A.M. and Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Richmond International Airport (Board decision, March 14, 2025)

ECAB final decision reversing OWCP. The Board reversed OWCP's finding that the chair-delivery incident was outside the worker's duties; medical causation remains unresolved. A party may petition the Board for reconsideration within 30 days of issuance unless this order specifies another period, under 20 C.F.R. § 501.7(a). FECA compensation decisions are generally not subject to court review under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b).

Plain-English summary

A TSA officer reported injury while removing a chair from a government vehicle during an assigned delivery. The Board found she was performing work duties and had not willfully disobeyed an instruction. It reversed OWCP's denial, leaving medical causation for further review.

Decision snapshot

• Authority: Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
• Outcome: Work incident established; medical causation remains for OWCP.
• Key point: The assigned delivery was within the performance of duty.

Full text (ECAB public release)

United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

________
)
A.M., Appellant
)
)
and ) Docket No. 25-0299
)
Issued: March 14, 2025
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, )
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
)
ADMINISTRATION, RICHMOND
)
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, Richmond, VA, )
Employer
)
__________ )

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:
ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge
PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On February 5, 2025 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 5, 2025 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. 1 Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1
Appellant submitted a timely request for oral argument before the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(b). Pursuant to the Board’s Rules of Procedure, oral argument may be held in the discretion of the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(a). In support of her oral argument request, appellant sought to further describe the April 22, 2024 incident for the Board. The Board, in exercising its discretion, denies appellant’s request for oral argument because the arguments on appeal can adequately be addressed in a decision based on a review of the case record. Oral argument in this appeal would further delay issuance of a Board decision and not serve a useful purpose. As such, the oral argument request is denied, and this decision is based on the case record as submitted to the Board. 2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury in the performance of duty on April 22, 2024, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On May 7, 2024 appellant, then a 60-year-old transportation security officer, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on April 22, 2024 she sustained a left shoulder and right neck injury when reaching to remove an office chair from the back of a government vehicle while in the performance of duty. On the reverse side of the claim form, the employing establishment asserted that appellant had been injured due to her own willful misconduct, because she was given written and verbal instructions to call for help to unload the chair. J.G., appellant’s manager, indicated that appellant did not follow instructions and unloaded the chair by herself without assistance. Appellant did not immediately stop work.

An April 18, 2024 e-mail from J.G., appellant’s manager, explained that appellant would be delivering a chair to Roanoke Airport on Monday. She was to park in front of the airport and call R.T., a manager. Help would then be sent out to unload the chair. In an e-mail dated May 3, 2024, R.T. wrote to J.G. that appellant called her cell phone at approximately 11:15 on Monday April 22, 2024, and stated that she was in front of the airport building with the chair to be dropped off. She was informed that R.T. would be down to unload the chair onto a cart and bring it upstairs. When R.T. arrived at the front door of the airport with the cart appellant had already unloaded the chair onto the sidewalk. R.T. commented to appellant that “you did not need to unload it I told you I would unload it.” R.T. indicated that appellant at no time mentioned pain or an injury .

In a return to work note dated May 6, 2024, Dr. Mark Taylor, a Board-certified family practitioner, treated appellant on May 3, 2024, and advised that she could return to work on May 9, 2024.

In a May 20, 2024 development letter, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies of her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence needed and provided a questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded appellant 60 days to respond. In a separate development letter of even date, it requested that the employing establishment provide additional information. OWCP afforded the employing establishment 30 days to respond.

OWCP received additional evidence. In a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated May 9, 2024, Dr. Taylor related a date of injury of April 22, 2024. He diagnosed thoracic back pain and indicated that appellant was unable to return to work. In attending physician’s reports (Form CA- 20) dated May 9 and 23, 2024, Dr. Taylor diagnosed neck pain, thoracic back pain, and pulled shoulder muscle. He checked a box marked “Yes” to indicate his opinion that appellant’s conditions were caused or aggravated by her employment activity and advised that she would be able to resume work on June 3, 2024. On May 31, 2024 Dr. Taylor diagnosed neck pain, thoracic back pain, and pain of the left shoulder joint and returned appellant to regular duty.

In response to the development letter, on May 23, 2024, appellant indicated that during the week of April 15, 2024 she was instructed by J.G. to deliver two unwanted office chairs to Roanoke and Norfolk airports. She indicated that the office chair delivered to the Roanoke Airport was

2 loaded toward the back of the truck bed. Appellant indicated that she sustained an injury not from unloading the chair but from reaching to get it. She noted that she was a transportation security officer assigned to screening passengers, but she was assigned to administrative duties during this timeframe. Appellant noted that she was normally assigned to the employing establishment facility in the Charlottesville Airport but on April 22 and 24, 2024 she was directed to other employing establishment facilities, specifically, Roanoke Airport and Norfolk Airport. She noted that when she arrived at Roanoke Airport she reached in and pulled the chair from the back of the truck bed toward the rear door and moved several other items to get to it. Appellant called R.T. to retrieve the chair and, while waiting, she became concerned about the time and that her supervisor would find fault with her taking too long to make the delivery. She contended that she did not receive verbal instructions from management other than the time to depart Charlottesville for Norfolk. Additionally, appellant asserted that she was never instructed on how to safely unload office chairs and had done it for the first time on the date of injury.

In a follow-up letter dated June 10, 2024, OWCP advised appellant that it had conducted an interim review, and the evidence remained insufficient to establish her claim. It noted that she had 60 days from the May 20, 2024 letter to submit the necessary evidence. OWCP further advised that if the evidence was not received during this time, it would issue a decision based on the evidence contained in the record.

OWCP received additional evidence. In a statement dated June 20, 2024, appellant restated her concern regarding the timing of the chair delivery.

On June 25, 2024, T.E., an employing establishment workers’ compensation program coordinator, indicated that at the time of the injury appellant was in front of the Roanoke Airport, which was not owned, operated, or controlled by the employing establishment. She explained that appellant was instructed to take the office chair to the Roanoke Airport and call R.T., who would send someone out to the vehicle to unload the chair. T.E. clarified that appellant had never been in this situation before.

In a Form CA-20 dated June 25, 2024, Dr. Taylor diagnosed strain of muscles of the left shoulder, spasm of the cervical paraspinous muscles, and strain of the neck muscles. He checked a box marked “Yes” to indicate his opinion that appellant’s conditions were caused or aggravated by her employment activity and advised that she would be able to resume work without restrictions.

By decision dated July 29, 2024, OWCP found that appellant had established that the April 22, 2024 incident occurred, as alleged, and that a medical condition had been diagnosed in connection with the accepted employment incident. However, it denied her claim, finding that she was not in the performance of duty at the time of the incident, because the evidence established willful misconduct by her for ignoring verbal and written instructions from her manager. Thus, OWCP found that the incident did not arise in the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors as defined by FECA.

On August 6, 2024, appellant requested a review of the written record by a representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.

In support thereof, appellant submitted a statement dated August 6, 2024, wherein she disagreed with the denial of her claim on the grounds that she was not in the performance of duty

3 when injured. She indicated that her response to OWCP’s development questionnaire and the employing establishment statement established that she was in performance of duty. Appellant provided a photograph of the chair that she was instructed to deliver on April 22 and 24, 2024. She provided a copy of the April 18, 2024 e-mail directive from J.G. instructing her to deliver the chair to the Roanoke and Norfolk airports on April 22 and 24, 2024.

In a statement dated August 9, 2024 appellant reiterated that the only verbal instructions she received pertaining to the delivery of the office chairs was the time to depart Charlottesville for Norfolk. She confirmed that, at the time of the injury, she was assigned administrative duties from February 21 through July 3, 2024, and was not working as a transportation security officer. Appellant maintained that she received no verbal or written instructions prohibiting her from unloading the chair and contended that she was being conscientious in removing the chair so that she could return to work in a timely manner. 3

By decision dated November 25, 2024, OWCP’s hearing representative set aside the July 29, 2024 decision and remanded the case for further development. The hearing representative requested that OWCP obtain additional information from the employing establishment addressing whether appellant intentionally disobeyed orders, or if there was a pattern of willful misconduct on appellant’s part. OWCP was further instructed to request that a supervisor or knowledgeable official provide a statement stating how, when, and the number of times and manner in which the employee and coworkers were informed of the task/order in question, describ ing how the order was enforced, and noting what disciplinary action was taken against appellant and other coworkers for prior instances when a task was not completed. The hearing representative also requested that OWCP obtain clarification from appellant as to how she was injured and what specific action(s) she was taking, or furniture she was moving, when injured. Following any additional further development deemed necessary, OWCP was instructed to issue a de novo decision.

On December 14, 2024, appellant provided a detailed explanation of how she injured her shoulder and neck when removing a used office chair from a government vehicle on April 22, 2024. She reiterated that the chair was located in the back of the vehicle, placed toward the back of the truck bed, resting against the rear passenger bench seat. Appellant noted that in front of the office chair were several auto safety kits and boxes. She reached far back in the vehicle to retrieve the office chair, which weighed approximately 38 pounds. Appellant noted that she had never-before been assigned to drive and deliver furniture.

In a statement dated January 23, 2025, J.G. indicated that on April 18, 2024 he provided written direction to appellant advising her that the Roanoke officers would unload the chair from the government vehicle. He related that on April 22, 2024, directly before appellant left for Roanoke, she was given a verbal direction that the Roanoke officers would unload the chair from the vehicle. J.G. noted that since appellant was given written direction and verbally reminded of the direction approximately two hours before it took place, she knew or should have known that she was not to unload the chair. He noted that no disciplinary action was taken against appellant.

By de novo decision dated February 5, 2025, OWCP found that appellant had established that the April 22, 2024 incident occurred, as alleged, and that a medical condition had been

3
Appellant submitted a copy of a performance improvement plan (PIP) dated February 21, 2024, which indicated that she would be performing administrative duties.

4 diagnosed in connection with the accepted employment incident. However, it denied her claim, finding that she was not in the performance of duty at the time of the incident, because the evidence of record established willful misconduct by her for ignoring verbal and written instructions from her manager. Thus, OWCP found that the incident did not arise in the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors as defined by FECA.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA 4 has the burden of proof to establish the essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time limitation of FECA, 5 that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury. 6 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim, regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease. 7

The Board has interpreted the phrase “sustained while in the performance of duty” to be the equivalent of the coverage formula commonly found in workers’ compensation laws, namely, arising out of and in the course of employment. 8 The phrase “in the course of employment” relates to the elements of time, place, and work activity.9 To arise in the course of employment, an injury must occur at a time when the employee may reasonably be stated to be engaged in his or her master’s business, at a place when he or she may reasonably be expected to be in connection with his or her employment, and while he or she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of employment, or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 10

4
Supra note 2.
5
F.H., Docket No. 18-0869 (issued January 29, 2020); J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989). 6 L.C., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988). 7 P.A., Docket No. 18-0559 (issued January 29, 2020); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990). 8 This construction makes the statute effective in those situations generally recognized as properly within the scope of workers’ compensation law. D.T., Docket No. 19-1486 (issued January 17, 2020); Bernard D. Blum, 1 ECAB 1 (1947). 9 R.E., Docket No. 18-0515 (issued February 18, 2020); J.G., Docket No. 17-0747 (issued May 14, 2018).
10
M.T., Docket No. 19-1546 (issued March 5, 2020); see J.B., Docket No. 17-0378 (issued December 22, 2017).

5
Section 8102(a)(1) of FECA provides:

“The United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty, unless the injury or death is --

(1) caused by willful misconduct of the employee.”11

The Board has defined willful misconduct as deliberate conduct involving premeditation, obstinacy, or intentional wrongdoing with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or conduct that is in wanton or reckless disregard of probable injurious consequences. 12 The allegation of willful misconduct is an affirmative defense, which OWCP must invoke in the original adjudication of the claim, 13 and OWCP has the burden to prove such a defense.

