Eduardo Caicedo Bustamante v. SOC, LLC and Continental Insurance Company (Board decision, April 9, 2025)

BRB final decision. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the denial of benefits under the Longshore Act as extended by the Defense Base Act. Under 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, a Board decision becomes final 60 days after issuance unless a timely petition for judicial review or a timely request for Board reconsideration is filed. A party may request Board reconsideration within 30 days under 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

Plain-English summary

Eduardo Caicedo Bustamante worked as a security guard in Iraq and claimed work-related hearing loss and psychological injury. The judge found that SOC rebutted the presumption connecting the claimed conditions to work, then denied benefits after weighing conflicting medical evidence. The Board upheld the judge's decision to give little weight to two audiograms whose testing and impairment calculations were insufficiently documented. It also held that the judge could discount psychological opinions that inadequately explained their diagnoses or the connection to work. The Board rejected the argument that treating providers automatically deserved special weight and affirmed the denial.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Work injury presumption under 33 U.S.C. § 920(a); hearing loss evaluation under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(E).
• Outcome: Denial of benefits for hearing loss and psychological injury affirmed.
• Key point: After the employer rebutted the presumption, the judge could weigh the documented medical opinions without automatically favoring treating providers.

Full text (DOL BRB public release)

U.S. Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

BRB No. 23-0414

EDUARDO CAICEDO BUSTAMANTE
)
)
Claimant-Petitioner
)
)
v. )
)
NOT-PUBLISHED
SOC, LLC
)
)
and
) DATE ISSUED: 04/09/2025
)
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
)
(CNA) )
)
Employer/Carrier-
)
Respondents
)
DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of Decision and Order Denying Benefits of Jonathan C. Calianos, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

Allison Graber and Jacob S. Garn (Attorneys Jo Ann Hoffman & Associates, P.A.), Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida, for Claimant.

Alexandra E. Grover and Rafaela Bani (Brown Sims), Houston, Texas, for Employer and Carrier.

Before: BOGGS, ROLFE and JONES, Administrative Appeals Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jonathan C. Calianos’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits (2021-LDA-02686) rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (Act), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1651-1655 (DBA).1 We must affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law. 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Claimant worked as a security guard in Iraq for Triple Canopy from 2007 through 2011, after which he returned to his native country, Peru. Joint Exhibit (JX) 5 at 6 (Transcript (Tr.) 22-23); Employer’s Exhibit (EX) 3. He returned to Iraq in October 2011, this time as a security guard for Employer. JXs 2, 4 at 2, 5 at 7 (Tr. 28). He testified to frequent rocket and mortar attacks while working for both Triple Canopy and Employer, including some resulting in death and injury to others, and he was frequently afraid for his life. JX 5 at 9, 13, 16, 18 (Tr. 33-36, 49-50, 64, 71-72); see also Claimant’s Exhibit (CX) 27 at 2. Claimant stopped working for Employer in September 2012 due to high blood pressure. JXs 2 at 18, 4 at 2, 5 at 7-8 (Tr. 28-29). Upon his return to Peru, he has worked for various employers as a security guard. JXs 4 at 2, 5 at 8-9 (Tr. 30-33). However, he testified to experiencing ear pain, as well as increased anger and irritability with co-workers and his wife. JX 5 at 12, 17-18 (Tr. 45, 47-48, 67-68, 72).

On July 5, 2019, Claimant underwent an audiogram. CX 15. Dr. Percy Aguilar Bustamante diagnosed him with slight neuro-sensory bilateral hypoacusis. CX 15 at 23. Also on July 5, 2019, Claimant sought treatment from psychologist Dr. Yhelsy Alva Coronado, with complaints of anxiety, irritability, and an inability to sleep. CX 17 at 2. After interviewing Claimant and conducting psychological testing,2 Dr. Alva Coronado diagnosed Claimant with “anxiety disorder (post-traumatic stress)” and noted Claimant’s symptoms began after he worked in Iraq. Id. at 3.

On June 29, 2020, Claimant began treating with psychiatrist Dr. J. Angel Manrique Galvez. CX 19 at 3. Dr. Manrique Galvez diagnosed Claimant with late-onset post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by his employment in Iraq. CX 19 at 2. He prescribed medication and recommended cognitive behavioral therapy. Id. at 4. Claimant testified he only saw Dr. Manrique Galvez in person once, but they continued to speak on

1
This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because the office of the district director who filed the ALJ’s decision is located in New York. 33 U.S.C. §921(c); Global Linguist Solutions, L.L.C. v. Abdelmeged, 913 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2019); McDonald v. Aecom Tech. Corp., 45 BRBS 45 (2011).
2
Dr. Alva Coronado administered the following tests: the Folstein Mini-Mental Test, the Raven Test, the Zung Anxiety Test, and the Beck Depression Test. CX 17 at 2.

2 the phone; Dr. Manrique Galvez’s records indicate he continued to treat Claimant through September 2022. JX 5 at 18 (Tr. 70); CX 19 at 73.

On October 21, 2021, psychologist Dr. Gloria Morote evaluated Claimant at Employer’s request. EX 7. She interviewed Claimant, reviewed his medical records, and conducted psychological testing.3 Id. at 1-2. She concluded there was “no objective, reliable, or substantive data to support that [Claimant] has a psychological/psychiatric condition,” and there was no evidence his employment with Employer either caused or aggravated any psychological condition. Id. at 15.

On June 21, 2022, Claimant underwent another audiogram, this time under the care of Dr. Sonia Peña Galindo. CX 21 at 2. It showed noise-induced mild bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, which Dr. Peña Galindo concluded resulted in binaural hearing loss of 37.71%. Id. As Claimant denied hearing problems prior to his employment in Iraq and reported his symptoms began after that employment, Dr. Peña Galindo concluded his hearing loss was caused by working conditions in Iraq. Id. at 3.

On June 28, 2022, at Employer’s request, audiologist Dr. Laurie S. Hebert issued a report following review of Claimant’s July 2019 audiogram. EX 5 at 1. She diagnosed Claimant with mild to moderate mixed hearing loss but opined it was not due to any work- related noise exposure. Id. at 1-2. Dr. Hebert supplemented her report on August 13, 2022, following review of the June 2022 audiogram. Id. at 5. She noted the June 2022 audiogram showed Claimant’s hearing had improved since 2019, but that noise-induced hearing loss is permanent in nature. Id. at 7. As a result, she again concluded any hearing loss Claimant suffered was not the result of work-related noise exposure. Id.

On October 3, 2022, Claimant was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Gustavo R.
Benejam, who interviewed Claimant, conducted a mental status examination, administered psychological testing,4 and reviewed his medical records. CX 22 at 1-2. Dr. Benejam

3
Dr. Morote administered the following tests: the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 2 (MMPI-2); the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 2 – Restructured Format (MMPI-2-RF); the Inventory of Problems (IOP-29); the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAM-A); and the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D).
4
Dr. Benejam administered the following psychological testing: the Beck Depression Inventory II, the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Paranoia Worries Questionnaires (PWQ), the PTSD Checklist-5 (PCL-5), the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (CAP-5), the WHODAS 2.0, the Structured Inventory of Malingering Symptomatology (SIMS), and the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST). CX 22 at 7-9.

3 concluded Claimant developed symptoms consistent with PTSD due to his work-related overseas experiences, but found he did not meet the criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Id. at 6, 8. Rather, he diagnosed Claimant with “Other Specified Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Mild,” which he noted to be in the severe range, and which he opined was caused by Claimant’s employment in Iraq. Id. at 17.

On October 22, 2022, Dr. Morote issued an Addendum to her previous psychological report after reviewing Dr. Benejam’s report and the updated records of Dr. Manrique Galvez. EX 7 at 19-38. In addition to responding to Dr. Benejam’s criticisms of her previous report, Dr. Morote applied the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5) criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, PTSD, and Other Specified Stressor and Trauma Related Disorder, and opined Claimant failed to meet the criteria for all three diagnoses. Id. at 23-29. Her opinion remained unchanged: Claimant did not suffer from any work-related psychological condition. Id. at 38.

Claimant filed a claim for compensation on November 15, 2019, alleging work- related hearing loss and psychological injuries. The claim was referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) on March 15, 2021, and was assigned to the ALJ on April 14, 2022, to be decided on a paper record without a formal hearing. On June 29, 2023, the ALJ issued a Decision and Order Denying Benefits (D&O), finding Claimant failed to prove he suffered work-related psychological and hearing loss injuries. D&O at

3. He found Claimant invoked the Section 20(a) presumption of compensability as to both
   his psychological and hearing loss claims, 33 U.S.C. §920(a), and Employer presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Id. at 16, 18. Upon weighing the medical evidence and Claimant’s deposition testimony, the ALJ found Claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a psychological condition or hearing loss related to his employment with Employer. Id. at 16-24.

   Claimant appeals. He argues the ALJ improperly took “judicial notice” of
   

   documents outside the record without providing proper notice and improperly weighed the evidence in applying the Act’s Section 20(a) analysis of compensability, most notably by failing to accord Claimant’s treating physicians the “special and considerable weight” they deserve. Claimant’s Petition for Review and Brief (Cl. PR) at 4-5, 9-10. Employer responds, urging affirmance. Claimant replies to Employer’s response.

                                Official Notice
   

   In the Decision and Order’s opening paragraphs, the ALJ acknowledged admission
   of both parties’ hearing exhibits and then stated:

                                       4
   

   To the extent necessary, I will also take judicial notice of any document filed
   in the Official OALJ file, which is entirely electronic in this matter.

D&O at 2. Claimant argues the ALJ’s “generic reference” to the OALJ’s electronic filing system, “which contains thousands of files on numerous areas of law,” indicated he intended to take official notice of evidence outside of the record. Claimant’s Reply to Employer’s Brief in Response (Cl. Reply) at 3; Cl. PR at 4. Claimant contends this attempt to take official notice is procedurally defective because the ALJ failed to adequately describe which documents within the OALJ’s vast filing system were subject to the notice, depriving him of the opportunity to respond and violating both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3)(A), and his procedural due process rights. Cl. PR at 4; Cl. Reply at 2-3.

While an ALJ cannot consider evidence outside of the record in deciding the claims before him, he can supplement the record sua sponte by taking official notice of a material and adjudicative fact “or other matter subject to judicial notice” as long as he notifies the parties and provides an opportunity to respond. 29 C.F.R. §18.84; 5 U.S.C. §556(e); Lindsay v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 16 BRBS 20, 22 (1986). However, even assuming the ALJ’s attempt to notice “any document filed in the Official OALJ file” was improperly vague, any error is harmless because all pleadings filed, documents submitted, and orders issued in conjunction with a claim are automatically incorporated into that claim’s “exclusive record” by virtue of Section 556(e) of the APA. 5 U.S.C. §556(e) (the “exclusive record” before an ALJ is “[t]he transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding.”) (emphasis added); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009). As there is no reason to take official notice of items already filed into the record, the ALJ’s official notice of filings is redundant and unnecessary but not reversible error.5

Weighing of the Evidence

When a claimant invokes the Section 20(a) presumption that his injury is work- related, as is the case here, the burden shifts to the employer to produce substantial evidence

5
Unlike Claimant, we do not believe the ALJ intended to encompass every document electronically filed in every claim pending before the OALJ. Cl. Reply at 3. Regardless, even assuming we take such an expansive view of the ALJ’s attempt at official notice, any error would be harmless, as Claimant fails to point to any instance within the ALJ’s Decision and Order wherein he relied on extra-record evidence potentially incorporated into the record through an improperly expansive attempt at official notice. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 406.

5 that the claimant’s condition is not work-related. Rose v. Vectrus Systems Corporation, 56 BRBS 27, 32 (2022) (en banc), appeal dismissed (MDFL Aug. 24, 2023); see also Rainey v. Director, OWCP, 517 F.3d 632, 634 (2d Cir. 2008); American Stevedoring, Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 2001). Because Employer successfully rebutted the presumption, and Claimant does not dispute that finding,6 he is no longer entitled to it, and the issue of causation must be resolved on the evidence in the record as a whole, with Claimant bearing the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Rainey, 517 F.3d at 634; Santoro v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 30 BRBS 171, 174 (1996); see also Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).

In evaluating the evidence, the ALJ is entitled to weigh the expert opinion evidence and draw his own inferences from it, and he is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any particular medical expert. See Pietrunti v. Director, OWCP, 119 F.3d 1035, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1997); John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 289 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1961). The Benefits Review Board is not free to re-weigh the evidence or to make credibility determinations and will not interfere with the ALJ’s credibility determinations unless they are “inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.” Cordero v. Triple A Mach. Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); see also Sealand Terminals, Inc. v. Gasparic, 7 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1993).

Claimant initially argues the ALJ, in weighing the medical evidence, failed to give the opinions of Drs. Aguilar Bustamante, Alva Coronado, Manrique Galvez, and Peña Galindo “special and considerable weight” due to their status as his treating providers. Cl. PR at 5 (citing Amos v. Director, OWCP, 153 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), amended, 164 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999); Pietrunti, 119 F.3d 1035; Rivera v. Harris, 623 F.2d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 1980)); Cl. Reply at 4. However, where there are conflicting medical opinions, as here, the ALJ is not required to automatically give “special weight” to the treating physicians’ opinions. Kkunsa v. Constellis Group/Triple Canopy, Inc., 59 BRBS 1, 4 (2025). Rather, he must consider all relevant evidence, assess the weight and credibility of each opinion, and explain his rationale in reaching a decision

6
At one point in his Petition for Review, Claimant appears to suggest the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Hebert’s report sufficient to rebut the Section 20(a) presumption, or “sever the potential connection between the disability and the work environment,” as to his hearing loss claim because it was merely a peer review of Claimant’s audiograms. Cl. PR at 9-10 (quoting Ramey v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 134 F.3d 954, 959-960 (9th Cir. 1997)). To the extent Claimant takes this position, we reject it. The burden on rebuttal is one of production, not persuasion, and the ALJ properly found Dr. Hebert’s unequivocal conclusion that Claimant does not suffer from work-related hearing loss is sufficient to meet that burden. Rose, 56 BRBS at 36; EX 5 at 2, 7.

6 on the evidence. Id. at 4-5. Consequently, the ALJ did not err by not automatically giving “special and considerable weight” to the opinions of Claimant’s treating providers outside of these other considerations. D&O at 19.

Claimant further contends the ALJ committed several additional errors when weighing the evidence.7 He maintains the ALJ improperly disregarded his testimony, despite finding him credible, focusing instead on the medical evidence to weigh causation. Cl. PR at 9-12; Cl. Reply at 5. He argues the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Manrique Galvez for failing to explain the criteria for PTSD as outlined by the DSM-5, and how Claimant met such criteria, as there is no requirement in the Act that the DSM-5 be used to diagnose psychological injury. Cl. PR at 6. He also argues the ALJ improperly discredited both Drs. Alva Coronado and Manrique Galvez for failing to document Claimant’s history, arguing this “discounts the roles of treating doctors.” Cl. PR at 7; Cl. Reply at 4. Lastly, Claimant maintains the ALJ violated the APA, 5 U.S.C. §557, by failing to weigh certain evidence of record: Claimant’s employment certificates and letters; his employment contracts; discovery responses; and filings with the Department of Labor. Cl. PR at 10; see CXs 1-5, 7, 9, 11-12, 23-25.

Claimant’s arguments are unavailing. We reject the notion that finding a claimant credible inherently obviates the need for evaluating the medical evidence. At the weighing stage of the causation analysis, finding a claimant credible does not automatically provide sufficient weight to prove causation by a preponderance of evidence; it is up to the ALJ to weigh all the evidence, accepting or rejecting all or any part of any testimony according to his judgment. Perini Corp. v. Heyde, 306 F. Supp. 1321, 1325-1326 (D.R.I. 1969). The ALJ also must independently analyze and discuss the medical evidence to satisfy the APA’s requirement for a reasoned analysis. 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3)(A); Ballesteros v. Willamette W. Corp., 20 BRBS 184, 187 (1988). Further, Claimant’s argument that the ALJ erroneously failed to weigh his employment certificates and letters, employment contracts, discovery responses, and filings with the Department of Labor, is inadequately briefed, as Claimant has not explained the relevance of those documents to the ALJ’s causation analysis or why the ALJ’s consideration of them could have led to a different outcome.8 Montoya v. Navy Exch. Serv. Command, 49 BRBS 51, 52 n.1 (2015); Plappert v. Marine Corps Exch., 31 BRBS 109, 111 (1997).

7
To the extent Claimant also argues any factual doubts should be resolved in his favor, see Cl. PR at 8-9, this position has been rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280-281 (1994); Santoro, 30 BRBS at 174-175.
8
The only case Claimant cites in support of his argument is Mitchell v. Island Creek Kentucky Mining & Dir., OWCP, BRB No. 19-0313 BLA (May 29, 2020), an unpublished 7
Ultimately, the ALJ rationally and permissibly weighed the evidence the parties submitted for both the hearing loss and psychological injury claims and adequately explained his reasoning in accordance with the APA. D&O at 16-23; see 5 U.S.C.
§557(c)(3)(A); Kkunsa, 59 BRBS at 4-5. Further, substantial evidence supports his reasons for giving less weight to certain medical providers. Powell v. Serv. Employees Int’l, Inc., 58 BRBS 13, 16 (2019).

For Claimant’s hearing loss claim, the ALJ evaluated the July 2019 audiogram, the June 2022 audiogram, and the reports of Drs. Aguilar Bustamante, Peña Galindo, and Hebert. He permissibly found the audiograms unreliable, as no evidence established they conformed to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) as required by the Act and its regulations.9 D&O at 16; CX 15

case arising under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§901-944 (2012). Cl. PR at 10 n.53. This case is not precedential. Moreover, Mitchell did not involve an ALJ’s failure to consider certain evidence at the weighing stage of the causation analysis. Rather, in Mitchell, the Board found the ALJ failed to adequately explain his conclusion that the x- ray evidence as a whole did not support the existence of pneumoconiosis. In sum, there was a lack of adequate explanation, not a failure to consider evidence.
9
Specifically, the ALJ found no evidence an approved audiologist, otolaryngologist, or certified technician administered Claimant’s audiograms, or that the audiometers were properly calibrated. D&O at 16-17. Although he acknowledged Dr. Peña Galindo is an otolaryngologist and Dr. Aguilar Bustamante is an otorhinolaryngologist, he found no evidence they had personally administered Claimant’s audiograms. D&O at 16 n.9; see CXs 15 at 2-3, 21 at 2-4. Even assuming they had, the ALJ found the only evidence of their credentials – webpages indicating they are registered with the “Regional Council” – were insufficient to determine whether they meet certification requirements without additional explanation of what is required to become “registered.” Id. (citing CXs 14, 20). Claimant argues the ALJ improperly placed an increased burden on him to prove his providers’ certification by requiring “these foreign doctors to show how they became ‘registered.’” Cl. PR at 6.

Even if Claimant is correct, any error is harmless, as the ALJ’s uncertainty about whether the individuals who administered the audiograms were certified was not the determinative factor in his decision to give little weight to Claimant’s hearing loss evidence. The ALJ also found the office notes accompanying the audiograms did not describe testing standards, the method of evaluating hearing loss, or the reliability of the test results, Dr. Aguilar Bustamante did not assign a percentage impairment rating under the AMA Guides, and although Dr. Peña Galindo did assign Claimant a 37.71% binaural hearing loss, she did not explain how she calculated this impairment. Id. at 17; CXs 15 at 8 at 2; CX 21 at 2; see 33 U.S.C. §908(c)(13)(E);10 20 C.F.R. §702.441(d);11 Green-Brown v. Sealand Serv., Inc., 586 F.3d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) (an ALJ may not credit an audiogram that is not administered in compliance with the AMA Guides).

Assuming the audiograms reliably demonstrated hearing loss, the ALJ found Claimant failed to establish the hearing loss was related to his employment with Employer. D&O at 17. Dr. Aguilar Bustamente did not identify the cause of hearing loss purportedly demonstrated by the July 2019 audiogram, and Dr. Peña Galindo’s determination that Claimant’s noise-induced hearing loss was work-related “hinged entirely on [Claimant]’s self-report that he did not have hearing loss prior to his employment in Iraq.” Id. at 17; CXs 15 at 2-3, 21 at 3. Conversely, the ALJ found Dr. Hebert opined any hearing loss the audiograms demonstrated could not be the result of work-related noise exposure. D&O at 17-18; EX 5 at 2, 7. According to Dr. Hebert, noise exposure creates high frequency hearing loss, but the audiograms showed hearing loss at lower frequencies. D&O at 18; EX 5 at 2, 7. She further found the June 2022 audiogram showed improvement, which she explained was inconsistent with noise-induced hearing loss because noise-induced hearing loss is permanent and cannot improve over time. Id.

2-3, 21 at 2-4. Moreover, the ALJ found Dr. Hebert’s assessment of Claimant’s audiograms supported their “inherent unreliability,” because neither test included calibration dates or objective testing measures, and the July 2019 audiogram did not include a measurement at 3000 Hz as required by the AMA Guides. Id. at 17; see EX 5 at 2-3, 7-8.
10
33 U.S.C. §908(c)(13)(E) states:

Determination of loss of hearing shall be made in accordance with the guides for the evaluation of permanent impairment as promulgated and modified from time to time by the American Medical Association.
11
20 C.F.R. §702.441(d) states, in relevant part:

In determining the loss of hearing under the Act, the evaluators shall use the criteria for measuring and calculating hearing impairment as published and modified from time-to-time by the American Medical Association in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, using the most currently revised edition of this publication. In addition, the audiometer used for testing the individual’s threshold of hearing must be calibrated according to current American National Standard Specifications for Audiometers.

9
Contrary to Claimant’s position, the ALJ acknowledged Claimant’s testimony that he was exposed to explosions, i.e., potentially harmful noise, while employed in Iraq. D&O at 15. In fact, the ALJ found this testimony, along with Claimant’s audiograms, sufficient to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption. Id. at 15-16. After rebuttal, the ALJ permissibly weighed the testimony and the medical evidence and found them unpersuasive. Id. at 16-18; Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Santoro, 30 BRBS at 173. Consequently, as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, and considering the broad discretion afforded ALJs at the weighing stage of the Section 20(a) analysis, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that Claimant failed to prove he suffered a work-related hearing loss. Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Santoro, 30 BRBS at 173.

As for Claimant’s psychological injury claim, the ALJ evaluated the medical reports of Drs. Alva Coronado, Manrique Galvez, Benejam, and Morote. D&O at 19-24; see CXs 17, 19, 22; EX 5. He gave no weight to either Dr. Alva Coronado’s or Dr. Manrique Galvez’s opinions. He found insufficient evidence to evaluate whether Dr. Alva Coronado is a qualified psychologist, and both physicians’ reports were conclusory in nature: they failed to document Claimant’s history, including his experiences in Iraq12 or adequately explain the PTSD diagnosis and how Claimant’s work in Iraq caused it.13 D&O at 19-20; see CX 16 at 2; CX 17 at 2-3; CX 19. Although Claimant is correct that the DSM-5 is not a required diagnostic tool,14 Dr. Manrique Galvez specifically indicated he used the DSM- 5 to diagnose Claimant with PTSD; therefore, it was within the ALJ’s discretion to accord diminished weight to his opinion based on his failure to adequately explain how the symptoms he listed supported the DSM-5 criteria. CX 19 at 2, 11, 20, 29, 37, 46, 54, 62, 71; see Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323. Similarly, although there is no requirement for providers to document a claimant’s self-reported history, it is within the ALJ’s broad discretion in evaluating causation to accord diminished weight to a report that lacks this information. Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Hughes, 289 F.2d at 405; Powell, 58 BRBS at 16.

12
The ALJ noted Dr. Alva Coronado’s “limited” reference to Claimant’s overseas experience was inaccurate, indicating he worked in both Iraq and Afghanistan when Claimant worked only in Iraq. D&O at 19; CX 17 at 3; JX 5 at 7 (Tr. 28).
13
The ALJ noted Dr. Manrique Galvez’s reports inaccurately listed Claimant’s symptoms, many of which did not correlate with Claimant’s testimony or other medical records, such as flashbacks, hyper-alertness, startle reflex, and insecurity. D&O at 20; see CX 19 at 3, 12, 21-22, 30, 47, 55, 63; CX 22 at 6; EX 7 at 6; JX 5 at 12, 18 (Tr. 45-46, 72).
14
See S.K. [Kamal] v. ITT Indus., Inc., 43 BRBS 78 (2009), aff’d in part and rev’d in part mem., No. 4:09-MC-348, 2011 WL 798464 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011).

10
The ALJ found Dr. Benejam’s report unpersuasive and conclusory as it contained statements contradicted or counter-indicated by Claimant’s testimony15 and failed to adequately explain how Claimant’s symptoms and diagnoses were related to his employment in Iraq, other than stating Claimant had no mental health history prior to that employment. D&O at 21-23; CX 22 at 15-19. The ALJ further found Claimant’s testimony, although credible, did “little to bolster” Dr. Benejam’s conclusions, as Claimant did not describe his symptoms in any detail,16 including their “onset, progression, frequency and intensity,” explain how they impacted his life, or indicate why he believes his overseas employment caused these “non-specific” symptoms. D&O at 23. Conversely, the ALJ found Dr. Morote’s contrary opinion persuasive because she explained in detail why Claimant’s reported symptoms failed to meet any of the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD or Major Depressive Disorder and why Claimant’s primary complaint – irritability – was a “nonspecific feeling” that could not “in and of itself” constitute “evidence of PTSD or any other psychiatric illness.” D&O at 22-23; see EX 7 at 26-28. As the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence of record, and considering the broad discretion accorded to him in weighing the evidence, we affirm his finding that Claimant failed to establish he suffered a work-related psychological injury. Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Hughes, 289 F.2d at 405; Santoro, 30 BRBS at 173.

The ALJ rationally weighed the evidence of record, including Claimant’s credibility and all medical opinions, and adequately detailed and explained his findings in compliance with the APA. Gelinas v. Electric Boat Corp., 45 BRBS 69, 71 (2011); Ballesteros, 20 BRBS at 187. Further, his credibility assessments are neither inherently incredible nor patently unreasonable but are supported by substantial evidence. Gasparic, 7 F.3d at 323; Cordero, 580 F.2d at 1335. Therefore, we affirm his conclusions, upon weighing the evi-

15
For instance, Dr. Benejam opined Claimant did not meet the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD because he had improved with treatment, but Claimant denied improvement since starting treatment in both his deposition and to Dr. Morote. D&O at 20-21 n.14; see CX 22 at 8, 16; EX 7 at 14; JX 5 at 19 (Tr. 73). The ALJ also noted Dr. Benejam’s classification of Claimant’s psychological impairment as “severe” and “clinically significant” was undermined by Claimant’s testimony that he has been able to maintain steady employment since returning to Peru. D&O at 21; see CX 22 at 12, 15, 19; JX 5 at 7-9 (Tr. 25-26, 30- 33).
16
The only symptoms Claimant testified to were irritability, anger, anguish, and arguments with his wife and co-workers. D&O at 23; JX 5 at 12, 18 (Tr. 45-46, 72).

11 dence of record, that Claimant failed to carry his burden of proving he suffered a work- related psychological injury and work-related hearing loss within the meaning of the Act.

Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits.

SO ORDERED.

JUDITH S. BOGGS
Administrative Appeals Judge

JONATHAN ROLFE
Administrative Appeals Judge

MELISSA LIN JONES
Administrative Appeals Judge

12