Natwijuka Dominic v. SOC-SMG Incorporated (Board decision, August 20, 2025)

BRB interlocutory order. The Benefits Review Board reversed the denial of benefits for the claimant's groin injury and remanded for the remaining issues. It affirmed the unchallenged findings on the separate psychological injury claim and dismissed a second appeal number assigned in error. The scope of benefits for the groin injury remains unresolved. A final Board decision ordinarily becomes final 60 days after issuance absent timely judicial review or reconsideration under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406; a party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Natwijuka Dominic worked as a security specialist in Iraq and claimed a groin injury that caused pain and swelling. A judge found he had not shown work conditions capable of causing that harm and, alternatively, that the employer had rebutted the work injury presumption. The Board held that Dominic's account of wearing armor and carrying heavy equipment was enough to invoke the presumption. It also held that a doctor's description of an earlier infection did not rule out a work connection to the pain or other aspects of the injury. With no other sufficient rebuttal evidence, the Board found the groin injury work-related as a matter of law and returned the case to decide remaining benefit issues.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Work injury presumption under 33 U.S.C. § 920(a).
• Outcome: Groin injury denial reversed and remanded; other findings affirmed.
• Key point: Evidence of a past infection did not by itself rule out the work connection to the claimed groin injury.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board 200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB Nos. 24-0093 and 24-0135

NATWIJUKA DOMINIC
)
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Claimant-Petitioner
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)
v. )
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SOC-SMG INCORPORATED
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)
and
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NOT-PUBLISHED
)
THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY
) DATE ISSUED: 08/20/2025
)
Employer/Carrier-
)
Respondents
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DECISION and ORDER

Appeal of the Decision and Order Denying Benefits of Noran J. Camp, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor

Matthew J. Rolla (Garfinkel Schwartz, P.A.), Maitland, Florida, for Claimant.

Michael T. Quinn and William L. Pardue (Thomas Quinn, LLP), San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, for Employer and its Carrier.

Before: GRESH, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, ROLFE, Administrative Appeals Judge, and ULMER, Acting Administrative Appeals Judge.

PER CURIAM:
Claimant appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Noran J. Camp’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits (2021-LDA-05336) rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (Act), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1651-1655 (DBA).1 We must affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law.2 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Claimant allegedly sustained psychological injuries, headaches, and a “Testicular Mass (Genital Injury)” as a result of his work for Employer as a security specialist at Camp Bucca and Camp Taji in Iraq between September 2008 and December 2011. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 13, 15; Joint Exhibits (JX) 10 at 5, 13, 15 at 8-9, 20-25, 16 at 2, 12. Claimant indicated he was primarily stationed at a gate, and his work required that he “always” wear body armor and carry heavy things, such as a rifle with multiple magazines. HT at 32; JXs 7 at 2, 15 at 24, 37. Specifically, he testified he began experiencing pain and swelling in his left testicle in 2008, which he attributed to the physical requirements of his work for Employer. HT at 13-15, 32; JX 15 at 37.

Due to pain and swelling, Claimant sought treatment with Employer’s medic at the on-base military hospital sometime between September and December 2008. HT at 14; JX 15 at 37-41. He stated the medic examined his testicles, found no specific issues, and gave him an ice pack to reduce the pain and swelling. HT at 14; JX 15 at 37-41. Based on the medic’s recommendation, Employer allowed Claimant two days to recover before he returned to work. HT at 15; JX 15 at 50. Claimant testified his pain and swelling continued, and he routinely iced the affected area while working for Employer. HT at 14-

1
Claimant’s petition for review and supporting brief, entitled Claimant’s Appeal of the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits, (Cl. Brief) in BRB No. 24-0093 was inadvertently also assigned the docket number, BRB No. 24-0135. Consequently, we dismiss BRB No. 24-0135.
2
This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because the office of the district director who filed the ALJ’s decision is located in New York. 33 U.S.C. §921(c); Glob. Linguist Sols., L.L.C. v. Abdelmeged, 913 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2019); McDonald v. Aecom Tech. Corp., 45 BRBS 45 (2011).

2
15; JX 15 at 39-40. He visited Employer’s medic at least one more time for his groin pain.3 HT at 14-15; JX 15 at 39-41, 51.