With respect to the affirmative defense of willful misconduct, OWCP’s procedures provide:

“The question of willful misconduct arises where at the time of the injury the employee was violating a safety rule, disobeying other orders of the employer, or violating a law. Safety rules have been promulgated for the protection of the worker -- not the employer -- and, for this reason, simple negligent disregard of such rules is not enough to deprive a worker or the worker’s dependents of any compensation rights. All employees are subject to the orders and directives of their employers in respect to what they may do, how they may do certain things, the place or places where they may work or go, or when they may or shall do certain things.
Disobedience of such orders may destroy the right to compensation only if the disobedience is deliberate and intentional as distinguished from careless and heedless.”14

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic incident in the performance of duty on April 22, 2024, as alleged.

OWCP accepted, and the evidence supports, that appellant sustained strain of left muscles of the shoulder, spasm of the cervical paraspinous muscles, and strain of the neck muscles as a result of an April 22, 2024 incident.

The employing establishment controverted the claim asserting that appellant’s injury was the result of willful misconduct. When asserting an affirmative defense in denying a claim, the 11 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a)(1).
12
I.A., Docket No. 15-1913 (issued July 20, 2016); W.S., Docket No. 15-1271 (issued October 5, 2015).
13
See M.D., Docket No.19-0841 (issued December 2, 2020); S.M., Docket No. 18-1574 (issued March 27, 2019); see also Bruce Wright, 43 ECAB 284, 295 (1991).
14
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.14 (September 1995).

6 defense must be invoked in the original adjudication of the claim, and the employing establishment has the burden to prove such a defense. 15 The evidence required to establish this defense must be reliable, probative, and substantial. 16

The Board finds that the evidence submitted fails to establish that appellant’s actions constituted willful misconduct. During the incident appellant was performing, her assigned duties and had no intent to deliberately and intentionally violate a safety rule, disobey other orders of the employer, or violate the law. In an e-mail dated April 18, 2024, appellant’s supervisor, J.G. explained that appellant would be delivering a chair to Roanoke Airport on Monday. She was to park in front of the airport and call R.T, a manager. Help would then be sent out to unload the chair. However, the record reflects that J.G. did not instruct verbally nor in writing that she was not to unload the chair. J.G. merely stated that “help would then be sent out to unload the chair.” There was no specific prohibition against unloading the chair. As noted above, all employees are subject to the orders and directives of their employers, and disobedience of such orders may preclude the right to compensation only if the disobedience is deliberate and intentional, as distinguished from careless and heedless.17 Thus, the Board finds the affirmative defense of willful misconduct is denied.

The Board further finds that appellant’s injury occurred while in the performance of duty as it occurred at a time and place where she was reasonably expected to be, and she was reasonably fulfilling the employment duties she had been assigned. 18 The statements of record confirmed that she was instructed to travel to this location. The injury occurred when she was reaching and pulling the chair from the back of the truck bed toward the rear door. An employee’s statement that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given manner is of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong or persuasive evidence. 19

As the evidence of record establishes that the claimed injury occurred in the performance of duty, thus the issue of causal relationship between the accepted employment incident and the diagnosed conditions must be considered by OWCP. 20

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has established a traumatic incident in the performance of duty on April 22, 2024, as alleged.

15
See B.P., Docket No. 17-0580 (issued March 12, 2018).
16
See A.S., Docket No. 10-0514 (issued April 12, 2011).
17
Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.14 (September 1995).
18
See M.D., Docket No.19-0841 (issued December 2, 2020); S.M., Docket No. 18-1574 (issued March 27, 2019); see also Bruce Wright, 43 ECAB 284, 295 (1991).
19
See A.C., Docket No. 18-1567 (issued April 9, 2019); Gregory J. Reser, 57 ECAB 277 (2005).
20
A.G., Docket No. 18-1560 (issued July 22, 2020).

7
ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 5, 2025 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs is reversed.

Issued: March 14, 2025
Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

8