Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Dayton Office, Dayton, Ohio and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3448 (Authority decision, June 19, 1979)

Final FLRA decision under Executive Order 11491. The Authority adopted the judge's dismissal of this transferred unfair labor practice case. The decision says it applies Executive Order 11491 rather than the later federal labor relations statute and does not address judicial review.

Plain-English summary

A union representative at the Social Security Administration's Dayton office complained about her supervisor's statements concerning time away from work for union meetings and the timing of a committee meeting. The judge found no interference, restraint, or coercion: the supervisor had asked her to obtain approval for union activities and to submit the meeting agenda on time under the parties' agreement. The Authority adopted the judge's findings and dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint. It did not consider the union's late exceptions to the judge's decision.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: 5 U.S.C. § 7135(b); Executive Order 11491, § 19(a)(1).
• Outcome: The judge's dismissal of the unfair labor practice complaint was upheld.
• Key point: The supervisor's instructions about requesting time for union work and submitting an agenda did not violate the Executive Order on this record.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v01 p629 ]

01:0629(71)CA

The decision of the Authority follows:

1 FLRA No. 71

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DAYTON OFFICE,
DAYTON, OHIO
Respondent

and

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3448
Complainant

Assistant Secretary
Case No. 53-10584(CA)

DECISION AND ORDER

ON MARCH 30, 1919, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WILLIAM B. DEVANEY ISSUED
HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDING,
FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD NOT ENGAGED IN VIOLATIVE CONDUCT AS
ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMPLAINT BE
DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. /1/

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED,
WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 304 OF REORGANIZATION
PLAN NO. 2 OF 1978 (43 F.R. 36040), WHICH TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IS
IMPLEMENTED BY SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES AND
REGULATIONS (44 F.R. 7). THE AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE FUNCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 7135(B) OF THE
FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1215).

THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION
RULES AND REGULATIONS AND SECTION 7135(B) OF THE STATUTE, THE AUTHORITY
HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE MADE AT THE
HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED. THE RULINGS
ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE
SUBJECT CASE, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. /2/

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN ASSISTANT SECRETARY CASE
NO. 53-10584(CA) BE, AND IT HEREBY IS, DISMISSED.

ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 19, 1979

RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN

HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

MS. KATHRYN S. NORRIS

7060 SANDALVIEW

DAYTON, OHIO 45424

FOR THE COMPLAINANT

MR. WILSON G. SCHUERHOLZ

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STAFF

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

ROOM 2218, WEST HIGH RISE BUILDING

6401 SECURITY BOULEVARD

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21235

FOR THE RESPONDENT

BEFORE: WILLIAM B. DEVANEY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION AND ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THIS IS A PROCEEDING UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED
(HEREINAFTER ALSO REFERRED TO AS THE "ORDER"). ALTHOUGH THE NOTICE OF
HEARING WAS ISSUED BY A REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND ALL
PROCEEDINGS WERE CONDUCTED BEFORE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THIS DECISION IS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, FEDERAL
REGISTER, VOL. 44, NO. 1, JANUARY 2, 1979 (5 C.F.R. SECTION 2400.2).

COMPLAINANT FILED A CHARGE ON FEBRUARY 13, 1978 (JT. EXH. 1) AND A
COMPLAINT ON JUNE 20, 1978 (ASST. SEC. EXH. 1) ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE ORDER. ON AUGUST 17, 1978, COMPLAINANT
FILED AN AMENDED COMPLAINT (ASST. SEC. EXH. 2) WHICH ALLEGED A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER. NOTICE OF HEARING ISSUE ON AUGUST 25,
1978, PURSUANT TO WHICH A HEARING WAS DULY HELD BEFORE THE UNDERSIGNED
ON NOVEMBER 8, 1978, IN DAYTON, OHIO. AT THE CLOSE OF THE HEARING,
DECEMBER 7, 1978, WAS FIXED AS THE DATE FOR THE MAILING OF BRIEFS AND
RESPONDENT TIMELY MAILED ITS BRIEF ON DECEMBER 6, 1978, WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON DECEMBER 8, 1978, AND HAS BEEN CAREFULLY
CONSIDERED. ON DECEMBER 11, 1978, THE COMPLAINING PARTY, MS. KATHRYN
NORRIS, ORALLY REQUESTED AN EXTENTION OF TIME TO FILE A BRIEF WHICH WAS
CONFIRMED BY LETTER, DATED DECEMBER 11, 1978, RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON
DECEMBER 14, 1978. ALTHOUGH SUCH REQUESTS MADE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF
TIME ALLOWED ARE NORMALLY DENIED, BECAUSE MS. NORRIS HAD, CONTRARY TO
HER EXPECTATIONS, PRESENTED HER CASE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE AND HAD HAD NO
PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS, TO AFFORD MS.
NORRIS EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER POSITION, THE TIME FOR
COMPLAINANT TO FILE A BRIEF WAS EXTENDED TO DECEMBER 29, 1978, AND
RESPONDENT WAS GRANTED LEAVE TO RESPOND ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 9, 1979.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXTENSION GRANTED, COMPLAINANT FILED NO BRIEF.

MS. NORRIS IS DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF LOCAL 3448 AND REPRESENTED
THE COMPLAINANT AT THE HEARING. MS. NORRIS WAS, IN REALITY, THE
COMPLAINING PARTY AND, AS NOTED, CONTRARY TO HER EXPECTATIONS, PRESENTED
HER CASE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE AND, IN EFFECT, APPEAR PRO SE. RESPONDENT
WAS REPRESENTED AT THE HEARING. BOTH PARTIES WERE AFFORDED FULL
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, TO EXAMINE AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND TO
INTRODUCE EVIDENCE BEARING ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED HEREIN. COMPLAINANT
REQUESTED AND WAS GIVEN FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT AND
COMPLAINANT'S CONTENTIONS, FULLY STATED AT THE HEARING, HAVE BEEN
CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.

UPON THE BASIS OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, INCLUDING MY OBSERVATION OF THE
WITNESSES AND THEIR DEMEANOR, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
AND ORDER.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. THE PARTIES' CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT /3/ (JT.
   EXH. 2) PROVIDES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:

"ARTICLE V

"STEWARD

"SECTION 2. . . . THE STEWARD OR ALTERNATE STEWARD WILL ARRANGE WITH
HIS SUPERVISOR TO

APPROVE A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME AWAY FROM HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES."

. . . .

"ARTICLE VIII

"EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

"SECTION 1. MANAGEMENT AND THE UNION AGREE TO ESTABLISH AN
EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

WITH MEETINGS TO BE HELD MONTHLY ON THE TUESDAY FOLLOWING THE UNION
MEETING. THIS COMMITTEE

WILL BE COMPOSED OF FOUR MEMBERS: 2 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE UNION
AND 2 FROM

MANAGEMENT. PROPOSALS FOR EACH MEETING'S AGENDA WILL BE EXCHANGED
NOT LESS THAN THREE DAYS

BEFORE THE MEETING." (JT. EXH. 2)

2. PRIOR TO OCTOBER OF 1977, THE MONTHLY MEETINGS, WHICH MR. GEORGE
   FARKAS, RESPONDENT'S DISTRICT MANAGER, LABELED "PAYDAY MEETINGS" TO
   DISTINGUISH FROM THE MEETINGS HELD THEREAFTER, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
   PROVISION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1 OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT, INVOLVED
   PERSONS WHO WERE NOT "UNION PEOPLE" AND "WERE TAKEN FROM VARIOUS UNITS."
   IN SEPTEMBER, 1977, COMPLAINANT FILED A CHARGE AND RESPONDENT AGREED TO
   DISCONTINUE THE "PAYDAY MEETINGS" AND TO HOLD ONLY UNION-MANAGEMENT
   MEETINGS AS PROVIDED BY ARTICLE VIII.

3. "PAYDAY MEETINGS" HAD BEEN HELD IN THE MORNING: HOWEVER, THE
   TIME VARIED, SOME HAVING BEEN HELD AT 8:15 A.M., SOME AT 8:30, AND SOME
   AT 9:00 A.M. NEITHER THE UNION NOR RESPONDENT DEMONSTRATED ANY
   CONSISTENT PRACTICE OF EXCHANGING AGENDA "NOT LESS THAN THREE DAYS
   BEFORE THE MEETING."

4. THE FIRST UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING WITH MEMBERSHIP AS SPECIFIED IN
   ARTICLE VIII, AT LEAST AS SHOWN BY THE RECORD, WAS HELD IN OCTOBER,

5. THE TIME OF THIS MEETING WAS NOT SHOWN.

6. THERE WAS NO UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING HELD IN NOVEMBER (MR.
   FARKAS INDICATED THE DATE WOULD HAVE BEEN NOVEMBER 16-- A WEDNESDAY--
   JT. EXH. 9); THE DECEMBER MEETING WAS "SCHEDULE" FOR DECEMBER 29, A
   THURSDAY, BUT WAS RESCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1977, AT 2:00
   P.M.

