2d 509, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1991); Walker v. Director, OWCP, 927 F.2d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1991); Decision and Order at 14. We thus affirm the ALJ’s finding that the unanimous medical opinion evidence establishes total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv). See Hicks, 138 F.3d at 533; Akers, 131 F.3d at 441.

    As Employer raises no other challenge to the ALJ’s findings, we affirm his
    determination that Claimant established total disability based on the record as a whole, Rafferty, 9 BLR at 1-232, and thereby invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(b)(1); see Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-710, 1-711 (1983); Decision and Order at 15.

                 Rebuttal of the Section 411(c)(4) Presumption
    
    Because Claimant invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption, the burden shifted to
    

    Employer to establish he has neither legal nor clinical pneumoconiosis, 9 or that “no part of
    [his] respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in

    9 “Clinical pneumoconiosis” consists of “those diseases recognized by the medical
    community as pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R.
    §718.201(a)(1).

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    [20 C.F.R.] §718.201.” 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i), (ii). The ALJ found Employer failed to establish rebuttal by either method.10 Decision and Order at 15-19.

    Legal Pneumoconiosis

    To disprove legal pneumoconiosis, Employer must establish Claimant does not have
    a chronic lung disease or impairment “significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. §§718.201(a)(2), (b), 718.305(d)(1)(i)(A); Va. CWP Fund v. Director, OWCP [Smith], 880 F.3d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 2018); Minich v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 25 BLR 1-149, 1-155 n.8 (2015).

    Employer relies only on the opinion of Dr. McSharry to rebut the presumption. 11
    Decision and Order at 16-17. Dr. McSharry opined Claimant has moderate restrictive lung disease due to suspected pulmonary fibrosis of unknown cause.12 Employer’s Exhibit 4 at
    2. Dr. McSharry explained:

    Radiographically, there is no evidence of coal-related injury to [Claimant’s]
    lungs or fibrosis that would account for his disease process. Many fibrotic
    diseases of lungs exist and are unrelated to coal dust exposure. For this
    reason, I do not feel that legal pneumoconiosis has been demonstrated to a
    reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Id. The ALJ found Dr. McSharry’s reliance on negative x-ray evidence of clinical pneumoconiosis to be an unpersuasive reason for eliminating coal dust exposure as a contributing cause of Claimant’s restrictive lung disease. Decision and Order at 17. Specifically, the ALJ explained Dr. McSharry’s opinion is contrary to the regulatory recognition that legal pneumoconiosis can exist independent of clinical pneumoconiosis

10 Because the ALJ found Employer failed to disprove the existence of legal pneumoconiosis, he declined to address the issue of whether Employer disproved the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis on the ground that even if successful on that issue Employer would still fail to satisfy the rebuttal standard at 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i). Decision and Order at 18.
11 The ALJ correctly observed that Drs. Nader and Habre diagnosed Claimant with

legal pneumoconiosis and therefore their opinions do not aid Employer in rebutting the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Decision and Order at 18; Director’s Exhibits 14, 22; Claimant’s Exhibit 2.
12 Dr. McSharry stated the cause of Claimant’s restriction is “uncertain;” however,

“based on the medications he has been prescribed by his pulmonary physician, I suspect he is being treated for a form of pulmonary fibrosis.” Employer’s Exhibit 4 at 2.

6 and Dr. McSharry otherwise did not explain why Claimant’s lengthy history of coal dust exposure could not have substantially aggravated his restriction. Decision and Order at 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. §718.201(b); Harman Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP [Looney], 678 F.3d 305, 313 (4th Cir. 2012); 65 Fed. Reg. 79920, 79971 (Dec. 20, 2000)). Thus, he found Dr. McSharry’s opinion insufficient to rebut the presumption of legal pneumoconiosis and Employer therefore failed to disprove the disease. Id. at 17-18.

In challenging the ALJ’s conclusion, Employer asserts only that the “ALJ’s rejection of Dr. McSharry’s opinion for purportedly relying on [negative] x-rays misapplies [Looney, 678 F.3d at 313], which prohibits reliance solely on negative x-rays to disprove legal pneumoconiosis, but does not prohibit their use as part of a broader clinical judgment.” Employer’s Brief at 5-6. However, it is Employer’s burden at 20 C.F.R.
§718.305(d)(1)(i)(A) to disprove legal pneumoconiosis. Smith, 880 F.3d at 695, 699; Minich, 25 BLR at 1-155 n.8. As Employer concedes Looney supports discounting a physician’s opinion at rebuttal for reliance on negative x-ray evidence, and the ALJ discounted Dr. McSharry’s opinion as to an absence of legal pneumoconiosis for reliance on negative x-ray evidence, Employer’s assertion that the ALJ misapplied Looney is misplaced. 678 F.3d at 313.

Although Employer generally asserts Dr. McSharry’s opinion is sufficient to rebut the presumed existence of legal pneumoconiosis, it identifies no error in the ALJ’s finding that Dr. McSharry failed to adequately explain how he eliminated Claimant’s history of coal dust exposure as a contributing factor in his respiratory impairment. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. Owens, 724 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2013); Looney, 678 F.3d at 313-14; Hicks, 138 F.3d at 533; Clark v. Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 12 BLR 1-149, 1-155 (1989) (en banc); Decision and Order at 17; Employer’s Brief at 5-6. We thus reject Employer’s assertion as a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Anderson v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 12 BLR 1-111, 1-113 (1989); Employer’s Brief at 5-6.

Because the ALJ permissibly discredited the only opinion supportive of Employer’s burden on rebuttal, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to disprove pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i).

Disability Causation

The ALJ next considered whether Employer established “no part of [Claimant’s] respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in [20 C.F.R.] § 718.201.” 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); Decision and Order at 18-19. The ALJ discredited Dr. McSharry because he did not diagnose legal pneumoconiosis, contrary to the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to disprove the disease. See Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling, 783 F.3d 498, 504-05 (4th Cir. 2015); Decision and Order at 19. As Employer does not challenge this finding apart from asserting the ALJ erred in discounting Dr.

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McSharry as to legal pneumoconiosis, we affirm it. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); see Skrack, 6 BLR at 1-711; Decision and Order at 18-19. Consequently, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to establish no part of Claimant’s total respiratory disability is due to legal pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); see Minich, 25 BLR at 154- 56; Decision and Order at 19.

Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Awarding Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

DANIEL T. GRESH, Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge

GLENN E. ULMER
Administrative Appeals Judge

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