Larson v. Family Dollar (agency decision, July 17, 2026)

Plain-English summary

Genevieve Larson alleged that Family Dollar violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and she sought review of two ALJ orders in an ongoing case. One order denied her request to use a non-attorney representative after the ALJ found that representative's communications were inappropriate, and the other addressed several pending motions, including damages, a continuance, summary decision, and a protective order. The ARB explained that interlocutory review is reserved for exceptional circumstances and that Larson did not satisfy the requirements for the collateral-order exception. The Board also held that the challenge to the non-attorney-representation order was untimely. The ARB denied the interlocutory appeal, leaving the case to proceed before the ALJ.

Decision snapshot

• Cited authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.22(b)(2), 1980.110(a); and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
• Outcome: The ARB denied Larson's interlocutory appeal and left the underlying proceedings before the ALJ in place.
• Key point: Interlocutory review of an ALJ's non-final order is available only in exceptional circumstances, and the petitioner must satisfy the requirements for such review.

Full text (DOL official public release)

    U.S. Department of Labor          Administrative Review Board
                                      200 Constitution Ave. NW
                                      Washington, DC 20210-0001

    IN THE MATTER OF:


    GENEVIEVE LARSON,                             ARB CASE NO. 2026-0045

                COMPLAINANT,                      ALJ CASE NO. 2025-SOX-00010
                                                  ALJ STEWART F. ALFORD
         v.
                                                  DATE: July 17, 2026
    FAMILY DOLLAR,

                RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:
      Genevieve R. Larson; Pro Se; Tonopah, Nevada

For the Respondent:
      Chrisanne Gultz, Esq. and Melissa L. Shingles, Esq.; Littler
      Mendelson; Phoenix, Arizona

Before KAPLAN and BURRELL Administrative Appeals Judges


        DECISION AND ORDER DENYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

       This case arises under the employee protection provisions of Section 806 of
the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), as amended, and its implementing regulations. 1  0F




Complainant Genevieve Larson filed a petition for interlocutory review requesting
that the Administrative Review Board (Board) review two orders issued by an
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ). For the following reasons, we deny
Complainant’s petition for interlocutory review.




1       18 U.S.C. § 1514A; 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2026).
                                           2


                                    BACKGROUND

       Complainant filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labor’s
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on November 9, 2024,
alleging that Respondent Family Dollar violated the SOX. On December 18, 2024,
OSHA dismissed the complaint. Complainant requested a hearing before an ALJ
with the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ).

        On December 4, 2025, Howard Friesner filed a Non-Attorney Representative
Notice of Appearance on behalf of Complainant. Respondent opposed allowing
Friesner to appear as a non-attorney representative, and asserted that Friesner
sent at least 84 emails, totaling more than 500 pages, to Respondent’s counsel’s
office, some of which contained hostile language. Respondent contended that this
correspondence demonstrated a pattern of abusive conduct rendering him unfit to
serve as a non-attorney representative in this matter.

      On January 22, 2026, the ALJ issued an Order to Show Cause Regarding
Non-Attorney Representation, ordering Complainant to show cause as to why he
should not deny the request. The ALJ cautioned Complainant that the failure to
respond would result in denying her request. Neither Complainant nor Friesner
responded. On February 5, 2026, the ALJ issued an Order Denying Non-Attorney
Representation. 2 The ALJ found that Friesner had not conducted himself in a
                1F




manner that warranted allowing him to serve as a non-attorney representative in
this matter and that his correspondence demonstrated a pattern of communication
that was inappropriate and would not be tolerated.

       On February 23, 2026, OALJ docketed a Response to the Motion to Remove
Pro Se Representative, which was dated January 23, 2026. 3 Complainant stated
                                                             2F




that she was preparing to represent herself and that the representation of Friesner



2       A non-attorney representative may represent a party upon an Administrative Law
Judge’s approval. 29 C.F.R. § 18.22(b)(2). The ALJ may require the representative to
establish that they are subject to the laws of the United States and possess the
“communication skills, knowledge, character, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary to render appropriate assistance.” Id. The ALJ may also “inquire as to the
qualification or ability of a non-attorney representative to render assistance.” Id.
The ALJ may deny the request after providing the party with notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Id.
3     Second Order Denying Non-Attorney Representation at 1.
                                               3


was “essentially complete.” 4 That same day, the ALJ issued a Second Order
                           3F




Denying Non-Attorney Representation, which stated that there was no reason to
amend or alter the February 5, 2026 order and that the totality of the record still
demonstrated that Friesner had not conducted himself in a manner that warranted
permitting him to serve as Complainant’s non-attorney representative. 54F




      On June 10, 2026, the ALJ issued an Order Addressing Pending Motions,
which addressed the following motions: (1) Complainant’s Motion for Tax
Neutralization/Gross-Up; (2) Respondent’s Motion to Continue Hearing;
(3) Complainant’s Motion for Summary Decision; (4) Respondent’s Motion to
Continue Remaining Deadlines; and (5) Respondent’s Motion for Protective Order. 6           5F




      Complainant had submitted a request for an award of $1,543,815.38 in
damages. 7 The ALJ found that the motion was premature, that any damages would
            6F




be based on evidence submitted by both parties after a hearing if Complainant
prevailed, and that Complainant could address such issues at the hearing. 8 7F




Thus, the ALJ denied Complainant’s motion without prejudice. 9 8F




       Respondent sought entry of a protective order that would allow the parties to
disclose confidential information without the risk of third-party disclosure. 10 9F




The ALJ granted Respondent’s request. 11 10F




      Respondent also sought to continue the hearing and remaining deadlines. 12      11F




Complainant opposed the motion and contended that it would impose an undue
hardship on her, and requested expedited relief and a referral to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for criminal charges. 13 The ALJ determined that a continuance was
                                   12F




4     Id.
5     Id. at 1-2.
6     Order Addressing Pending Motions at 1.
7     Id. at 1-2.
8     Id. at 2.
9     Id.
10    Id.
11    Id.
12    Id.
13    Id. at 2-3.
                                             4


warranted to allow Respondent to complete discovery, and continued the hearing to
February 1, 2027. 14 The ALJ also determined that expedited relief was not
                   13F




warranted, and that he did not have the authority to address Complainant’s request
for a referral to the DOJ for criminal charges. 15 Thus, the ALJ denied
                                                 14F




Complainant’s request. 16       15F




      Lastly, Complainant filed a motion for summary decision. 17 The ALJ denied
                                                                     16F




the motion because Complainant had not set forth any argument or basis for
granting summary decision. 18         17F




       On June 15, 2026, Complainant filed a Petition for Review with the Board
seeking review of the ALJ’s Second Order Denying Non-Attorney Representation
and the June 10, 2026 Order Addressing Pending Motions. On June 18, 2026, the
Board issued an Order to Show Cause, which explained that, because the ALJ had
not yet issued a decision fully disposing of all claims in Complainant’s complaint,
the petition was for interlocutory review. The Board ordered Complainant to file a
brief within ten calendar days explaining why the Board should not dismiss the
interlocutory appeal and demonstrate why this matter satisfied the three elements
of the collateral order exception identified in the order. On June 27, 2026,
Complainant filed a response.

                         JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The Board’s delegated authority includes the consideration and disposition of
interlocutory appeals “in exceptional circumstances, provided such review is not
prohibited by statute.” 19 This authority includes the discretion to consider
                          18F




interlocutory appeals “in exceptional circumstances . . . .” 20
                                                             19F




14     Id. at 3.
15     Id.
16     Id.
17     Id.
18     Id.
19    Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of
Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 85 Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020)).
20     Id.
                                                5


                                        DISCUSSION

1. Complainant’s Petition for Interlocutory Review of the ALJ’s Second
   Order Denying Non-Attorney Representation is Untimely

       Complainant contends that the ALJ’s order denying her non-attorney
representation satisfies the collateral order test. 21 However, Complainant’s petition
                                                      20F




for interlocutory review of the ALJ’s denial of her non-attorney representative is
untimely. Under the SOX, a party has fourteen days from the date of an ALJ’s
decision to file a petition for review with the Board. 22 This deadline also applies to
                                                                    21F




collateral order interlocutory appeals. 23 Here, the ALJ issued the Second Order
                                          22F




Denying Non-Attorney Representation on February 23, 2026. Complainant did not
file her request for interlocutory review of this order until June 15, 2026, well past
the fourteen-day deadline. Thus, Complainant’s interlocutory appeal of the ALJ’s
denial of non-attorney representation is untimely. 24       23F




2. Complainant’s Petition for Interlocutory Review of the ALJ’s Order
   Addressing Pending Motions Does Not Satisfy the Collateral Order
   Doctrine

       We decline to accept Complainant’s interlocutory appeal on the remaining
issues, though timely filed, because they do not satisfy the collateral order
exception. As stated above, the Secretary of Labor’s delegation of authority to the
Board provides that interlocutory appeals should only be considered in “exceptional
circumstances.” The Board takes the Secretary’s dictate seriously and has
emphasized repeatedly that interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored and that
there is a strong policy against piecemeal appeals. 25        24F




21     Complainant’s Brief in Response to Order to Show Cause at 1-3.
22     29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(a).
23     Gulden v. Exxon Mobil Corp., ARB No. 2023-0050, ALJ Nos. 2023-SOX-00021,
-00022, slip op. at 5 (ARB Feb. 29, 2024) (citing Priddle v. United Airlines, Inc., ARB No.
2021-0064, ALJ No. 2020-AIR-00013, slip op. at 6 (ARB Jan. 26, 2022)).
24      Even if Complainant had filed a timely appeal of the ALJ’s Second Order Denying
Non-Attorney Representation, orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases “are not
sufficiently separable from the merits to qualify for interlocutory appeal.” Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985).
25      Gadbury v. Park Aerospace Corp., ARB No. 2026-0024, ALJ No. 2025-SOX-00022,
slip op. at 3 (ARB Apr. 17, 2026) (citation omitted).
                                             6



       When a party seeks interlocutory review of an ALJ’s non-final order, the
Board has elected to look to the interlocutory review procedures used by federal
courts, including requesting the trial court certify issues involving a controlling
question of law for immediate appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 26             25F




It does not appear that Complainant received ALJ certification under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) in this case.

       If a party has failed to obtain ALJ certification, the Board may still consider
reviewing an interlocutory order that meets the “collateral order” exception. 27      26F




The collateral order exception applies if the appealed decision belongs to that “small
class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated.” 28
                                      27F




       To fall within the “collateral order” exception, the order appealed must:
(1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 29   28F




      Complainant contends that the ALJ’s June 10, 2026 rulings declining to
address an evidentiary issue, granting Respondent’s request for a protective order,
and rescheduling the hearing for February 1, 2027, all conclusively determine the
disputed questions. 30 Complainant also contends that each of these issues are
                     29F




completely separate from the merits of her SOX whistleblower complaint because
evidentiary rulings concern the integrity of the adjudication process, rescheduling
the hearing relates to statutory timeliness requirements, and the protective order
implicates constitutional and public policy concerns. 31 Lastly, Complainant
                                                         30F




contends that these issues are all effectively unreviewable after a final judgment


26    Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
27    Id.
28    Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
29    Id. (citation omitted).
30    Complainant’s Brief in Response to Order to Show Cause at 1.
31    Id. at 2-3.
                                              7


because missing evidence cannot be later cured, the delay leads to lost time and
evidence, and the protective order imposes irreversible harm. 32    31F




        Setting aside the first and second prongs of the collateral order test,
Complainant’s appeal does not satisfy the third prong. To be “effectively
unreviewable,” the right sought to be vindicated must “be, for all practical and legal
purposes, destroyed if it were not vindicated prior to final judgment.” 33 As long as
                                                                             32F




the rights at issue “can be adequately vindicated by other means, the chance that
the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, does not
provide a basis for” immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order. 34      33F




      Complainant has not provided any support for her allegations. Moreover,
Complainant’s appeal concerns procedural rulings and an order imposed to control
the conduct of the proceedings below. The Board has repeatedly declined to interfere
with an ALJ’s procedural orders in interlocutory appeals because they are readily
subject to review on appeal from a final judgment. 35 Complainant can appeal the
                                                       34F




32     Id. at 3.
33      Lattimore v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 2025-0089, ALJ No. 2025-AIR-00038,
slip op. at 5 (ARB Mar. 9, 2026) (citation omitted).
34       Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (internal quotations and
citation omitted); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872
(1994) (“A fully litigated case can no more be untried than the law’s proverbial bell can be
unrung, and almost every pretrial or trial order might be called ‘effectively unreviewable’ in
the sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting history. Thus, erroneous
[orders] may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate
reversal of a final district court judgment . . . . But if immediate appellate review were
available every such time, Congress’s final decision rule would end up a pretty puny
one . . . .”); see generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3911.4 (3d ed. Sept. 2025 update) (internal citations omitted) (“The mere
burden of submitting to trial proceedings that will be wasted if the appellant’s position is
correct does not support collateral order appeal. Nor is it enough to show that a wrong order
may cause tactical disadvantages that cannot be undone even by a second trial. The final
judgment rule rests on a determination that ordinarily these costs be borne to support the
greater benefits that generally flow [from] denying interlocutory appeal.”).
35     Ashcraft v. First Citizens Bank, ARB Nos. 2026-0008, -0017, ALJ No. 2025-SOX-
00035, slip op. at 10-11 (ARB Jan. 30, 2026) (citing Lewis v. Deepwell Energy Servs., LLC,
ARB Nos. 2025-0037, -0039, -0051, ALJ No. 2024-STA-00042, slip op. at 7-8 (ARB Apr. 23,
2025) (denying interlocutory appeals of ALJ orders prohibiting complainant from filing,
denying reconsideration, denying motion for recusal, and denying request to certify for
interlocutory appeal); Mawhinney v. Transp. Workers Union, ARB No. 2015-0013, ALJ No.
2012-AIR-00014, slip op. at 3 (ARB Feb. 3, 2015) (declining interlocutory review concerning
ALJ orders denying amendments to arguments about individual liability and concerning
                                             8


ALJ’s decision, including this procedural order and the restrictions it placed on her,
at the conclusion of the ALJ proceedings. If the Board agrees with Complainant at
that time that the ALJ erred, and that the error was not harmless, the Board can
order necessary relief. Thus, we find that Complainant has not satisfied the
collateral order exception.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Complainant’s interlocutory appeal.

       SO ORDERED.




                                   ELLIOT M. KAPLAN
                                   Administrative Appeals Judge




                                   THOMAS H. BURRELL
                                   Administrative Appeals Judge




alleged ex parte communications; “the Board may fully consider and dispose of both issues
he has presented, upon appeal of the ALJ’s final order in this case, should that be
necessary”); Pragasam v. Wellness Home Health Care, Inc., ARB No. 2011-0017, ALJ No.
2010-LCA-00018, slip op. at 6 (ARB Apr. 12, 2011) (“[T]here is no viable argument that the
procedural and discovery dispute issues presented here are subject to the collateral order
exception . . . . The ARB can most certainly review the procedural issues Pragasam has
raised regarding default judgment, joinder of parties, and audio CD transcription upon
appeal of the ALJ’s final decision in this case.”)).