Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois and National Association of Government Employees, Local R7-23 (Authority decision, September 23, 1991)

Final FLRA decision. The Authority finds that Scott Air Force Base committed unfair labor practices by cutting an environmental pay differential without fulfilling its bargaining obligations. An aggrieved person may seek judicial review of this final order in an appropriate United States court of appeals within 60 days after issuance under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). A petition does not stay the order unless the court orders a stay under § 7123(c).

Plain-English summary

Scott Air Force Base stopped paying a four percent environmental differential to corrosion shop employees who had received it for work involving paint and dust exposure. The union requested bargaining and sought help from the Federal Service Impasses Panel, but the base implemented the cut without agreement. An administrative law judge recommended dismissing the complaint. The Authority reversed, finding that the contract's grievance option did not clearly waive bargaining rights and that the base had to maintain existing pay while the impasse was pending. It ordered the base to restore the differential, make affected employees whole, bargain on request, and post a notice.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Bargaining and impasse obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a), with backpay under § 5596.
• Outcome: Judge's dismissal reversed; differential restored and affected employees made whole.
• Key point: A clause saying pay disputes may be grieved did not clearly waive bargaining rights or permit a pay cut during impasse proceedings.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v42 p266 ]

42:0266(22)CA

The decision of the Authority follows:

42 FLRA No. 22

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

(Respondent)

and

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

LOCAL R7-23, SEIU, AFL-CIO

(Charging Party/Union)

5-CA-00080

DECISION AND ORDER

September 23, 1991

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on
exceptions filed by the General Counsel to the attached
decision of the Administrative Law Judge in the above-entitled
proceeding. The Respondent filed an opposition to the General
Counsel's exceptions.

The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1), (5) and (6) of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute (the Statute) by failing to bargain in good
faith and cooperate in impasse procedures when it eliminated
environmental differential pay (EDP) for certain bargaining
unit employees without negotiating with the Union "concerning
the substance and/or impact and implementation of the change."
Complaint at 5, General Counsel's Exhibit 1(c). The Judge
found that the Respondent did not violate the Statute and
recommended dismissal of the complaint.

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and
Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, we have reviewed
the rulings of the Judge made at the hearing and find that no prejudicial error was committed. We affirm the
rulings. However, for the reasons set forth below, we find,
contrary to the Judge, that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1), (5), and (6) of the Statute as alleged.

II. Background and Judge's Decision

The Union represents certain of the Respondent's wage
grade employees, including those in the 375th Consolidated
Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control Shop (the
Shop). For many years, Shop employees had received 4 percent
EDP because of their exposure to dust when sanding lead-based
paint and to polyurethane paint.

Article XX, Section 2 of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement provides as follows:

Employees will receive environmental
differential pay in accordance with applicable
regulations. Where there is a question of the
application of the regulation, the Union is
afforded an opportunity to present it to the
Civilian Personnel Officer for expeditious
investigation and review. Disputes may be
grieved.

Judge's Decision at 2.

Applicable regulations require the Respondent
to, among other things, conduct an annual review
of work situations currently approved for EDP.
These reviews are used to determine whether the
hazard that is the basis for the EDP has been
eliminated to such a degree that precludes
continued EDP. The Respondent initiated such a
review in late 1988 and informed the Union on
September 11, 1989, that EDP would be eliminated
in the Shop effective October 1, 1989.

The Union requested negotiations over the
matter "to the extent allowable by law." Joint
Exhibit 6. The Respondent refused to negotiate
over the substance of its decision to eliminate
the EDP. The Respondent maintained that it had
no duty to bargain because Article XX, Section 2
limited the Union to its remedies under the
negotiated grievance procedure if the Union
wished to contest the elimination of the EDP.

On September 22, 1989, the Union requested
the assistance of the Federal Service Impasses
Panel (the Panel) to resolve what, in the
Union's view, was a bargaining impasse. Joint
Exhibit 8. On October 15, 1989, the Respondent
implemented the change eliminating EDP. On
November 1, 1989, the Panel declined to assert
jurisdiction, stating that the Respondent's
"questions concerning [its] obligation to
bargain must be resolved in an appropriate forum
before a determination can be made as to whether
the parties have, in fact, reached a negotiation
impasse." Joint Exhibit 18 at 1.

The Judge found that he was "constrained" to
recommend dismissal of the complaint. Judge's
Decision at 7. The Judge stated that the issue
before him was "whether the applicable legal
principle is that of 'clear and unmistakable
waiver' of the Union's right to bargain or that
of 'differing and arguable interpretations of a
collective bargaining agreement.'" Id. at 3.
The Judge noted that, according to the General
Counsel, the former principle applies and
nothing in the parties' agreement constitutes
such a waiver. The Judge also noted that the
Respondent took the position that the latter
principle applies, and that Article XX, Section
2 at least arguably gives the Respondent the
right to change unilaterally the manner in which
it applies the EDP regulations, subject to
review only through the grievance procedure.

The Judge found that, based on his reading of
Authority case law and "welcoming the
possibility that" he was misinterpreting the
Authority's policy, the latter principle
applied. Id. at 5. The Judge then found that
the Respondent "has presented an arguable
position that the contract shunts disputes
concerning the application of the EDP
regulations away from the negotiations arena and
into the forum of the grievance procedure." Id.
Having found that the contract language was
"subject to differing and arguable
interpretations as to the negotiability of the
subject of eliminating the EDP," the Judge
stated that he was "constrained to recommend
that the Authority" dismiss the complaint. Id.
at 7.

III. Positions of the Parties

A. The General Counsel

The General Counsel contends that the Judge
erred by applying the wrong legal principle when
he concluded that this case involves a question
of arguable contract interpretation rather than
waiver of a statutory right. The General
Counsel argues that the "arguable contract
interpretation" principle does not apply to a
case, such as this one, where an agency defends
its refusal to bargain by relying on the
parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Exceptions at 2. According to the General
Counsel, the correct principle of law to be
applied in this case is the "clear and
unmistakable waiver" principle. Id. at 4.

The General Counsel notes that the Respondent
refused to bargain concerning the elimination of
the EDP solely because the Respondent asserted
that the parties' agreement required the Union
to use the grievance procedure to resolve any
dispute concerning EDP. The General Counsel
contends that inasmuch as the Respondent
defended its refusal to negotiate on the basis
of the parties' contract, the only pertinent
question is whether that contract contains a
waiver of the Respondent's bargaining
obligation. The General Counsel notes that a
waiver of statutory rights must be clear and
unmistakable, and argues that in this case there
is no waiver. In this regard, the General
Counsel notes that the Respondent did not
present any evidence that a waiver existed, but
rather defended its refusal to bargain only on
the basis of its interpretation of the
agreement. The General Counsel requests that
the Authority find that the Respondent violated
section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (6) as alleged in
the complaint. The General Counsel also
requests that the Respondent be required to
reinstate the status quo ante and to offer the
Union an opportunity to bargain concerning any
proposed change in EDP in the Shop.

B. The Respondent

The Respondent asserts that the Judge
correctly recommended dismissal of the
complaint. As an initial matter, the Respondent
contends that the General Counsel's exception
should not be considered because it does not
comply with the requirements of section
2423.27(a) of the Authority's Regulations. In
particular, the Respondent contends that the
exception does not set forth with specificity
the questions upon which the exception is taken
and does not state the grounds for the
exception.

The Respondent asserts that the Judge applied
the correct legal standard. The Respondent
maintains that Article XX, Section 2 of the
parties' agreement "directs the parties to the
negotiated grievance procedure as the exclusive
means available to resolve disputes concerning
environmental pay[,]" and contends, therefore,
that "it was excused from any bargaining
obligation under the terms of the agreement."
Respondent's Opposition at 2 (footnote omitted).

Noting that the General Counsel did not
challenge the Judge's determination that the
Respondent's reading of Article XX, Section 2
is plausible, the Respondent asserts that this
finding must "remain undisturbed." Id. at 6.
Further, the Respondent asserts that the policy
of deferral to grievance arbitration is sound.
The Respondent contends that where a dispute
over the obligation to bargain focuses upon
differing and arguable interpretations of the
collective bargaining agreement, the proper
forum for resolution of that dispute is
grievance arbitration.

Finally, the Respondent contends that because
it complied with Article XX, Section 2, its
termination of EDP did not amount to a change in
working conditions that gave rise to a
bargaining obligation.

V. Analysis and Conclusions

A. Preliminary Matter

We reject the Respondent's contention that
the General Counsel's exception fails to comply
with the Authority's Regulations and should be
dismissed. We find that the General Counsel has
set forth with sufficient particularity the
questions and the portions of the Judge's
decision to which it excepts. In our view, the
parties and the Authority are sufficiently
informed of the basis of the General Counsel's
exceptions. See Internal Revenue Service,
Washington, D.C., 39 FLRA 1568, 1573 (1991)
(IRS).

B. Appropriate Standard to Be Applied

In IRS, which was issued after the Judge
issued his decision in this case, the Authority
set forth the approach to be followed in cases
involving an alleged statutory violation and
allegations that a collective bargaining
agreement permits the action that is alleged to
constitute an unfair labor practice. We
rejected an approach that would dismiss
complaints alleging a violation of a statutory
right based on a finding that the parties have
proffered differing and arguable interpretations
of a collective bargaining agreement. We noted
that a "differing and arguable" analysis would
permit a respondent to violate protected rights
based solely on an arguable or plausible
interpretation of an agreement without any
necessity of proving that its interpretation is
correct. We concluded that use of a "differing
and arguable" analysis in such cases was
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of
the Statute and stated that, to the extent that
previous Authority decisions applied such an
analysis, those decisions would no longer be
followed.

In IRS, the Authority reaffirmed that "[t]he
established approach . . . to resolve defenses
based on a collective bargaining agreement to
alleged interference with statutory rights is to
determine whether the charging party has clearly
and unmistakably waived its statutory right."
Id. at 1574. Consistent with IRS, we resolve
complaints, such as the one now before us, by
determining whether the union clearly and
unmistakably waived its statutory rights. See,
for example, Marine Corps Logistics Base,
Barstow, California, 39 FLRA 1126 (1991) (union
did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right
to bargain over the impact and implementation of
changes in the agency's performance appraisal
system); Department of the Army, U.S. Army
Finance and Accounting Center, Indianapolis,
Indiana, 39 FLRA 1586 (1991) (pursuant to
collective bargaining agreement and subsequent
settlement agreement, the union clearly and
unmistakably waived its right to determine the
number of union representatives for bargaining).

Accordingly, we find that the Judge erred in
applying the differing and arguable standard in
this case.

C. Application of the Standard to This Case

The issue in this case is whether the Union
clearly and unmistakably waived its statutory
right to bargain. The Respondent argues that
the Union waived its right to bargain over how
questions regarding EDP will be resolved because
the parties' agreement "directs the parties to
the negotiated grievance procedure as the
exclusive means available to resolve disputes
concerning environmental pay [EDP]."
Respondent's Opposition at 9.

A waiver of a union's statutory right to
bargain must be clear and unmistakable. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Customs Service,
Washington, D.C. and Customs Service, North East
Region, Boston, Massachusetts, 38 FLRA 770, 784
(1990). A waiver can be established by express
agreement or by reliance on bargaining history.
Id.; see also U.S. Department of the Navy,
United States Marine Corps (MPL), Washington,
D.C. and Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,
Georgia, 38 FLRA 632, 636-38 (1990).

The plain wording of Article XX, Section 2
states that "[d]isputes may be grieved." The
agreement uses the permissive verb "may" rather
than any terms that would indicate a clear
intent to make all disputes regarding EDP
subject to resolution solely and exclusively
through the parties' grievance procedure.
Therefore, the agreement provision itself does
not establish the grievance procedure as the
only procedure for addressing disputes over EDP
matters. Accordingly, we find that the plain
language of the agreement does not waive the
Union's right to bargain over EDP disputes.

Moreover, the parties' bargaining history
does not demonstrate that a waiver occurred.
The Union's negotiator testified that the Union
never intended to, and never did, waive its
rights when agreeing to Article XX, Section 2.
See Hearing Transcript at 44. The Union's
negotiator also testified that during the
renegotiation of the parties' agreement in 1985,
the Respondent proposed a revised version of
Article XX, Section 2, which clearly stated that
the negotiated grievance procedure was the
exclusive means for contesting EDP matters. See
General Counsel's Hearing Exhibit 7(a) at 5;
Hearing Transcript at 47. The Union did not
agree to the Respondent's proposal, and the
language of Article XX, Section 2 remained
unchanged. Thus, rather than establishing that
the Union clearly and unmistakably waived its
statutory rights, the parties' bargaining
history demonstrates that the parties had a
longstanding difference as to whether the
grievance procedure was the exclusive means to
contest EDP matters.

In these circumstances, we conclude that the
parties' negotiated agreement and their
bargaining history do not establish that the
Union clearly and unmistakably waived its right
to bargain regarding EDP matters. Accordingly,
we find that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) when it refused to bargain
about the elimination of EDP in the Shop.

D. Violation of Section 7116(a)(1) and (6)

The complaint in this case also alleged that
the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and
(6) of the Statute by implementing its decision
to terminate EDP for employees in the Shop while
the parties' dispute was pending before the
Federal Service Impasses Panel (the Panel) on
the EDP issue. For the following reasons, we
agree that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1) and (6) as alleged.

Once parties reach an impasse in their
negotiations and one party timely invokes the
services of the Panel, the status quo must be
maintained to the maximum extent possible, that
is, to the extent consistent with the necessary
functioning of the agency, in order to allow the
Panel to take whatever action is deemed
appropriate. See, for example, Department of
Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing
Administration, AFL-CIO, 39 FLRA 120, 131-32
(1991), reconsideration denied, 40 FLRA 40
(1991), petition for review filed sub nom.
Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Care Financing Administration v. FLRA, No.
91-1068 (4th Cir. April 18, 1991). Failure to
maintain the status quo, to the extent
consistent with the necessary functioning of an
agency, while a negotiation dispute is pending
before the Panel violates section 7116(a)(1),
(5) and (6) of the Statute. See id. at 131.
See also, for example, Department of Health and
Human Services, Social Security Administration
and Social Security Administration, Field
Operations, Region II, 35 FLRA 940, 949-51
(1990) (DHHS, SSA Field Operations); U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development and
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Kansas City Region, Kansas City,
Missouri, 23 FLRA 435, 436-38 (1986) (HUD Kansas
City); Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 18 FLRA 466
(1985).

The Authority has found no basis on which to
conclude that the status quo requirement is, or
should be, affected by whatever action the Panel
eventually takes regarding the impasse. The
purpose of the requirement is to facilitate the
Panel's consideration of negotiation impasses
and allow the Panel to take whatever action it
deems appropriate to resolve disputes. Allowing
an agency to implement a change based on its
speculation as to what action the Panel will
take after implementation would undermine the
important role played by the Panel in collective
bargaining under the Statute.

Therefore, the Authority has rejected a
respondent's contention that it was not
obligated to maintain the status quo because the
Panel declined jurisdiction after
implementation. DHHS, SSA Field Operations, 35
FLRA at 950. The Authority has also rejected a
respondent's arguments that implementation was
required by agency deadlines. Id. at 951.
Similarly, while the Authority agreed with an
agency that costs are a legitimate factor in
deciding what is necessary for the efficient
functioning of an agency, the Authority rejected
an agency's argument that costs alone required
implementation while an impasse was pending
before the Panel. See HUD Kansas City, 23 FLRA
at 437-38.

The Respondent implemented the termination of
EDP for employees in the Shop without bargaining
with the appropriate exclusive representative
and while the parties' dispute over the matter
was pending before the Panel. We have rejected
the Respondent's argument that Article XX,
Section 2 of the parties' agreement constitutes
a waiver of the Union's right to bargain over
EDP matters. We note that the Respondent does
not allege that implementation of the decision
to eliminate EDP while the dispute over the
matter was pending before the Panel was
consistent with the necessary functioning of the
Respondent. The Respondent had an obligation to
bargain with the Union and to maintain the
status quo while the parties' dispute was
pending before the Panel. Accordingly, we find
that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)
and (6) of the Statute.

E. Remedy

We find that the Respondent failed to
maintain the status quo to the maximum extent
possible, while an impasse concerning the
termination of EDP for employees in the Shop was
pending before the Panel. Instead, the
Respondent terminated the EDP for those
employees without bargaining with the exclusive
representative of the employees. Generally, in
the absence of special circumstances, a status
quo ante remedy is appropriate in cases where,
as here, an agency has refused to bargain over
the substance of a matter which is within its
duty to bargain. See U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Customs Service, Region IV, Miami
District, Miami, Florida, 38 FLRA 838, 844
(1990). We note that no special circumstances
are alleged in this case, and none are apparent
to us. Accordingly, we find that a return to
the status quo ante and a notice posting at the
affected locations are appropriate actions to
remedy the unfair labor practices which have
been committed.

We also conclude that backpay is an
appropriate remedy to make whole any employee
who suffered a withdrawal or reduction in pay,
allowances, or differentials as a result of the
implementation of the decision to terminate EDP
in the Shop. In U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Social Security Administration,
Baltimore, Maryland and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration, Hartford District Office,
Hartford, Connecticut, 37 FLRA 278 (1990) (DHHS,
SSA), we set forth an approach for determining
when, in addition to a status quo ante award,
backpay would be appropriate in "cases involving
changes in conditions of employment resulting
from unlawful refusals to bargain, regardless of
whether the status quo ante award stems from a
refusal to bargain over [the substance of] a
decision or from an analysis conducted under
Federal Correctional [Institution, 8 FLRA 604
(1982)] concerning a failure to engage in impact
and implementation bargaining." DHHS, SSA, 37
FLRA at 291. We stated that in such cases, if
we determine that "the agency's actions resulted
in a withdrawal or reduction in pay, allowances
or differentials of identifiable employees, we
will then order the agency to make such
employees whole for that withdrawal or
reduction." Id. at 292. We further stated that
we would "leave to the compliance stage any
questions as to the actual amount to be paid."
Id. (footnote omitted).

We conclude that the Respondent's unilateral
elimination of the EDP for employees in the Shop
resulted in a withdrawal of the EDP which the
employees had been receiving prior to the
change. The record indicates that at least
three employees in the Shop lost the EDP which
they had been receiving. See Hearing Transcript
at 68. Therefore, the causal nexus required by
the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, has been
established. DHHS, SSA, 37 FLRA at 289-90.

Accordingly, we will order the Respondent to
return to the status quo ante and to make
employees in the Shop whole for the EDP they
lost as a result of the Respondent's elimination
of the EDP in the Shop without bargaining with
the Union. The amount of the backpay owed will
be a matter for compliance. DHHS, SSA, 37 FLRA
at 291-93.

VI. Order

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the
Authority's Rules and Regulations and section
7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, the Department of the Air
Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Refusing to bargain with the
National Association of Government Employees,
Local R7, 23, SEIU, AFL-CIO, the exclusive
representative of its employees, on the
termination of environmental differential pay
for employees in the 375th Consolidated Aircraft
Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control Shop.

(b) Terminating environmental
differential pay for employees in the 375th
Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
Corrosion Control Shop without first bargaining
with the National Association of Government
Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU, AFL-CIO, the
exclusive representative of its employees.

(c) Failing and refusing to cooperate in
impasse proceedings by implementing the decision
to terminate environmental differential pay for
employees in the 375th Consolidated Aircraft
Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control Shop
while an impasse concerning that decision is
pending before the Federal Service Impasses
Panel.

(d) In any like or related manner,
interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights assured
them by the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute.

2. Take the following affirmative action in
   order to effectuate the purposes and policies of
   the Statute:

(a) Rescind the implementation of its
decision to terminate environmental differential
pay for employees in the 375th Consolidated
Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control
Shop.

(b) Make whole and restore environmental
differential pay to those employees in the 375th
Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
Corrosion Control Shop who would have received
the pay but for the Respondent's decision to
terminate the pay.

(c) Maintain the status quo ante, to the
maximum extent possible, while impasse
proceedings are pending before the Federal
Service Impasses Panel.

(d) Notify the National Association of
Government Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU,
AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of its
employees, of any intention to implement changes
in environmental differential pay for employees,
and, upon request of the National Association of
Government Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU,
AFL-CIO, negotiate on the termination of
environmental differential pay for employees in
the 375th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance
Squadron Corrosion Control Shop.

(e) Post at the facilities involved in
this case, copies of the attached Notice on
forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor
Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such
forms, they shall be signed by the Commanding
Officer, Scott Air Force Base, and shall be
posted in conspicuous places, including all
bulletin boards and other places where notices
to employees are customarily posted, and shall
be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
ensure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.

(f) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the
Authority's Rules and Regulations, notify the
Regional Director, Chicago Regional Office,
Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing,
within 30 days from the date of this Order as to
what steps have been taken to comply.

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE

FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE

WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the National
Association of Government Employees, Local R7,
23, SEIU, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative
of our employees, on the termination of
environmental differential pay for employees in
the 375th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance
Squadron Corrosion Control Shop.

WE WILL NOT implement a decision to terminate
environmental differential pay for employees in
the 375th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance
Squadron Corrosion Control Shop without first
bargaining with the National Association of
Government Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU,
AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of our
employees.

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to cooperate in
impasse proceedings by implementing the decision
to terminate environmental differential pay for
employees in the 375th Consolidated Aircraft
Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control Shop
while an impasse concerning that decision is
pending before the Federal Service Impasses
Panel.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner,
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the rights assured
them by the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute.

WE WILL rescind the implementation of our
decision to terminate environmental differential
pay for employees in the 375th Consolidated
Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Corrosion Control
Shop.

WE WILL make whole and restore environmental
differential pay to those employees in the 375th
Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
Corrosion Control Shop who would have received
the pay but for the Respondent's decision to
terminate the pay.

WE WILL maintain the status quo ante, to the
maximum extent possible, while impasse
proceedings are pending before the Federal
Service Impasses Panel.

WE WILL notify the National Association of
Government Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU,
AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of our
employees, of any intention to implement changes
in environmental differential pay for employees,
and, upon request of the National Association of
Government Employees, Local R7, 23, SEIU,
AFL-CIO, negotiate on the termination of
environmental differential pay for employees in
the 375th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance
Squadron Corrosion Control Shop.

(Activity)

Dated: By:

(Signature) (Title)

This Notice must remain posted for 60
consecutive days from the date of posting, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.

If employees have any questions concerning this
Notice or compliance with its provisions, they
may communicate directly with the Regional
Director in Chicago, Illinois, Federal Labor
Relations Authority, whose address is: 175 West
Jackson Blvd., Suite 1359-A, Chicago, Illinois
60604 and whose telephone number is: (312)
353-6306.

FOOTNOTES:
(If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.)