U.S. Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss, NFFE Local 2068, and NAGE Local R14-89 (Authority decision, March 22, 1988)

Final FLRA decision. The Authority denies the General Counsel's motion to reconsider its prior finding that Fort Bliss did not unlawfully deny a union a separate campaign building. An aggrieved person may seek judicial review by filing a petition in an appropriate United States court of appeals within 60 days after issuance under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).

Plain-English summary

During a representation election campaign, NFFE Local 2068 sought a building comparable to the union hall held by incumbent NAGE Local R14-89. The Authority had found that Fort Bliss met its obligation by offering NFFE customary meeting facilities and did not have to supply an equivalent building. The General Counsel sought reconsideration, arguing that the ruling changed the agency's duty of neutrality. The Authority found that the motion repeated arguments already resolved and showed no extraordinary circumstances. It denied reconsideration.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(3); 5 C.F.R. § 2429.17.
• Outcome: Reconsideration denied; prior no-violation ruling stands.
• Key point: Offering customary campaign facilities satisfied the agency's obligation without duplicating the incumbent union's bargained-for hall.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v31 p904 ]

31:0904(68)CA

The decision of the Authority follows:

31 FLRA No. 68

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE
CENTER AND FORT BLISS
FORT BLISS, TEXAS

Respondent

and

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2068, INDEPENDENT

Charging Party

and

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL R14-89

Party in Interest

Case No. 6-CA-60020
(29 FLRA 362)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

This case is before us on the General Counsel's motion for reconsideration of our September 30, 1987, decision in the above-cited case. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the motion for reconsideration.

In our decision, we found that the Respondent did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (3) of the Statute by refusing to provide the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2068, Independent (NFFE) with a building for use during a representation election campaign. NFFE had requested a building similar to the one the National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-89 (NAGE) had acquired for [PAGE] use as a union hall under Article IV, Section II of the collective bargain agreement entered into by the Respondent and NAGE before NFFE became a union "having equivalent status." We found that the Respondent had satisfied the requirement of section 7116(a)(3) of the Statute by offering NFFE the use of customary and routine facilities for use in the campaign. We noted that the Respondent had offered NFFE the use of various meeting facilities, including a theater and conference rooms to use in its campaign effort.

We concluded that section 7116(a)(3) did not require an agency to furnish a labor organization that has achieved equivalent status with an incumbent Union in a representation proceeding with the exact same services and facilities that the incumbent obtained through collective bargaining before the proceeding. Further, we stated that it was our belief that a building was not the kind of "customary and routine" facility contemplated by Congress in fashioning section 7116(a)(3). Nevertheless, we found that even if it was a "customary and routine" facility, NAGE had not requested the facility nor did the Respondent provide the facility to NAGE during the representation proceeding. Therefore, we concluded that the Respondent had satisfied its obligation by offering NFFE various meeting facilities and was not required to provide NFFE's with a building similar to that provided to NAGE under the collective bargaining agreement.

In its motion for reconsideration, the General Counsel contends that our decision represents a substantial change in the law on the Agency's duty of neutrality in the context of a pending representation case petition when two competing labor organizations are involved. The General Counsel requests the Authority to reconsider and reverse or limit application of its decision.

Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a party to request reconsideration of a final decision or order when the party can establish "extraordinary circumstances." We conclude that the General Counsel is merely disagreeing with the merits of our decision and is attempting to relitigate the issues of that decision by continuing to argue that only "exact same" facility satisfies the requirement of section 7116(a)(3) of the Statute. Accordingly, we find that the General Counsel has not established "extraordinary circumstances" for [ v31 p2 ] reconsideration of our decision within the meaning of section 2429.17. The General Counsel's motion is, therefore, denied.

Issued, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1988.

Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman

Jean McKee, Member

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY