Rahmatullah Rohani v. Mission Essential Personnel (Board decision, September 15, 2025)

BRB interlocutory order. The Benefits Review Board upheld the finding that the claimant's work injury resolved but remanded for the judge to determine when it resolved and whether additional benefits or an employer credit are due. That question remains unresolved. A final Board decision ordinarily becomes final 60 days after issuance absent timely judicial review or reconsideration under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406; a party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Rahmatullah Rohani worked as an interpreter in Afghanistan and sustained a work-related psychological injury after an attack on his base. His employer paid temporary total disability benefits, then stopped payments. The judge found that Rohani's condition had resolved and that he could return to work. The Board upheld that finding but said the judge had not determined the date of recovery. It returned the case for a finding on that date, which will decide whether Rohani receives more benefits or the employer receives credit for excess payments.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Disability under 33 U.S.C. § 902(10).
• Outcome: Recovery finding affirmed; case remanded to determine recovery date and payment consequences.
• Key point: A finding that a work injury resolved must identify when it resolved to calculate benefits or a credit.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 24-0081

RAHMATULLAH ROHANI
)
)
Claimant-Petitioner
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)
v. )
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NOT-PUBLISHED
MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
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)
and
) DATE ISSUED: 09/15/2025
)
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE
)
OF PENNSYLVANIA
)
)
Employer/Carrier-
)
Respondents
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DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order on the Record Denying Benefits of William P. Farley, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Jonathan S. Beiser (Beiser Law Firm), Rockville, Maryland, for Claimant.

James M. Mesnard (Postol Law Firm, P.C.), McLean, Virginia, for Employer and its Carrier.

Before: ROLFE and JONES, Administrative Appeals Judges and ULMER, Acting Administrative Appeals Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) William P. Farley’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits (2021-LDA-00408) rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (Act), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1651-1655 (DBA). We must affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with law. 1 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Claimant began working for Employer in Afghanistan in 2004 as a linguist , terminated his employment in 2012 when he moved to the United States, and was rehired as an interpreter beginning in 2019. Hearing Transcript (TR) at 14; Employer’s Exhibit (EX) 31 at 23-26. He sustained a psychological injury as a result of a two-day attack on the base which began on March 1, 2019, while he was sleeping. Claimant’s Exhibit (CX) 1; EX 31 at 40-41, 45; TR at 20.2

Claimant testified he developed sleep issues, was fearful, and was concerned someone would knock on his door or follow him. EX 31 at 40; TR at 22. He stated Employer sent him to Kandahar to see a doctor at TMH Medical Services, and after his visit, he believed he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) based on his symptoms. TR at 22. On March 21, 2019, Claimant notified Employer of his mental health injury. EX 8. After being seen at the clinic, Claimant asked for medication to be able to keep working for Employer, but Employer refused and sent him home to the United States on March 28, 2019. CX 1; EX 31 at 23-24. There is no dispute that Claimant suffered a work-related injury; however, Claimant asserts he remains disabled due to the injury.

Employer paid temporary total disability (TTD) benefits at a compensation rate of $835.77 per week from March 29, 2019, until November 17, 2019 (a total of $26,744.64). 3 It terminated disability benefits after receiving a September 2019 Labor Market Survey Report showing several suitable positions for Claimant which paid the same or more than he was earning in Afghanistan. EXs 10, 16; TR at 8-9; Emp’s Post-Hearing Brief at 34. Subsequently, following its medical expert’s examination, Employer believed Claimant’s

1 This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit because the office of the district director who filed the ALJ’s decision is located in New York. 33 U.S.C. §921(c); Glob. Linguist Sols., L.L.C. v. Abdelmeged, 913 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2019); McDonald v. Aecom Tech. Corp., 45 BRBS 45 (2011).
2 Claimant stated he heard a gunshot, experienced a power outage, hid in a bunker,

and saw bombs fall and explode as near as 200 feet from him. EX 31 at 40, 44; TR at 20.
3 It appears Employer has paid all medical bills. EX 23 at 7.

2 injury had resolved with no disability or need for further treatment. Emp.’s Post-Hearing Brief at 34-35. TR at 9.

Previously, on April 4, 2019, Claimant had begun treatment at the Way Station Outpatient Mental Health Clinic (Way Station Clinic), where he met with Dr. Shamsia Ally, a Staff Psychiatrist and Medical Director, and Jeremy Tallman, a licensed Clinical profession counselor, among others. CX 2 at 7; TR at 24-25. On December 17, 2019, Dr. Ally and Mr. Tallman opined Claimant has chronic PTSD and cannot return to work in a warzone but can return to work within the mainland United States. CX 2 at 1. Between April 2019 and March 2021, Claimant’s PTSD diagnosis did not change. Id. at 1-2, 10-11, 13, 17, 21, 23-24, 31. On March 4, 2021, despite his diagnosis, Claimant indicated his willingness to work. Id. at 33.

On December 9, 2020, at Employer’s request, Dr. Brian Schulman, a board-certified psychiatrist, interviewed Claimant, reviewed his treatment records, and administered various psychological tests. EXs 20 at 1-2, 21. He authored a report dated December 16, 2020, in which he opined Claimant’s acute stress disorder had resolved, and he no longer has any psychological condition related to his work with Employer that would “necessitate any further psychiatric treatment beyond a six-month continuation of his current medication regimen to complete his course of therapy.” EX 20 at 17-18; TR at 90-91.

Meanwhile, Claimant filed a claim under the Act on January 2, 2020, seeking benefits for his alleged continuing psychological condition. CX 1. The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) notified Employer of the claim via letter dated January 17, 2020, and Employer controverted the claim on February 24, 2020. EXs 11, 12. The case was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) for a hearing, which the ALJ held on July 20, 2021.

On November 7, 2023, the ALJ issued his Decision and Order (D&O). After summarizing the evidence and stating the parties stipulated to an injury on March 1, 2019, the ALJ identified the issue before him as: “whether [Claimant’s] injuries have resolved and is he able to return to his former work, or similar work.” D&O at 19. In his analysis of Claimant’s injury, he stated “the first sub issue is whether [Claimant] is incapacitated due to an injury caused by Employer.” Id. at 20. To address this issue, the ALJ considered both the medical and the vocational evidence of record. Id. at 22-25.

The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Schulman’s opinion and found Claimant does not have PTSD, is no longer disabled, and is not limited to working in the United States. D&O at 23, 25. In conjunction with Dr. Schulman’s opinion, the ALJ credited Claimant’s assertion that he could work anywhere, and he found Claimant’s work injury does “not limit him to working only in the United States,” so he “is not partially incapacitated due to geographical limitations.” Id. at 23. He also concluded “Employer has met [its] burden of 3 showing [Claimant] is capable of earning wages ‘in regular, continuous employment’[,]” and Claimant failed to show he is disabled. Id. at 24-25. Relying on Dr. Schulman’s opinion, Claimant’s qualifications, and the availability of other high-paying jobs, the ALJ concluded Claimant has not shown he “has a disability that precludes him from performing his work as an interpreter, or linguist, driver, restaurant manager, or phone repairer” because he “failed to show he is disqualified for positions due to his injury of March 19, 2019,”4 and he denied benefits. Id.

Claimant appeals the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits. He contends the ALJ erred in finding he is not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits from November 18, 2019, to the present and continuing,5 and erred in not addressing his diligent job search. Employer responds, urging the Board to affirm because Claimant has no disability and can return to any work.

The employee has the burden of establishing the nature and extent of his disability. Gacki v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 33 BRBS 127, 128 (1998); Trask v. Lockheed Shipbuilding & Constr. Co., 17 BRBS 56, 60-61 (1980). Disability is generally addressed in terms of its nature, permanent or temporary, and its extent, total or partial. The nature of a disability is determined solely by medical evidence, see, e.g., SGS Control Servs. v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1996); Trask, 17 BRBS at 60-61, while the extent of disability is an economic as well as a medical concept. Pietrunti v. Director, OWCP, 119 F.3d 1035 (2d Cir. 1997); Quick v. Martin, 397 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Stevens v. Director, OWCP, 909 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991). The Section 20(a) presumption, 33 U.S.C. §920(a), does not apply to these issues. Gardner v. Director, OWCP, 640 F.2d 1385 (1st Cir. 1981); Gacki, 33 BRBS at 129 n.3.

In this case, Claimant asserts he has a temporary partial disability, because, although he feels he can work, he states he still experiences symptoms and gets treatment. Employer asserts Claimant’s work-related disability has resolved. To determine whether Claimant’s

4 Claimant also testified that he applied for linguist jobs, including overseas positions. D&O at 24; EX 31 at 64; TR at 33-35.
5 Although the ALJ denied him permanent partial disability benefits, Claimant asserts there is no evidence his condition has reached maximum medical improvement, and he is not seeking permanent disability benefits. Cl.’s Brief at 13. Indeed, Claimant clearly stated the main issue is whether he is temporarily partially disabled from November 18, 2019, to the present and continuing, following the termination of benefits. Id. at 19 (emphasis added); see Cl.’s Brief at 11-13; Cl.’s Post Hearing Brief at 1, 9; TR at 9. Given the outcome of our decision, any error the ALJ made in this regard is harmless.