In December 2011, Claimant’s contract with Employer expired and he returned to Uganda. HT at 15; JXs 15 at 30, 16 at 12. Claimant stated upon his return home, his “pain had reduced, but there was some kind of a lump that was a bit painful in the testicle.” HT at 14-15; JX 15 at 40-41. Nevertheless, Claimant did not seek further treatment because of his finances. HT at 32-33; JX 15 at 41.

On July 30, 2020, Claimant filed his claim seeking benefits for work-related psychological injuries and headaches. JX 10. He amended his claim on October 29, 2021, to include a “Testicular Mass (Genital Injury).” JX 10 at 9, 13. Employer controverted both claims. JX 12 at 2, 4.

At Employer’s request, Dr. Ben A. Khingi4 examined Claimant at the Friends Medical Centre in Kampala, Uganda, and authored a report dated August 3, 2022. JX 7. Claimant’s first examination at the Friends Medical Centre was in February 2022, and on July 18, 2022, Dr. Kwitonda Pascal also conducted an ultrasound to evaluate Claimant’s left-sided testicular swelling. Id. at 2. Dr. Khingi noted Claimant’s complaints, including “left testicular swelling and pain . . . that started spontaneously and increased whenever he lifted heavy loads,” and that his pain started while working for Employer in 2009. Id. at 1-2. Dr. Khingi opined “all systems [were] unremarkable with [a] slightly swollen left scrotum with mild tenderness on palpation.” Id. at 2. He opined Claimant’s left-sided chronic calcific epididymitis is “evidence of a past chronic testicular infection.” Id. at 2.5 In addition, Dr. Khingi opined Claimant’s complaints were credible and recommended “quarterly observation” with the possibility of explorative surgery “in case this issues [sic] progresses.” Id. at 2.

Ultimately, the case was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a video hearing, which was held on March 7, 2023. In his Decision and Order, the ALJ

3
Only Claimant’s hearing and deposition testimony support his assertions that he was treated by either Employer’s medic or at the on-base military hospital. Decision and Order (D&O) at 18.
4
Dr. Khingi is a consultant surgeon at multiple hospitals in Kampala, Uganda. JXs 7, 8 at 2-3.
5
Dr. Khingi reviewed Dr. Pascal’s July 2022 ultrasound report which identified Claimant’s problem as a “calcific lesion involving the tail of the left epididymis measuring about 15 x 12 [millimeters]” and left-sided chronic calcific epididymitis. JX 7 at 2, 8.

3 addressed Claimant’s alleged groin injury and psychological injuries, including headaches, separately. D&O at 17-18. He found Claimant did not establish working conditions existed that could have caused his groin injury and, therefore, did not invoke the Section 20(a) presumption with respect to that injury, 33 U.S.C. §920(a). Id. at 18. Alternatively, in a footnote, the ALJ found that if Claimant invoked the Section 20(a) presumption, Employer rebutted it and Claimant did not demonstrate, based on the evidence as a whole, that his work for Employer caused his groin injury. Id. at 18 n.21. The ALJ also determined Claimant invoked the Section 20(a) presumption for his psychological injuries, Employer rebutted the presumption, and Claimant failed to establish he suffered a work- related psychological injury. Id. at 17, 19-21. Accordingly, the ALJ denied Claimant’s claim for benefits relating to both his groin and psychological injuries.

On appeal, Claimant challenges only the denial of benefits related to his groin injury. He contends the ALJ erred in finding he did not invoke the Section 20(a) presumption and in alternatively finding Employer rebutted it. Employer responds, urging affirmance of the ALJ’s decision. Claimant filed a reply brief reiterating his contentions.6

Section 20(a) – Invocation

Claimant first asserts the ALJ applied the wrong standard in concluding he failed to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption for his groin injury. Cl. Brief at 7-8. We agree.

To invoke the Section 20(a) presumption linking his injuries to his employment, a claimant must sufficiently allege: 1) he sustained a harm; and 2) an accident occurred or working conditions existed which could have caused or aggravated the harm. Rose v. Vectrus Sys. Corp., 56 BRBS 27 (2022) (en banc), appeal dismissed (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2023); see also Am. Stevedoring Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2001); O’Kelley v. Dep’t of the Army/NAF, 34 BRBS 39, 40 (2000). The claimant bears an initial burden of production to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption.7 Rose, 56 BRBS at 36. Credibility plays no role in addressing whether the claimant has established a prima facie case. Id. at 37. In this regard, the Section 20(a) invocation analysis “does not require examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of witness’ credibility, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. Instead, a claimant need only “present some evidence or

6
We affirm as unchallenged on appeal the ALJ’s findings related to Claimant’s alleged psychological injuries. Scalio v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 41 BRBS 57, 58 (2007); D&O at 17-21.
7
“The burden of production or ‘some evidence’ standard . . . is a light burden – being no greater than an employer’s burden on rebuttal – meant to give the claimant the benefit of the statutory framework.” Rose, 56 BRBS at 38.

4 allegation that if true would state a claim under the Act.”8 Id. Consequently, if the claimant establishes his prima facie case, he is entitled to the presumption that his injury is work- related and compensable, subject to rebuttal by the employer. Id.

In addressing invocation, the ALJ concluded Claimant’s testimony in combination with Dr. Khingi’s report was sufficient to establish the existence of “a harm in his groin area.” D&O at 18. However, the ALJ found Claimant failed to provide any “affirmative evidence” that conditions existed during his work for Employer that could have caused the harm and concluded “Claimant’s equivocal supposition, without anything more, does not cross even the low threshold of ‘some evidence.’”9 Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, the ALJ found Claimant did not invoke the Section 20(a) presumption. Id.

As Claimant maintains, he identified working conditions that could have caused his injury. During the hearing and his deposition, Claimant described his work requirements as a security specialist for Employer included “always” wearing body armor and carrying heavy things while guarding various locations at the camps. HT at 32; JX 15 at 24, 37. Further, Claimant testified he began experiencing pain and swelling in his left testicle while working for Employer and attributed it to the physical requirements of his work for Employer. HT at 13-15, 32; JX 15 at 37.

Under Rose, this constitutes sufficient evidence showing Claimant’s working conditions could have caused his alleged harm and invokes the Section 20(a) presumption. Rose, 56 BRBS at 37-39; see, e.g., Obadiaru v. ITT Corp., 45 BRBS 17, 18-19 (2011) (determining that a claimant’s testimony regarding his back pain levels and job duties was sufficient to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption); Hampton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 24 BRBS 141, 144 (1990) (a claimant is not required to introduce evidence that working conditions in fact caused the harm but only that conditions existed which could have caused the harm). Consequently, we reverse the ALJ’s finding that Claimant did not meet his burden to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption, and therefore we will consider the ALJ’s alternative findings on causation.10

8
“Whether the claimant’s evidence fails or carries the day is a matter to be resolved at step three when weighing the evidence, not at step one invocation.” Rose, 56 BRBS at 38.
9
The ALJ noted Claimant testified wearing heavy body armor and carrying heavy things could have “been the very reason why I had that, the testicle swelling, and also the pain.” D&O at 18 (quoting HT at 32).
10
Employer asserts Claimant is raising a new “primary injury” on appeal and the Board cannot consider an injury that was not raised at the hearing. Employer’s Response 5
Section 20(a) – Rebuttal

Claimant also contends the ALJ erred in alternatively finding Dr. Khingi’s opinion rebutted the Section 20(a) presumption because Claimant asserts the doctor did not address whether Claimant’s groin injury was related to his working conditions. Cl. Brief at 8-10; Cl. Reply Brief at 5 (unpaginated).

Once, as in this case, the Section 20(a) presumption is invoked, the burden shifts to the employer to produce substantial evidence that the claimant’s condition was not caused or aggravated by his employment. Rainey v. Director, OWCP, 517 F.3d 632, 634 (2d Cir. 2008); Marinelli, 248 F.3d at 64-65; O’Kelley, 34 BRBS at 41. Substantial evidence is the amount of evidence which a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637. The employer’s burden on rebuttal is one of production, not persuasion, and is not dependent on credibility. Id.; Rose, 56 BRBS at 30; Victorian v. Int’l-Matex Tank Terminals, 52 BRBS 35, 41 (2018), aff’d sub nom. Int’l- Matex Tank Terminals v. Director, OWCP, 943 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2019); Suarez v. Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc., 50 BRBS 33, 36 n.4 (2016); Cline v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 48 BRBS 5, 7 (2013). All an employer must do is submit “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support a finding that the claimant’s injury is not work- related. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637. In addition, a medical opinion of non-causation rendered to a reasonable degree of medical certainty is sufficient to rebut the presumption. See O’Kelley, 34 BRBS at 41. If, however, the employer does not present substantial evidence

Brief at 21-26, 23 n.8 (citing Ins. Co. of the State of Pa. v. Director, OWCP [Vickers], 713 F.3d 779 (5th Cir. 2013) (the court held that a “catch-all” claim for a left arm injury and for injuries to “other parts of [claimant’s] body, [and] other related problems associated with [his] injury and working conditions in Iraq” was too vague for the Section 20(a) presumption to apply to the claimant’s chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy)). Employer specifically argues that Claimant attempts to conflate the “testicular mass (genital injury)” raised in his amended claim with the chronic testicular infection identified by Dr. Khingi. Id. at 21-26. Employer asserts Claimant did not provide notice of his past chronic testicular infection injury. Id. at 22.

We reject Employer’s contention. Not only did it fail to assert these were distinct injuries before the ALJ, see Johnston v. Hayward Baker, 48 BRBS 59 (2014); Turk v. E. Shore R.R., Inc., 34 BRBS 27, 32 (2000); Boyd v. Ceres Terminals, 30 BRBS 218, 223 (1997); Emp. Post-H. Brief at 14, but the ALJ found Dr. Khingi’s diagnosis of “calcification in [Claimant’s] left testicle” supported Claimant’s contention that he suffered harm in his groin. D&O at 18. Moreover, Claimant specifically asserted before the ALJ that Dr. Khingi’s report “support[ed]” his burden of production. Cl. Post-H. Brief at 8.
6 rebutting the presumption, the claimant’s condition is work-related as a matter of law. See, e.g., Obadiaru, 45 BRBS at 20.

The ALJ found Employer rebutted the Section 20(a) presumption based on Dr.
Khingi’s opinion. D&O at 18 n.21. Dr. Khingi noted Claimant reported testicular swelling and pain that increased with lifting and began while he worked for Employer, and he observed Claimant’s left testicle was slightly swollen and mildly tender with palpitation during his examination. JX 7 at 1-2. He opined Claimant’s left-sided chronic calcific epididymitis was evidence of a past chronic testicular infection. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). However, based on Dr. Khingi’s report, the ALJ found “Dr. Khingi, having documented Claimant’s workplace conditions, opined Claimant’s calcific mass was instead the result of a past infection” and, thus, sufficient to rebut the presumption. D&O at 18 n.21 (emphasis added).

We agree with Claimant that Dr. Khingi’s opinion cannot rebut the Section 20(a) presumption. While Dr. Khingi opined the calcific mass on Claimant’s left testicle was “evidence of” a past chronic infection, the ALJ misinterpreted his report as attributing any groin injury to this past infection “instead” of Claimant’s working conditions. D&O at 18 n.21; JX 7 at 2. Rather, Dr. Khingi did not address whether a relationship exists between Claimant’s pain or any other aspect of his groin injury and his working conditions.11 JX 7 at 2. Consequently, his opinion is insufficient to rebut the Section 20(a) presumption. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637 (“[A]n employer cannot satisfy its burden of production simply by submitting any ‘evidence’ whatsoever.”); see also Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Fields, 599 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2010); La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bunol, 211 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 2000); Burley v. Tidewater Temps, Inc., 35 BRBS 185, 189 (2002).

In the absence of any other evidence in the record legally sufficient to support a finding that Claimant’s groin injury is not work-related, we reverse the ALJ’s finding that Employer rebutted the Section 20(a) presumption. See Rainey, 517 F.3d at 637; Kubin v. Pro-Football, Inc., 29 BRBS 117 (1995); Phillips, 22 BRBS 94. Claimant’s groin injury, therefore, is work-related as a matter of law. See Obadiaru, 45 BRBS at 20.

Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s denial of benefits for Claimant’s groin injury, and we remand the case for further consideration of any remaining disputed issues related

11
Notably, Claimant asserts his pain began in 2008. The ultrasound took place in
2022. Dr. Khingi’s statement about a “past” infection does not eliminate Claimant’s work as a factor, as it was in the “past.”

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to that injury. In all other respects, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits.

  SO ORDERED.




                                   DANIEL T. GRESH, Chief
                                   Administrative Appeals Judge


                                   JONATHAN ROLFE
                                   Administrative Appeals Judge


                                   GLENN E. ULMER
                                   Acting Administrative Appeals Judge