Gregory H. Miniard, Sr. v. Shamrock Coal Company, Incorporated (Board decision, April 9, 2025)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge's denial of black lung benefits. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Gregory H. Miniard, Sr., appealed without a representative after a judge denied his black lung benefits claim on remand. The judge counted 9.275 years of qualifying coal mine work, including some coal laboratory work, which was below the fifteen years needed for the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Without that presumption, Miniard had to prove that he had pneumoconiosis. The Board upheld the work history finding and the judge's assessment of the x-rays and medical opinions. It affirmed the denial because the evidence did not establish either clinical or legal pneumoconiosis.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Miner definition under 30 U.S.C. § 902(d) and pneumoconiosis proof under 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a).
• Outcome: Black lung benefits denial affirmed.
• Key point: The credited work history fell short of the presumption threshold, and the medical record did not prove pneumoconiosis.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board 200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 24-0329 BLA

GREGORY H. MINIARD, SR.
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Claimant-Petitioner
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v. )
NOT-PUBLISHED
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SHAMROCK COAL COMPANY,
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INCORPORATED, Self-insured through ) DATE ISSUED: 04/09/2025
SUN COAL COMPANY
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Employer-Respondent
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DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
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COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
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STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
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Party-in-Interest
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DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order on Remand Denying Benefits of Carrie Bland, Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Gregory H. Miniard, Sr., Hazard, Kentucky.

James M. Kennedy (Baird & Baird, P.S.C.), Pikeville, Kentucky, for Employer.

Before: GRESH, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, ROLFE and JONES, Administrative Appeals Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Claimant appeals, without representation,1 Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Carrie Bland’s Decision and Order on Remand Denying Benefits (2016-BLA- 05329) rendered on a claim filed on April 21, 2014, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§901-944 (2018) (Act). This case is before the Board for a second time.

In a Decision and Order Denying Benefits issued on December 13, 2017, ALJ Richard M. Clark found that Employer is the responsible operator. He credited Claimant with 13.5 months of underground coal mine employment and, therefore, found Claimant could not invoke the rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(4) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018).2 Considering entitlement under 20 C.F.R. Part 718, ALJ Clark found the medical evidence did not support a finding that that Claimant has pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a). Therefore, he denied benefits.

After considering Claimant’s appeal, the Board vacated ALJ Clark’s determination that Claimant has less than fifteen years of coal mine employment and therefore could not invoke the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Miniard v. Shamrock Coal Co., Inc., BRB Nos. 18-0174 BLA and 18-0174 BLA/A, slip op. at 8 (Aug. 30, 2019) (unpub.). The Board declined to address, as premature, whether ALJ Clark correctly found that Claimant failed to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis.3 Id. at 9.

1
On Claimant’s behalf, Robin Napier, a benefits counselor with Stone Mountain Health Services of St. Charles, Virginia, requested the Benefits Review Board review Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Carrie Bland’s decision, but Ms. Napier is not representing Claimant on appeal. See Shelton v. Claude V. Keene Trucking Co., 19 BLR 1-88 (1995) (Order).
2
Section 411(c)(4) of the Act provides a rebuttable presumption that a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if he has at least fifteen years of underground or substantially similar surface coal mine employment and a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4) (2018); 20 C.F.R. §718.305.
3
The Board affirmed ALJ Clark’s findings that Employer is the responsible operator and that Claimant cannot invoke the irrebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at Section 411(c)(3) of the Act because there is no evidence in the record of complicated pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §718.304; see Miniard 2
On remand, the case was reassigned without objection to ALJ Bland (the ALJ), who determined Claimant has 9.275 years of coal mine employment in conditions substantially similar to those underground and is therefore unable to invoke the Section 411(c)(4) presumption. Considering entitlement under 20 C.F.R. Part 718, the ALJ adopted ALJ Clark’s finding that Claimant failed to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis, an essential element of entitlement, and denied benefits. 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a).

On appeal, Claimant generally challenges the ALJ’s denial of benefits. Employer responds in support of the denial. The Acting Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, declined to file a substantive response.

In an appeal a claimant files without representation, the Board considers whether substantial evidence supports the Decision and Order below. Hodges v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 18 BLR 1-84, 1-86 (1994). We must affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law.4 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Section 411(c)(4) Presumption – Length of Coal Mine Employment

To invoke the Section 411(c)(4) presumption, Claimant must establish he worked at least fifteen years in underground coal mines or surface coal mines in conditions “substantially similar” to underground mines. 20 C.F.R. §718.305(b)(1)(i). The ALJ found that Claimant’s work as a coal lab technician with Aceco, Inc. (Aceco), Ekenco, Inc. (Ekenco), and Coal-Fields Testing & Engineering (Coal-Fields) constituted work as a miner as defined by the Act. Decision and Order on Remand at 4-5. She further determined that once Claimant subsequently began working as a lab technician at HCI-Hall, Inc. (HCI- Hall) and M&E Enterprises (M&E), however, the “nature of his work” changed so that he no longer performed coal preparation work and therefore his work with them did not meet the definition of a miner. Id. at 5-6. Based on this analysis and factoring in Claimant’s work for Employer, the ALJ found Claimant had 9.275 years of qualifying coal mine employment. Id. at 6-7.

v. Shamrock Coal Co., Inc., BRB Nos. 18-0174 BLA and 18-0174 BLA/A, slip op. at 3, 11 (Aug. 30, 2019) (unpub.).
4
This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because Claimant performed his coal mine employment in Kentucky. See Shupe v. Director, OWCP, 12 BLR 1-200, 1-202 (1989) (en banc); Director’s Exhibit 3.

3
Definition of a Miner

We initially consider the ALJ’s findings concerning whether Claimant’s employment with Aceco, Ekenco, Coal-Fields, HCI-Hall, and M&E constitutes qualifying coal mine employment under the Act. See Decision and Order on Remand at 3-6. A “miner” is “any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal.” 30 U.S.C. §902(d). There is “a rebuttable presumption that any person working in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility is a miner.” 20 C.F.R. §725.202(a); see also 20 C.F.R.
§725.101(a)(19); Stephen v. Consolidation Coal Co., BLR , BRB Nos. 23-0091 BLA and 23-0259 BLA, slip op. at 3-4 (Mar. 20, 2025) (pub.). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, within whose jurisdiction this case arises, has held duties that meet situs and function requirements constitute the work of a miner as defined in the Act. See Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2014); Falcon Coal Co. v. Clemons, 873 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1989); Director, OWCP v. Consol. Coal Co.
[Petracca], 884 F.2d 926, 929-30 (6th Cir. 1989). Under the situs requirement, the work must take place in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility; under the function requirement, the work must be integral or necessary to the extraction or preparation of coal. See Forester, 767 F.3d at 641; Clemons, 873 F.2d at 922; Petracca, 884 F.2d at 929-30.

On Claimant’s form CM-911a, he indicated he worked for Aceco at a strip mine from October 1975 to March 1977 as a coal crusher, as a coal sampler, and doing coal preparation. Director’s Exhibit 3. At the hearing,5 Claimant testified that he worked in the lab and “picked up coal samples at tipples and on strip jobs, and occasionally, underground.” Hearing Transcript at 19. Claimant reported that he conducted coal sampling, assessing the quality of coal to determine its worth. Id. at 20. He estimated that he spent two hours per day touching the coal and collecting samples but primarily worked inside an office building. Id. at 19, 24.

Claimant stated that the coal he collected was already processed and typically came in bags. Hearing Transcript at 19-20. After he collected samples, he placed them in a crusher room which was located in a separate building outside of the laboratory; then he collected the crushed coal and brought it to the laboratory. Id. Claimant also indicated that

5
The Board previously noted that the hearing transcript incorrectly identifies this company as “Ace Coal Incorporated” or “Ace Coal.” Miniard, BRB Nos. 18-0174 BLA and 18-0174 BLA/A, slip op. at 4 n.7; see Hearing Transcript at 19, 24. However, Claimant’s employment history form, work questionnaires, and Social Security Administration earnings records state that he worked for “Aceco, Inc.” during that time period. Director’s Exhibits 3, 5, 7.

4 he would have to go out to the mines and physically take channel samples once a month and stockpile samples weekly to determine the quality of the coal before it was mined. Id. at 22-23.

Claimant reported that he subsequently worked for Ekenco, which he identified as an underground mine, from March 1977 to March 1981 as a coal crusher, coal sampler, and doing coal preparation. Director’s Exhibit 3. He testified at the hearing that his work took place in the same building with the same duties as his work with Aceco. Hearing Transcript at 27-28.

Claimant next reported working at Coal-Fields from September 1981 to December 1989 as a coal crusher and coal sampler. Director’s Exhibit 3. He stated that his duties were the same as those at Ekenco and it “was the same company doing the same job under a different name.” Hearing Transcript at 28. Claimant testified that the company was sold and became HCI-Hall, where he transitioned into running the laboratory instead of sampling coal. Id. at 29. He also stated that he eventually purchased HCI-Hall and ran it as M&E where he continued to “run the lab.” Id. at 32-33.

