Edil Chamaya Arbildo v. Constellis Group/Triple Canopy (Board decision, September 8, 2025)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the denial of benefits under the Longshore Act as extended by the Defense Base Act. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Edil Chamaya Arbildo worked as a security guard in Iraq and sought benefits for a claimed work-related psychological condition. A judge found that the claim initially triggered a presumption of work-related injury, but that the employer rebutted it with a psychiatrist's contrary opinion. After weighing the conflicting medical opinions, the judge denied benefits. The Board upheld his assessment that the treating providers' diagnoses lacked sufficient explanation and relied on reports he found unreliable, while the employer's psychiatrist explained his clinical and testing findings. It affirmed the denial of benefits.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Work injury presumption under 33 U.S.C. § 920(a).
• Outcome: Denial of benefits affirmed.
• Key point: Treating providers' opinions receive no automatic preference when the judge weighs conflicting medical evidence after rebuttal.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 24-0124

EDIL CHAMAYA ARBILDO
)
)
Claimant-Petitioner
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)
v. )
)
NOT-PUBLISHED
CONSTELLIS GROUP/TRIPLE CANOPY
)
)
and
) DATE ISSUED: 09/08/2025
)
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
)
)
Employer/Carrier-
)
Respondents
)
DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order Denying Benefits of Stephen R. Henley, Chief Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Allison Graber and Jacob S. Garn (Attorneys Jo Ann Hoffman & Associates, P.A.), Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida, for Claimant.

Sherman W. Jones, III, and Sergio A. Reynoso (Markovich Grover PLLC), Houston, Texas, for Employer and its Carrier.

Before: ROLFE and JONES, Administrative Appeals Judges, and ULMER, Acting Administrative Appeals Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant appeals Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Stephen R. Henley’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits (2021-LDA-04472) rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C.
§§901-950 (Act), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1651-1655 (DBA). We must affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order if it is rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law.1 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1965).

Claimant allegedly sustained a psychological injury due to his work for Employer as a security guard in Iraq from July 2006 to September 2009. Claimant testified he experienced mortar attacks, heard cars explode, saw bullet holes in vehicles, and witnessed bloodied soldiers while working for Employer. Employer’s Exhibit (EX) 10 at 43-60. He testified that after he returned to his home in Peru, he initially felt happy and excited to see his family, but after a few months, he began feeling irritable and had difficulty sleeping. Id. at 61-63. He said he did not seek treatment for these symptoms until 2020. Id. at 64.

On October 16, 2020, Claimant presented to Dr. Julian Valderrama Escalante, a psychiatrist. Claimant’s Exhibit (CX) 21 at 2. Claimant reported experiencing nightmares, flashbacks, irritability, sadness, avoidance, detachment, and emotional numbness. Id. Dr. Valderrama Escalante noted Claimant’s symptoms of anxiety, depression, and panic attacks tended to fluctuate, but the onset of these symptoms began in 2010. Id. He diagnosed Claimant with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by his work for Employer. Id. at 11, 53.

On October 17, 2020, Claimant went to Dr. E. Amador Moran Hernandez, a psychologist, who noted Claimant complained of anger and concentration issues, sadness, being easily startled, feeling watched, and excessive sweating. CX 19 at 2. Dr. Moran Hernandez administered several psychological evaluations and concluded Claimant has strong emotional conflicts, personality disorders, depression, anxiety, and inadequate impulse control “as a result of stressors.”2 Id. at 4. He treated Claimant with various psychotherapies, but after several treatments, Claimant’s symptoms did not improve. Id. at 11-12, 16, 19, 22, 25.

1 This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit because the office of the district director who filed the ALJ’s decision is located in New York, New York. 33 U.S.C. §921(c); Glob. Linguist Sols., LLC v. Abdelmeged, 913 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2019); McDonald v. Aecom Tech. Corp., 45 BRBS 45, 47 (2011).
2 Dr. Moran Hernandez administered the Psychological Interview Form, Mental Examination and Behavioral Observation, Visual Retention Test, Projective Test of the Human Figure, Multiaxial Clinical Inventory III, Self-Esteem Scale for Adults, and Anxiety and Depression Scale. CX 19 at 4.

2
On January 11, 2022, Dr. Moises Ponce Malaver, a psychiatrist, examined Claimant at Employer’s request. EXs 5, 7. Claimant reported symptoms of self-isolation, irritability, aggressiveness, and impulsiveness. EX 5 at 6-8. After conducting several psychological evaluations, Dr. Ponce Malaver opined Claimant does not have PTSD and is malingering. Id. at 19, 27-28. In his supplemental report, he stated his opinion remained unchanged, and he clarified that Claimant does not meet the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5), Criterion A, for PTSD because emotional reactions to traumatic events are no longer part of Criterion A. EX 7 at 7-9.