7. THE JANUARY, 1978, MEETING PRESUMABLY "FELL" ON WEDNESDAY,
   JANUARY 25, 1978, AND COMPLAINANT SUBMITTED ITS AGENDA ON JANUARY 24,
   1978 (RES. EXH. 1).

8. IT IS NOT WHOLLY CLEAR WHAT GOVERNED THE "SCHEDULED" DATE OF
   THESE MEETINGS. OBVIOUSLY, THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE VIII WERE NOT
   FOLLOWED AS TO THE DAY OF THE WEEK AND WHETHER THE DATE WAS GOVERNED BY
   "THE UNION MEETING" OR BY A PAYDAY IS UNCERTAIN BUT IS OF NO
   SIGNIFICANCE IN ANY EVENT.

9. IT IS CLEAR THAT NO TIME HAD BEEN DESIGNATED BY RESPONDENT FOR
   THE JANUARY 25, 1978, MEETING.

10. ON JANUARY 25, 1978, MS. NORRIS AND MR. PAUL LAVIN WERE OUTSIDE
    MR. FARKAS' OFFICE AT APPROXIMATELY 9:00 A.M. TO ATTEND THE
    UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING WHICH THEY ASSUMED, FOR REASONS NOT READILY
    APPARENT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT "PAYDAY MEETINGS" HAD BEEN HELD AT
    VARIOUS TIMES, THAT THE DECEMBER, 1977, UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING HAD
    BEEN HELD AT 2:00 P.M., AND THAT NO TIME HAD BEEN DESIGNATED BY
    RESPONDENT FOR THE JANUARY 25, 1978, UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING. MR.
    FARKAS WAS HAVING A MEETING WITH MS. KAREN COX, OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR
    AND MS. NORRIS' IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, AND WHEN HE BECAME AWARE THAT MS.
    NORRIS AND MR. LAVIN WERE PRESENT FOR THE MONTHLY UNION-MANAGEMENT
    MEETING, HE ASKED MS. COX TO EXPLAIN TO MS. NORRIS AND MR. LAVIN THAT
    THE UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING WOULD NOT BE HELD UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY.
    MS. COX DID SO AND MR. LAVIN RETURNED TO HIS WORK STATION; HOWEVER, MS.
    COX MET PRIVATELY WITH MS. NORRIS IN AN INTERVIEWING ROOM. MS. NORRIS
    TESTIFIED:

"SHE (MS. COX) SAID THAT I DIDN'T REQUEST TIME FOR ANY OF MY UNION
ACTIVITIES . . .AND

DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING SHE WAS RATHER HARSH WITH ME. SHE
SAID THAT I HADN'T

REQUESTED TIME, SHE SAID THAT I HAD TURNED AGENDA'S (SIC) IN LATE,
THAT I WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO

SAY THAT I WAS GOING TO A MEETING BUT I SHOULD ASK TO GO TO ANY
MEETING, AND THERE WAS

SOMETHING ELSE, I HAVE TO THINK FOR A SECOND. SHE ASKED ME IF I HAD
ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT OUR

DISCUSSION AND THE ONLY COMMENT I MADE TO HER WAS I FELT THAT IF
THERE WAS ANYTHING IN

RELATIONSHIP TO MY UNION ACTIVITIES IT SHOULD BE MR. FARKAS WHO
SHOULD BE EXPLAINING THIS TO

ME SINCE WE'RE ON A ONE TO ONE BASIS, HIM BEING THE DISTRICT MANAGER
AND MY BEING THE DISTRICT

REPRESENTATIVE. AN I HAD NEVER BEEN APPROACHED BEFORE ABOUT IT.
"(TR. 23-24)

10. THE JANUARY 25, 1978, UNION-MANAGEMENT MEETING WAS HELD AT
    APPROXIMATELY 1:00 P.M. ON JANUARY 25 (RES. EXH. 2) AND ALL ITEMS ON
    COMPLAINANT'S AGENDA (RES. EXH. 1) WERE DISCUSSED.

CONCLUSIONS

WHETHER THE PARTIES' CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS
"OUT-OF-DATE" THE PARTIES MUST DETERMINE FOR THEMSELVES. OBVIOUSLY,
NEITHER PARTY HAS EVIDENCED COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TERMS AS REGARDS ARTICLE
VIII AND WHILE SECTION 2 OF THE ARTICLE V PROVIDES THAT THE STEWARD
"WILL ARRANGE WITH HIS SUPERVISOR TO APPROVE A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME
AWAY FROM HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES," SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V PLAINLY STATES
THAT "THE STEWARD'S FUNCTION WILL BE TO ASSIST ON-SITE DISTRICT AND
BRANCH OFFICE EMPLOYEES IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT, WHEN
REQUESTED TO DO SO, BY ASSISTING THEM IN PREPARING AND/OR PRESENTING
GRIEVANCES . . ." LITERALLY, ARTICLE V DOES NOT REFER TO, NOR IS IT MADE
APPLICABLE TO, ARTICLE VIII.

ARTICLE VIII PROVIDES FOR AN EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE; PROVIDES
THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MONTHLY MEETING "ON THE TUESDAY FOLLOWING THE
UNION MEETING;" AND PROVIDES THAT MEETINGS OF THIS COMMITTEE "WILL BE
HELD DURING REGULAR OFFICE HOURS." REALISTICALLY, WHOLLY APART FROM
ARTICLE V, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR OFFICIAL TIME FOR THE TWO UNION
MEMBERS OF THE EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE FOR THE MONTHLY MEETINGS.
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PRACTICE, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER OCTOBER, 1977,
HAD BEEN THAT RESPONDENT DESIGNATED THE TIME FOR THESE MEETINGS. WHILE
IT WAS NOT WHOLLY ILLOGICAL FOR MS. NORRIS TO ASSUME THAT THE JANUARY
25, 1978, MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN THE MORNING, AS THE TIME OF THE
MEETINGS PRIOR TO OCTOBER, 1977, HAD VARIED, AS RESPONDENT HAD, ON EACH
OCCASION, DESIGNATED THE TIME OF THE MEETING, AS THE DECEMBER, 1977,
MEETING HAD BEEN HELD AT 2:00 P.M., AND AS RESPONDENT HAD NOT DESIGNATED
THE TIME OF THE JANUARY 25, 1978, MEETING, IT WAS A BIT PRESUMPTUOUS OF
MS. NORRIS AND MR. LAVIN TO ASSUME THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE HELD AT
9:00 A.M.

OF COURSE, MS. NORRIS AND MR. LAVIN MADE AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION AS
TO WHEN THE JANUARY 25, 1978, MEETING WOULD BE HELD. BUT THE GRAVAMEN
OF THE COMPLAINT IS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE
ORDER BY MS. COX'S STATEMENTS TO MS. NORRIS. ALTHOUGH MS. COX'S
TESTIMONY IS SOMEWHAT AT VARIANCE WITH MS. NORRIS' TESTIMONY, /4/ FOR
PRESENT PURPOSES, I HAVE CONSIDERED ONLY MS. NORRIS' TESTIMONY. AS SET
FORTH ABOVE, MS. NORRIS TESTIFIED THAT MS. COX "SAID THAT I DIDN'T
REQUEST TIME FOR ANY OF MY UNION ACTIVITIES . . . THAT I HADN'T
REQUESTED TIME, SHE SAID THAT I HAD TURNED AGENDA'S (SIC) IN LATE, THAT
I WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO SAY THAT I WAS GOING TO A MEETING BUT I SHOULD ASK
TO GO TO ANY MEETING . . ." MS. NORRIS STATED THAT HER ONLY RESPONSE WAS
THAT "IT SHOULD BE MR. FARKAS WHO SHOULD BE EXPLAINING THIS TO ME . . .
HIM BEING THE DISTRICT MANAGER AND MY BEING THE DISTRICT
REPRESENTATIVE."

ARTICLE VIII DOES, INDEED, PROVIDE THAT AGENDA "WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT
LESS THAN THREE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING." IN DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR
FORCE, BASE PROCUREMENT OFFICE, VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA
AND NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL UNION 1001, A/SLMR
NO. 485, 5 A/SLMR 112 (1975), FLRA NO. 75A-25 (1976), A/SLMR NO. 767, 6
A/SLMR 702 (1976), IT WAS HELD THAT A SUPERVISOR'S STATEMENT CONCERNING
OFFICIAL TIME FOR REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION
19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER. HERE, THE RECORD SHOWS NO INTERFERENCE WITH,
RESTRAINT, OR COERCION OF MS. NORRIS IN HER EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHT
ASSURED BY THE ORDER. BY MS. NORRIS' TESTIMONY, HER IMMEDIATE
SUPERVISOR TOLD HER THAT SHE HADN'T REQUESTED TIME FOR HER UNION
ACTIVITIES; THAT SHE MUST REQUEST TIME TO ATTEND MEETINGS; AND THAT
SHE HAD TURNED IN HER AGENDA FOR THE MONTHLY MEETING LATE, I.E., LESS
THAN THREE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING IS PROVIDED BY ARTICLE VIII.

I FIND NO BASIS FOR A FINDING OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1). MS.
COX'S STATEMENT THAT MS. NORRIS HAD NOT REQUESTED TIME FOR HER
REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES WAS NOT DENIED BY MS. NORRIS, INDEED, SHE
STATED THAT HER ONLY RESPONSE WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE MR. FARKAS" WHO
SHOULD BE EXPLAINING THIS TO ME" AND, OBVIOUSLY, MS. NORRIS HAD NOT
COMPLIED WITH ARTICLE VIII IN SUBMITTING HER AGENDA FOR THE MONTHLY
MEETING. IN NEITHER STATEMENT WAS THERE ANY THREAT WHICH COULD POSSIBLY
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1). NOR WAS THE STATEMENT THAT
MS. NORRIS MUST REQUEST PERMISSION OF HER IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, MS.
COX, TO ATTEND UNION MEETINGS A VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1). THE ONLY
OCCASION ON WHICH MS. NORRIS HAD BEEN DENIED IMMEDIATE PERMISSION TO
ATTEND A MEETING HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE PRESS OF WORK AND MS. NORRIS WAS
GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE UNION ACTIVITY LATER ON THE SAME DAY. ALTHOUGH
THE AGREEMENT IS SILENT AS TO APPROVAL OF TIME FOR UNION ACTIVITIES
EXCEPT FOR STEWARDS, THE CLEAR INFERENCE OF SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE V IS
THAT AUTHORIZATION MUST BE OBTAINED WHETHER THE UNION OFFICIAL IS A
STEWARD OR, AS IN MS. NORRIS' CASE, AN OFFICIAL OTHER THAN MERELY A
STEWARD. USE OF OFFICIAL TIME FOR THE CONDUCT OF UNION BUSINESS IS NOT
AN INHERENT MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, VANDENBERG,
SUPRA, 5 A/SLMR AT 113, AND TO THE EXTENT NOT PROVIDED FOR BY AGREEMENT
WOULD NOT EXIST. ASSUMING, AS I DO, THAT ARTICLE V APPLIES TO MS.
NORRIS' UNION ACTIVITY AS DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF LOCAL 3448, ADVISING HER
THAT SHE MUST, PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, OBTAIN
AUTHORIZATION TO ATTEND MEETINGS DID NOT, STANDING ALONE, CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER.

ACCORDINGLY, AS COMPLAINANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY BASIS FOR A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, THE COMPLAINT IS
DISMISSED.

WILLIAM B. DEVANEY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DATED: 30 MAR 1979

WASHINGTON, D.C.

/1/ THE COMPLAINANT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S
DECISION AND ORDER WERE FILED UNTIMELY AND THUS WERE NOT CONSIDERED.

/2/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224) THE PRESENT CASE IS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS
OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED.
THE DECISION AND ORDER DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE
MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE
RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN
UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.

/3/ INITIALLY SIGNED APRIL 26, 1971, EFFECTIVE JULY 8, 1971. THERE
IS AN "ADDENDUM" BUT THE DATE OF THE ADDENDUM WAS NOT SHOWN (SEE JT.
EXH. 2).

/4/ FOR EXAMPLE, MS. COX VERY CREDIBLY TESTIFIED THAT, INITIALLY, SHE
SIMPLY TOLD MS. NORRIS AND MR. LAVIN THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE HELD
LATER IN THE DAY; THAT SHE RETURNED TO THE MEETING WITH MR. FARKAS;
AND THAT LATER SHE WENT TO MS. NORRIS' DESK AND ASKED IF SHE COULD TALK
WITH HER IN THE INTERVIEWING ROOM. THIS CHRONOLOGY WAS FULLY CONFIRMED
BY THE TESTIMONY OF MR. FARKAS.