In accordance with the Board’s remand instructions, the ALJ considered all relevant evidence, including Claimant’s work questionnaires that state he spent seventy percent of his typical workday at Ekenco, Coal-Fields, and M&E and eighty percent of his typical workday at HCI-Hall at a coal mine, tipple, or preparation plant. Miniard, BRB Nos. 18- 0174 BLA and 18-0174 BLA/A, slip op. at 6-9; Decision and Order on Remand at 4-5; Director’s Exhibit 5. She found there was “little substantiation” for Claimant’s statements in his work questionnaires, especially as there is nothing in the record indicating that the lab where he worked was on the site of a mine, tipple, or preparation plant,6 although he did indicate that a portion of his career as a lab technician required him to collect samples at mine sites and crush the samples before analyzing them. Decision and Order on Remand at 5. The ALJ “also note[d] that Claimant provided the same information for every employer for whom he completed a work questionnaire” and “[t]here are no distinctions in his job duty descriptions[,] although his job eventually turned into a supervisory position” where he analyzed samples that had already been crushed or prepared. Id. Consequently, she permissibly found that the questionnaires were “entitled to little weight . . . whereas Claimant’s deposition and testimony at the hearing provide more clarity on the exact nature

6
Claimant testified that, in an eight-hour day, he would spend two hours physically touching the coal and getting the sample. Hearing Transcript at 19. He said he would spend an hour a day on the phone calling locations to see who had samples and then two to three hours driving to mine locations that were approximately thirty minutes to an hour away one way. Id. at 24-25.

5 of his work as a coal lab technician at various points in his career.” Id.; Director, OWCP v. Rowe, 710 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1983) (ALJ is granted broad discretion in evaluating the credibility of the evidence, including witness testimony).

She also permissibly found Claimant’s work as a lab technician at Aceco, Ekenco, and Coal-Fields met the situs and function prongs because Claimant crushed and pulverized coal samples, which he collected at tipples, strip mines, and underground mines, for analysis for the purpose of determining its market value prior to it entering the stream of commerce. See Clemons, 873 F.2d at 922-23; Bower v. Amigo Smokeless Coal Co., 2 BLR 1-729, 1-736 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Amigo Smokeless Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Bower], 642 F.2d 68, 69-71 (4th Cir. 1981); Decision and Order on Remand at 5. Further, she permissibly determined that Claimant’s work at HCI-Hall and M&E did not meet the definition of a miner because he worked in a supervisory capacity and did not collect or prepare coal samples. See Clemons, 873 F.2d at 922-23; Bower, 642 F.2d at 69-71; Decision and Order on Remand at 5-6.

Consequently, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s work was as a miner at Aceco, Ekenco, and Coal-Fields. Decision and Order on Remand at 5.

Length of Coal Mine Employment

Claimant bears the burden to establish the number of years he worked in coal mine employment. Kephart v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR 1-185, 1-186 (1985); Hunt v. Director, OWCP, 7 BLR 1-709, 1-710-11 (1985). The Board will uphold an ALJ’s determination if it is based on a reasonable method of calculation that is supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §725.101(a)(32)(ii); see Muncy v. Elkay Mining Co., 25 BLR 1-21, 1-27 (2011); Vickery v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR 1-430, 1-432 (1986).

The ALJ considered Claimant’s Employment History Form CM-911a, hearing and deposition testimony, work questionnaires, and Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings records. Decision and Order on Remand at 6-9.

The ALJ initially noted Claimant alleged employment with Indian Head Mining from January 1974 to October 1975. Decision and Orde on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibits 3-4. But she found his SSA earnings records do not show any employment with this coal mine and the only earnings during the third and fourth quarters in 1975 were with Jennifer Wiley Village, Inc. (Jennifer Wiley). Decision and order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibit 7. She accurately stated that Claimant did not recognize the name Jennifer Wiley when questioned about it at the hearing, and there is nothing in the record to support that it is a coal mine or that Claimant was otherwise engaged in coal mine employment during this time period. Decision and Order on Remand at 6; see Hearing Transcript at 18-19. The ALJ’s findings are reasonable. Thus, we affirm the ALJ’s 6 determination that Claimant did not establish coal mine employment from January 1974 to October 1975. Decision and Order on Remand at 6; see Tackett v. Director, OWCP, 6 BLR 1-839, 1-841 & n.2 (1984) (ALJ may credit SSA earnings records over a miner’s testimony); see also Calfee v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR 1-7, 1-9 (1985) (ALJ need not credit SSA earnings records where testimony and other documentary evidence constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings).