4 condition has resolved, we must assess whether the ALJ correctly conducted a disability analysis.

In addressing the extent of disability, a claimant must establish a prima facie case of total disability by showing he cannot return to his usual work due to his injuries. Palombo v. Director, OWCP, 937 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1991). The ALJ is not bound by any particular standard or formula and may base his determination of the extent of disability on credible medical opinions and observations as well as on the claimant’s testimony regarding his symptoms and the physical effects of his injury. Pimpinella v. Universal Mar. Serv. Inc., 27 BRBS 154 (1993). If the claimant satisfies his burden of showing a prima facie case of total disability, the employer may rebut it with evidence of jobs the claimant can realistically perform, making his disability, at most, partial. Gacki, 33 BRBS at 128.

The ALJ relied on Dr. Schulman’s December 2020 opinion that Claimant is no longer disabled. Specifically, following his interview and testing, Dr. Schulman concluded Claimant “does not have a mental or behavioral disorder that precludes his ability to resume his former occupation as an interpreter in the United States and/or Afghanistan or any other location where his expertise might be required.” EX 20 at 18. He stated Claimant’s condition “is at maximum medical improvement as related to psychiatric sequelae of the March 1, 2019 occupational incident,”6 Claimant does not need further treatment beyond a six-month continuation of his medication to complete his therapy, and Claimant “does not have a mental impairment that precludes his ability to [work as a translator], either in a combat zone embedded with military troops or domestically.” Id.

The ALJ found Dr. Schulman to be “highly credible” with “sound” qualifications.
He stated the doctor’s records are detailed and thorough, and he gave the doctor’s opinion great weight because it is “reliable,” “solidly based in the facts,” and “persuasive due to its thoroughness, its reasoning, documentation, and broader understanding of Claimant’s circumstances.” D&O at 23, 25. Conversely, the ALJ found Dr. Ally’s statement that Claimant cannot work outside the United States “to be of little use” because it is an unsupported statement. Id. at 22. Further, he found she did not testify, provide any credentials, or explain why Claimant could not work, for example, in Canada or England. Id. In addition, the ALJ gave weight to Claimant’s own testimony that he believes he can perform, and has applied for, linguist jobs both nationally and internationally. Id. at 24;

6 Dr. Schulman opined Claimant developed Acute Stress Disorder in response to the

March 2019 incident which “abated within 30 to 60 days” of the incident. EX 20 at 17.

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EX 31 at 35. The ALJ also credited Employer’s vocational expert, Ms. Barbara Byer, stating she supplied evidence of other jobs suitable for Claimant. D&O at 23-24.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Claimant’s work-related condition has resolved, and he is not disabled and can return to any work, including his pre-injury employment. Gacki, 33 BRBS at 128. Disability is defined as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 33 U.S.C. §902(10). To satisfy his initial burden, Claimant must show he has medical restrictions that preclude his ability to perform his pre- injury work duties. Carroll v. Hanover Bridge Marina, 17 BRBS 176, 178 (1985). Here, the ALJ credited the doctor who concluded Claimant has no ongoing injury or work restrictions; consequently, Claimant has not established a prima facie case of total disability. Absent such a showing, the ALJ need not continue the analysis. Therefore, we need not assess suitable alternate employment, skills comparison, diligence in seeking work, or loss of wage-earning capacity, and we reject Claimant’s arguments to the contrary. Gacki, 33 BRBS at 128. Nevertheless, we cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Although the ALJ rationally found Claimant is no longer disabled based on Dr.
Schulman’s December 2020 report, EX 20, he did not make a finding as to when Claimant’s condition had resolved. Employer ceased paying benefits as of November 7, 2019, based on Ms. Byer’s vocational report showing alternate work Claimant could perform, and Claimant asserts entitlement to benefits after that date. At the hearing, Employer disputed liability but also stated: “it’s our position that [Claimant] is not entitled to any benefits past the date of Dr. Schulman’s report.” TR at 9. However, Dr. Schulman testified that the injury stemming from Claimant’s March 2019 incident likely resolved within thirty to sixty days of the injury. TR at 92. As the ALJ found Claimant is not disabled and can perform “any job he is qualified to perform,” D&O at 25, but did not determine the date the work- related injury had resolved, we must remand the case for him to make this finding. If the date he finds is after November 7, 2019, Claimant is entitled to additional benefits at the previously-paid rate of compensation; if the date is prior thereto, Claimant is not entitled to any additional benefits, and Employer is entitled to a credit for indemnity benefits paid after that date.

Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s work-related injury has resolved; however, we remand the case for the ALJ to determine the date Claimant’s injury

6 resolved and to award benefits to that date. In all other respects, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge

GLENN E. ULMER
Acting Administrative Appeals Judge

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