Edmund G. Edwards v. Betty B Coal Company, Incorporated (Board decision, July 29, 2025)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the award of black lung benefits after remand. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Edmund Edwards filed a subsequent black lung claim after an earlier denial. On remand, the judge found that qualifying pulmonary function studies and medical opinions established total disability, and awarded benefits under the fifteen year coal mine employment presumption. Betty B Coal argued that the remand process denied it a chance to submit more briefing and that the medical evidence did not establish disability. The Board held that the employer had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and argument before the original hearing and had not requested further procedures on remand. It upheld the judge's evaluation of the pulmonary studies and medical opinions, and affirmed the benefits award.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Fifteen year presumption under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); subsequent claim rule under 20 C.F.R. § 725.309.
• Outcome: Benefits award on remand affirmed.
• Key point: A remand for further consideration did not require a new hearing when the Board had not directed one and the employer had not requested additional procedures.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board 200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 24-0418 BLA

EDMUND G. EDWARDS
)
)
Claimant-Respondent
)
)
v. )
)
BETTY B COAL COMPANY,
)
INCORPORATED
)
NOT-PUBLISHED
)
and
)
) DATE ISSUED: 07/29/2025
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY
)
)
Employer/Carrier-Petitioners )
)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
)
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
)
LABOR
)
)
Party-in-Interest
)
DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision on Remand of Christopher Larsen, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Joseph N. Stepp (Two Rivers Law Group P.C.), Christiansburg, Virginia, for Employer and its Carrier.

Kathleen H. Kim (Jonathan Snare, Deputy Solicitor of Labor; Jennifer Feldman Jones, Acting Associate Solicitor; William M. Bush, Acting Counsel for Administrative Appeals), Washington, D.C., for the Acting Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor.

Before: GRESH, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, ROLFE, Administrative Appeals Judge, and ULMER, Acting Administrative Appeals Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Employer and its Carrier (Employer) appeal Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Christopher Larsen’s Decision on Remand (2019-BLA-05024) rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§901-944 (2018) (Act). This case involves a subsequent claim1 filed on December 19, 2016, and is before the Benefits Review Board for the second time.2

In his August 26, 2020 Decision and Order – Denying Benefits, ALJ Larsen (the ALJ) accepted the parties’ stipulation that Claimant has 29.98 years of underground coal mine employment and pneumoconiosis arising from such coal mine employment . However, he found Claimant did not establish a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2), and therefore did not invoke the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(4) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018),3 or establish a change in an applicable condition of entitlement, 20 C.F.R.
§725.309(c).4 Thus, he denied benefits.

1 This is Claimant’s second claim for benefits. Director’s Exhibits 1, 3. On December 3, 1997, the district director denied his prior claim, filed on September 29, 1997, for failing to establish any element of entitlement. Director’s Exhibit 1 at 309, 361.
2 We incorporate the procedural history of this case as set forth in Edwards v. Betty

B Coal Co., BRB No. 20-0541 BLA (Dec. 21, 2021) (unpub.).
3 Section 411(c)(4) of the Act provides a rebuttable presumption that a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if he has at least fifteen years of underground or substantially similar surface coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018); see 20 C.F.R. §718.305.
4 When a miner files a claim for benefits more than one year after the denial of a

previous claim becomes final, the ALJ must also deny the subsequent claim unless he finds that “one of the applicable conditions of entitlement . . . has changed since the date upon which the order denying the prior claim became final.” 20 C.F.R. §725.309(c); see White v. New White Coal Co., 23 BLR 1-1, 1-3 (2004). The “applicable conditions of 2
Considering Claimant’s initial appeal, the Board vacated the ALJ’s finding that Claimant did not establish total disability based on the pulmonary function study evidence at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i) as the ALJ did not adequately explain his validity or credibility findings. Edwards v. Betty B Coal Co., BRB No. 20-0541 BLA, slip op. at 4-7 (Dec. 21, 2021) (unpub.), aff’d on recon., Edwards v. Betty B Coal Co., BRB No. 20-0541 BLA (June 28, 2022) (unpub.); 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i). Because the ALJ’s weighing of the pulmonary function study evidence affected his weighing of the medical opinion evidence at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv), the Board also vacated his findings that the medical opinion evidence -- and record as a whole -- do not establish total disability and remanded the case for further consideration. Edwards, BRB No. 20-0541 BLA, slip op. at 8-9; 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2).

In his Decision on Remand, the ALJ found Claimant has 29.98 years of underground coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary condition. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2). Thus, he found Claimant invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption and established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement. 20 C.F.R.
§725.309(c). He further found Employer did not rebut the presumption and awarded benefits.

On appeal, Employer argues the ALJ deprived it of due process by failing to afford the parties an opportunity to be heard on remand. On the merits, it argues the ALJ erred in finding Claimant established total disability and invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption.5 Claimant has not filed a response brief. The Acting Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (the Director), filed a response, urging rejection of Employer’s due process argument. Employer filed a reply reiterating its due process arguments.

The Board’s scope of review is defined by statute. We must affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order if it is rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance

entitlement” are “those conditions upon which the prior denial was based.” 20 C.F.R.
§725.309(c)(3). Because Claimant failed to establish any element of entitlement in his prior claim, Claimant must submit new evidence establishing at least one element to obtain review of the claim on the merits. See 20 C.F.R. §725.309(c)(3); see also White, 23 BLR at 1-3; Director’s Exhibit 1 at 309.
5 We affirm, as unchallenged on appeal, the ALJ’s finding Claimant has 29.98 years

of qualifying coal mine employment. See Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-710, 1-711 (1983); Decision on Remand at 5.

3 with applicable law.6 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1965).

Due Process Challenge

Employer contends “a remand order must be generally construed as an order for a new trial” and the ALJ thus erred in failing to provide it with opportunity to submit a post- remand brief framing its position and evidence in light of the Board’s decision remanding the case. Employer’s Brief at 12-13; Employer’s Reply at 2-5. The Director argues the ALJ did not deny Employer the opportunity to request a new hearing or submit a supplemental brief; rather, the Director asserts Employer failed to raise the issue before the ALJ on remand and thus forfeited it. Director’s Brief at 2. We agree with the Director’s argument.

Following a remand from the Board, although an ALJ “may” reopen the hearing either on his “own motion or for good cause shown by a party,” he is not required to do so absent an explicit directive by the Board. 20 C.F.R. §§725.454, 725.455(c), 802.405(a). The Board’s prior Decision and Order, dated December 21, 2021, vacated the ALJ’s original Decision and Order in part and remanded the case for the ALJ to reconsider whether Claimant established total disability based on the pulmonary function studies and medical opinion evidence. Edwards, BRB No. 20-0541 BLA, slip op. at 8-9. But the Board did not direct the ALJ to reopen the record, hold a new hearing, or issue a post - remand briefing schedule. The ALJ was therefore under no obligation to provide the parties with an opportunity to submit further briefing or to issue additional procedural notices before rendering his decision on remand. 20 C.F.R. §§725.455(c), 802.405(a).

Due process in this context requires only that Employer be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which includes the opportunity to present evidence and argument before the ALJ in the original hearing. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Borda, 171 F.3d 175, 183 (4th Cir. 1999); Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Lockhart], 137 F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998). The “due process right to be heard compels the government to listen, but not the defendant to speak.” Betty B Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Stanley], 194 F.3d 491, 503 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Arguments not raised before the ALJ are forfeited. See Edd Potter Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Salmons], 39 F.4th 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2022) (forfeiture

6 This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit because Claimant performed his coal mine employment in Virginia. See Shupe v. Director, OWCP, 12 BLR 1-200, 1-202 (1989) (en banc); Director’s Exhibits 1 at 362; 7.

4 results when a party fails to raise an issue at the appropriate time); Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, OWCP [Davis], 987 F.3d 581, 591 (6th Cir. 2021) (parties forfeit arguments before the Board not first raised to the ALJ).

During the initial pendency of this case before the ALJ, Employer actively litigated the claim, submitted evidence, and submitted a post-hearing brief. On December 21, 2021, the Board remanded the claim for further consideration of record evidence. Edwards, BRB No. 20-0541 BLA, slip op. at 8-9. On June 28, 2022, pursuant to Employer’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Board reaffirmed its December 21, 2021 decision to remand the case for further consideration. Edwards v. Betty B Coal Co., BRB No. 20-0541 BLA, slip op. at 2 (June 28, 2022) (unpub.). At no point during the interim period between the Board’s issuing its Decision and Order on Reconsideration and the ALJ’s issuing his August 1, 2024 Decision on Remand did Employer file a motion requesting leave to file a post- remand brief, seek any procedural clarification, or request a status conference. The record reflects only that Employer submitted copies of the Board’s Decision and Orders under a neutral cover letter stating, “As requested by your clerk, please find enclosed a copy of that Decision and Order, as well as a copy of the Benefit[s] Review Board’s June 28, 2022 Decision and Order on Reconsideration, affirming the December 21, 2021 decision.” Employer’s May 20, 2024 Letter. Contrary to Employer’s assertion, this submission cannot reasonably be construed as either a request for further briefing or request for procedural clarification. Employer’s Reply at 3. As Employer did not raise any procedural objection below, it may not raise this due process claim for the first time on appeal. See Salmons, 39 F.4th at 206; Stanley, 194 F.3d at 503. Moreover, Employer does not assert any prejudice resulting from the absence of briefing on remand. Employer’s Brief at 11- 3; Employer’s Reply at 2-5. We therefore find no violation of Employer’s due process rights. See Borda, 171 F.3d at 183; Lockhart, 137 F.3d at 808.

Invocation of the Section 411(c)(4) Presumption - Total Disability

To invoke the Section 411(c)(4) presumption, a claimant must establish he has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(b)(1)(iii). A miner is totally disabled if his pulmonary or respiratory impairment, standing alone, prevents him from performing his usual coal mine work or comparable gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(1). A claimant may establish total disability based on qualifying pulmonary function or arterial blood gas studies, 7 evidence of

7 A “qualifying” pulmonary function study or arterial blood gas study yields results

equal to or less than the applicable table values contained in Appendices B and C of 20 C.F.R. Part 718, respectively. A “non-qualifying” study yields results exceeding those values. See 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i), (ii).

5 pneumoconiosis and cor pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart failure, or medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i)-(iv). The ALJ must weigh all relevant supporting evidence against all relevant contrary evidence. See Defore v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 12 BLR 1-27, 1-28-29 (1988); Rafferty v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 9 BLR 1-231, 1-232 (1987); Shedlock v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 9 BLR 1-195, 1-198 (1986), aff’d on recon., 9 BLR 1-236 (1987) (en banc).

The ALJ found Claimant established total disability based on the pulmonary function studies, medical opinions, and evidence as a whole. 8 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i), (iv); Decision on Remand at 7-24. Employer challenges these findings.

Pulmonary Function Studies

The ALJ considered three pulmonary function studies dated February 20, 2017, July 24, 2017, and October 18, 2017. Decision on Remand at 8-14. The February 20, 2017 study produced qualifying results before and after the administration of a bronchodilator. Director’s Exhibit 12 at 12. The July 24, 2017 study produced qualifying pre- bronchodilator results and did not include post-bronchodilator testing. Director’s Exhibit 15 at 2-3. The October 18, 2017 study produced non-qualifying results before and after the administration of a bronchodilator. Employer’s Exhibit 6. The ALJ rejected Dr. Fino’s invalidation of the February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary function studies and found all the studies are valid and reliable.9 Decision on Remand at 9-14. Further finding the contemporaneous studies equally probative, the ALJ found the preponderance of the pulmonary function studies establishes Claimant has a qualifying pulmonary impairment. Decision on Remand at 14. Thus, he found the pulmonary function study evidence supports a finding of total disability. Id. We see no error in this finding.

When weighing pulmonary function studies, an ALJ must determine whether they are in substantial compliance with the regulatory quality standards. 20 C.F.R.
§§718.101(b), 718.103(c); 20 C.F.R. Part 718, Appendix B; see Keener v. Peerless Eagle Coal Co., 23 BLR 1-229, 1-237 (2007) (en banc). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, compliance with the quality standards is presumed. 20 C.F.R. §718.103(c); see

8 The ALJ found the arterial blood gas studies do not support a finding of total

disability and there is no evidence that Claimant has cor pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart failure. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(ii), (iii); Decision on Remand at 14-15.
9 Dr. Fino invalidated the qualifying results of the February 20 and July 24, 2017

pulmonary function studies as “not acceptable;” he explained the spirometry for both tests were “invalid because of premature termination of exhalation and a lack of reproducibility in expiratory tracings and abrupt onset to exhalation.” Employer’s Exhibit 7 at 7.

6
Vivian v. Director, OWCP, 7 BLR 1-360, 1-361 (1984) (party challenging the validity of a study has the burden to establish the results are unreliable); 20 C.F.R. Part 718, Appendix B. If a study does not precisely conform to the quality standards, but is in substantial compliance, it “constitute[s] evidence of the fact for which it is proffered.” 20 C.F.R.
§718.101(b). The ALJ, in his role as the factfinder, must determine the probative weight to assign the study. See Orek v. Director, OWCP, 10 BLR 1-51, 1-54-55 (1987).

Contrary to Employer’s argument, the ALJ permissibly found Dr. Fino’s opinion as to the invalidity of both the February 20 and July 24, 2017 studies inadequately explained and unpersuasive because the report accompanying each study indicated the studies met the American Thoracic Society standard for reproducibility. Vivian, 7 BLR at 1-361; see Piney Mountain Coal Co. v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 756 (4th Cir. 1999); Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 533 (4th Cir. 1998); Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 441 (4th Cir. 1997); Revnack v. Director, OWCP, 7 BLR 1-771 (1985); Decision on Remand at 10; Director’s Exhibits 12 at 13, 15 at 2-3; Employer’s Brief at 13-20. As no other medical expert opined the studies were invalid, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary function studies are valid.10 See Orek, 10 BLR at 1-54-55; 20 C.F.R. §718.101(b).

10 We agree with Employer that any error the ALJ or Dr. Fino may have made in

summarizing Claimant’s July 24, 2017 pulmonary function study FVC value as 1.54/1.64 has no bearing on the credibility of Dr. Fino’s interpretation of either the February 20, 2017 study’s or the July 24, 2017 study’s spirometry tracings. Employer’s Brief at 13-20; see Larioni v. Director, OWCP, 6 BLR 1-1276, 1-1278 (1984); Kozele v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-378, 1-382 n.4 (1983); Decision on Remand at 11. We also agree that any mathematical formula Dr. Fino may have used to find Claimant’s October 18, 2017 pulmonary function study is normal for his age has no bearing on the credibility of his opinion as to the validity of the February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary function studies. Employer’s Brief at 20-22; see Larioni, 6 BLR at 1-1278; Kozele, 6 BLR at 1-382 n.4; Decision on Remand at 11. Although Employer additionally asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the July 24, 2017 pulmonary function study is invalid because the face of the report indicates Claimant did not use a nose clip during testing, we decline to address this argument because Employer did not raise it in the proceedings before the ALJ. See Edd Potter Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Salmons], 39 F.4th 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2022); Employer’s Brief at 22-23; Employer’s Closing Brief at 7-10. Additionally, as no medical expert opined Claimant’s failure to wear a nose clip renders the July 24, 2017 study less than substantially compliant with the applicable quality standards, Employer cannot now fault the ALJ for failing to sua sponte invalidate the study. 20 C.F.R. §718.101(b); see Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986); Schetroma v.
7
We additionally reject Employer’s argument that the ALJ erred in finding the preponderance of the pulmonary function studies establishes total disability at 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(b)(2)(i) where Claimant’s October 18, 2017 pulmonary function study, the most recent study of record, is valid and nonqualifying. See Adkins v. Director, OWCP, 958 F.2d 49, 51-52 (4th Cir. 1992); Decision on Remand at 13-14; Employer’s Brief at 24-26. Contrary to Employer’s assertion, as the ALJ accurately observed the February 20 and July 24, 2017 studies produced qualifying values, while the October 18, 2017 study did not, substantial evidence supports his finding that the preponderance of the contemporaneous studies establishes total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i). See Sea “B” Mining Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2016); Adkins, 958 F.2d at 52-53.

Employer’s arguments are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we are not empowered to do. Anderson v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 12 BLR 1-111, 1-113 (1989). Thus, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the pulmonary function study evidence supports a finding of total disability. 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i); Decision on Remand at 14.

Medical Opinions11

The ALJ considered three medical opinions. Decision on Remand at 15-24. Dr.
Ajjarapu diagnosed total disability based on Claimant’s qualifying, severe pulmonary impairment on his pulmonary function study and moderate/severe resting hypoxemia on his blood gas study. Director’s Exhibits 12 at 7, 21 at 2. She explained this impairment precludes Claimant’s performing the walking, crawling, and lifting requirements of his usual coal mine employment. Director’s Exhibits 12 at 7, 21 at 2. By contrast, Drs. Fino and McSharry opined Claimant is not totally disabled. Dr. Fino diagnosed Claimant with mild hypoxemia and opined he could perform the exertional requirements of his usual coal mine work based on the results of his October 18, 2017 “normal” pulmonary function study and February 20, 2017 mildly abnormal resting blood gas study.12 Employer’s Exhibit 7

Director, OWCP, 18 BLR 1-19, 1-23-24 (1993); Marcum v. Director, OWCP, 11 BLR 1- 23, 1-24 (1987).
11 The ALJ found Claimant’s usual coal mine employment required thirty percent

very heavy labor, thirty percent heavy labor, thirty percent moderate labor, and ten percent light labor and that it required him to crawl and lift. Decision on Remand at 22; Director’s Exhibit 12 at 1; Employer’s Exhibit 7 at 2. We affirm this finding as unchallenged on appeal. See Skrack, 6 BLR at 1-711.
12 Dr. Fino opined Dr. Ajjarapu’s February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary function

studies were invalid and did not rely on them in assessing Claimant’s pulmonary function. Employer’s Exhibit 7.

8 at 35-38. Dr. McSharry opined Claimant has no pulmonary impairment based on the October 18, 2017 “normal” pulmonary function study and the February 20, 2017 “relatively normal” resting blood gas study.13 Employer’s Exhibit 8 at 3. The ALJ found Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion better reasoned and documented than the opinions of Drs. Fino and McSharry because it is consistent with his finding that the preponderance of the pulmonary function studies establishes a qualifying impairment at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv). 14 Decision on Remand at 22-24. Thus, he found the medical opinion evidence supports a finding of total disability. Id. at 24.

Employer asserts the ALJ erred in crediting Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion over those of Drs. Fino and McSharry at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv) because: 1) the February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary function studies are invalid; 2) Dr. Ajjarapu lacked an adequate understanding of the exertional requirements of Claimant’s last coal mine job; and 3) the ALJ cannot infer from Dr. Ajjarapu’s description of Claimant’s symptoms that Claimant is totally disabled. Employer’s Brief at 27-39. We disagree.

As we have affirmed the ALJ’s weighing of the pulmonary function studies at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i), we reject Employer’s assertions of error as to the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinions and affirm that Claimant established total disability pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv). Contrary to Employer’s assertion, the ALJ permissibly credited Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion diagnosing total disability as consistent with the qualifying pulmonary function studies he found valid under 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i). See Hicks, 138 F.3d 524 at 533; Akers, 131 F.3d at 441; Decision on Remand at 23-24. The ALJ likewise permissibly discredited the contrary opinions of Drs. Fino and McSharry for relying on the October 18, 2017 non-qualifying pulmonary function study that the ALJ found outweighed at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i). See Hicks, 138 F.3d at 533; Akers, 131 F.3d at 441; Decision on Remand at 22-23. Because the ALJ acted within his discretion in resolving the conflicting medical opinions and provided a reasoned explanation, we affirm

13 Dr. McSharry did not opine Claimant’s February 20 and July 24, 2017 pulmonary

function studies are invalid but, nonetheless, declined to rely on their results as evidencing an impairment. He explained, “The subsequent normal [October 18, 2017] test results eliminate the possibility the prior disability-range spirometry values were the result of an irreversible disease such as [coal workers’ pneumoconiosis].” Employer’s Exhibit 8 at 3.
14 The ALJ additionally found, “Dr. Ajjarapu was the only physician to consider [Claimant’s] health profile as a whole including his respiratory symptoms” in opining Claimant’s impairment, including reported dyspnea with walking eight to ten steps, precludes his performing the walking, crawling, and lifting requirements of his work. Decision on Remand at 23-24 (emphasis in original); see Director’s Exhibit 12 at 3, 6.

9 his finding that the medical opinion evidence supports a finding of total disability.15 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv); see Harman Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP [Looney], 678 F.3d 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2012). Thus, we also affirm the ALJ’s finding Claimant established total disability based on the evidence as a whole and, therefore, invoked the Section 411(c)(4) presumption and established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement. 20 C.F.R.
§§718.204(b)(2), 725.309(c); Rafferty, 9 BLR at 1-232; Shedlock, 9 BLR at 1-198; Decision on Remand at 24. We further affirm, as unchallenged, his finding Employer failed to rebut the presumption. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(d); see Skrack, 6 BLR at 1-711; Decision on Remand at 27.

15 We reject, as moot, Employer’s remaining challenges to the ALJ’s determination

to credit Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv). Employer’s Brief at 27-

33. Because the ALJ permissibly credited Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion as consistent with his
    weighing of the pulmonary function study evidence, her diagnosis of total disability is sufficiently reasoned without regard to whether the non-qualifying arterial blood gas study or her understanding of Claimant’s exertional requirements also support her opinion. Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 533 (4th Cir. 1998); Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 441 (4th Cir. 1997); see Sheranko v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 6 BLR 1-797, 1-798 (1984) (non-qualifying evidence under one subsection does not undermine qualifying evidence under another). Further, because the ALJ permissibly found Dr. Ajjarapu’s explicit diagnosis of total disability to be credible and well-reasoned, he was not required to infer total disability from her recitation of Claimant’s symptoms or functional limitations. See Kozele, 6 BLR at 1-382 n.4.

                                        10
    

    Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision on Remand.

SO ORDERED.

DANIEL T. GRESH, Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

GLENN E. ULMER
Acting Administrative Appeals Judge

11