Considering Claimant’s employment with Aceco from October 1975 to March 1977, the ALJ permissibly credited Claimant with 1.75 years of coal mine employment because his SSA earnings records contain a total of seven quarters of earnings greater than $50.00. See Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc., 915 F.3d 392, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging Board’s holding that a reasonable method of calculating length of coal mine employment for pre-1978 years is crediting Claimant with every quarter in which he earned at least $50.00); Decision and Order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibits 3, 7. Using this same method, the ALJ also permissibly credited Claimant with three quarters of coal mine employment in 1977 for his work at Ekenco based on Claimant’s SSA earnings records. Shepherd, 915 F.3d at 405-06; Decision and Order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibit 7.

For Claimant’s post-1978 employment with Ekenco from January 1978 to March 1981, the ALJ noted that his SSA earnings records show that Claimant “worked only for Ekenco during this period, and that his earnings between 1978-1980 were more than the average earnings for coal miners during these years as indicated in Exhibit 610 [of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs Coal Mine (Black Lung Benefits Act) Procedure Manual].”7 Decision and Order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibit 7. The ALJ also found Claimant entitled to an additional one-quarter year of coal mine employment with Ekenco in 1981 based on Claimant’s statement that he worked for it until March 1981. Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks, 690 F.3d 477, 489 (6th Cir. 2012); Decision and Order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibit 3.

As the ALJ set forth a reasonable method of calculation, we affirm her permissible finding that Claimant had four years of coal mine employment with Ekenco. Muncy, 25 BLR at 1-27; Vickery, 8 BLR at 1-432; Decision and Order on Remand at 6. We further affirm, as reasonable, the ALJ’s determination that Claimant had 1.5 years of coal mine employment with Coal-Fields between March 1981 and September 1982 based on Claimant’s “credible” “recollection of his dates of employment” and his SSA earnings

7
Exhibit 610 to the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs Coal Mine (Black Lung Benefits Act) Procedure Manual, entitled “Average Wage Base,” contains the average daily earnings of employees in coal mining and the earnings for those who worked 125 days during a year; it is referenced in 20 C.F.R. §725.101(a)(32)(iii).

7 records showing “Claimant earned $12,150 in 1981 and $12,825 in 1982.”8 Muncy, 25 BLR at 1-27; Vickery, 8 BLR at 1-432; Decision and Order on Remand at 6; Director’s Exhibits 3, 6.

Considering Claimant’s work for Employer, the ALJ indicated that she incorporated ALJ Clark’s finding of 1.125 years of coal mine employment. Decision and Order on Remand at 7. She explained that ALJ Clark determined Claimant established 13.5 months of coal mine employment for Employer in 1989 and 1990 “by dividing Claimant’s earnings for each year by the average daily wage, for a total of 302 days in a 365-day period.” Id. Noting that ALJ Clark “did not specify how he apportioned his [coal mine employment] calculation between the two years,” she found “the approximately 6.5 weeks of employment in 1989 (for 5 days a week of employment) constitutes the one and one-half months portion of his calculation for work with Employer, with the remaining year reflecting work done in 1990 for Employer.” Id.

The ALJ determined that ALJ Clark, however, failed to consider that Claimant’s SSA earnings records show he also worked for Employer in 1991, earning $15,357.02. Decision and Order on Remand at 7; see Director’s Exhibit 6. The ALJ stated that Claimant’s SSA earnings records show additional earnings in 1991 of $4,000.00 for M&E and $537.00 of self-employment. Decision and Order on Remand at 7. She found Claimant’s testimony credible that although he owned M&E while working for Employer, he did not personally work there but rather hired others to do the work. Id.; Director’s Exhibit 19 at 26. In addition, she indicted that “Claimant’s period of self-employment is undefined” but she has “no basis on which to consider that it is [coal mine employment].” Decision and Order on Remand at 7. The ALJ therefore permissibly determined that Claimant’s only coal mine work in 1991 was for Employer, and she permissibly divided Claimant’s earnings for that year ($15,357.02) by the average yearly earnings for 125 days of employment as set out in Exhibit 610 ($17,080.00). Shepherd, 15 F.3d at 402-05; Decision and Order on Remand at 7. In doing so, she permissibly credited Claimant with 0.9 years of coal mine work with Employer in 1991 for a total of 2.025 additional years of coal mine employment. Shepherd, 15 F.3d at 402-05; Decision and Order on Remand at 7.

