Jerry D. Edwards v. Island Creek Coal Company (Board decision, September 26, 2025)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge's award of black lung benefits because the employer did not rebut the statutory presumption. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Jerry Edwards qualified for the 15-year black lung presumption after a judge found more than 28 years of qualifying coal mine work and a totally disabling respiratory impairment. Island Creek Coal argued that his impairment resulted from lung cancer and surgery rather than coal mine dust. The judge found the employer's doctors had not adequately explained why dust exposure played no contributing or aggravating role. The Board upheld that assessment and held that identifying another cause did not, by itself, rebut the presumption of legal pneumoconiosis. It also upheld the finding that the employer had not ruled out pneumoconiosis as a cause of Edwards's disability. The benefits award was affirmed.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Fifteen-year presumption under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and 20 C.F.R. § 718.305.
• Outcome: Black lung benefits award affirmed.
• Key point: Evidence of cancer and lung surgery did not eliminate coal mine dust as a contributing or aggravating cause of impairment.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board 200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 25-0057 BLA

JERRY D. EDWARDS
)
)
Claimant-Respondent
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)
v. )
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NOT-PUBLISHED
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY
)
)
Employer-Petitioner
) DATE ISSUED: 09/26/2025
)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
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COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
)
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
)
)
Party-in-Interest
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DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order Awarding Benefits of William P. Farley, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

John R. Sigmond (Penn, Stuart & Eskridge), Bristol, Virginia, for Employer.

Before: ROLFE and JONES, Administrative Appeals Judges, and ULMER, Acting Administrative Appeals Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Employer appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) William P. Farley’s Decision and Order Awarding Benefits (2020-BLA-05563) rendered on a subsequent claim filed on October 29, 2018,1 pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§901- 944 (2018) (Act).

The ALJ found Claimant established 28.87 years of qualifying coal mine employment and has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(b)(2). Thus, he found Claimant invoked the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(4) of the Act.2 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018). He further found Employer did not rebut the presumption and awarded benefits. 3

On appeal, Employer contends the ALJ erred in finding it did not rebut the Section 411(c)(4) presumption.4 Neither Claimant nor the Acting Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, has filed a response brief.

The Benefits Review Board’s scope of review is defined by statute. We must affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order if it is rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in

1 Claimant filed a prior claim for benefits on October 26, 2001, which was denied

on June 2, 2003. Director’s Exhibit 47 at 5; Decision and Order at 3. With the exception of the report and testing from the September 3, 2002 Department-sponsored pulmonary evaluation of Claimant, the record from his prior claim is unavailable. Decision and Order at 3. Because Claimant’s prior claim record is unavailable, the ALJ assumed the claim was denied for failure to establish any element of entitlement. Decision and Order at 3.
2 Section 411(c)(4) provides a rebuttable presumption that a miner is totally disabled

due to pneumoconiosis if he has at least fifteen years of underground or substantially similar surface coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018); see 20 C.F.R. §718.305.
3 When a miner files a claim for benefits more than one year after the denial of a

previous claim becomes final, the ALJ must also deny the subsequent claim unless he finds that “one of the applicable conditions of entitlement . . . has changed since the date upon which the order denying the prior claim became final.” 20 C.F.R. §725.309(c); White v. New White Coal Co., 23 BLR 1-1, 1-3 (2004). The “applicable conditions of entitlement” are “those conditions upon which the prior denial was based.” 20 C.F.R. §725.309(c)(3). Because the ALJ proceeded as if Claimant did not establish any element of entitlement in his prior claim, he had to submit evidence establishing at least one element to obtain review of the merits of his current claim. Decision and Order at 3.
4 We affirm, as unchallenged on appeal, the ALJ’s determination that Claimant invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 BLR 1- 710, 1-711 (1983); Decision and Order at 5-9, 25-29.

2 accordance with applicable law.5 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C.
§932(a); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman and Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Rebuttal of the Section 411(c)(4) Presumption

Because Claimant invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption, the burden shifted to Employer to establish he has neither legal nor clinical pneumoconiosis, 6 or that “no part of [his] respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in [20 C.F.R.] § 718.201.” 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i), (ii). The ALJ found Employer failed to establish rebuttal by either method. Decision and Order at 30-39. Employer challenges only the ALJ’s findings that it failed to rebut the presumption of legal pneumoconiosis and disability causation. Employer’s Brief at 2-11. We therefore affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to rebut the presumed existence of clinical pneumoconiosis. See Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co.¸ 6 BLR 1-710, 1-711 (1983); Decision and Order at 37.

Legal Pneumoconiosis

To disprove legal pneumoconiosis, Employer must establish Claimant does not have a chronic lung disease or impairment “significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. §§718.201(a)(2), (b), 718.305(d)(1)(i)(A); see Minich v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 25 BLR 1-149, 1-155 n.8 (2015).

5 The Board will apply the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit because Claimant performed his coal mine employment in Virginia. See Shupe v. Director, OWCP, 12 BLR 1-200, 1-202 (1989) (en banc); Hearing Transcript at 21.
6 “Legal pneumoconiosis” includes any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. §718.201(a)(2). The definition includes “any chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. §718.201(b). “Clinical pneumoconiosis” consists of “those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. §718.201(a)(1).

3
Employer relies on the opinions of Drs. Sargent and McSharry to rebut the presumption.7 Decision and Order at 35-36. Dr. Sargent diagnosed Claimant with a “moderate decrease in diffusion capacity” and “arterial oxygen desaturation with exercise” due to his cancer-related lung resection and not coal mine dust exposure. Director’s Exhibit 25 at 2; Employer’s Exhibits 3, 11. Citing Claimant’s normal spirometry, Dr. Sargent explained he eliminated a diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis because normal spirometry “is a finding that can occasionally be seen in nonsmoking individuals without significant intrinsic lung disease who undergo lobectomy.” Director’s Exhibit 25 at 4. Dr. McSharry similarly diagnosed “moderate” “exertional arterial desaturation” due to Claimant’s history of lung cancer with partial lung resection and not coal mine dust exposure; he explained there is “no evidence to suggest” that coal dust exposure affected Claimant’s lung function. Employer’s Exhibits 1 at 3-4; 7 at 4. The ALJ found Drs. Sargent’s and McSharry’s opinions not well-reasoned because they did not adequately explain how they eliminated Claimant’s significant coal mine dust exposure as a contributing or aggravating cause of his pulmonary impairment. Decision and Order at 35-36. Thus, he found their opinions insufficient to rebut the presumption of legal pneumoconiosis. Id. at 36. Employer challenges this finding.

Employer argues “[t]he evidence proves that no part of the [C]laimant’s impairment or disability was caused by coal mine dust exposure or coal workers’ pneumoconiosis,” because Drs. Sargent and McSharry expressed “certainty” as to Claimant’s lung cancer and resection causing his impairment and Dr. Mabe agreed that these conditions may contribute to his impairment. Employer’s Brief at 6, 9. We reject Employer’s argument as it misunderstands Employer’s burden at rebuttal. As mentioned above, because Claimant invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption that his totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment is due to pneumoconiosis, the burden shifted to Employer to establish he has neither legal nor clinical pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i)(A). In this context, any chronic pulmonary disease or impairment that Claimant has is presumed to be significantly related to, and substantially aggravated by, coal mine dust exposure. Thus, as the ALJ observed, the relevant question at rebuttal is not whether Employer established Claimant’s cancer and lung resection as causes of impairment, but whether it disproved coal mine dust exposure as a contributing or substantially aggravating factor in his cancer and lobectomy-related impairment. Decision and Order at 36; see Va. CWP Fund v. Director, OWCP [Smith], 880 F.3d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 2018); Mingo Logan

7 The ALJ correctly observed that Dr. Mabe diagnosed Claimant with legal pneumoconiosis and therefore his opinion does not aid Employer in rebutting the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Decision and Order at 35; Director’s Exhibits 15, 30.

4
Coal Co. v. Owens, 724 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2013); Harman Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP [Looney], 678 F.3d 305, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2012).

The ALJ found Drs. Sargent and McSharry based their opinions on generalities and failed to explain how they determined that the degree of Claimant’s desaturation is fully consistent with the amount of lung tissue resected; he thus found their bases for excluding a diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis unpersuasive. Decision and Order at 36; see Director’s Exhibit 25; Employer’s Exhibits 1, 7, 11. He further found Dr. Sargent’s reliance on the timing of Claimant’s lung deterioration beginning nearly twenty years after he left the mines inconsistent with the regulation’s recognition of pneumoconiosis as a latent and progressive disease. Decision and Order at 36; see 20 C.F.R. §718.201(c); 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,970-72 (Dec. 20, 2000); Director’s Exhibit 25 at 4. As Employer identifies no specific error in the ALJ’s stated bases for finding the opinions of Drs. Sargent and McSharry inadequately reasoned, we affirm his credibility determinations. See Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard, 876 F.3d 663, 671-72 n.4 (4th Cir. 2017); Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling, 783 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2015); Decision and Order at 36.

Employer’s argument amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we are not empowered to do. Anderson v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 12 BLR 1-111, 1-113 (1989); Employer’s Brief at 9-10. We thus affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to disprove pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(i).

Disability Causation

The ALJ next considered whether Employer established “no part of [Claimant’s] respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in [20 C.F.R.] § 718.201.” 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); Decision and Order at 38-39. The ALJ discredited the disability causation opinions of Drs. Sargent and McSharry because they did not diagnose legal pneumoconiosis, contrary to his finding that Employer failed to disprove the disease. See Epling, 783 F.3d at 504-05; Decision and Order at 39. As Employer does not specifically identify any error in the ALJ’s credibility findings, we affirm them. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); see Skrack, 6 BLR at 1-711; Decision and Order at 38-39. As it is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to establish no part of Claimant’s total respiratory disability is due to legal pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d)(1)(ii); see Minich, 25 BLR at 154-56; Decision and Order at 39.

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Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Awarding Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge

GLENN E. ULMER
Acting Administrative Appeals Judge