On July 26, 2022, Claimant presented to Dr. Gustavo Benejam, a clinical psychologist. CX 22. Dr. Benejam noted he did not treat Claimant but only provided a diagnosis for him. Id. at 2. Dr. Benejam acknowledged Claimant reported symptoms of difficulty concentrating, anxiety, depression, irritability, isolation, detachment, intrusive thoughts, negative cognitions, difficulty sleeping, nightmares, and avoidance. Id. at 5. He administered psychological evaluations and opined the results were consistent with Claimant’s clinical interview.3 Id. at 7-10. He ultimately concluded “the specific reported symptomatology, as per [Claimant], meet criteria” for a diagnosis of PTSD, major depressive disorder, and anxiety caused by his work for Employer. Id. at 6-10, 17.

The ALJ found Claimant invoked the Section 20(a) presumption, 33 U.S.C. §920(a), that he has a work-related psychological injury and that Employer rebutted the presumption with Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion. Decision and Order (D&O) at 15. Weighing the evidence, the ALJ gave little to no weight to the opinions of Drs. Moran Hernandez, Valderrama Escalante, and Benejam, but he found Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion entitled to probative weight. Id. at 16-20. Consequently, he concluded Claimant failed to establish he has a compensable psychological injury. Id. at 20.

On appeal, Claimant contends the ALJ erred in finding Employer rebutted the presumption and in weighing the medical opinions. Employer responds in support of the denial of benefits.

3 Dr. Benejam administered the Folstein Mini-Mental State Exam, Beck Depression

Inventory, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Paranoia Worries Questionnaire, PTSD Checklist-5, Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale-5, and World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule 2. CX 22 at 7-9.

3
Section 20(a) Presumption

Rebuttal

Once a claimant invokes the presumption linking his injuries to his work, as here,4 the burden shifts to the employer to rebut it with substantial evidence that the claimant’s condition was not caused or aggravated by his employment. Rainey v. Director, OWCP, 517 F.3d 632, 634 (2d Cir. 2008); Am. Stevedoring, Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 2001); O’Kelley v. Dep’t of the Army/NAF, 34 BRBS 39, 41 (2000). The inquiry at rebuttal is whether the employer submitted “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support a finding that the claimant’s injury is not work- related. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637. The employer’s burden on rebuttal is one of production, not persuasion. Rose v. Vectrus Sys. Corp., 56 BRBS 27, 32 (2022) (Decision on Recon. en banc), appeal dismissed (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2023); Suarez v. Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc., 50 BRBS 33, 36 n.4 (2016); Cline v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 48 BRBS 5, 7 (2013). A physician’s unequivocal opinion, rendered to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that no relationship exists between the alleged injury and the claimant’s employment is sufficient to rebut the presumption. See Suarez, 50 BRBS at 36; Cline, 48 BRBS at 7.

The ALJ found Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion sufficient to rebut the presumption because he opined Claimant’s testing results were contradictory and showed Claimant does not have PTSD but is exaggerating symptoms. D&O at 15; EX 5 at 20. Claimant asserts Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion cannot rebut the presumption because it is equivocal and because he did not adequately explain how he reached the conclusion that Claimant is malingering. Claimant’s Br. at 4-7. We disagree.

Dr. Ponce Malaver opined Claimant’s results on the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) revealed he does not have a memory disorder, but his results on the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) showed he is malingering symptoms of memory disorders. EX 5 at 20. He noted Claimant scored “higher than the recommended cut-off point” on the SIMS, suggesting malingering, and that Claimant frequently answered

4 To be entitled to the Section 20(a) presumption linking his alleged injuries to his employment, a claimant must sufficiently demonstrate: 1) he has sustained a harm and 2) an accident occurred or working conditions existed which could have caused or aggravated the harm. Rose v. Vectrus Sys. Corp., 56 BRBS 27, 36 (2022) (en banc), appeal dismissed (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2023); see, e.g., Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. Ogawa, 608 F.3d 642, 651 (9th Cir. 2010); Rainey v. Director, OWCP, 517 F.3d 632, 634 (2d Cir. 2008); O’Kelley v. Dep’t of the Army/NAF, 34 BRBS 39, 41 (2000). No party challenges the ALJ’s finding of invocation.

4 items “referring to atypical symptoms in patients with genuine psychopathological or neurocognitive disorders.” Id. He opined Claimant’s score “reflects a pattern centered on the presence of unusual or bizarre psychotic symptoms” that are not typical of actual psychological disorders. Id. In addition, Dr. Ponce Malaver determined Claimant’s results on the Morel Emotional Numbing Test (MENT) showed he does not have PTSD, and his answers to questions on the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (M-FAST) indicated malingering because he endorsed symptoms not observed during the evaluation.5 Id. Dr. Ponce Malaver unequivocally concluded Claimant does not have PTSD or any psychiatric disorder but rather is malingering, and any treatment for his mental health “would not be related to his work.” Id. at 20, 28.

As Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion directly contradicts the presumption that Claimant’s psychological injuries are related to his employment and is the kind of evidence “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support that conclusion, it constitutes substantial evidence that is legally sufficient to rebut the presumption. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637; see Suarez, 50 BRBS at 36; Cline; 48 BRBS at 6-7; O’Kelley, 34 BRBS at 41-42. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Employer rebutted the presumption.6 D&O at 15.

5 Dr. Ponce Malaver acknowledged Claimant’s reported symptoms of irritability and aggressiveness but also noted Claimant said he has “always been like that.” EX 5 at 6-8. He opined the symptoms Claimant described are not “features” of a mental illness but are “personality features.” Id.
6 Claimant generally asserts he has been deprived of due process “to adequately address” the ALJ’s rebuttal findings. Claimant’s Br. at 7. Due process requires a party be afforded notice of the claim and the opportunity to respond . See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). Claimant has not demonstrated how any alleged error by the ALJ prejudiced him or rose to the level of a due process violation. See Downey v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 22 BRBS 203, 205 (1989) (due process not violated where the party had an opportunity to respond); Carter v. Gen. Elevator Co., 14 BRBS 90, 93 (1981) (due process requires “a party [to] demonstrate an abuse of discretion which results in prejudice to it”). He also has not shown how, at the weighing of the evidence stage, he was not given the opportunity to address Employer’s rebuttal evidence. We therefore reject Claimant’s assertions that he was deprived of due process.

5
Weighing the Evidence

Because Employer successfully rebutted the presumption, the issue of causation must be resolved on the evidence of the record as a whole with the claimant bearing the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries [Ondecko], 512 U.S. 267, 271 (1994); Rainey, 517 F.3d at 634; Rose, 56 BRBS at 39. If the evidence is in equipoise, the claimant must lose. Ondecko, 512 U.S. at 271; Santoro v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 30 BRBS 171, 174 (1996). When weighing the evidence as a whole, the ALJ is entitled to evaluate the credibility of all witnesses, weigh the medical evidence, and draw his own inferences and conclusions from the record. Pietrunti v. Director, OWCP, 119 F.3d 1035, 1042 (2d Cir. 1997). The Benefits Review Board may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its opinion for that of the ALJ even if the evidence could support other inferences or conclusions. See Sealand Terminals, Inc. v. Gasparic, 7 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1993); Volpe v. Ne. Marine Terminals, 671 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1982).

The ALJ considered the medical opinions of Drs. Moran Hernandez, Valderrama Escalante, and Benejam, who each opined Claimant’s psychological injury is work-related, and the contrary opinion of Dr. Ponce Malaver, who opined Claimant does not have a work- related psychological injury. D&O at 15-20; CXs 19, 21, 22; EXs 5, 7. Having found Claimant lacked credibility, the ALJ discredited the opinions of Drs. Moran Hernandez and Valderrama Escalante because they relied on Claimant’s self-reporting. D&O at 16-

18. He also discredited Dr. Benejam’s opinion as inadequately explained. Id. at 19.
    Conversely, the ALJ found Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion reasoned and documented and entitled to probative weight. Id. at 20. Consequently, the ALJ found Claimant failed to establish his alleged psychological condition is a work-related injury. Id.

    Claimant does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that he “lacks credibility;” therefore,
    we affirm it. D&O at 16-17; see Scalio v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 41 BRBS 57, 58 (2007). Rather, Claimant argues the ALJ erred in failing to credit the opinions of Drs. Moran Hernandez and Valderrama Escalante by virtue of their status as his treating physicians. Claimant’s Br. at 7-9. We reject this argument.

    When there is conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ is not required to give special
    weight to a treating physician’s opinion. Kkunsa v. Constellis Grp./Triple Canopy, Inc., 59 BRBS 1, 4 (2025). Instead, he must consider all relevant evidence, assess the weight and credibility of each opinion, and explain his rationale for reaching a decision based on the evidence in the record. Id. at 4-5. Because the record contains conflicting reports from four providers addressing whether Claimant has a work-related psychological injury, the ALJ was obligated to review and weigh the evidence. See Pietrunti, 119 F.3d at 1042;

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    Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 5. The ALJ permissibly did so and refrained from baldly deferring to the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians. See Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 5.

    In weighing Dr. Moran Hernandez’s opinion, the ALJ found it unpersuasive, despite
    the administration of psychological tests, because he failed to adequately explain what mental illness Claimant has or offer an opinion on causation. D&O at 17; CX 19 at 4-5. The ALJ also found Dr. Moran Hernandez based his treatment and diagnosis “largely” on Claimant’s self-reporting, which he found unreliable. D&O at 18; CX 19 at 2-4. For these reasons, the ALJ rationally found Dr. Moran Hernandez’s opinion “lack[s] clarity” and gave it no weight. D&O at 18; see Pietrunti, 119 F.3d at 1042; Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 4.

    Dr. Valderrama Escalante noted Claimant’s reported symptoms and concluded he
    

    is “in a state of vegetative hyperactivity with hypervigilance, an increased startle reaction, and insomnia.” CX 21 at 2. He also noted Claimant’s clinical condition “indicates a persistent personality transformation” toward paranoid personality disorder and diagnosed Claimant with PTSD caused by his employment. Id. However, much like his evaluation of Dr. Moran Hernandez’s opinion, the ALJ found Dr. Valderrama Escalante failed to adequately explain what he relied upon in making his diagnosis. D&O at 18. Rather, the ALJ observed Dr. Valderrama Escalante appears to have relied “entirely on Claimant’s self-reporting.” Id.; CX 21 at 2. Therefore, the ALJ rationally gave his opinion no weight. See Pietrunti, 119 F.3d at 1042; Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 4; D&O at 18.

    We also reject Claimant’s argument that the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Benejam’s
    opinion. Claimant’s Br. at 11-12. The ALJ found Dr. Benejam did not adequately explain his opinion because, although he opined Claimant’s results on the Paranoia Worries Questionnaire evaluation were negative for paranoia, he failed to address how this result is consistent with Claimant’s previously reported symptoms of paranoia to Dr. Moran Hernandez.7 D&O at 19; CXs 19 at 2, 22 at 8. The ALJ further found Dr. Benejam failed to adequately explain his reliance on Claimant’s treatment records, as they contained “minimal information about [his] symptomatology and treatment.”8 D&O at 19. For these

    7 Claimant reported the following to Dr. Moran Hernandez: “I feel very sensitive,

when someone calls me I startle, I feel that people are watching me or want to hurt me.” CX 19 at 2. Dr. Moran Hernandez opined Claimant is paranoid because he “shows a vigilant distrust of others and a nervously anticipatory defense against disappointment and criticism.” Id. at 4.
8 Dr.Moran Hernandez treated Clamant with “Jacobson progressive relaxation therapy.” CX 19 at 11, 16, 19, 22, 25. Dr. Valderrama Escalante treated Claimant with “psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment.” CX 21 at 2, 9, 18-135.

7 reasons, the ALJ rationally determined Dr. Benejam “did not adequately explain how he reached his conclusions” and gave his opinion no weight.9 Id.; see Pietrunti, 119 F.3d at 1042; Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 4.

Claimant next argues the ALJ erred in crediting Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion because it is equivocal. Claimant’s Br. at 9-12. We disagree. The ALJ found Dr. Ponce Malaver “clearly summarized” Claimant’s responses throughout the clinical interview and adequately explained why his responses did not indicate he was experiencing PTSD symptoms. D&O at 20; EX 5 at 2-17, 19-20. The ALJ also found Dr. Ponce Malaver adequately explained how the results of Clamant’s psychological evaluations supported his opinion that Claimant does not have PTSD. D&O at 20; EX 5 at 19-20. Therefore, the ALJ rationally determined Dr. Ponce Malaver’s opinion is reasoned and documented and entitled to probative weight. Pietrunti, 119 F.3d at 1042; Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 4; D&O at 20.

Claimant’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinions amount to a request to reweigh the evidence which we are not empowered to do. 10 See Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Volpe, 671 F.2d at 700; Claimant’s Br. at 7-15. Rather, because the ALJ permissibly exercised his discretion in weighing the medical opinions, and his credibility determinations are rational and supported by substantial evidence, we affirm his finding that Claimant does not have a work-related psychological condition. See Mijangos v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 948 F.2d 941, 944-945 (5th Cir. 1991) (although the evidence could support a finding in favor of either party, the choice among reasonable inferences is

9 Because the ALJ provided a valid reason for rejecting Dr. Benejam’s opinion, we

need not address Claimant’s remaining arguments regarding his weighing of Dr. Benejam’s opinion. See Pisaturo v. Logistec, Inc., 49 BRBS 77, 81 (2015); D&O at 19; Claimant’s Br. at 11-12.
10 We reject Claimant’s suggestion that all doubtful questions of fact should be resolved in his favor as it represents an incorrect statement of the law. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries [Ondecko], 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994) (the “true doubt” rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§556(d), 557(c)); Claimant’s Br. at 13.

8 left to the ALJ; the Board may not engage in de novo review of the evidence); Elkins v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1981) (“If the [ALJ’s] findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision, even though as triers of fact we might have arrived at a different result.”); D&O at 17.

Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge

GLENN E. ULMER
Acting Administrative Appeals Judge

9