As the ALJ’s method of calculating Claimant’s length of coal mine employment is rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with the applicable law of the Sixth Circuit, we affirm her finding that Claimant established 9.275 years of coal mine

8
The ALJ explained that “[t]his reflects 9 months of [coal mine employment] in 1981 (the overlap month of March has already been accounted for in Ekenco) and 9 months in 1982.” Decision and Order on Remand at 6.

8 employment. See Shepherd, 915 F.3d at 405-06; Muncy, 25 BLR at 1-27; Decision and Order on Remand at 7; Director’s Exhibits 3, 5-7. Because the ALJ permissibly found Claimant established less than fifteen years of coal mine employment, we affirm her finding that Claimant did not invoke the Section 411(c)(4) presumption.9 See 30 U.S.C.
§921(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. §718.305(b)(1)(i); Decision and Order on Remand at 10.

Entitlement Under 20 C.F.R. Part 718

Without the Section 411(c)(3) or Section 411(c)(4) presumptions, Claimant must establish disease (pneumoconiosis); disease causation (it arose out of coal mine employment); disability (a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment); and disability causation (pneumoconiosis substantially contributed to the disability). 30 U.S.C.
§901; 20 C.F.R. §§718.3, 718.202, 718.203, 718.204. Failure to establish any one of these elements precludes an award of benefits. Anderson v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 12 BLR 1-111, 1-112 (1989); Trent v. Director, OWCP, 11 BLR 1-26, 1-27 (1987); Perry v. Director, OWCP, 9 BLR 1-1, 1-2 (1986) (en banc).

In considering whether Claimant established pneumoconiosis, the ALJ incorporated ALJ Clark’s findings from his Decision and Order and determined that Claimant failed to establish the presence of pneumoconiosis.10 Decision and Order on Remand at 10; Decision and Order at 21.

Clinical Pneumoconiosis

ALJ Clark considered nine readings of five x-rays. Decision and Order at 11. All of the physicians providing interpretations are dually qualified as Board-certified radiologists and B readers. Id. Dr. Alexander interpreted the June 20, 2013 x-ray as positive for simple pneumoconiosis, whereas Dr. Adcock interpreted it as negative. Claimant’s Exhibit 2; Employer’s Exhibit 5. Because this x-ray has conflicting readings

9
As we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Claimant has only 9.275 years of total coal mine employment, we need not address the ALJ’s findings regarding whether Claimant’s coal mine employment took place in conditions substantially similar to those underground. See Larioni v. Director, OWCP, 6 BLR 1-1276, 1-1278 (1984).
10
“Clinical pneumoconiosis” consists of “those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R.
§718.201(a)(1). “Legal pneumoconiosis” includes any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. §718.201(a)(2).

9 by dually-qualified physicians, ALJ Clark found it neither weighs for nor against a finding of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 12.

Dr. DePonte interpreted the March 10, 2014 x-ray as positive for simple pneumoconiosis, whereas Dr. Adcock interpreted it as negative. Claimant’s Exhibit 1; Employer’s Exhibit 4. Again, because this x-ray had conflicting readings by dually- qualified physicians, ALJ Clark found this x-ray neither weighs for nor against a finding of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 12.

Drs. DePonte and Seaman both interpreted the June 11, 2014 x-ray as negative for pneumoconiosis. Director’s Exhibits 12 at 7, 16. Consequently, ALJ Clark found this x- ray weighs against a finding of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 13.

Dr. Kendall interpreted the May 13, 2015 x-ray as negative for pneumoconiosis.
Director’s Exhibit 14. As there are no other interpretations of record, ALJ Clark found this x-ray weighs against a finding of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 13.

Finally, Drs. Meyer and DePonte both read the March 10, 2016 x-ray as negative for pneumoconiosis. Claimant’s Exhibit 4; Employer’s Exhibit 2. Consequently, ALJ Clark found this x-ray weighs against a finding of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 13.

Having permissibly found three x-rays negative and the readings of two others in equipoise, ALJ Clark rationally concluded that Claimant did not satisfy his burden to prove the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis by a preponderance of the x-ray evidence. See Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries [Ondecko], 512 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1994); Decision and Order at 13. Because ALJ Clark conducted both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the conflicting x-ray readings and rendered permissible findings that are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm his determination that Claimant did not establish clinical pneumoconiosis at 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a)(1).11 See Staton v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 55, 58-60 (6th Cir. 1995); Woodward v. Director, OWCP, 991 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1993).

ALJ Clark also considered the medical opinions of Drs. Ajjarapu, Fino, and Rosenberg and Claimant’s treatment records. Decision and Order at 14-20. He correctly

11
As there is no biopsy evidence in the record, Claimant cannot establish the existence of pneumoconiosis at 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a)(2). See Decision and Order at 13. In addition, Claimant cannot invoke the presumptions under 20 C.F.R. §§718.304 and 718.305 and therefore cannot establish the existence of pneumoconiosis at 20 C.F.R.
§718.202(a)(3).

10 observed that Dr. Ajjarapu was the only physician to diagnose clinical pneumoconiosis and permissibly discredited her opinion because she relied on Dr. DePonte’s negative June 11, 2014 x-ray interpretation without providing an adequate explanation as to why she found Claimant had clinical pneumoconiosis despite the negative reading.12 Banks, 690 F.3d at 489; 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a)(4); Decision and Order at 20; Director’s Exhibit 12 at 34; see Kozele v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-378, 1-382 n.4 (1983); Director’s Exhibit 54 at 1. Because there is no other evidence supportive of Claimant’s burden of proof,13 we affirm the ALJ’s incorporated finding that Claimant failed to establish clinical pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a); Decision and Order at 21; see Decision and Order on Remand at 10.

Legal Pneumoconiosis

To establish legal pneumoconiosis, Claimant must prove he has a “chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R.
§718.201(b). ALJ Clark considered Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion that Claimant has legal pneumoconiosis and the opinions of Drs. Fino and Rosenberg that he does not.14 Decision and Order at 14-21; Director’s Exhibits 12, 15, 54; Employer’s Exhibits 1, 3, 6, 7.

Dr. Ajjarapu performed the Department of Labor (DOL)-sponsored complete pulmonary evaluation of Claimant on June 11, 2014, and diagnosed chronic bronchitis based on his pulmonary function study values and Claimant’s symptoms of dyspnea, wheezing, and coughing, which she attributed to his “37 years” of “work in the mines, since he has no smoking history.” Director’s Exhibits 12 at 33-34; 54 at 1-2. Dr. Rosenberg opined Claimant’s lungs are “totally clear” and that Claimant does not have legal pneumoconiosis, instead opining that any reduction of spirometric measurement is likely caused by obesity. Director’s Exhibit 15 at 3-4; Employer’s Exhibit 6. Dr. Fino likewise opined Claimant does not have legal pneumoconiosis and any abnormal pulmonary function is due to obesity. Employer’s Exhibits 1, 7.

12
Dr. Ajjarapu stated Dr. DePonte’s June 11, 2014 x-ray interpretation of 0/1 profusion “is essentially considered negative” but then concluded a “negative chest x-ray does not rule out the presence of the disease.” Director’s Exhibit 12 at 34.
13
ALJ Clark accurately stated that Claimant’s treatment records do not contain a diagnosis of clinical pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 20; Claimant’s Exhibits 7-9.
14
ALJ Clark accurately noted Claimant’s treatment records do not include a diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 20; Claimant’s Exhibits 7-9.

11
ALJ Clark permissibly found Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion insufficient to establish coal dust exposure contributed to Claimant’s lung disease because she relied on an inflated coal mine employment history. See Creech v. Benefits Review Board, 841 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1988) (ALJ may discount a physician’s diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis that is based on an inflated coal mine employment history); Decision and Order at 19-21. Because ALJ Clark permissibly discredited Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion, the only opinion supportive of Claimant’s burden of proof,15 we affirm his determination, and the ALJ’s resultant finding, that Claimant did not establish legal pneumoconiosis. See Martin v. Ligon Preparation Co., 400 F.3d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 2005); Rowe, 710 F.2d at 255; Decision and Order at 20; see Decision and Order on Remand at 10. As Claimant failed to establish the existence of either clinical or legal pneumoconiosis, a requisite element of entitlement, we affirm the ALJ’s denial of benefits. Anderson, 12 BLR at 1-112; Trent, 11 BLR at 1-27.

15
The ALJ accurately observed the opinions of Drs. Fino and Rosenberg cannot assist Claimant in establishing he suffers from legal pneumoconiosis as neither physician diagnosed the disease. Decision and Order at 20.

12
Accordingly, we affirm the Decision and Order on Remand Denying Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

DANIEL T. GRESH, Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge