Rashad v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. (agency decision, August 14, 2025)

Plain-English summary

Muhammad Rashad challenged OSHA’s rejection of his truck-safety retaliation complaint against Ryder Integrated Logistics more than three years after the findings were issued. He asserted that he first received the findings when OSHA emailed them in January 2025, and he objected the next day. The Board vacated the ALJ’s untimeliness dismissal because the judge had not adequately considered OSHA’s statement that it could not confirm delivery of the original findings. It explained that the objection period runs from receipt and that OSHA must use a delivery method permitting confirmation. If the objections prove timely and Ryder continues to assert the delay defense of laches, the ALJ must also examine the evidence of lack of diligence and prejudice more fully. The Board remanded without deciding whether the retaliation claim succeeds.

Decision snapshot

• Cited authorities: 49 U.S.C. § 31105; 29 C.F.R. § 1978.105(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1978.106(a)
• Outcome: ALJ dismissal vacated; timeliness and, if necessary, laches remanded for further analysis.
• Key point: The date findings were issued does not alone establish when the receipt-based objection period began.

Full text (DOL official public release)

U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001

IN THE MATTER OF:

MUHAMMAD RASHAD, ARB CASE NO. 2025-0047

            COMPLAINANT,                     ALJ CASE NO. 2025-STA-00039
                                             ALJ JOSEPH E. KANE
      v.
                                             DATE: AUGUST 14, 2025

RYDER INTEGRATED
LOGISTICS, INC.

            RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:
Muhammad Rashad; Pro Se; Bloomfield, Kentucky

For the Respondent:
R. Evan Jarrold, Esq.; Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP;
Kansas City, Missouri

Before THOMPSON, KAPLAN, and KIKO, Administrative Appeals Judges

                     DECISION AND ORDER OF REMAND

  This case arises under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982

(STAA), as amended. 1 Complainant Muhammad Rashad filed a complaint with the
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) alleging STAA violations against Respondent Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. On October 27, 2021, OSHA issued a letter dismissing Complainant’s complaint (Dismissal Letter). On January 17, 2025, over three years later, Complainant filed objections to the OSHA

1 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a), as implemented by the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2025). 2

Dismissal Letter. On March 25, 2025, U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Joseph E. Kane issued a Decision and Order Dismissing Claim (D.
& O.), concluding that Complainant’s objections were untimely. On March 31, 2025, Complainant filed a Petition for Review with the Administrative Review Board (ARB).

  For the reasons explained below, we vacate the ALJ’s D. & O. and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                      BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. STAA Complaint, OSHA Dismissal Letter, and Complainant’s Objections

   In 2021, Complainant filed a STAA complaint against Respondent. 2 On  1F
   

October 27, 2021, OSHA issued a Dismissal Letter because OSHA found no reasonable cause to believe a STAA violation occurred. 3 The Dismissal Letter noted
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that “Respondent and Complainant have 30 days from the receipt of these Findings to file objections and to request a hearing before an” ALJ. 4 OSHA addressed the
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Dismissal letter to Complainant, listing his name and address. 5 4F

    In January 2025, over three years after Complainant filed his STAA

complaint, Complainant called OSHA and claimed that he never received a copy of the Dismissal Letter. 6 On January 16, 2025, OSHA e-mailed Complainant to follow
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up on his phone call (OSHA E-mail). 7 In the OSHA E-mail, OSHA attached the
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Dismissal Letter and stated “[w]e apologize if [Complainant] previously received this.” 8 OSHA also noted in the e-mail that “[u]pon review and based in part on the
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2 D. & O. at 1.
3 Dismissal Letter at 2.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1.
6 D. & O. at 2.
7 Id. The e-mail was also sent to various contacts at the Truckers Justice Center because it appears that Complainant informed OSHA that Truckers Justice Center, Paul Taylor, Esq., represented him in this matter. Id. at 2 n.2. However, OSHA had no record of this representation, and it does not appear that Mr. Taylor represented Complainant before the Department of Labor. Id. 8 OSHA E-mail; D. & O. at 2. 3

length of time since we made our determination, we are unable to show that
[Complainant] did receive a copy of the Secretary’s Findings.” 9 Finally, OSHA noted
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in the e-mail that “we are sending out these findings with the understanding that Complainant never received them, and that Complainant and Respondent have 30 days to appeal” to the Office of Administrative Law Judges. 10 On January 17, 2025,
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Complained filed objections to OSHA’s Dismissal Letter of October 27, 2021. 11 10F

2. ALJ D. & O.

   On March 11, 2025, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case for
   untimeliness. 12 On March 25, 2025, the ALJ issued the D. & O., dismissing the
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claim and finding that OSHA’s Dismissal Letter remained the final decision of the Secretary of Labor. 13 12F

   First, the ALJ found that Complainant’s objections to the OSHA Dismissal

Letter were untimely. 14 In support, the ALJ found that the “record shows that
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OSHA mailed Complainant the original dismissal in 2021 to his address on file.” 15 14F

It appears that the ALJ reached this conclusion primarily relying on the fact that Complainant’s “name and address” were on the Dismissal Letter. 16 Furthermore,15F

when OSHA stated in the January 16, 2025 OSHA E-mail that “[w]e apologize if your client previously received this,” the ALJ found the statement indicated “that OSHA originally sent the findings to Complainant . . . .” 17 The ALJ also found that
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Complainant “was actively involved in numerous cases against the Respondent,” and it is “highly unlikely that he would have just ignored the case for three years if he didn’t receive the dismissal.” 18
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9 OSHA E-mail.
10 Id.; see also D. & O. at 2. The ALJ also noted that the “email d[id] not copy the Respondent.” Id. 11 D. & O. at 1. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 3. 14 Id. at 2. The ALJ also found that “equitable tolling should not apply.” Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 OSHA E-mail; D. & O. at 2. 18 D. & O. at 2. 4

   Second, the ALJ also found that, even if Complainant did not receive the

Dismissal Letter, Complainant’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically, the ALJ stated that Complainant had not exercised due diligence to litigate his claim and Respondent would be greatly prejudiced by Complainant’s renewed pursuit of the claim after three years. 1918F

  Complainant filed a timely appeal with the ARB, claiming the ALJ erred in

dismissing the case as untimely and in finding laches barred the claim. 20 19F

                         JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

   The Secretary has delegated to the ARB the authority to issue agency

decisions under the STAA. 21 The ARB reviews pre-hearing dismissals based on
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timeliness de novo. 22 21F

                                     DISCUSSION

   Upon review, we find that the D. & O. did not adequately analyze certain

evidence when the ALJ found that Complainant’s objections were untimely. Given that the evidence could support a finding that OSHA did not mail Complainant the Dismissal Letter, we remand to the ALJ to reconsider his analysis that Complainant’s objections were untimely, taking into account the evidence identified below and any other evidence the ALJ identifies as relevant. Furthermore, if the ALJ finds Complainant’s objections were timely filed, we also remand to the ALJ to reconsider his finding that Complainant’s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. 23
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19 Id.
20 Supplemental Opening Brief at 5-11.
21 Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board) (Secretary’s discretionary review of ARB decisions)), 85 Fed. Reg. 13,186 (Mar. 6, 2020). 22 Jahanbin v. Boeing Co., ARB No. 2024-0035, ALJ No. 2023-AIR-00023, slip op. at 4 (ARB Mar. 13, 2025) (citation omitted); Martin v. Paragon Foods, ARB No. 2022-0058, ALJ No. 2021-FDA-00001, slip op. at 5 (ARB June 8, 2023) (citation omitted). 23 D. & O. at 2. 5

   After investigating a complaint, OSHA provides its findings to the parties,

and the parties have 30 days from receipt to file objections. 24 STAA’s implementing
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regulations require that OSHA’s findings “will be sent by means that allow OSHA to confirm delivery to all parties of record (and each party’s legal counsel if the party is represented by counsel).” 2524F

   The ALJ found that Complainant’s objections to the Dismissal Letter were

untimely and declined to toll the deadline for Complainant to file his objections. 26 25F

In support, the ALJ found that the “record shows that OSHA mailed Complainant the original dismissal in 2021 to his address on file.” 27 However, the ALJ did not
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adequately analyze certain evidence that raises questions about whether OSHA mailed Complainant the Dismissal Letter.

   In particular, the D. & O. failed to sufficiently evaluate the January 16, 2025,

OSHA E-mail to Complainant. The ALJ highlighted how the OSHA E-mail stated that “[w]e apologize if [Complainant] previously received this,” which the ALJ interpreted as evidence “[i]ndicating that OSHA originally sent the findings to Complainant . . . .” 28 However, the D. & O. neglected to properly address how the
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OSHA E-mail also stated that “[u]pon review and based in part on the length of time since we made our determination, we are unable to show that [Complainant] did receive a copy of the Secretary’s Findings.” 29 Given that the regulations require
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OSHA to send the findings by “means that allow OSHA to confirm delivery to all parties of record,” 30 it is noteworthy that OSHA acknowledged that it could not
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determine whether Complainant had received the Dismissal Letter. On remand, the

24 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(2)(B) (“Not later than 30 days after the notice” of OSHA’s findings, “the complainant and the person alleged to have committed the violation may file objections to the findings . . . .”); 29 C.F.R. § 1978.106(a) (“Any party who desires review, including judicial review, must file any objections and a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings . . . .”). 25 29 C.F.R. 1978.105(b). 26 D. & O. at 2-3. 27 Id. at 2. 28 OSHA E-mail; D. & O. at 2. 29 OSHA E-mail. The D. & O. references the statement, but the D. & O. does not provide sufficient analysis: “OSHA did not state that they never sent it to Complainant or that they found Complainant didn’t receive the dismissal, but instead that due to the length of time that has passed, they could not determine that he didn’t receive it.” D. & O. at 2. 30 29 C.F.R. § 1978.105(b). 6

ALJ must properly evaluate the OSHA E-mail, and any other relevant evidence, and sufficiently explain how the evidence supports a conclusion that OSHA mailed the Dismissal Letter to Complainant.

   Furthermore, if the ALJ finds Complainant’s objections were timely raised,

we also remand for further consideration of the ALJ’s finding that the claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. 31 Laches “requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by
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the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” 32 “Proof of these elements necessarily requires a fact-
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sensitive inquiry into the particular circumstances of the case at hand.” 33 32F

   Regarding the first element (lack of diligence), the ALJ found that “[t]here is

no evidence in the record that Complainant diligently proceeded with this claim” and that Complainant “cannot ignore the claim for three years and then attempt to litigate it.” 34 Regarding the second element (prejudice), the ALJ found that
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Complainant’s lack of diligence “greatly prejudices the Respondent who has treated it as dismissed for over three years.” 35 34F

  The D. & O. provided minimal examination and analysis of the evidence to

reach these findings. Given that laches is a fact-sensitive inquiry, the D. & O. did

31 However, the ALJ only needs to revisit the laches analysis if the Respondent chooses to continue raising the affirmative defense of laches. 32 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (citations omitted); see also Sihota v. IRS, 908 F.3d 1284, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As the Supreme Court observed in Costello, laches bars a claim where the plaintiff’s lack of diligence prejudices the defendant’s access to witnesses and other evidence.”); Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Even though statutes of limitations and laches both implicate whether a particular case has been pursued in a timely manner, the doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff’s claim even though the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired if the laches are of such character as to work an equitable estoppel (which contains the additional element of reliance by the defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 33 Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A] laches defense is normally not susceptible to pretrial resolution. Nevertheless, when the record is sufficiently clear, even elusive concepts like delay and prejudice may be evaluated conclusively on pretrial motion.”); see also Newell v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 18-20743-CIV, 2021 WL 12218402, at * 4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2021) (“[G]iven the fact sensitive nature of a laches inquiry, courts are generally reticent to bar claims under a laches defense when ruling on a motion to dismiss.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 34 D. & O. at 2. 35 Id. 7

not sufficiently evaluate the evidence in its laches ruling. 36 Accordingly, if the ALJ
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finds Complainant’s objections were timely raised, we also remand for further evaluation of whether Respondent has properly met its burden for laches to bar the claim.

                                  CONCLUSION

   Accordingly, we vacate the ALJ’s D. & O. and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

   SO ORDERED.




                                      ANGELA W. THOMPSON
                                      Administrative Appeals Judge



                                      ELLIOT M. KAPLAN
                                      Administrative Appeals Judge



                                      PHILIP G. KIKO
                                      Administrative Appeals Judge

36 If necessary, the ALJ may also decide to reopen the record for additional evidence related to laches.